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Abstract 
This thesis examines the experiences of British soldiers and sailors during Britain’s 
military intervention in Egypt between 1798 and 1801. The operations which took 
place in these years have been examined in the literature from strategic and 
geopolitical perspectives, but they have not been appreciated in the context of travel 
writing or orientalism. This thesis considers whether the British armed forces were 
contributors to orientalism. Although military personnel were not ordinary travel 
writers or orientalists, they were undoubtedly influenced by popular travel and 
orientalist literature. Their different experiences produced accounts that showed a 
distinctive blend of military narrative, travelogue and orientalist analysis, which has 
not received the attention deserved.  
 
Chapter one emphasizes the diversity of British military views about the Egyptian 
landscape and climate, and highlights the distinctiveness of these views in comparison 
to civilian travellers. Chapter two examines the variety of military responses to objects 
and structures of antiquity in Egypt. It argues that the pursuit of antiquarianism was 
not at odds with the military occupation, and highlights the motivations behind the 
military collection of antiquities. Chapter three explores the ways in which British 
servicemen perceived their identity and a sense of difference from Near Eastern 
culture as they described encounters with the local peoples. It argues that military 
writing in Egypt reflects the confused and ever-changing understandings of different 
races and societies in this period. Chapters four and five consider the British response 
to the military bodies encountered in Egypt - the Ottomans and the Mamluks - whose 
lack of western characteristics was central to the British appraisal of them. This 
resulted in contradictory views amongst the British, who admired their exoticism but 
condemned the seemingly corrupt and backward state of their society.  
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Introduction 
 
We were now upon Scripture ground; we had come 
from a distant island of the sea to the country of the 
proud Pharaohs to carry on war where Nebuchadnezzar 
and Alexander the Great, Caesar, and other great 
warriors had put armies in motion.1 
 
Written by Daniel Nicol, a sergeant in the 92nd Gordon Highlanders, as he described 
Egypt’s Mediterranean coast near Alexandria, this passage encapsulates many 
elements of the British soldier’s experience in the Egyptian campaign in 1801. Nicol 
was acutely aware of Egypt’s biblical importance, and he expressed excitement at his 
proximity to the grand civilizations and great figures of antiquity. His experiences 
were framed by comparisons to his own nation, “a distant island of the sea”. Britain’s 
military performance in Egypt was to be compared with the achievements of those 
from antiquity. Nicol’s view of the history and religion of Egypt had a martial 
inflection, but his discussion of such topics was inspired by, and draws parallels with, 
the writings of civilian travellers and orientalists.  
 
Nicol’s quotation highlights that there was much more to soldiering in the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars than the experience of battle, but these 
experiences have, until recently, tended to be neglected by military and social histories 
of Britain in this period. As Kevin Linch and Matthew McCormack note in a recent 
article published for the bicentenary of the Battle of Waterloo, military history can 
often seem depersonalized, as it concentrates on grand strategy and battlefield tactics, 
or the importance of institutions and technology for the war effort. Although military 
history has at times engaged with the perspective of the common soldier, it has been 
primarily concerned with group psychology and morale and ascertaining the combat 
effectiveness of the men, rather than assessing their individual experiences.2 This is 
                                                        
1 Daniel Nicol, Sergeant Nicol: The Experiences of a Gordon Highlander During the Napoleonic 
Wars in Egypt, the Peninsula and France (Milton Keynes: Lenaur, 2007, repr.), 45.  
2  Kevin Linch and Matthew McCormack, ‘Wellington’s Men: The British Soldier of the Napoleonic 
Wars’, History Compass 13, no.6, (2015): 288-296.  
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certainly the case for the British campaign in Egypt. The two most detailed works on 
the campaign, Edward Ingram’s series of four articles titled ‘The Geopolitics of the 
First British Expedition to Egypt’ and Piers Mackesy’s British Victory in Egypt, 
address the geopolitical history and operational history of the campaign respectively.3 
In the first of his four articles, Ingram argues that the Egyptian campaign in 1801 was 
the outcome of a cabinet crisis in September and October 1800. It was the climax of 
an ongoing debate that began in June 1798 when Napoleon landed at Alexandria at 
the head of 40,000 men. Ingram describes the frustrating stalemate between two 
parties in cabinet: those who supported a continuation of military efforts against 
France on the European continent, and those who thought Britain’s limited manpower 
should be dedicated to the defence of India. 4 
 
The initial alarmed reaction at the threat of the French occupation to India quickly 
dissipated when on 1 August 1798, a British naval squadron under Horatio Nelson 
annihilated the French fleet that had escorted Napoleon to Egypt at the Battle of the 
Nile. Napoleon and his army were left stranded. On hearing the news, the Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Grenville, wrote of his certainty that the French garrison would rot 
away through disease and homesickness.5  Subsequent events reinforced this view. In 
the spring of 1799, Napoleon’s advance into Israel (then Syria) was halted at the walls 
of Acre, and forced into retreat. By August 1799, Napoleon had abandoned his army 
and returned to France. Contrary to expectations however, the French garrison in 
Egypt did not disintegrate, and after the collapse of the Second Coalition which made 
                                                        
3 Edward Ingram, ‘The Geopolitics of the first British expedition to Egypt –I: the cabinet crisis of 
September 1800’, Middle Eastern Studies 30, no.3 (1994): 435-460; Edward Ingram, ‘The 
Geopolitics of the first British expedition to Egypt – II: The Mediterranean Campaign, 1800-1’, 
Middle Eastern Studies 30, no.4 (1994): 699-723; Edward Ingram, ‘The Geopolitics of the First 
British Expedition to Egypt – III: The Red Sea Campaign, 1800-1’, Middles Eastern Studies 31, no.1 
(1995): 146-169; Edward Ingram, ‘The Geopolitics of the First British Expedition to Egypt – IV: 
Occupation and Withdrawal, 1801-3’, Middle Eastern Studies 31, no.2 (1995): 317-346; Piers 
Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, The End of Napoleon’s Conquest (London: Tauris Parke 
Paperbacks repr., 2010). 
4 Ingram, ‘Geopolitics – cabinet crisis’, 435-460.  
5 Grenville to Rufus King, 4 October 1798, The Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue, esq., Preserved at 
Dropmore, ed. John Fortescue (London: The Historical Manuscripts Commission, 1892-1910), vol. 
4, 334-335. 
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peace negotiations inevitable, Britain was increasingly concerned with their removal. 
Henry Dundas, the secretary for war, had repeatedly attempted to persuade the cabinet 
to send an expeditionary force to Egypt. Finally, on 3 October 1800 he got his way. 
The British could not leave India permanently endangered by the French control of 
Egypt. Ingram argues the episode revealed much about British war aims: when defeat 
seemed imminent in Europe, the defence of the Indian empire took precedence over 
continental commitments. 6 
 
In his second and third articles, Ingram outlines the progress of the expedition itself. 
He portrays the campaign as a race against time as the British sought to defeat the 
French before the cabinet at home agreed to less favourable peace terms. Orders were 
dispatched for two separate armies to converge on Egypt and force a French surrender.  
In March 1801, just over 17,000 men landed at Aboukir Bay under the command of 
General Ralph Abercromby.  A second force of 8,000 men under General David Baird 
sailed from Bombay in January 1801 and arrived at Kossier, on the Egyptian coast of 
the Red Sea, in May. From there, they marched across the desert to the Nile, and then 
sailed downstream to Cairo. The two forces were to coordinate their advance with an 
Ottoman army advancing on Cairo from Jaffa. Ingram highlights the ridiculousness 
of this ambitious pincer movement, citing the impossibility of separate armies 
synchronizing their movements hundreds if not thousands of miles apart from one 
another. The timetable was laid down precisely and made no allowance for delays.7  
 
Piers Mackesy approaches the campaign from a different perspective. His detailed 
operational narrative describes the British victory as one against the odds, and a 
critical moment for the British army. Outnumbered, ill-equipped and led by the aging 
general Abercromby, who possessed a dubious military record and even worse eye-
sight, the British army decisively defeated Napoleon’s veterans for the first time in 
the Revolutionary wars. Although the victory was a small one, not to be compared 
with the major battles on the European continent, nor won quickly enough to influence 
peace negotiations, it did appear to ensure the safety of the British Empire, and proved 
                                                        
6 Ingram, ‘Geopolitics – cabinet crisis’, 435.  
7 See: Ingram, ‘Geopolitics - Mediterranean Campaign, 1800-1’, 699-723; Ingram, ‘Geopolitics -Red 
Sea Campaign, 1800-1’, 146-169.  
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a turning point in the reputation of the British army. Since the Seven Years War, the 
army had known nothing but failure. Expelled from the American colonies after the 
War of Independence, driven out of the Low Countries by the Revolutionary armies 
in 1793-4, British forces had been obliterated by yellow fever and malaria during an 
inconclusive campaign in the West Indies. The 24 months prior to the Egyptian 
expedition added to these disappointments. In autumn 1799, a second campaign in 
Holland ended in failure. In 1800, three separate amphibious assaults were aborted at 
the last minute, at Belle Ile in June, the Spanish naval base at Ferrol in August, and at 
Cadiz in October. By 1801, the reputation of the British army had plummeted to 
arguably its lowest ever depth. It had become, said Lord Cornwallis, “the scorn and 
laughing stock of friends and foes.”8 Lady Holland’s fashionable sneer “How 
harmless an English military force is against an enemy in battle array” validated 
Cornwallis’ statement.9 The Egyptian campaign provided the model for the victorious 
army of the Peninsular War, which, by 1815, was envied throughout Europe. Much 
of the success Mackesy attributes to Abercromby. Although not the greatest battlefield 
commander, he prepared his men thoroughly for the campaign through rigorous 
planning and training. This preparation paid dividends in the landing on the Aboukir 
peninsula on 8 March, and in the victory at the battle of Alexandria on 21 March. 
Abercromby died from wounds he received a week after the battle, but he had struck 
the decisive blow against French morale.10 After their defeat at Alexandria, the 
homesick French were unable to mount a vigorous defence. Cairo surrendered to 
Anglo-Ottoman forces in July, followed by Alexandria in September.  
 
This focus on the military history of the British campaign in Egypt has left other 
historical approaches neglected. This has not been the case for the French campaign. 
Juan Cole for instance, examines French encounters with Egyptian culture, its ancient 
antiquities and the climate of the country. He frames these experiences as the first 
modern attempt to invade the Arab world, which invented and crystallized the rhetoric 
                                                        
8 Lord Cornwallis, Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis, ed. Charles Ross, 
(London: 1859), vol.3, 300, quoted in Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, 3.  
9 Elizabeth Lady Holland, Journal of Elizabeth, Lady Holland (1791-1811) (London: 1908), vol.2, 
62, quoted in Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, 3. 
10 Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt.  
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of liberal imperialism.11 Others have studied the team of 167 hand-picked ‘savants’ 
who accompanied the French forces, and their role in catalysing the ‘Egyptomania’ 
which took hold in France, and to some extent in Britain, in the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century.12 By contrast, the British campaign has often been dismissed as a 
footnote to the French occupation. It has been assumed that the significance of the 
operation lay solely in bringing about an ignominious end to Napoleon’s ambitions in 
the Middle East. Perhaps one reason for this is that the British campaign lacked the 
romantic charm of the French occupation. They brought no ‘savants’ with them and 
possessed a single primary objective: to expel the French from Egypt. Added to this, 
the political and strategic consequences for Britain were mostly short term. The 
campaign played a significant role during the ongoing peace negotiations, yet 
historians have assumed its repercussions went no further once hostilities between 
Britain and France resumed in 1803. The campaign itself was also very short: begun 
in March 1801, the British secured a French capitulation by the end of September.  
However, by British standards of the time, the campaign was a major operation: 
22,000 troops landed in Egypt.  It was rare for such large numbers of military 
personnel from a wide range of nations – England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland, Corsica, 
Menorca, India, Ceylon and even France – to serve together in the same army in a 
foreign country.13 Certainly, in the eyes of Britons at home, the campaign was an 
important victory. In a review of Lt.-Col. Sir Robert Thomas Wilson’s History of the 
British Expedition to Egypt, the Annual Register declared:  
 
There is no subject in the annals of English history 
which more deserves the attention of a British reader, 
                                                        
11 Juan Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt: Invading the Middle East (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007). 
12 See: Paul Strathern, Napoleon in Egypt, ‘The Greatest Glory’ (London: Vintage, 2008); Diego 
Saglia, ‘Consuming Egypt: Appropriation and the Cultural Modalities of Romantic Luxury’, 
Nineteenth Century Contexts: An Interdisciplinary Journal 24, no.3 (2002): 317-332; Rashad 
Rushdy, The Lure of Egypt for English Travel Writers during the Nineteenth Century (Cairo: Anglo-
Egyptian Bookshop, 1953); Nina Burleigh, Mirage, Napoleon’s Scientists and the Unveiling of Egypt 
(New York: Harper Collins, 2007). 
13 Paul Fox & Fergus Robson, British and French Soldiers in Egypt and in the Levant, 1798—1918. 
Introductory Text to the Exhibition of www.mwme.eu (2015), 
URL: http://www.mwme.eu/essays/index.html. 
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than this ever memorable expedition, which completely 
defeated the boldest project of ambition Bonaparte had 
ever conceived, and at the same time recovered and 
supported the ancient character of the British army, 
which had perhaps been somewhat clouded in the 
course of the last war by ill success on the continent.14 
 
Similar views were expressed elsewhere. The Monthly Review stated that “Though 
the tale of glory respecting the Egyptian expedition has been so frequently repeated, 
we still dwell on it without satiety…”15  
 
Orientalism and identities 
Most significantly, the British and French campaigns in Egypt have been often 
overlooked by scholars of orientalism. One of the most significant works to date on 
the relationship between the military and orientalism has been written by Patrick 
Porter, who examines the ‘western’ practice of comparing ‘eastern’ and ‘western’ 
militaries. Porter emphasizes that war is a potent site of orientalism, and tracks 
‘western’ visions of ‘eastern’ warfare from antiquity to the present.16 He highlights 
the distinctiveness of military views of the ‘east’, and argues that war was a crucial 
medium through which the calibre of one’s own and other civilizations was judged. 
In battle, cultural differences tended to dissolve and soldiers developed affinities with 
one another, irrespective of their background. Although Porter addresses a broad 
period, he considers military orientalism a modern phenomenon, and tailors his 
conclusions towards how ‘eastern’ warriors have shaped ‘western’ armies in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. There is little comment on how the image of 
‘eastern’ warriors had an impact on ‘western’ forces in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century.  
                                                        
14 Annual Register or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature. For the Year 1803. review of History 
of the British Expedition to Egypt, by Robert Thomas Wilson. 44 (1805): 855.  
15 Monthly Review; or Literary Journal. review of Journal of the Late Campaign in Egypt…, by Thomas 
Walsh. 41 (May – August 1803): 127. See also: Annual Review and History of Literature. review of 
History of the British Expedition to Egypt, by Robert Thomas Wilson. 1 (1803): 311-320.   
16 Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes (London: Hurst & 
Company, 2009), 2-3, 33-34.  
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Aside from Porter’s admirable contribution, work on this subject is scarce because, 
despite the recent popularity of studies of orientalism, little work has been done on 
the relationship between orientalism and the military. The vast body of scholarship 
relating to orientalism produced in the past forty years, has relegated war largely to 
the periphery. According to historian Douglas Peers, there are several reasons for this, 
including what he describes as the anti-intellectual traditions of military history and 
the anti-military traditions of intellectual history.17 One could argue that the current 
state of orientalist scholarship has been defined largely by Edward Said’s 
Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. First published in 1978, Said’s book 
is 40 years old, yet it remains difficult to discuss the subject of orientalism without 
reference to it. Said argued, controversially, that orientalism is inextricably tied to the 
imperialist societies that produced it, which makes much orientalist work inherently 
political and servile to power. This argument bitterly divided oriental scholars. Since 
1978, traditional orientalists such as Albert Hourani, Robert Irwin and Bernard Lewis, 
have all focused primarily on an intellectual history of orientalism to oppose Said’s 
views.18 
 
For Said, the starting point for orientalism was the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 
1798. He argues that it stimulated the growing interest in the whole field of 
scholarship in the ‘east’. Travellers, soldiers, administrators, artists and poets began 
to collaborate, consciously or not, in a vast undertaking of geopolitical espionage. 
This argument has attracted great criticism, yet it is difficult to find fault with one 
fundamental point made by Said – that the French invasion brought about the birth of 
                                                        
17 Douglas M. Peers, ‘Colonial Knowledge and the Military in India 1780-1860’, The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 33, no.2 (2005): 162, 166-169. 
18 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin Books, 1978, 
repr. 1995), 42, 80-89; Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991); Robert Irwin, For Lust of Knowing: The Orientalists and their Enemies 
(London: Penguin Books, 2006); Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 99-118. For an overview of the impact of Edward Said’s Orientalism on orientalist 
literature, see: John Mackenzie, Orientalism History, theory and the arts (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1995); A. L. Macfie, ‘Introduction’, in Orientalism: A Reader, ed. A. L. Macfie 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 1-10.   
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modern orientalism.19 Certainly there are grounds to justify this assertion: the British 
and French campaigns enabled the work of prominent orientalists and travellers who 
visited Egypt to reach a wider audience in Britain than ever before.20 Yet the 
importance of this statement has often gone unnoticed amidst the fierce debates 
surrounding Said’s work, and the British campaign has yet to be examined with regard 
to its role in the development of modern orientalist scholarship.21 
 
Although Said remains an influential figure in this field of literature, there have been 
other important contributions published in more recent decades. Aslı Çırakman 
provides one of the best examples, in her research on European attitudes towards the 
Ottoman Empire between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. She argues that once 
evidence of Ottoman decline emerged in the mid-eighteenth century, European 
attitudes towards the Ottomans drastically changed. Western admiration and fear that 
had accompanied Ottoman expansion into Eastern Europe from the fifteenth to 
seventeenth centuries, was replaced by the concept of oriental despotism. This term 
implied a static and slavish society, and a backward and corrupt government with 
arbitrary and ferocious rulers, who governed servile and timid subjects. Çırakman 
emphasizes the importance of Baron de Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws, published in 
1748, in formulating this eighteenth century definition of oriental despotism. 
Montesquieu argued that despotism was an exclusively oriental form of regime. His 
thesis was intended to provide a pretext for a critique and proposed reform of the 
French regime under which he lived, but his interpretation of oriental despotism 
became the landmark verdict on the nature of ‘Eastern’ societies, for generations of 
travel authors in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. According to 
Çırakman, it was common practice for later observers to filter all their experiences 
and observations through theories and abstractions that had been inspired by 
Montesquieu.22  As a result, popular travel authors such as William Eton, François 
                                                        
19 Said, Orientalism, 42, 80-89.  
20 Chen Tzoref-Ashkenazi, ‘Romantic Attitudes toward Oriental Despotism’, The Journal of Modern 
History, 85, no. 2 (2013): 288. 
21 See for example of recent of recent orientalist scholarship which has overlooked the importance of 
the Egyptian campaign: Urs App, The Birth of Orientalism (Oxford: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2010). 
22 Aslı Çırakman,. ‘From Tyranny to Despotism: The Enlightenment’s Unenlightened Image of the 
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Baron de Tott and the Comte de Volney, all shared Montesquieu’s core beliefs 
concerning ‘eastern’ despotism and decadence.23 By the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, the trend of denouncing  ‘oriental’ societies had become the norm among 
travel writers. Those who differed from this norm were noticeably less popular. 
William George Browne, who published a more sympathetic travel book in 1799, is 
one such example. He admired many aspects of eastern life, comparing it favourably 
with the west, which aroused some controversy, and his work was poorly received.24  
 
The concept of despotism has fascinated scholars who have debated the nature of its 
influence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Much of the current 
literature on the use of oriental despotism draws from the writing of travellers to the 
east, along with the occasional diplomat, but they rarely consider the writing of 
military personnel. Joan-Pau Rubiés for example, discusses whether the concept was 
pure fantasy, one that was developed to legitimize imperialism. Although much of 
what was written about the despotism of ‘oriental’ powers was ill-informed, Rubiés 
contends that Europeans were often genuinely concerned with understanding the 
‘east’, and developed empirical methods for studying the ‘orient’. As a consequence, 
she argues, oriental despotism was not a mental scheme that blinded Europeans to the 
perception of the true orient, but rather, a compelling tool for interpreting the 
information gathered about the orient.25 Michael Curtis considers the use of oriental 
despotism in less forgiving terms. He believes the concept was useful to European 
authors in three ways: firstly, as a mode for a straightforward denunciation of an 
eastern society; secondly, as a tool for supporting arguments for imperial control over 
                                                        
Turks’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 33, no.1, (2001): 55-59; Aslı Çırakman, “From the 
“Terror of the World” to the “Sick Man of Europe” European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society 
from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2002), 1-24; 106.  
23 William Eton, A Survey of the Turkish Empire (London: 1798); Francois Baron de Tott, Memoirs of 
Baron de Tott: Containing the State of the Turkish Empire and the Crimea during the late war with 
Russia, 2 vols (London: 1786): Constantin François de Chasseboeuf, Comte de Volney, Travels through 
Syria and Egypt, in the years 1783, 1784, and 1785, 2 vols (London: 1787).  
24 Richard Garnett, ‘Browne, William George (1768–1813)’, in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Accessed 10 August 2015, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/3710.  
25 Joan-Pau Rubiés, ‘Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism: Botero to Montesquieu’, London 
School of Economics and Political Science 9, no.1-2 (2005): 109, 113.  
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eastern regimes; and thirdly, as an implicit criticism of the writer’s own society.26 In 
his article discussing the use of oriental despotism among romantic writers, Chen 
Tzoref-Ashkenazi argues that almost every European Romantic author speaking of 
oriental despotism during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, was also 
thinking about Europe, and many of them were thinking primarily about Europe.27  
 
In many ways, one can argue that military writings on foreign lands could be markedly 
similar to civilian travel literature, and that these texts should be included in the 
discussion about oriental despotism, and orientalism more generally. Soldiers and 
sailors in Egypt were undoubtedly influenced by civilian literature, and the prevailing 
cultural values and fashions in Britain. Although literacy rates among some naval 
crews and regiments could be as low as forty per cent, there were ways in which the 
ideas and arguments of popular travel books could be widely circulated in military 
circles. Excerpts of bestsellers were printed in the form of broadsides and pamphlets28, 
newspapers often plundered travel accounts for information, publishing passages 
from such texts,29 and Paul Kaufmann suggests that the borrowing of travel books 
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from public libraries was also popular.30 Combined with the common practice of 
individuals reading newspapers and other literature aloud to their peers, one can safely 
assume that many soldiers and sailors were consumers of travel literature. Levant-
based travel books were certainly in fashion during this period – the half century 
between 1775 and 1825 witnessed the publication of an almost uninterrupted flow of 
travels, described as a torrent “reaching flood-tide proportions” by P.J. Marshall and 
Glyndwr Williams.31 According to Charles Batten, the reading public developed an 
insatiable appetite for these travels, which became one of the most widely read forms 
of literature, second only to novels and romances.32 An indication of soldiers’ interest 
in travel narratives can be found in their own writing. A number of military memoirs 
were directed towards audiences who had an interest in the exploits of gentlemanly 
travellers. They imitated the writing style of travel narratives and deliberately 
positioned their writing within the genre of travel literature. The basic structure of 
travel writing – departure, arrival, journey through foreign lands, and the return home 
– helped soldiers frame their own journeys, from home to the war zone and back again. 
Some even omitted military matters in favour of a more traditional travel narrative.33 
 
In spite of this, military servicemen lived in different circumstances and were subject 
to different pressures from civilians. During the British campaign in Egypt in 1801, a 
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militaristic form of thinking can be discerned in British servicemen’s writing about 
various topics, such as landscape, climate, disease, the collection of antiquities, and 
in their views of the ‘eastern’ inhabitants. For instance, soldiers looked at the 
landscape around them with a strategic eye, something that civilian travellers rarely 
addressed. Soldiers’ emotional responses to foreign lands could also be significantly 
different from their civilian contemporaries. On campaign, soldiers underwent a more 
intense and demanding physical and psychological experience than any civilian 
traveller. However, when not marching or fighting, soldiers spent a good deal of their 
time exploring the foreign environment. Many were aware of Egypt’s rich history, 
and were keen to visit the remains of ancient civilizations. Their interest in ancient 
antiquity was often expressed through collecting. Soldiers had always taken 
mementoes from campaigns, a process encouraged by civilian cultures of collecting.34 
Despite this, military servicemen in Egypt also developed a distinctive military 
appreciation for collecting: the objects they acquired were not only souvenirs but 
trophies of their victory in Egypt.  
 
When military servicemen described the people they encountered in Egypt, their 
views were heavily influenced by civilian travel literature. One might even argue that 
military views were, to some extent, pre-programmed by civilian travel authors, as 
many soldiers and sailors expressed opinions on ‘eastern’ people that were markedly 
similar to those of Montesquieu. However, the way in which British servicemen 
arrived at this judgement was different from civilian travellers. Due to the nature of 
their circumstances, many of the people that British servicemen encountered in Egypt 
had some military role. Therefore, martial ability and performance in combat were 
vital elements in British servicemen’s appraisals, and could even supplant popular 
stereotypes. This is most apparent in British attitudes towards the Mamluks, the 
former rulers of Egypt. They were seen as oriental despots by civilian travellers, and 
initially by many of the soldiers on campaign in Egypt. Yet some soldiers began to 
accept Mamluk culture when they realized the strategic value of Mamluk cavalry. The 
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1808-1813’, in Civilians and War in Europe 1618-1815, ed. Erica Charters, Eve Rosenhaft and 
Hannah Smith (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 220. 
 20 
visual appearance of the Mamluks was also admired by the British, who came to 
regard them as culturally predisposed to war.   
 
The accounts of soldiers and sailors during the Egyptian campaign constitute a 
distinctive mix of military narrative, travelogue and orientalist analysis and have not 
received the attention they deserve. Over the past decade, a range of histories have 
been published on the British soldier during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars 
that have shed some light on the travel experience of military personnel. The focus of 
these historians has concentrated primarily on soldiers either in Britain or on 
campaign in the Peninsular wars. Gavin Daly has been one of the most active 
historians in this field. He explores how soldiers in the Iberian Peninsula interacted 
with the local environment, its culture, and the Spanish and Portuguese inhabitants. 
He emphasizes that soldiers spent very little of their time in a theatre of war actually 
fighting, and many were as concerned with what happened off the battlefield as on it. 
The Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, which involved tens of thousands of young 
British men being sent abroad to fight, can be understood as an unprecedented 
experience of mass collective travel. Daly highlights the varied and distinctive ways 
in which soldiers responded to the landscape, the climate, their living conditions, the 
local civilization and the role of women in the Peninsula. Although Daly concedes 
that much of the soldiers’ character was forged by their battlefield experiences, they 
were much more than just fighting men whose interests and identities were solely 
bound to their military uniforms.35 Edward Coss’ book All for the King’s Shilling 
similarly focuses on the Peninsula. He studies the day-to-day campaigning experience 
of the British army during the Peninsular War. His impressive study of the diet, living 
conditions and the social environment of the soldiers, provides an insight into their 
daily lives and the strategies they developed to cope with the stress of war.  Poorly 
fed, often ill-equipped and neglected, the soldiers survived by supporting and fighting 
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for one another.36 Jennine Hurl-Eamon considers soldiers’ sex lives, both at home and 
on campaign. She scrutinizes marriage in the British army, and how soldiers perceived 
their duties, which took them overseas and far from their sweethearts. When on 
campaign, many of these men continued to remember and identify with their domestic 
ties.  In a recent article, Hurl-Eamon has examined officers’ accounts of Portuguese 
nuns and convents in Peninsular war memoirs. She suggests that descriptions of 
convents shed light on the authors’ ideas on masculinity, and revealed the influence 
of gothic, erotic, romantic and travel literature on military life writing.37  
 
Other works, such as Neil Ramsey’s Military Memoirs, offer an overview of the glut 
of military autobiographies published in the years following the Napoleonic wars. He 
situates these works in the context of Romantic literary culture, as they were infused 
with the language of sensibility and detailed the horrors of war in a way that could be 
threatening to the establishment. Ramsey convincingly argues that military 
autobiographies profoundly shaped nineteenth-century Britain’s understanding of war 
as Romantic adventure, establishing images of the nation's middle-class soldier heroes 
that would be of enduring significance through the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.38 Catriona Kennedy, in her broad survey of the writings of British 
combatants throughout the wars, is one of the few who has considered the campaign 
in Egypt, albeit briefly. She argues that the officers’ experience of Egypt was shaped 
by their knowledge of classical history and a scholarly interest in the monuments of 
Ancient Egypt. By contrast, the experience of the common ranks was shaped primarily 
by the Bible. The more devout ranks were excited by the prospect of seeing the lands 
described in the Old Testament, and for some of these men, the expedition became a 
means of testing the authority of the biblical account. However, due to the broad focus 
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of Kennedy’s work, the number of pages devoted to the experiences of soldiers in 
Egypt is limited. 39 
 
One can see from this literature a strong focus on the experiences of soldiers in the 
Peninsular war. Britain’s involvement in the Iberian Peninsula was undoubtedly the 
army’s longest and most significant campaign during the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic wars, yet the Spanish and Portuguese inhabitants were far from the only 
foreign people British forces encountered throughout this conflict. To attain a more 
rounded picture of the British army’s attitude to foreign peoples, one must look 
beyond the Iberian Peninsula, beyond Europe. Other operations deserve further 
investigation. This thesis argues that the most deserving of these is Britain’s military 
intervention in Egypt between 1798 and 1801, which peaked during the 1801 
Egyptian campaign. The primary objective of this thesis is to emphasize the 
distinctiveness of accounts by British soldiers and sailors in Egypt during this 
campaign, and to consider whether they constitute a distinctive form of military 
orientalism.  
 
At present, the most detailed study of the British army’s encounters and attitudes 
towards Egypt can be found in the essays produced by the collaborative research 
project “Making War, Mapping Europe: Militarized Cultural Encounters, 1792-
1920”, which concluded in September 2016. Through a series of interlocking case-
studies focusing on encounters between Western European armies and the peoples 
and cultures of Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East, the project explores 
the distinctive characteristics of militarized cultural encounters and how they have 
shaped European identity and perceptions of ‘self’. Several of the essays discuss the 
British and French campaigns in Egypt: Catriona Kennedy considers the British 
understanding, experience and representation of Egypt’s iconic topography during the 
campaign. She argues that the absence of reliable geographical knowledge of Egypt 
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forced the soldiers to draw from a broad range of military, historical and religious 
knowledge in an attempt to make the unfamiliar land intelligible.40 In other essays, 
Fergus Robson examines French soldiers’ encounters with Egyptian architecture, 
their perceptions of Egyptian hygiene, and how they interacted with Egyptian 
women.41 While these essays provide a good overview which spotlights the 
distinctiveness of militarized cultural encounters, they lack the depth of an extended 
analysis.  
 
Historians who have referred to the British campaign in Egypt have done so primarily 
when examining broader cultures of collecting. Maya Jasanoff, for example, has 
delved into the stories behind artefact collection on imperial frontiers. Her study of 
European collectors in India and Egypt reveals collecting to be a highly complex 
process, motivated by a combination of factors, such as imperial rivalry, a genuine 
interest in antiquity, the prospect of great financial reward, and the opportunity for the 
collector to refashion their self-image and social status. She argues cogently that the 
ill-tutored mania of collectors on imperial frontiers often resembled the formation of 
the British Empire itself. This was not the planned seizure of distant lands or the 
merciless exploitation of capital, but the piecemeal and disorganized acquisition of 
territory that only developed the features of a distinct imperial pattern with the benefit 
of hindsight. Jasanoff’s revisionist history is far removed from the imperial 
triumphalism of Niall Ferguson; she provides a more nuanced explanation of colonial 
development, uncovering the distorted growth of empire brought about by the conflict 
between Britain and France. The central part of her book concerns Anglo-French 
                                                        
40 Catriona Kennedy, ‘Military topographies: the British army on the Egyptian coast, 1801’, Text for 
the Exhibition of www.mwme.eu (2015), Accessed 13 April 2017, 
URL: http://www.mwme.eu/essays/index.html. 
41 Fergus Robson, ‘French Soldiers encounter European and Arabic Architecture’, Text for the 
Exhibition of www.mwme.eu, (2015), Accessed 13 April 2017, 
URL: http://www.mwme.eu/essays/index.html;  Fergus Robson, ‘Hygiene and Pollution: French 
soldiers gaze upon dirt, dust and disease’, Text for the Exhibition of www.mwme.eu (2015), 
Accessed 13 April 2017, URL: http://www.mwme.eu/essays/index.html; Fergus Robson, ‘French 
Soldiers’ Gaze upon Italian and Egyptian Women: Gender, Masculinity and Sexuality in Militarised 
Cultural Encounters’, Text for the Exhibition of www.mwme.eu (2015), Accessed 13 April 2017, 
URL: http://www.mwme.eu/essays/index.html.  
 24 
clashes on imperial frontiers in the 1790s, and she argues that they introduced an era 
of territorial collecting that endowed Britain with a heightened sense of imperial 
purpose.42 The relationship between collecting and imperialism has been closely 
studied more recently by Holger Hoock. He demonstrates how Britons appropriated 
objects from ancient cultures in the Mediterranean, the Near East, and India, as tools 
with which to fight international wars of culture and prestige.43 
 
Generally, historians have tended to focus on the antiquarian interests of British 
officials in Egypt in the decades that followed the Egyptian campaign, rather than 
during it. Their work has focused on prominent archaeologists and Egyptologists of 
this era, such as Giovanni Belzoni, Bernardino Drovetti and Henry Salt.44 This neglect 
is surprising as the items that the British seized from the French after the latter’s 
capitulation at Alexandria, constituted one of the largest hauls of eastern artefacts ever 
seen, and soon filled the British Museum. When not fighting or marching in Egypt, 
soldiers often undertook recreational tours to famous Ancient Egyptian sites, such as 
the Pyramid complex at Giza, Pompey’s Pillar at Alexandria, or the massive temple 
at Dendera. In the months the British forces spent in the vicinity of Alexandria, they 
marched, slept and fought surrounded by ruins and fragments of ancient structures 
and objects, at times even using them to create breastworks and redoubts. This 
experience provoked an antiquarian enthusiasm among some of the soldiers. Colonel 
Hilgrove Tomkyns Turner is one of the best examples of this. He remained in Egypt 
at his own expense long after his regiment had left the country, to serve in an 
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antiquarian capacity. After his return to Britain, he attempted to become a trustee of 
the British Museum.45 
 
Although historians have referred to soldiers in Egypt in the context of collecting, 
they have rarely done so with regard to orientalism. Marching through what they 
considered a foreign, ‘eastern’ landscape, it is clear that British servicemen in Egypt 
were producers of orientalist ‘knowledge’, just like civilian travellers. A second 
objective of this thesis, is to discuss whether British military servicemen perceived 
the people they encountered in Egypt in terms of a homogenised view of the ‘East’. 
Certainly one can discern similar patterns in the attitudes of the British military 
servicemen towards the people they encountered in Egypt, and those they encountered 
in British India. In particular, it was common in both theatres for soldiers to write 
about the organization and performance of the native military bodies. Douglas Peers 
has examined perceptions of military performance in India, and claims it became one 
of the key characteristics used to distinguish between Britons, Muslims and Hindus. 
A recurring theme, he argues, was the juxtaposition of British military order against 
Indian disorder. Such views encouraged hegemonic orientalist pretensions. Peers’ 
argument can be applied to Egypt, as British soldiers and sailors repeatedly 
emphasized the contrast between the order and discipline of the British military 
system, and the chaotic disorderliness of the allied Ottoman forces.46 Although the 
British military were generally disdainful towards large portions of the Indian and 
Egyptian population, they admired a small minority who were thought to possess 
martial traits. Punjabi Sikhs and Nepalese Ghurkhas in India, and the Mamluks in 
Egypt, were praised in similar terms by the British. Each of these groups were thought 
of as a race of brave, fearsome warriors, bred for war. By examining British 
intervention in Egypt in this way, and comparing it with colonial India, one can see 
that certain trends and concepts in British imperialism were being applied not only in 
India, but more generally towards non-European peoples. 
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For most British military personnel, their service in Egypt was brief and this fact 
provides an opportunity for further analysis. A third objective of this thesis is to 
determine how far Britain’s mental approach to, and representation of, this short 
campaign paralleled that of longer term colonial projects in British India and the West 
Indies. Similarities can be discerned in a variety of fields.  Picturesque tourism was a 
popular pastime among officer circles, and the formulaic approach to picturesque 
painting and literary description meant that representations of Egypt could resemble 
those of other imperial regions or even Britain.47 By highlighting sameness rather than 
difference, Egyptian landscapes were represented as desirable for British habitation. 
In the medical sphere, physicians in both Egypt and India sought ways to curb the 
losses occasioned by disease. Their research correlated with ongoing efforts 
throughout this period to create medical topographies that would indicate which areas 
were the healthiest for European soldiers. For this reason, both India and Egypt were 
places where young physicians could make a name for themselves. In her recent 
article, Catherine Kelly investigates how British and French medical officers were 
affected by their encounters with disease during the Egyptian campaign. Ambitious 
medical practitioners treated such ailments by trial and error with experimental cures, 
an approach which draws comparison with medical practice in India.48 Finally, the 
ways in which the British military approached Egyptian antiquities bears comparison 
with French colonial enterprises in Algeria. As Michael Greenhalgh notes in his 
article about the French military’s use of ancient structures in the early nineteenth 
century, scholarly interest in these buildings was valuable as it provided essential 
information on the still-usable Roman infrastructure during the French takeover of 
Algeria.49 This appropriation of ancient structures for military purposes can be seen 
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during the British campaign in Egypt; soldiers appraised ruined buildings and forts in 
terms of their utility to an occupation force, should the military remain in the country 
for the long term.  
 
The central theme of this thesis concerns the distinctiveness of military writings in 
Egypt, which transcends the boundaries of military, travel and orientalist genres of 
literature. This is reflected in the discussion throughout the chapters. Chapter 1 
emphasizes the diversity of soldiers’ and sailors’ responses to the Egyptian landscape 
and climate, and highlights the distinctiveness of these views in comparison to civilian 
travellers. It also explores the efforts made by medical practitioners to construct a 
medical topography of the country. Chapter 2 examines the variety of military 
responses to objects and structures of antiquity in Egypt. It argues that the pursuit of 
antiquarianism was not at odds with the military occupation, and highlights the 
combination of factors which motivated the armed forces to collect antiquities. 
Chapter 3 explores the ways in which British servicemen in Egypt conceived of their 
identity and a sense of their difference from Near Eastern culture as they described 
encounters with Egyptian and Ottoman peoples. It argues that British writing in Egypt 
reflects the confused and ever-changing understandings of different races and 
societies in this period. Chapters 4 and 5 consider the British response to the military 
bodies encountered in Egypt: the Ottomans and the Mamluks. They show that military 
considerations were vital in British servicemen’s appraisal of these two groups. 
Chapter 4 outlines how the lack of ‘western’ features within the Ottoman military 
drove a divide between British and Ottoman soldiers. This cultural divide drew the 
British to identify more closely with their French enemy in Egypt. Chapter 5 discusses 
the contradiction in British views towards the Mamluks. On the one hand, the 
Mamluks were admired as exotic and formidable warriors. On the other, they were 
condemned for their seemingly depraved and backward society.  
 
Methodology 
Having outlined the objectives, it is important to highlight what has not been 
considered in this thesis. One of the most significant omissions is the Alexandria 
expedition in 1807. Little is known about this peculiar operation, other than what can 
be learned from a small number of documents found in the war office. After the 
Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia and allied itself with France in late 1806, a 
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British force of 5,000 men was sent to Egypt under Major-General Alexander 
Mackenzie Fraser. Their objective was to remove Ottoman presence from the country 
and establish a base of operations in the eastern Mediterranean. Fraser landed in Egypt 
on 21 March 1807, and occupied Alexandria with ease. However, two offensives 
against Rosetta were bloodily repulsed with the loss of 1,400 men. Having lost the 
initiative, bickering ensued between the officers who exchanged accusations of blame. 
Fraser had little choice but to withdraw from Alexandria in September.50 The 
campaign had been a costly disaster, and had achieved nothing. Perhaps for this 
reason, there seems to have been an element of amnesia regarding this operation. 
There is precious little written material on this campaign, and much of it was written 
second hand, by those who were not there. Unfortunately, the war office records for 
the campaign are incomplete. The official dispatches range from January to August, 
but many documents written in the remainder of 1807 are missing.  At present, these 
records consist primarily of a series of increasingly angry letters by General Fraser 
and Major Ernest Missett, a British agent posted in Egypt from 1802 to monitor 
French activity. Both of these men blamed one another for the setbacks encountered.51 
Therefore, the focus of this thesis will primarily be on the three years between 1798 
and 1801. In this period, British intervention in Egypt reached its peak. From the battle 
of the Nile in August 1798 until the conclusion of the British campaign in October 
1801, there was an almost uninterrupted British military presence either in, or 
stationed off the coast of, Egypt. From October 1801 to spring 1803, a small 
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occupation force remained in Alexandria. Some of the material included in this thesis 
will relate to regiments who remained in Egypt until 1803.   
 
This thesis draws from a range of documents. Where relevant, I have included records 
and dispatches from the war office. However, as this thesis is a study of encounters 
and experiences among individuals, these documents do not feature heavily 
throughout all chapters.  Instead the focus is primarily, though not exclusively, on 
published and unpublished personal accounts written by 52 men in the army and navy 
who were present in Egypt at some point in the period 1798-1803. These documents 
are supplemented by contemporary reviews in magazines and periodicals, by 
newspapers which contain dispatches and by non-military contemporary accounts of 
Egypt or the Near-East, which place the military writings within a broader context of 
the literature about Egypt published in this period. Of the 52 men who wrote from a 
personal perspective about Egypt, 39 were in the army: 30 were officers and 9 were 
in the ordinary ranks. 13 were in the navy: 10 officers and 3 ordinary seamen. From 
these figures, there is clearly a strong focus on the army, rather than the navy. Despite 
the significance of naval accounts to Britain’s war experience, they feature less 
prominently in the chapters. A range of warships were involved in military operations 
in the Levant during this period, but their duties usually kept sailors on board their 
ships. As a result, naval accounts of foreign landscapes and peoples are generally not 
as rich, varied or as numerous as those written by soldiers. I have, however, 
endeavoured to include naval material whenever possible.  
 
These 52 individuals produced a total of 60 documents of varying types, which can 
be divided into three categories: 10 are letters, or collections of letters; 19 are 
manuscript diaries, journals or narratives, and 31 are published memoirs or narratives. 
Most of the soldier’s publications originated from letters or diaries. Letters were 
relatively immediate and spontaneous, produced within hours or days of the events 
they write about, although some were written after weeks of reflection. This 
immediacy is also true for diaries and journals, but they tend to be more 
contemplative. They were written for the author himself and to be kept for family and 
future generations. There was no censorship of these documents, and sensitive 
information could be easily transmitted, much to the annoyance of the commanding 
officers. Many of the letters were not intended for publication, they were a personal 
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form of correspondence written for family and friends back home. Writers may have 
been aware, however, that the contents of their letters might have been used as 
community newsletters, and the composition of a letter was often done in the presence 
of their peers, whilst in bivouacs or billets for the night. All the authors discussed in 
this thesis were free to edit their letters, diaries and memoirs at leisure, removing any 
undesirable passages while embellishing or inventing others. For example, one can 
assume that authors glossed over their own or their comrades’ reprehensible 
behaviour in their letters and memoirs, especially if these documents were intended 
for a public audience. 
 
It is important to differentiate memoirs from other material because they were usually 
written long after the events they describe, perhaps even after the author’s military 
service had ended. Memoirs were written in hindsight, and marked by the passage of 
time; those published after the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars are more likely to 
reflect the later cultural climate in which they were written. These sources tend to be 
less factually reliable than documents created during the war.52 This is most noticeable 
among the lower ranks. Before 1800, it was rare for common soldiers to write 
autobiographical narratives apart from in a spiritual context.53 The first publication of 
an Egyptian campaign memoir by a lower-ranked soldier was George Billanie’s 
anonymously published Narrative of A Private Soldier in His Majesty’s 92nd 
Regiment of Foot, in 1819. By contrast, most of the officers had published their 
accounts by 1805. In a review of one officer’s memoir in 1803, the Anti-Jacobin 
Review observed that “The public has been so inundated with journals, accounts &c. 
of Egypt, since our glorious campaign in that country, that there hardly seemed room 
for any future observations on the subject.”54 The 1820s and 30s were marked by the 
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publication of narratives by lower ranks, which may partly have been the result of 
evangelical groups, who encouraged literacy rates among the ranks, but also 
persuaded soldiers to write their narratives in such a way to promote conversion to 
Methodism. Several memoirs published during this time promised exciting tales of 
war, but were in fact rather thin on military action and instead concentrated on 
religious preaching.55 Neil Ramsey provides another explanation. He argues that the 
1819 publication of the first memoir of an ordinary soldier, Journal of a soldier of the 
Seventy First, was a pivotal moment in the development of military memoirs, helping 
to redefine the work around the experiences of the common soldier. It sold more than 
3,000 copies and was highly influential on the subsequent development of 
autobiographical stories of soldiering in the period, and helped frame the soldier’s tale 
within the generic conventions of the story of the suffering traveller.56 This 
development can be attributed to the rise of public interest in and the reputation of the 
common soldier. With an improved education, soldiers were more willing to write 
narratives and found more willing audiences and publishers. 
 
The soldier as traveller and memoirist 
In terms of travel writing and encounters with extra-European peoples, one of the 
values of personal campaign narratives such as those in Egypt is that they document 
the perceptions of a much broader cross-section of society than those groups from 
whom the typical travel writer or explorer were drawn. One of the central concerns of 
this thesis is to investigate the different ways in which officers and men perceived and 
narrated their encounters with Egypt. An account of the social composition and 
characteristics of the different ranks is therefore required. Just over 17,000 men landed 
at Aboukir in March 1801, under the command of Sir Ralph Abercromby, and they 
were generally a cross-section of British society. This expeditionary force was a 
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combination of upper, middle and lower class representatives from all of Britain’s 
constituent nationalities. The national composition of the army during the wars is 
difficult to state precisely because many of the regimental returns are incomplete, 
particularly for the army overseas. However, John Cookson has presented some 
tentative findings using the inspection returns for 1806, 1811 and 1813. These returns 
reveal that the army was about one half English, one-sixth Scottish and one-third Irish. 
Based on these estimates, approximately a quarter of the army was Irish Catholic.57 
The concentration of Scottish and Irish soldiers into a few distinctively Scottish or 
Irish regiments became a feature of the army. The 92nd Gordon Highlanders and 79th 
Cameron Highlanders both served in Egypt, and were predominantly filled with Scots. 
From the 1813 returns, seventy per cent of Scots serving in the line infantry were 
found in just ten regiments.58 Irish soldiers were spread more evenly, the higher 
number of Irishmen in the service resulted in a greater dispersion throughout the army, 
but there were perhaps fifteen regiments with a high proportion of Irish.59 One such 
regiment was the 23rd Royal Welch Fusiliers, a regiment with a high reputation which 
had lost 265 men in a shipwreck returning from Holland in 1799, and had been made 
up with Irish Militiamen. These replacements were of a poor quality and they earned 
Abercromby’s displeasure during the campaign.60  The high proportion of Scottish 
and Irish can be seen in the officers who served in Egypt. The commander in chief – 
Ralph Abercromby – was a Scottish native of Clackmannanshire; Sir John Moore, 
who commanded the reserve was Glaswegian, and Sir David Baird, who led the Indian 
expedition from Bombay, originated from East Lothian. Abercromby’s second-in-
command, Sir John Hely-Hutchinson, was Irish, as was Captain Thomas Walsh. 
Captain Peter Jennings appears to have been one of the few memoirists who was an 
Irish Catholic. 
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A significant number of regiments in Egypt did not originate in Britain; the grave 
shortage of troops on the outbreak of the French Revolutionary war persuaded the 
Government to authorize the recruitment of foreign regiments. Between 1793 and 
1802, nearly 80 foreign units of horse, foot and artillery were raised, predominantly 
by French émigrés and German princelings. Some of these regiments were short lived 
and all varied greatly in quality. The Corsican Rangers was formed as a light infantry 
corps in Minorca in 1799 from Corsicans who had fled their native island. They fought 
with John Moore’s Reserve and were sufficiently well trained and disciplined to be 
entrusted with outpost duties. In Egypt, General John Stuart’s Foreign Brigade 
contained three regiments: the first was formed mainly of soldiers of the Swiss Guards 
of the Bourbons; the second was made up of French émigrés and some Italians, and 
the third consisted of German and Swiss prisoners of war taken from Minorca. All 
three performed well in Egypt. In the cavalry brigade there was a detachment of 
Hompesch’s Mounted Rifles, raised by Baron Charles de Hompsesch, a Prussian 
hussar colonel. Its men were mostly Germans with some French émigrés among the 
officers. They acquired an excellent reputation during the Irish Rebellion in 1798, 
which continued in Egypt, until three men deserted, an offence for which the whole 
detachment was deprived of its horses and put into garrison at Aboukir.61 In a different 
category from all these foreign regiments, were the three battalions of Sepoys from 
the East India Company forces, which formed the bulk of General Baird’s contingent 
of 8,000 men.  
 
The social composition of the Royal Navy was similarly diverse. Nelson’s squadron 
that defeated the French at the Battle of the Nile on 1 August 1798 were hand-picked 
to a limited extent, in that Earl St Vincent had given Nelson the best ships available 
to him; but in most respects, they were quite ordinary, a cross-section of the navy at 
that time.62 All kinds of seamen - fishermen, smugglers, foreign recruits and raw 
novices conscripted by the press gang - served in the Royal Navy. The maintenance 
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of a ship of war required a variety of craftsmen with various skills, and as a result they 
were filled with men from a range of backgrounds and nationalities.63 In 1803, the 
fourteen-year-old Scottish volunteer Robert Hay was amazed by the different 
nationalities and social backgrounds of sailors on board his first ship: 
 
To the eye were presented complexions of every hue, 
and features of every cast, from the jetty face, flat nose, 
thick lips and frizzled hair of the African, to the more 
slender frame and milder features of the Asiatic. The 
rosy complexion of the English swain and the sallow 
features of the sun-burnt Portuguese. People of every 
profession and of the most contrasted manners, from 
the brawny ploughman to the delicate fop. The decayed 
author and bankrupt merchant who had eluded their 
creditors. The apprentice who had eloped from 
servitude. The improvident and impoverished father 
who had abandoned his family, and the smuggler and 
the swindler who had escaped by flight the vengeance 
of the laws.64 
 
Hay was also astonished by the number of languages spoken on board the ship: “To 
the ear was addressed a hubbub little short of that which occurred at Babel. Irish, 
Welsh, Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, French, Swedish, Italian and all the provincial 
dialects between Landsend and John O’Groats joined their discordant notes.”65  
 
Although not as ethnically diverse as the rank-and-file, officers in the army were 
drawn from a much wider cross-section of British society than is commonly thought. 
Wealth, property, influence and traditions of military service ensured that most 
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officers came from landed families. The traditional pathway into the officer corps 
remained the purchase of a commission.66 However, the exigencies of the war opened 
up opportunities for entry into the officer’s ranks for those without the means to 
purchase a commission. They ensured that the officer corps was not monopolized by 
the landed elites.67 About a quarter of regimental officers were drawn from the 
aristocracy and the greater gentry, with two per cent coming from the peerage. The 
majority of regimental officers were from the lesser gentry, the professional and 
commercial classes, and families of comfortable means with traditions of military 
service.68 This diversity can be discerned among the officers of the British expedition. 
A portion were from the greater gentry: General Hutchinson was the second son of 
the Irish Earl of Donoughmore, and Colonel Hilgrove Turner, a courtier to the Prince 
of Wales, was born into a wealthy family based in Shepherd’s Bush. Like many 
acquaintances of royalty, he studied at Eton College.69 The Irish-born Eyre Coote, 
who commanded the besieging forces at Alexandria for much of the duration of the 
Egyptian campaign, was the son of the Dean of Kilfenora. He was educated at Eton 
and enrolled at Trinity College Dublin, but was commissioned as a lieutenant in the 
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37th regiment before he began his studies.70 Robert Thomas Wilson, the third son of 
the celebrated portrait painter Benjamin Wilson, obtained a commission in the 15th 
King’s Light Dragoons at the personal recommendation of George III.71 Others 
originated from the lesser gentry and professional classes: Abercromby was the son 
of a wealthy lawyer, who possessed the means to have his children educated privately 
at home. John Moore was the son of a physician and writer.  When his father 
accompanied the Duke of Hamilton as a tutor and doctor on a grand tour, John was 
able to accompany them, and visited France, Switzerland, Germany and Italy.72 The 
military surgeon James McGrigor, who served as superintendent surgeon to Baird’s 
Indian expeditionary force, was born to a merchant family in Aberdeen. His family 
evidently had money, as they funded his studies in medicine at Aberdeen and 
Edinburgh, and he began his career in the army by purchasing the post of surgeon to 
the 88th Connaught Rangers.73  
 
While officers of the regular army were drawn from a wide social spectrum, East India 
Company officers were generally men who lacked either the connections or the money 
to enter the King’s service. Company officers did require some connections or money, 
as their initial appointment would be at the behest of a Company director, but 
thereafter, promotion was strictly determined by seniority within the service as a 
whole, rather than a combination of purchase, patronage and merit, as in the regular 
army.74 David Baird, who commanded the expeditionary force from India, was 
certainly from a less privileged background than most of the officers in the regular 
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army. He was born to an Edinburgh merchant family, which experienced significant 
financial difficulty after his father died when David was nine years of age. The 
commission he obtained as an ensign in the 2nd regiment of foot had been purchased 
by his mother for an older, more promising brother who had died suddenly. After five 
years of garrison duty at Gibraltar, he obtained a captaincy in the newly raised 73rd 
Highlanders, and was sent to India.75 
 
To some extent, advancement in the navy was based more on merit than money. 
Before an officer could obtain a commission, he had to pass a seamanship 
examination, which could not be taken until the candidate had spent six years at sea, 
with at least two in the rank of midshipman or master’s mate. Aspiring lieutenants 
from rich, landed classes required at least some talent in order to progress, but 
patronage remained a dominant feature in the navy. Captains had complete control 
over which young midshipman to take to sea, and such boys were usually the sons of 
friends and relatives. Promising officers could remain unpromoted if they had no 
patron to help them. Unemployment was high among naval officers, as there was 
always a large surplus of them.  Before the war less than a quarter were fully 
employed, and even with the wartime expansion of the service large numbers 
remained in retirement.76  
 
Although socially diverse, officers were largely united in what it meant to be 
gentlemen. Aristocratic martial traditions and honour codes were crucial to how 
officers behaved in war, shaping ideals of leadership, courage, paternalism, the 
treatment of the enemy and personal honour. There were also important civil 
dimensions to the officers’ gentlemanly identity and behaviour. Traditional activities 
of hunting, gambling and drinking remained integral to many officers’ leisure time, 
but their interests were guided to some extent by ideals of gentlemanly 
accomplishment and polite society. Refined manners and sensibilities were thought 
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to produce a more complete soldier. For this reason, there was a growing culture of 
professional education and diverse reading interests. Reading and knowledge were 
deemed important to a gentleman’s refinement, accomplishment, taste and 
improvement. Some understanding of history, geography, religion, philosophy, 
science, literature, travel, art, landscape and architecture were important ingredients 
in fashioning a cultivated mind.77 
 
The military as a profession also began to encourage reading. Prior to the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, there had been no institutionalized education in 
the military. Divisions that required a greater technical ability, such as the Royal 
Engineers and artillery officers, were trained at the Royal Military Academy at 
Woolwich, founded in 1741. These men were generally of a different calibre to those 
from the regular army: their commission and promotion depended upon merit and 
seniority, rather than on purchase. For the general army officer however, there was no 
established training. This began to change when the Royal Military College was 
established in 1801, which began the formal institutionalized military education of 
regular British officers. Nevertheless, almost all officers entered the British army 
during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars with no training.78 Education was 
encouraged to a greater degree in the navy, particularly among midshipmen aspiring 
to become lieutenants. Occasionally a schoolmaster was appointed on board ships for 
the purpose of teaching these young gentlemen.79 Reflecting on the intellectual and 
literary currents of the time, Gavin Daly thinks it safe to assume that officers read 
across a wide spectrum of genres, from newspapers and periodicals, to books on 
enlightened history and philosophy, poetry, sentimental novels and travel literature.80 
Despite this, British officers were considered poorly educated in wider contemporary 
thought. Few attended public school or university, and there was no formal training 
or education required for entry into the officer corps. There was an expectation that 
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officers should learn on the job, calling on their gentlemanly qualities of leadership, 
gallantry and moral fortitude when the time required.81  
 
Officers may have received an education and read widely, but what of the common 
ranks? The conventional view of the redcoat has largely been defined by Wellington’s 
famous phrase, labelling the British soldier as the “scum of the earth”, written as he 
struggled to restrain the plundering behaviour of his troops after the Battle of Vitoria 
in July 1813.82 Wellington’s phrase fits with the leading military image at the time, 
which depicted the common soldier as a brutal creature, completely devoid of thought, 
initiative and the finer qualities of mind.83 The poor reputation was largely due to the 
squalid living conditions and poor pay. Most enlistments were for 21 years, and very 
few survived their term for service in unhealthy climates like India. As a result, there 
was a widespread belief that self-respecting men never signed up. Only the most 
despicable individuals were thought to join the military, whose crimes and failings of 
character meant the army was the only occupation left open to them.84 The ranks in 
the East India Company battalions possessed the poorest reputation; the Company 
was permitted to recruit soldiers in Britain, but for the most part, those willing to enlist 
found the regular army a more attractive prospect. Consequently, Company recruiters 
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took whomever they could get.85 The contemporary image of the ordinary sailor was 
far better, perhaps because they remained Britain’s main defence against France, and 
there was a certain pride at the growing superiority of the Royal Navy. Much like the 
army however, the navy was not an attractive occupation, and was poorly paid. 
Seamen could also be seen as ruffians, just like soldiers, and this view was especially 
strong after the great mutinies at Spithead and the Nore in 1797.86  
 
Recent research by Edward J. Coss, Kevin Linch and Nick Mansfield has discredited 
this popular perception of Britain’s armed forces. Enlisted men certainly came from 
the lower orders with humble backgrounds, but most were “respectable” working-
class men.87 They were primarily semi-skilled labourers, artisans and tradesmen such 
as shoemakers, tailors, and weavers. The key drive for recruitment was financial 
stability. Economic slumps were in abundance in Britain over the course of the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Skilled artisans and tradesmen fell on hard times 
and the army was a regularly paid job.88 Most of those who joined willingly did so 
because they had few alternative means to feed and clothe themselves. The military 
also appealed to many young men irrespective of the low pay. The spectacle, romance 
and power of a military uniform and the lure of travel and adventure to exotic 
locations, proved irresistible for many adventurous youngsters.89 This was certainly 
the primary motivation behind James Downing’s enlistment. Born in Truro, Cornwall, 
he was sent to school at an early age, before being apprenticed to a shoemaker. After 
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five years of increasing boredom, he joined the army for the excitement.90 The 
Edinburgh-born sailor John Nicol, who saw action at the Battle of the Nile, cited a 
similar motivation behind enlistment. From reading Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe 
many times over, he longed to be at sea. When his apprenticeship as a cooper ended, 
he volunteered for the Royal Navy.91 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, many were forced into the army or navy against their 
will, as recruiting parties pressed men into military service. These unfortunates had 
no intention of signing up, but were coerced into doing so after being kidnapped or 
tricked by false promises and liquor. All this meant that although the majority of 
enlisted men did have humble origins, they were not the thoughtless criminals the 
upper classes thought them to be.92 The same can be said for the ranks of the East 
India Company. Some of the best recruits in the Company service were British 
regulars discharged when their regiments were ordered home. They had enlisted with 
the Company either because they had contracted local marriages during their service 
in India, or simply because they had become accustomed to colonial life. For the rank-
and-file, India provided a warmer climate and a higher standard of living than they 
could expect in Britain.93 
 
That said, the number of rankers who were able to compose a narrative was in a 
minority. Gavin Daly estimates that no more than half of the rank and file were 
signature literate, and even fewer were capable of writing a letter or a diary.94 
Nevertheless, there were readers and writers amongst the ranks, and common soldiers 
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around 1800 were generally more literate than their predecessors. Literacy rates 
amongst the ranks gradually increased throughout this period as a result of expanding 
reading cultures and changes in recruitment policies and military and civilian 
education. Literacy skills were also encouraged by enlightened ideals of self-
improvement and by evangelicals.95 By the latter quarter of the eighteenth century, it 
was expected that every sergeant and most corporals in the British army should be 
able to read and write. Although these men often had no access to formal education, 
many exploited the opportunity to acquire literacy through their local church. The 
artilleryman Benjamin Miller provides one such example. He learnt to read and write 
while he was a page boy and was well drilled in a knowledge of the Scriptures.96 
George Billanie, a Glaswegian private in the 92nd Highlanders who published an 
evangelical-minded narrative anonymously, outlined a similar education in his 
memoir:   
 
I pretty early learned to read; and as I grew older I 
became increasingly fond of it… I read whatever came 
in my way; but the Psalms of David in metre, in use by 
the Church of Scotland and the Bible, being the first 
books in which I learned to read, and having the benefit 
of godly instruction and example at home, religious 
knowledge was that with which I was most 
acquainted.97 
 
Those who wrote an account of their experiences in Egypt were literate, but in a 
minority of cases, illiterate men were able to dictate their experiences to others who 
could write them down.98 James Downing provides one such example of this. 
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Although he received an education, he was blinded during the Egyptian campaign, 
and dictated his narrative to his friends.99 
 
Similar to the army, there is evidence that the majority of sailors were illiterate, 
although this varied from ship to ship. Evidence suggests that there could be a high 
demand for literate individuals to read their shipmates’ letters and write their 
response.100 Reading seems to have been a common leisure activity among naval 
officers and educated seamen. Some commanders, including Nelson, distributed 
among their crews Bibles and prayer books, provided by the Society for the Promotion 
of Christian Knowledge. In a few ships, other books might be provided, as Joseph 
Bates wrote: “To improve our mental faculties, when we had a few leisure moments 
from ship duty and naval tactics, we were furnished with a library of two choice books 
for every ten men…”101 
 
Evidently, British military personnel derived from different backgrounds and social 
standing, and these differences are most apparent when comparing the writing of 
ordinary ranks with that of officers. John Cookson has emphasized that an 
unbridgeable class difference between officers and rankers remained a characteristic 
of the British military during this era. Officers adopted a paternalistic attitude which 
was rooted in the moral and intellectual superiority they felt towards the lower 
ranks.102 Officers’ enjoyed greater levels of comfort than the men they commanded, 
and their accounts were generally more grounded in the conventions and styles of 
travel writing.103 When circumstances permitted, officers had a greater freedom to 
explore the environment around them. They could journey further afield to visit sites 
of historical interest, and had greater access to the upper echelons of foreign societies. 
As we shall see, the different backgrounds of these men helped to define how they 
interpreted their experiences of Egypt and the people it contained.  
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1. 
“An almost uninhabitable country”: 
military representations of the Egyptian 
landscape and climate 
 
 
Writing about the campaign in Egypt, British soldiers and sailors paid a great deal of 
attention to the natural environment they occupied. The number of pages containing 
detailed descriptions of the environment was similar to those devoted to accounts of 
foreign peoples. These accounts were varied: on the one hand, they demonstrated the 
unique circumstances of campaigning, and on the other, they reflected broader British 
attitudes towards imperial landscapes. In the past decade, scholars have increasingly 
recognized that western views of non-Western, colonial landscapes were not 
monolithic or one-dimensional. John McAleer, in Representing Africa, posits that 
representations of landscapes were very much subjective responses; those who 
recorded the landscape possessed a diverse range of interests, impulses and 
professional priorities. The way in which the reality of the environment was presented 
depended on the differing circumstances of each individual and their intended 
audience. McAleer postulates that these representations of landscape became tools for 
expressing an individual reaction to particular circumstances.1 For Gavin Daly, the 
diverse ways in which British soldiers interacted with the landscape during the 
Peninsular War mirrored the pleasures and pains of the war experience itself: the 
enjoyment of Romantic Mediterranean environments; the awe of sublime landscapes, 
the boredom and frustration of bleak wildernesses and flat spaces; the suffering and 
death that came with extreme weather conditions; the sorrow and trauma of terrain 
marked by battle, and finally, the soft, picturesque spaces and valleys that brought 
comfort and solitude from the war.2 Much like their contemporaries in Southern 
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Africa and the Spanish Peninsular, the soldiers in Egypt employed diverse portrayals 
of landscapes to help convey their reaction to their experience of campaigning. The 
first objective of this chapter is to emphasize this diversity. 
 
As Gavin Daly, Robin Gerster and Peter Pierce have argued, going to war on the tour 
of duty was itself a form of travel experience, and soldiers’ narratives “look” like 
travel books, as they follow the basic conventions and structure of the travel narrative. 
The combination of the idioms and attitudes of tourism with the stresses and horrors 
of the battlefield produced mixed feelings of contempt and admiration among soldiers 
for the places they visited.3 One can see this blend of militarism and tourism in 
soldiers’ narratives of Egypt. Soldiers may have written their accounts in a similar 
style to civilian travellers, but they were subject to different pressures and 
circumstances. The second objective of this chapter is to highlight the distinctiveness 
of these military views. In order to do this, the diverse responses of military 
servicemen towards the Egyptian environment have been roughly arranged into four 
categories, which shall be analyzed in turn.  
 
The first of these categories considers responses that have been defined primarily by 
strategic considerations. This was a subject that civilian authors rarely addressed. In 
the century prior to the Egyptian campaign, European warfare had gradually evolved 
from static attack and defence of cities, into a more mobile form that took place over 
greater expanses of territory.4 As a result, greater attention was being paid to the 
formation and tactical manoeuvres of military bodies, particularly infantry. Soldiers 
in Egypt were sensitive to the strategic features of the environment in which they 
fought and marched. They discussed how cities might be attacked or defended, and 
how military operations might have been executed differently with the benefit of 
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hindsight and a fuller knowledge of the local terrain. For military memoirists, this 
information was communicated to their readers through verbal description and 
through maps.  
 
A second group of responses to the Egyptian environment can be described as 
‘emotional’. In the late eighteenth century, more sentimental and subjective forms of 
travel writing emerged, concerned with the individual’s emotional and sensory 
response to foreign places and peoples. Previously, memoirists and travel writers only 
described what they did and saw. By the end of the eighteenth century, sentimental 
literature took great care to explain the emotional impact of events and the 
environment on the individual, employing a rich and diverse language for that 
purpose. A significant number of travellers sought to differentiate themselves from 
ordinary picturesque tourists or gentlemen on a Grand Tour, by dramatizing their 
travels. To do this, they rather perversely sought out suffering, discomfort and 
adversity. Carl Thompson, among others, label these writers as “suffering travellers”. 
Such authors developed a conviction that bad or difficult experiences had greater 
worth or existential validity. Thus, in their travels they were often the victims of 
shipwreck, oppression or robbery. By relating these events to their readers, suffering 
travellers hoped to evoke a sympathetic response.5 The soldiers and sailors who 
journeyed to Egypt were receptive to this literary trend. Similar to their civilian 
counterparts, they often stressed their emotional response to the extreme experience 
of combat, in an attempt to establish themselves among reading audiences as 
sentimental heroes, who endured the misfortunes and rigours of war to defend the 
country.6 Soldiers could be very effective at appealing for sympathy from their 
audiences, and they often used accounts of the climate and landscape to convey the 
extreme physical and psychological ordeal of campaigning to their readers.  
 
Although the environment caused much of the suffering endured by the soldiers on 
campaign, they saw parts of Egypt as visually or commercially desirable. A third 
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group of responses comprises of the ways in which soldiers conveyed this desirability 
in their writing. For military memoirists, the picturesque was one of the primary 
methods through which the visual beauty of Egypt’s topography was transmitted to 
their readers. Picturesque tourism was a popular pastime amongst officers, and offered 
a temporary escape from the campaign. The formulaic approach to picturesque 
painting and literary description of landscapes meant that representations of Egypt 
resembled those of other imperial regions and even Britain.7 By highlighting sameness 
rather than difference, a process described by David Cannadine as “the domestication 
of the exotic”, Egyptian landscapes were represented as desirable for British 
habitation.8 These areas also had considerable commercial potential. The high 
productivity of the landscape in the Nile delta, combined with the poor standard of 
Egypt’s agricultural industry, led several soldiers to speculate on the benefits for both 
Britain and the Egyptian inhabitants should Egypt be properly cultivated under British 
instruction.  
 
These desires for greater British involvement in Egypt were juxtaposed with concerns 
over the diseases contained within the country. This anxiety expressed by soldiers in 
Egypt comprises the final group of responses. British soldiers developed an 
unfounded fear of the Egyptian climate. They regarded it in a similar manner to the 
deadly tropical climates of India and the West Indies, despite the much lower 
mortality rates. The objective of this final section is to explore why this was the case.  
At this time, disease was generally attributed to climatic and geographic factors, hence 
the apprehension expressed in Egypt reflected the geographic position of the country 
on the boundary between the orient and the occident.  
 
Strategic perspectives of the landscape 
Marching and fighting in the Egyptian landscape, it seems natural that the soldiers 
looked at the landscape around them with a strategic eye. This was one of the primary 
ways in which military writings differed from those of civilians. Tactical appraisals 
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of the terrain were simply not present in civilian literature. Soldiers who devoted their 
prose to a strategic evaluation of the environment did so primarily when discussing 
the initial phases of the campaign on the Aboukir peninsula in mid-March, or when 
viewing the major Egyptian cities. Robert Wilson provides one of the best examples, 
as he speculated, with the benefit of hindsight, that a better use of the terrain in the 
first week of the campaign may have brought about a quick victory. After the battle 
of Mandara on 13 March, the French retreated to the heights on the outskirts of 
Alexandria. It seemed impossible to force the French from this position, as it was 
“rendered formidable by nature”.9  The heights occupy the point at which the Aboukir 
peninsula connects to the mainland. For the British, with the sea to their right and 
marshy ground to their left, a costly frontal assault appeared the only route from the 
peninsula into the mainland. They were unable to support any attack with artillery, as 
it required lifting by hand through the loose sand. At this point, the British centre 
suffered heavy losses, exposed to the French cannon on the heights. The British 
remained on this ground until 21 March, when they repulsed a large French attack and 
subsequently broke out from the peninsula. Inspecting this ground after the French 
capitulation in September, Wilson lamented the decisions the British made. Had the 
swampy ground to their left been closely examined, it would have been discovered to 
only appear marshy: “the nitrous salt upon the surface, and partial sappiness” of the 
terrain, were “deemed evident proofs of its total marshy nature…. but the eye was 
then unacquainted with the phenomena, and the deception was natural”. Wilson 
speculated on the British movements had this fact been exposed earlier. It “would 
have opened the weak part of the [French] position”; detachments of the army would 
have been marched to the left, and the French on the heights would have been attacked 
on two sides. Wilson concluded that “no doubt can now exist of it being easily carried, 
and most probably the towns of Alexandria, Old and New.”10 
 
Strategic evaluations of the environment were perhaps most common when the British 
came in sight of the major urban centres in Egypt: Alexandria, Rosetta and Cairo. 
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When the British first came within sight of these cities, they were under the possession 
of the French. Therefore, it was natural for the British to survey the lay of the land, 
and assess how they might be attacked or defended. John Moore’s diary provides a 
good example of this. On 3 July, he and General Hope reconnoitred the walls of Cairo, 
in preparation for laying siege. Viewing the French positions from afar, he wrote “It 
is so extensive as to require an army to defend it. We should have been able soon to 
make ourselves masters of their first positions and of the town, but there are works to 
which the French might have retired which must have been regularly besieged. These 
it would have required time and labour to capture.”11 Fortunately for the British, the 
French garrison surrendered before the siege was underway. Moore entered Cairo 
with General Hutchinson on 12 July, and inspected the works around the city and its 
citadel. “The line of defence round Cairo is about twelve miles, too extensive to be 
defended by any works. Those erected are in general trifling; they could not, however, 
have been assaulted.” Moore was thankful for the French capitulation. Had an attack 
been made, against this large city with narrow, intolerably hot streets, “we should 
have been delayed, and should have lost men both by that and sickness.”12 Moore was 
fervently dedicated to his profession and it seems that he enjoyed inspecting the mix 
of ancient and modern redoubts and breastworks that lined Egypt’s ancient cities, 
perhaps almost as much as his visit to other popular sites in Egypt. This is most 
apparent as he toured the defences of Alexandria, following the capitulation of the 
French at the beginning of September. “I have visited their works, which are very 
extensive. The fortified position in our front is strong; the lines are drawn with 
judgement, and executed with much art. In every part the superiority of their engineers 
is apparent.”13 Robert Wilson provided a similar evaluation on Alexandria’s defences 
as he entered the city. “The walls of Old Alexandria ran in the convex arch of a circle 
behind the position, the centre, the gate of Rosetta not being above one hundred and 
fifty yards from the citadel of the line”. The defences were strewn with field pieces, 
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and “batteries on the ramparts of the wall.” 14 Wilson theorized the outcome of an 
attack on these defences.  
 
Supposing then the first line carried in front, the troops 
would have been instantly exposed to grape from the 
redoubt before the Rosetta gate, and a battery on the 
wall above, whilst fort Crétin, the redoubt of Cleopatra, 
and another on the right, would have fired with effect 
shells and round shot. To have maintained a lodgement 
under such a cannonade, would have been difficult, yet 
had the right of the French position been turned by 
regular approaches, the troops would have been 
sheltered, and the heights occupied without danger; still 
the mere possession of them by no means would alone 
have been sufficient, nor could the batteries have been 
judiciously constructed on them, since they did not 
command the principal works of the place. However 
even from hence, the walls of Old Alexandria could not 
have resisted an hour’s battering….15 
 
Captain Charles Hill displayed a similar interest in strategically appraising the 
environment around him. He commanded a company of sepoys in General Baird’s 
Indian army. When he arrived at Cairo in July, he found the Egyptian capital had 
already fallen to the British and Ottoman forces. Nevertheless, Hill ran a strategic eye 
over the city’s position and its defences.  “Grand Cairo is on the side of a hill, quite 
open, and in many parts unprotected by any fortification whatever, indeed I am 
convinced it is extremely easy for any active enemy to make himself masters of it 
whenever he chooses.” The Citadel of Cairo, which “completely commands the city 
below…. is itself commanded by a hill close at the back of it, where a few pieces of 
canon properly directed would soon make the Citadel untenable… neither could it be 
defended against European skill in its present state, having neither ditch nor 
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rampart.”16 Away from combat and the Egyptian cities, there were times when 
soldiers commented on specific areas of terrain they passed though, which offered 
substantial strategic advantages. John Budgen, a captain in the 54th Regiment and one 
of General Baird’s aide-de-camps, wrote during the march from Kossier to Qena, that 
he passed through “a very narrow winding pass”, which “might be defended by a very 
small force against a very large army.”17 
 
Interestingly, strategic surveys of the Egyptian environment were not as common as 
one might assume. One reason for this, which Huw Davies highlights, could be that 
the discussion of military operations was generally frowned upon in officers’ circles 
during recreational periods. Christopher Hely-Hutchinson, the younger brother of the 
second-in-command John, noted en route to Alexandria in February 1801 that 
discussions about the forthcoming operation often ended acrimoniously.18 This social 
etiquette was not always strictly regulated, and could be relaxed after several months 
in each other’s company, but it is possible that soldiers felt themselves obliged to 
maintain this custom in their writing. Another reason for the lack of military 
topographical description, particularly among military memoirists, may have been 
that reading audiences seemed to have quickly tired of this subject. After a series of 
publications on the Egyptian campaign in 1802, including Robert Wilson’s intricately 
detailed and highly acclaimed History of the British Expedition to Egypt, there were 
signs by 1803 that the readers’ enthusiasm for military details of the Egyptian 
campaign was fading. The Monthly Review commented in a review of Captain 
Thomas Walsh’s Journal in 1803 that “the tale of glory respecting the Egyptian 
expedition has been so frequently repeated”.19 In the same year, the Critical Review 
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made a similar point, put rather more bluntly: “This tale has been so often told, that, 
without novelty of event or of language, it must disgust.”20 As a consequence, military 
memoirists disregarded tactical details in order to place their writing within the genre 
of travel literature, and appeal to audiences interested in the exploits of gentlemanly 
travellers. The anonymous author of A Non-Military Journal summarized this sales 
tactic in his preface: “As I do not wish to be out of the fashion, I present to you a few 
observations” but “if you be one of those who live upon war, and rumours of wars, 
you will be sadly disappointed”.21 In his account published in 1816, Major Francis 
Maule wrote in his preface that he “does not profess to enter into minute details of 
military movements, as at so distant a period the marches and countermarches of 
regiments and brigades must be wholly unnecessary and uninteresting.”22  
 
Perhaps for this reason, several memoirists chose to represent the strategic topography 
of Egypt primarily through maps. This was a practice with which many who had 
served in Egypt would be acquainted; map drawing had become common among 
military writings in the late eighteenth century. The increasing emphasis on tactical 
manoeuvres within European warfare meant that the mapping of local natural features 
was becoming vital to military strategy. By the end of the century, maps were not only 
sources of information about the theatre of operations, but were the increasingly 
dominant medium of operational planning. Maps were essential in influencing and 
often defining a commander’s decisions on the composition, arrangement and 
formation of the army, its route of march, and its line of operations and supplies, as 
well as enabling him to familiarize himself with the ground on which the army would 
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march and fight. Indeed, by the end of the eighteenth century, the importance of 
mapping was reflected in military training. Topographical and landscape drawing was 
present in the curriculum in most military academies. Prominent artists and engravers 
became drawing masters at military colleges, such as Paul Sanby, who served in this 
capacity at the military academy in Woolwich.23 Moreover, topographical works 
published in Britain were rising in popularity. In 1801, normal topographical or 
antiquarian publications had print runs usually between 200 and 1,000 copies. This 
changed when John Briton began publishing his topographical and history series The 
Beauties of England and Wales in 1801, which sold in the thousands.24 
 
Maps were a prominent feature in several military publications on Egypt, and some 
of the best examples can be found in Thomas Walsh’s Journal of the Late Campaign 
in Egypt. Walsh littered his work with detailed topographical representations of the 
coastline and islands in the Mediterranean, with more on the interior of Egypt. Precise 
details can often be seen, from the smallest settlements, to streams, coastal shoals, 
watchtowers, redoubts, and copses of trees and shrubs. In his maps representing the 
fighting on the Aboukir peninsula in March 1801, Walsh pinpointed each unit and 
their movement across the terrain during the separate actions, allowing the viewer to 
see how the forces navigated across plains, hills and broken ground; he even included 
individual pickets.25 Detailed topographical maps such as this were highly valued by 
civilian periodicals, presumably they allowed readers to quickly appraise themselves 
of the strategic situation without reading dry prose outlining strategy. In a review of 
Walsh’s Journal, the Edinburgh Review declared “Too much praise cannot be given 
to the elegance and perspicuity of his topographical charts, and military plans.”26  The 
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Critical Review gave a similar appraisal. “…as a journal, it is, perhaps, still less 
interesting than Mr. Anderson’s, and, as a military history, greatly inferior to sir 
Robert Wilson’s work. Yet in some respects, it rises considerably above both; we 
mean, on account of its valuable plans and maps.”27 The lack of such detail could 
provoke severe criticism, and it was for this reason that Aeneas Anderson’s Journal 
of the Forces Which sailed from the Downs, was poorly received. The Critical Review 
asserted that “The work is handsomely printed, and adorned with numerous plates…. 
We have, however, seen nothing a style so truly incorrect as these drawings, or so 
imperfect as these representations.”28  
 
One can look at these military maps as ideological works of British imperialism, even 
though Britain would not formally occupy Egypt until 1882. There is, as Matthew 
Edney notes, a basic intersection between imperialism and mapmaking. Knowledge 
of the territory is determined by geographic representations and most especially by 
the map. To govern territories, one must know them.29 However, these maps were 
created primarily to illustrate the terrain and circumstances in which soldiers fought 
and marched. They served an immediate descriptive purpose, hence there is reason to 
doubt whether such maps came with the baggage of imperialistic imagination. 
 
Interestingly, Huw Davies highlights that the experience of British soldiers in the 
Egyptian landscape provided an important moment in the development of British light 
infantry tactics. In the decades prior to the Egyptian campaign, strategic thought in 
Britain was in flux, and divisions emerged between British tacticians. European 
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warfare had gradually evolved from static attack and defence of cities, into a more 
mobile form that took place over greater expanses of territory. As a result, greater 
attention was being paid to the formation and tactical manoeuvres of military bodies, 
particularly infantry. Britain’s global expansion from 1760 forced its army into 
contact, and often into conflict, with a diverse array of military bodies with alternative 
fighting styles and approaches to war.30 The various methods can be loosely 
categorized into two competing schools of thought about how to best utilize military 
force. In Europe, during a series of wars throughout the mid-eighteenth-century, the 
success of Frederick the Great’s Prussian army exhibited the importance of mass 
ranks, mechanical discipline and drill regulations. Meanwhile, in America, a very 
different school of thought emerged. After the experience in the Seven Years War and 
the American War of Independence, some British tacticians began to emphasize the 
importance of light infantry. Greater autonomy was given to individual soldiers, 
whose speed and fluidity of movement provided tactical advantages in broken and 
enclosed country. The principles of these schools of thought were widely transmitted 
throughout the British military and it was not long before they were in conflict with 
one another. The crux of the argument came down to the differing nature of the terrain, 
with the ‘European’ school arguing that tactics developed in the American 
wildernesses were irrelevant in Europe, and the ‘American’ school arguing that the 
British army might benefit from a combination of regular and irregular tactics on any 
battlefield.31 By 1801, as Britain faced multiple threats from Revolutionary France in 
the Caribbean, Europe and Egypt, and from the Indian powers of Mysore and the 
Maratha Confederacy, Davies claims a forced amalgamation of the two schools 
occurred in Egypt. The army began to realize the importance of adaptability and 
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innovation, especially with regard to the terrain. It was not appropriate to impose 
another nation’s military doctrine on Britain’s army, because the diversity of Britain’s 
military experience – in North America, the Caribbean, India and Europe - rendered 
any predetermined doctrine invalid. The experience of warfare in theatres across the 
globe enabled the British army to develop its tactics in a unique and innovative 
manner.32 
 
Davies was quite right to point out a forced combination between the two tactical 
schools, but this argument could be more nuanced in the context of the Egyptian 
campaign. The process of amalgamation appears to have begun in January 1800, when 
14 line regiments were ordered to send four NCOs and 30 men for rifle training.  The 
chosen detachments assembled for training in March 1800, and were later returned to 
their units as riflemen, many of whom served in Egypt.33 This method of light infantry 
was different from that of some European armies, whose light troops were primarily 
skirmishers and not much more. In the British army, the light troops were to act 
closely with regulars. Depending on the circumstances, the light troops were expected 
to fulfil the role of skirmishers and regular infantry. There were, however, very few 
fully-fledged light infantry regiments in the British army in 1801. The Baker rifle, 
used by British light infantry from 1800, was widely known to have greater range and 
accuracy than the musket, but it required a longer, more complicated loading 
procedure. For this reason it was not used by regular infantry. At shorter ranges, it 
was thought that riflemen would be shot to pieces by the faster-firing volleys of 
muskets, and the shorter barrelled rifle was a great disadvantage in a bayonet fight. 
Rifle equipped light infantry were distributed in small units throughout the army, to 
maintain their sharpshooting capacity while being protected by nearby regulars.34 The 
experience and the performance of the rifle detachments in Egypt threw doubt on these 
assumptions, and encouraged the extension of light infantry from the single company 
per battalion into larger units. 
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A crucial factor in this development was the severe lack of detailed information on 
the local terrain during the preparations for the Egyptian campaign. This meant that a 
predetermined military doctrine of tactics was impractical, and tactical adaptability 
became increasingly crucial. As the British army commanders planned for the 
amphibious assault at Aboukir, they had nothing more than a vague idea of the terrain 
in which they would fight. They were familiar with the famous names of antiquity: 
Alexandria, Cairo and Giza but did not have any knowledge of strategic use. Only 
Sidney Smith, the Commodore famous for the crucial role he played in repelling 
Napoleon’s army during the siege of Acre, had been to Aboukir before; he provided 
Abercromby and his staff with the little he could recall from his reconnaissance a year 
earlier.35 What was really needed were detailed maps, of which there were none.  “It 
is vain”, wrote Col. Robert Anstruther to his brother, “to refer you to maps. There are 
none but what the French may now have that are not the greatest botchpennies 
possible, and perfectly erroneous.”36 To all intents and purposes, practical knowledge 
about the landscape and topography of Egypt was non-existent in the British army. 
This was a common feature in this period among British servicemen and bureaucrats, 
which derived from the empire’s emphasis on maritime, rather than land based, 
military power. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, general topographical 
surveying was in its infancy; the Ordnance Survey had been founded in Britain in 
1791 and it spent the first years of its existence concentrating on the cartography of 
the southern English counties for the purposes of strategic defence. As late as 1850, 
John McAleer argues, the state of geographical and topographical knowledge of 
Britain’s colonies was still woefully underdeveloped.37 
 
British attempts to ascertain more topographical information prior to landing were 
frustrated. Major-General John Moore’s conferences in January and February with 
the Ottoman Grand Vizir at Jaffa yielded little information; the Ottomans had not sent 
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any surveillance parties to Egypt.38  The chief engineer of the British forces, Major 
McKerras, had made a thorough reconnaissance of Aboukir Bay, but was killed before 
he delivered his report, and the surviving members of his surveillance party were 
captured.39 Desperate for information, Abercromby and John Moore rashly set out 
together in a cutter to personally survey the coastline of Aboukir. Together, they 
selected a landing point. Their risk paid off, but one may speculate on the outcome of 
the campaign had they been spotted by one of the French gunboats patrolling the 
coastline.40 Moore offered a few scant words in his diary on what he could see “about 
a mile and a half from the shore”: “I could observe no works whatever; the ground to 
the left is very woody and unequal, that upon the right a high sandhill…. the ground 
is favourable to the enemy, as he can be concealed close to the shore.” 41 Although a 
landing area had been chosen, the British had little idea what terrain lay beyond their 
line of sight. Deprived of any reliable reconnaissance reports, the British landed in 
Egypt effectively blind.42 This was a severe concern as the strategic importance of 
mapping and charting cannot be underestimated: making the landscape visible on 
widely circulated documents provided information that was crucial in attempts to 
outmanoeuvre and defeat the enemy.43  
 
The lack of topographical information would certainly have impacted morale. Many 
of the regiments that served in Egypt had also fought in the Dutch campaign. Those 
who remembered the landing on the Helder, on 27 August 1799, may have feared a 
repetition of these events, as there were some striking similarities between the two 
amphibious operations. Both were conducted on a small peninsula of barren sandy 
terrain, against an enemy who knew they were coming. Conditions on the shore were 
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also similar: the surf at Aboukir and the Helder could often be boisterous.44 Although 
the landing itself was not opposed at the Helder, the French had been waiting for the 
British, sheltered by the ridge of sand hills “distant only a half musket-shot from the 
sea.” As soon as the British had formed and moved up the beach they were assailed 
by heavy fire, and losses were high.45 John Moore, who commanded a brigade during 
the Helder landing, later wrote about conditions on the beach. “Our situation at this 
moment was unpromising. An enemy was on both our flanks and we were in a position 
which, however favourably it had been represented by maps, proved extremely bad.”46 
 
A similar lack in topographical knowledge beset the Anglo-Indian expeditionary force 
that sailed from Bombay for Egypt in January 1801 under the command of General 
David Baird. Their voyage took longer than anticipated, due in part to the inaccuracy 
of the two charts in their possession of Egypt’s Red Sea coast. Charles Hill pointed 
out the numerous errors – shoals and even mountains were in the wrong locations.47 
After disembarking at Kossier in June, the army was forced to wait while Colonel 
Murray, the quartermaster, reconnoitred the route to Qena with a large escort, to 
ascertain and establish outposts at the locations of wells and watering points. The 
shortage of water in the wells meant that the army could not march together. Small 
divisions of approximately 800 men marched across the desert at intervals, to allow 
time for the wells to refill. As a result, the Anglo-Indian army took a long time to 
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cross the desert. The first division marched from Kossier on 19 June, and the last did 
not arrive at Qena until 1 August.48  
 
With limited reconnaissance of French positions prior to landing, British forces at 
Aboukir were obligated to improvise their tactics, adapting to the terrain and the 
circumstances they encountered. In doing so, the rifle detachments proved themselves 
able to withstand the attack of regular infantry and cavalry on their own, while also 
acting as skirmishers whenever the opportunity arose. Their dual role as skirmishers 
and line infantry allowed their commanders to respond more effectively to different 
circumstances. This is apparent during the opposed amphibious landing on 8 March. 
The British did not know how far the French lines extended; and as the assault forces 
approached the shore, it became clear that the light troops forming the reserve, under 
the command of John Moore, would land facing an unknown number of Frenchmen 
atop a sand hill. Moore did not hesitate. On jumping ashore, he led the grenadiers and 
light infantry from the 23rd and 28th regiments, and the light detachments from the 
40th, up the hill which overlooked the entire landing. 49 According to Robert Wilson, 
they “rushed up the heights with almost preternatural energy, never firing a shot, but 
charging with the bayonet the two battalions that crowned it breaking them and 
pursuing till they carried the two Nole hills in the rear”.50 To the left of the sand hill, 
another reserve unit – the Corsican Rangers - found themselves in the thickest fighting 
of the day. Landing alongside the 43rd and 58th Regiments, the Rangers were “attacked 
by both infantry and cavalry, both of which they repulsed, and they also followed 
them into the plain, taking three pieces of artillery.”51  
 
Upon moving ashore, the British discovered that the terrain of the Aboukir peninsula 
favoured neither the ‘European’ nor ‘American’ school of tactics. Large open plains 
of barren sandy terrain surrounded the immediate vicinity, and such open areas 
allowed large formations of cavalry to move rapidly, making tight, heavily packed 
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formations of infantry, trained in the ‘European’ school, a necessity. However, these 
plains could be undulating, and were intersected by numerous ruins and groves of 
trees and bushes, which enabled infantry to operate in the ‘American’ style. 52 
Therefore, the military effectiveness of the British troops would be determined in part 
by their ability to combine the two schools of tactics, and how well they could 
interchange between them.  
 
Two days after the landing, on 10 March, the British light troops demonstrated their 
tactical flexibility. Moore led the advanced guard of the army which comprised of the 
Corsican Rangers and occupied a small redoubt on the right flank of the main British 
force. There, he and his men encountered a “considerable body of cavalry who 
endeavoured to push us back”. In most circumstances, light infantry was extremely 
vulnerable to cavalry, their loose formation made individual infantrymen an easy 
target. In this instance however, the ground Moore and his men occupied was “broken 
and intersected by brushwood and old ruins”, and he ordered his men to use this to 
their advantage:  
 
As the ground was favourable to infantry, the Corsican 
[Rangers] were directed to disperse and post 
themselves… By this means they forced the advanced 
guard of the cavalry back; but instead of being satisfied 
with this… they followed the enemy, who led them 
close to the main body, and then turned upon them.53  
 
Later, during the battle of Mandara on the 13 March, the 90th light infantry regiment, 
and the 92nd Highlanders with their rifle detachment, demonstrated their abilities as 
regular infantry, under the able command of Moore. Leading the detachment in 
column, Moore wrote:  
 
We advanced rapidly, exposed to a most heavy 
cannonade from the front and of musketry from hussars 
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and light infantry on the flank. The men, though mowed 
down by the cannon, never lost their order, and there 
was no was no period during the action or pursuit that I 
could not have halted the reserve and instantly wheeled 
to a flank without interval.54  
 
In the first few days of the campaign, the light infantry units had fulfilled various 
roles, demonstrating their adaptability. They had skirmished with the enemy while 
dispersed among ruins and bushes, and had attacked in tightly packed columns, in a 
similar style to regular infantry. Moore concisely summarized their abilities: “Our 
Light Infantry… are in fact a mixture of the Yager [sic, German skirmisher], and the 
Grenadier.”55 
 
For Piers Mackesy, in his extensive study of the Egyptian campaign, British Victory 
in Egypt, the importance of the Egyptian campaign for British tactics lay in the 
successful employment of the ‘European’ rather than ‘American’ school. 
Commenting on the performance of the British infantry, Mackesy, claims “It was the 
antithesis of the old loose order of the ‘American’ system”. He portrays the victory as 
“the fruits of a tree nurtured by Abercromby but planted thirteen years earlier by 
General Dundas when he published his Principles”.56 Sir David Dundas’ work, 
Principles of Military Movements, was one of the main texts in Britain that adhered 
to the ‘European’ school; it enjoyed so much success that a revised version had 
become the regulation drill book of the British army in 1792. It devoted only nine 
pages out of 458 to light infantry.57 In his concluding remarks reflecting on the success 
of the campaign, Mackesy writes “Dundas must have felt deep satisfaction when he 
read Abercromby’s posthumous letter confirming the success of his tactical system”.58 
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There is some substance to this argument; the comments of British officers as they 
reflected on the military success highlights their satisfaction and confidence in the 
ordered ranks of the British regulars, schooled in ‘European’ tactics. Charles Hill 
proudly remarked on the “order and regularity of the advance” at Mandara.59 After 
communicating to his Indian troops the King’s approval of their conduct, Colonel 
Auchimuty added that his officers “feel with the fullest force the advantages which 
may ever result from order, discipline, and military system.”60  
 
Yet, as Huw Davies points out, there are considerable grounds to oppose the argument 
that military experience in Egypt reinforced the ‘European’ school of tactics.61 
Mackesy appears not to have recognized that British commanders employed a mixture 
of regular and irregular tactics, utilizing light infantry and the terrain to protect the 
flanks, while using the main body to force the French off balance. At times, the drills 
prescribed by Dundas’ Principles were unsuitable in Egypt, and officers deviated 
from the regulations as they adapted to the terrain. Amphibious operations, notably 
the landing of troops on beaches, were not covered in official manuals, hence the 
landing at Aboukir on 8 March was the result of an entirely improvised plan by 
Abercromby and his officers.62 Perhaps the most common digression was the 
deployment of lines two ranks deep, rather than the three favoured in Principles. Lines 
of two ranks was the favoured formation of the American system; it allowed every 
man to use his musket freely, bringing more guns to bear on the enemy at any given 
time. Regiments in two-rank lines also had a greater frontage than the French, which 
meant that the front of the enemy could be overlapped. These advantages were 
tempered by the greater vulnerability to cavalry, especially if the flanks were 
unprotected. Due to the greater frontage, lines of two ranks lost some of the solidarity 
that was present in more compact formations, and it took longer for a two-rank line to 
form squares that bristled with bayonets, into which horses were reluctant to charge.63  
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On the Aboukir peninsula, the British found that the lines of two ranks worked 
effectively. The large open plains allowed the British to use a greater frontage, and 
their flanks were secured by the intersections of broken ground and the sea on either 
side.  
 
Events in the immediate aftermath of the Egyptian campaign suggest it had been a 
proving ground for the use of light infantry. Two new and innovative military 
education and training facilities were established that studied ‘American’ tactics. 
Before the end of 1801, Colonel John le Marchant founded the Royal Military 
College, in essence the first British Staff College at High Wycombe. Its purpose was 
to instruct young officers in military theories, concepts and tactics that existed not 
only in the British army, but in those of rival nations.64 John Moore, who was 
instrumental in the training of light infantry regiments prior to the Peninsular war, had 
been particularly impressed by the performance of light troops in Egypt. On his return 
to Britain, he advised the Duke of York that some of the best regiments in the service 
should be trained as marksmen and in light infantry tactics. The Duke approved of 
this idea, and gave him the means to form his own regiment. In 1803, at Shorncliffe 
in Kent, Moore took command of the Experimental Rifle Corps, and set about training 
a unit which valued intellectual as well as physical abilities amongst the ranks.65  
 
Emotional responses to the environment 
Although the strategic problems posed by the Egyptian environment were an 
important factor in the development of British infantry tactics, this was not a common 
topic of discussion in narratives of the Egyptian campaign. Perhaps the most popular 
means by which military personnel in Egypt engaged with, and described the 
environment around them, was through emotion and the language of sensation. 
Writing in this fashion, military memoirists were heavily influenced in form and style 
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by broader civilian cultures of writing, especially the ‘suffering traveller’.66 As Gavin 
Daly and Neil Ramsey highlight, the literary approach of the ‘suffering traveller’ 
enabled soldiers to employ the landscape as a medium through which to convey the 
arduous nature of their war experiences. Indeed, soldiers were so successful at 
conveying their hardships throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, that 
the reading public began to connect the language of suffering primarily with military 
personnel.67 
 
The soldiers’ description of the emotions and sensations experienced on campaign in 
Egypt, especially suffering, is most apparent in accounts of the climate. 
Unaccustomed to high temperatures and living on salted provisions, British soldiers 
struggled with the effects of dehydration throughout the campaign.68 After landing at 
Aboukir Bay, the troops’ only source of water for ten days were the small pools found 
by digging hollows around date trees with their bayonets. This trivial amount was “of 
a white clay colour, and brackish”, but the soldiers treated it “as if it were wine.”69 
During combat in the first days of the campaign, Sergeant Robertson, of the 92nd 
Gordon Highlanders, wrote of the extreme thirst: 
 
… with the effects of the powder in our mouths in biting 
off the ends of the cartridges, and the heat of the day, 
our throats were parched and burning… so thirsty were 
several of the men, that they adopted the expedient of 
trying to allay their parched throats with salt water; but 
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the result may be imagined – instead of benefiting 
them, it made them infinitely worse.70  
 
Fresh water springs were soon found, but the soldiers could never carry enough liquid 
with them, equipped with only their standard issue canteens. The difficult terrain 
exacerbated these problems. According to Lieutenant Exham Vincent of the 54th 
Regiment, the soldiers marched primarily “on sandy soil in which we were ankle 
deep”.71 This made the carrying of guns, provisions and ammunition from the fleet 
tortuously difficult. With severely limited numbers of draught animals, the soldiers 
had to carry many of their supplies for miles by hand, dragging them off the boats to 
the supply depots. It is worth considering here the weight of cannon pieces, the most 
common of which used by the British army were light and medium 6-pounders. One 
of these cannon pieces weighed approximately 230kg, and combined with its limbers 
and ammunition carriage, weighed over a tonne.72 This had significant strategic 
consequences, as Thomas Walsh noted during the battle of Mandara. The British 
advance was “often obliged to halt for the artillery, which, not being drawn by horses, 
but by men, was dragged with great difficulty and labour through the heavy sands”.73 
Daniel Nicol, another sergeant in the 92nd Highlanders, remembered that detachments 
of infantry “were frequently sent to assist the seamen with the guns….”74 
 
It is unsurprising, given the sweltering temperatures and the effort required to move 
such objects, that Sergeant Robertson reported “a number of the men had died of 
thirst, and others had gone mad from the effects.”75 Several memoirists stressed the 
indescribable nature of their ordeal. Francis Maule, a major in the Queens’ Regiment, 
wrote: “An unquenchable burning thirst continually demanded water. Who indeed, 
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who has not suffered in such a climate, experienced similar privations, and waded 
through the sands of Egypt, can form an adequate idea of the pains of extreme 
thirst?”76 Captain Vincent summarized the difficulties: “the men were nearly 
exhausted before they arrived. Heavily laden, and wading through scorching sand, 
without a drop of water to allay the thirst it produced, many of them fell down and 
were unable to proceed.”77 
 
Even the troops who had prior experience of hot temperatures in India or the West 
Indies were shocked by the intense heat. Baird’s 8,000 men, who had sailed from 
Bombay in January, reached Kossier, on the Egyptian coast of the Red Sea on 16 May.  
From there, the army marched across 120 miles of desert at the height of summer, and 
reached Cairo on 26 August, only to find the French garrison had already 
surrendered.78 Astonishingly, the army travelling by night achieved this feat with only 
one casualty, but it was undoubtedly a gruelling experience, even for the Indian 
regiments accustomed to the heat. While camped in centre of  “this horrid desert”, 
Charles Hill repeatedly emphasized his desire to be away from the heat and the sand. 
“We are”, he wrote, “heartily sick of it and anxious to get over it, the uncommon 
fatigue in the long marches exciting most dreadful thirst…. The idea of seeing a green 
field, a river, or a wood, has the same effect upon the mind as the sights of the white 
cliffs of Britain would have upon a homeward-bound Briton.” The desert was 
“unhealthy and even dangerous to the Constitution of an European”.79 James 
McGrigor, the superintendent surgeon to the Indian expeditionary force, opined. He 
had served in hot, tropical climates before: at Grenada and St Vincent in the West 
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Indies, and later in Bombay and Ceylon.80 Despite his experience he found himself 
unprepared for the heat. “The fatigue on the march”, McGrigor wrote, “has perhaps 
never been exceeded in any army”; the Egyptian desert was “most inimical to the 
human race”.81 The sepoys, he claimed, shared this view: “At Kossier, and in crossing 
the desert, the degree of heat was very great, and both the officers and men, from 
Madras, as well as Bengal, complained that it was more insupportable than they had 
ever felt it in the hottest seasons.”82 
 
One may argue that the shock experienced by British soldiers at the intense heat 
during the initial stages of the campaign, had an impact on British strategy. A few 
days after taking command of the army at Aboukir after the death of Abercromby, 
General John Hutchinson wrote to Henry Dundas, outlining his plans for the 
campaign. His aim was not to destroy the French garrisons; instead he sought to drive 
them away from the larger settlements and the Nile Delta, into the desert. There, the 
heat, lack of supplies, and hostility of the Bedouin would force the French to 
capitulate. Hutchinson reasoned that this approach would save the lives of British 
soldiers, by using the Egyptian climate to kill Frenchmen, rather than British muskets. 
In the event, this tactic was not pursued, the French were too numerous for this 
outcome to be possible, but it is interesting that Hutchinson entertained the possibility 
of using the climate as a weapon. He clearly appreciated the dangers of the Egyptian 
climate to European troops.83    
 
Some of the most intense descriptions of suffering were in the accounts of the local 
sandstorms – the Khamsin and Simoom. These storms blow great quantities of sand 
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and dust at speeds of up to 140 kilometres per hour, which blot out the sun and raise 
temperatures by as much as 20 degrees within two hours. The storms blow 
intermittently, most commonly between February and June, lasting from 30 minutes 
to a few days. In more violent cases, they are capable of harming crops, causing illness 
to livestock and people, and occasionally damaging buildings.84 Heatstroke is one of 
the most common complaints, as the hot winds bring more heat to the body than can 
be disposed of by the evaporation of perspiration. To the British soldiers, 
unaccustomed to the high temperatures of Egypt, the Khamsin and Simoom posed 
severe hazards. 
 
One of these violent storms descended on 23 May. It engulfed the British army, 
encamped on the banks of the Nile several miles downstream from Cairo, as well as 
the hospitals at Rosetta and Aboukir. Although the storm lasted only until the evening, 
few memoirs of the campaign fail to mention it, not only did it heighten the soldiers’ 
suffering, but it was a foreign and exotic phenomenon. Thomas Evans, a lieutenant in 
the 8th Regiment of Foot, wrote: “This day will be remembered by every person in 
camp, was it possible that they could exist for centuries to come.”85 Lt-Col. Robert 
Thomas Wilson, commander of a detachment of Hompesch mounted riflemen, 
described the heat: “the thermometer was at 120 [Fahrenheit] in the shade; the ground 
was heated like the floor of a furnace; every thing that was metallic, such as arms, 
buttons, knives… became burning hot.” Combined with the masses of sand and dust 
blowing furiously, respiration became difficult as “the lungs were parched with the 
fiery particles.”86 There was little the soldiers could do but endure. They hid in tents 
and buried themselves under blankets, in a desperate attempt to keep the burning sand 
out of their eyes and lungs. George Billanie, lying in a hospital bed at Rosetta, wrote: 
“The air was darkened with mist, which was so thick that it rendered breathing 
difficult.” He and his fellow patients huddled under their bedsheets, drenched in 
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sweat, “for although the heat was intense, and the blankets disagreeably warm and 
heavy… our breathing [was] more tolerable under them”.87  
 
One of the most interesting descriptions of the storm was written by Sergeant 
Robertson. Contrasting it with the most violent weather of the highlands, he wrote 
that the sand “fell upon us thick as snow-drift” and “formed altogether the opposite 
extreme of a Highland snow storm,- sand and heat instead of snow and cold.”88 
Robertson’s comment encapsulates an intriguing aspect of the soldiers’ reaction to the 
Egyptian climate, and draws comparison with the literary techniques of civilian 
travellers. According to historians John McAleer and Paul Carter, British tourists’ 
representations of exotic landscapes often possessed an urge to render the unfamiliar 
familiar, to make them conform with images of home in order to show that they could 
be controlled and mastered. Paradoxically there was also a desire to emphasize the 
exotic, wild and untamed character of these foreign lands, so that the protagonist of 
the narrative can be seen to be bringing the landscape and its people into the frame of 
civilization.89 By representing the Egyptian landscape and climate as completely 
opposite from the Highlands, the soldiers were able to communicate a sense of 
exoticism within a familiar visual vocabulary, thus pre-empting any feeling of 
disturbance that may have arisen among their readers from imagining foreign 
landscapes.90 
 
Another challenge posed by the Egyptian environment was the multitude of pests and 
vermin. Swarms of flies and fleas proved an infuriating menace, covering and biting 
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exposed skin, living in clothes and swarming over food before there was any chance 
of eating it. One of General Abercromby’s staff officers wrote “flies, fleas, bugs, 
moschettoes, cockroaches… live upon you… if you opened your mouth you were 
almost choaked by a swarm that rushed down your throat”.91 Considerable effort was 
required to deter them, as “it was impossible to eat without hiring persons to stand by 
every table with feathers, or flappers, to drive them away.” Without proper camping 
equipment, the soldiers slept under the stars for months on end, and no respite could 
be gained from insect bites: “The utmost attention to cleanliness, by a frequent change 
of every article of wearing apparel, could not repel the attacks of vermin which 
seemed to infest even the air of the place.”92 The bite from these insects “had an 
inflammatory effect; so much so, that every one for some time after his arrival, 
resembled a person in the height of measles.”93  
 
The soldiers’ accounts of Egyptian sandstorms and local pests highlight some of the 
differences between the experience of military personnel and civilian travellers. Many 
tourists wrote of the danger of Egyptian sandstorms and the annoyance of flies, fleas 
and locusts, but they nevertheless found the Egyptian climate bearable. During the 
twelve years John Antes stayed in Egypt, as an American Moravian missionary who 
served with the Coptic Church of Cairo, he “felt no other inconveniency from it but a 
more difficult respiration than usual, and an intolerable dust, exceedingly fine, and 
penetrating every where.”94 Claude-Étienne Savary, who spent two years in Egypt 
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between 1777 and 1779, wrote that the route between Cairo and Kossier, which the 
Indian expeditionary force traversed in 1801, was not too arduous:  
 
The inconveniences of the road from Cossier [sic] are 
not so great during winter the heats being much less… 
Even during summer, if proper care is taken to have a 
supply of provisions and water, in jars or skins… 
people who are accustomed to these climates perform 
this journey with tolerable ease.95  
 
The conflicting views of soldiers and civilian travellers on the rigours of the Egyptian 
environment, highlight some of the differences in the experiences of these two groups 
of writers. Soldiers camped in the Egyptian countryside for the duration of the 
campaign and, due to failings in planning and preparation, lacked proper camping 
equipment. They were entirely exposed to the harshest environmental features of the 
country: the hot climate, desert winds and irritating vermin. These circumstances were 
quite unlike those of tourists, who stayed in caravanserais, or carried their own 
camping equipment.96 In some ways however, military personnel benefited from 
superior living conditions to those of civilian travellers who had visited Egypt. 
Soldiers found it relatively easy to attain food provisions and they expressed a sense 
of personal security, which derived from the sizable British force, and the friendliness 
of the local inhabitants. Such conditions were rarely enjoyed by civilian travellers. 
John Antes illustrates this point. In 1779 he was seized and tortured by the Mamluks, 
who mistakenly thought Antes had hidden his wealth from them. He was quickly 
released when Antes could not pay, but he never fully recovered from the wounds he 
had received.97 Understandably, there are several instances where European travellers 
felt compelled for their own safety to impersonate and adopt the dress of a Muslim. 
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One of the most famous was Carsten Niebuhr, the only survivor of a Danish 
expedition to Arabia between 1761 and 1767. He attributed his survival in part to his 
adoption of native dress and eating habits.98 By the start of the Egyptian campaign, 
W.G. Browne, who published his travels in 1799, was perhaps the most recent tourist 
in Egypt to adopt Muslim attire for his safety.99 
 
This problem was not encountered by the British army in 1801. As a large, 
concentrated and easily recognizable military force, which paid for its supplies and 
made it clear that they were in Egypt to remove the French, the British forces were 
tacitly supported by most of the local population. According to some of the 
memoirists, this was evident in the delight of the Egyptian inhabitants in towns and 
villages as the army marched past. “men, women, and children got on the top of their 
flat-roofed houses and shouted for joy”.100 Others “crowded about us received us with 
every expression of delight, offered up prayers for our success, and the women 
congratulated us by a quick motion of the tongue… This uncommon mode of 
reception, it seems, meant to assure us how they rejoiced at our arrival”. 101 This 
response brought great satisfaction to the British, not least because the French had 
been treated in an entirely different manner. Robert Wilson summarized these 
thoughts. He claimed to have ridden through the country frequently without escort, 
all the while  
 
…experiencing the kindest attentions of friendship 
from every individual… There was a vanity justly 
indulged in reflecting, that a Frenchmen could never 
venture to pass through the same districts, even when 
the French army ruled with uncontested dominion, 
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unless guarded by a force sufficient to command his 
security.102  
 
Another officer, writing anonymously, offered a similar view, and even suggested the 
British were idolized by the Egyptians.  
 
From these very people have we received, and continue 
to receive every possible mark of attention, hospitality 
and attachment: they look upon us as a wonderful race, 
who, though able to defeat the French, whom they 
supposed invincible, yet do not exercise that strength 
which we are known by them to have, in levying 
contribution, taking things without paying for them, or 
in any way oppressing them.103 
 
Egyptian support for the British was manifested primarily in supplies. After the 
victory at Mandara on 13 March, local Arabs began to appear at the British camp, and 
a sizeable market sprang up. Various kinds of provisions could be attained, for a price. 
On sale were water, coffee, bread, sheep, goats, fowls, eggs, fish and all kinds of 
indigenous fruit and vegetables, “in short, every thing that the country afforded”.104 
A little money was distributed to the troops to buy what they wanted, and Daniel Nicol 
had a particularly successful first visit to the market: “I bought a sheep for a Spanish 
dollar and a cheese about 10lbs. for 60 paras and a bunch of young onions.”105  
 
The market was important enough as a source of supply that George Baldwin, the 
former consul in Egypt, was appointed its superintendent to keep the stalls regular and 
organized.106 Other services were occasionally supplied by the Arabs, as Nicol 
observed. “Some stout fellows among them would carry eight or ten men’s knapsacks 
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a whole day’s march for ten or twelve paras.”107 Later, Arabs were employed to 
supply the hospitals with water, bringing it from the Nile on their backs in goat skins. 
To the delight of the sick and wounded, a few skins arrived full of wine and honey.108 
Some British soldiers were conflicted as to whether these Arab salesmen were 
motivated by kindness or greed.  Thomas Walsh for instance, was certain that the 
Arabs made a tidy profit, and he became irritated with their attempts to “impose on us 
as much as possible.” Yet Walsh later recognized that the Arabs travelled to the British 
camp at their own risk. The French executed any who were caught heading to the 
British camp with provisions.109 
 
Moreover, food and refreshments were occasionally supplied to the British free of 
charge. This was most common when the vanguard of the British force arrived to 
occupy settlements previously held by the French. Milk, bread and jars of water would 
often be distributed among the thirsty troops. A notable instance of this occurred at 
Darmanhur, when crowds of Egyptians met the British and handed out refreshments 
a mile from the outskirts of the town.110 The British force from India, marching 
through the desert, rarely had to pay for the stream of supplies they received from the 
locals. The Indian troops, “experience the greatest friendship from the Arabs; who 
willingly afforded them all the assistance in their power, without which it would have 
been almost impossible for them to have reached Cairo.” It later emerged that this 
payment had merely been deferred. Osman Bey, in command of the Mamluks, had 
arranged the payment for the supplies, and shrewdly sent the bill to the Ottoman Grand 
Vizir. The Vizir refused to pay and, on the conclusion of the campaign, charged it to 
the British.111 
 
Although British soldiers received assistance from the fellahs, the Egyptian peasantry, 
they were not supported by the Bedouin. These bands of nomadic, desert dwelling 
tribes had no allegiance, and had little care whom they assaulted. Although the British 
                                                        
107 Nicol, Experiences, 58.  
108 Anon. [Billanie], Narrative of A Private Soldier in His Majesty’s 92nd Regiment, 111-112. 
109 Walsh, Journal, 52-53, 95.  
110 Anon., Non-Military Journal, 49.  
111 Walsh, Journal, 206. 
 76 
were safe in numbers, isolated soldiers and stragglers were easy prey to the Bedouin, 
who invariably robbed and murdered their victims, leaving the mutilated bodies for 
their comrades to find. The hazards the Bedouin posed were reflected in general orders 
on 13 May: “Officers will be careful to explain to the soldiers, and all persons 
belonging to the army, the danger which they incur of being robbed and plundered by 
the Arabs, if they stray from, or remain behind their regiments.”112 The fear of the 
Bedouin is most apparent in artilleryman Benjamin Miller’s account. On 13 June, he 
became seriously ill and was barely able to stay upright on his horse. He quickly fell 
behind the main body of the army on the march, and was provided with a “Non-
Commissioned officer and two men to guard me and get me along, as it was dangerous 
of being killed by the Arabs if we stopped in the rear”.113 
 
Although British soldiers generally benefited from the affability of the local Egyptians 
and the supplies they provided, one must remember that soldiers were not ordinary 
travellers. They did not enjoy an itinerary defined solely by travel books or the more 
temperate seasons of the year. Their paths were largely determined by the exigencies 
of war, often taking them to remote and inhospitable regions; and they travelled in all 
weather conditions, common soldiers slogging it on foot. The soldiers’ travel 
arrangements were therefore physically and psychologically more demanding than 
those of civilians. This is perhaps most apparent with regard to voyages at sea. Before 
sailing to Egypt, most of the troops in the Abercromby’s force had been employed 
during the past seven months on various abortive expeditions. Apart from rare 
intervals, they had been confined on crowded, filthy and stinking transports either at 
sea or in harbours. Daniel Nicol wrote a detailed account of the abysmal 
accommodation aboard the troopship HMS Stately:  
 
we had no hammocks or beds but only our camp 
blankets to sleep in. We lay on the under deck and when 
the weather was stormy so much water leaked in by the 
edges of the ports as made the lee side of the ship very 
wet. When she tacked the water would run across the 
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whole deck and so we had to lie in the damp. This made 
us very uncomfortable and caused us to feel stiff and 
our bones sore.114 
 
In these conditions the men lived on an unappetising diet of foul water, salt pork, and 
biscuits which, “were bad and full of worms; many of our men could only eat them in 
the dark!”115 It is unsurprising that men fell ill. Daniel Nicol recalled: “An infectious 
slow fever broke out in our regiment… Our condition on board the Stately contributed 
towards it…” When Nicol’s regiment, the 92nd, landed at Aboukir, he claimed, “About 
400 of our men were left on board the fleet ill of fever”.116 The condition of the 92nd 
was not exceptional. Clearly, living for months on board troopships was not conducive 
to physical fitness or health, and this was reflected in the sick lists. When the army 
finally sailed to Egypt, over ten per cent of the expeditionary force was ill.117 
Reflecting on the prevalence of sickness, one officer remarked, “on shipboard private 
                                                        
114 Nicol, Experiences, 30-31.  
115 Ibid., 29. See also: Anon., [Billanie] Narrative of A Private Soldier in His Majesty’s 92nd 
Regiment, 59; See: Documents relating to Lt James Brown, 44th (East Essex) Regiment of Foot, 
1798-1801, National Army Museum, 80-11-40-1, pp.13-15; ‘Fortunes of Highlander Whimster’ - 
Memoirs and letters of James Whimster, 79th Highlanders 1800-1811, National Army Museum, 87-
03-21, pp.1-2. Voyages in these troopships were so despised that soldiers were haunted by memories 
of the passage once they had disembarked. “I never wish to be on board a man of war again” wrote 
Lieutenant James Brown of the 44th Regiment, after landing at Marmaris. His next voyage would 
sadly be his last.  
116 Ibid., 30-31, 47. Taking the 92nd as an example, the regiment had 681 men fit for duty at Marmaris 
in January. According to the order of battle for 8 March, only 529 men were fit for duty. 152 men had 
been rendered unfit before the fighting had begun. By 18 March, the 92nd comprised of 643 men, and 
only 283 were fit for duty. These figures must take into account the losses in combat: The 92nd had 
been in the thick of the fighting on 8 March, when the army as a whole sustained 625 casualties. See: 
Abercromby to Dundas, 16 February 1801, War Office (WO) 1/345, pp.79-80; State of the Army, 18 
March 1801, War Office (WO) 1/345, p.113; Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, 70, 75.  
117 See: G. Kempthorne, ‘The Egyptian Campaign of 1801’, Journal of the Royal Army Medical 
Corps 55, no.3 (1930): 219-220. See also: McGrigor, Medical Sketches, 89. On assuming his duties 
as the expeditionary force sailed to Egypt, Dr. James Franck, the Principal Medical Officer, found 
that there were 1,098 sick with the army and a further 798 at Malta, Minorca and other places in the 
Mediterranean. The number of effectives numbered 16,347. 
 78 
soldiers suffer ten times as much almost, as before an enemy”.118 By comparison, on 
his voyage from Gibraltar to Constantinople, the novelist John Galt enjoyed lengthy 
stopovers at Sardinia, Sicily, Malta, Crete and the southern coast of Anatolia.119 
Shorter voyages allowed the body to recover from the debilitating conditions on board 
ships.   
 
Already weak from the conditions on the transports, soldiers naturally succumbed to 
more serious illnesses as they undertook the demanding day-to-day routine of 
campaigning in a climate to which they were unaccustomed. Benjamin Miller, an 
artilleryman, provided an insight into the soldier’s routine, at the height of summer in 
August. After the march had been halted for the day, he had to travel “often 10 or 12 
miles to go for forage”, and then “perhaps 2 or 3 miles to go to the Nile” to feed and 
water the horses, “before we could look to ourselves, which would be frequently very 
late at night”. The following morning, Miller had to be “up by two o’clock, and 
formed into line 2 hours before other soldiers were out of [their] tents.”120 Miller was 
an exceptional case; such an exhausting routine was not constant throughout the 
campaign, and in the hottest season the army marched by night. During the British 
advance along the Nile, General Hutchinson occasionally ordered a halt for a day to 
allow the men to recuperate. In spite of this, the soldiers were required to endure 
extended periods of intense activity, which involved several weeks if not months of 
long marches, with little rest.  
 
The language of sensation and sentimentality were important elements in the 
emotional response of military memoirists to the climate, but it was employed most 
often in descriptions of infection and disease. Although civilian writers often 
described their own struggles with sickness during their travels in Egypt, this problem 
was more common, and more serious, in military bodies, where standards of hygiene 
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were naturally reduced. Sickness was a constant feature of armies in the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and the Egyptian environment exacerbated this 
problem. The scarcity of water, desert winds and swarms of flies and mosquitoes 
made the maintenance of any hygiene whatsoever almost impossible. The situation 
was exaggerated by the lack of spare uniforms. By September, the British had lived 
in the same clothes day and night for six months, only undressing to wash.121 The 
result of such conditions was a rapid and alarming spread of various diseases, and a 
tendency for even the slightest wounds to fester. By 30 March, three weeks after the 
initial landing, the number of sick had swelled to over twenty-five per cent of the 
army.122  
 
The physical pain from wounds and disease, and the fear that they might prove fatal 
or permanently debilitating, was effectively conveyed in the soldiers’ writing. George 
Billanie in the 92nd Highlanders, had been “wounded in a comparatively merciful 
manner” during the Battle of Alexandria on 21 March. The wound became infected, 
and “continued for some time to get worse, the inflammation spreading, the lower part 
of the leg swelling greatly, and the pain being excessive.” His leg healed and he began 
to move about with a crutch, only to fall and re-open the wound, which became 
infected again. Too sick to move, Billanie was tormented by fleas, while swarms of 
flies hatched maggots in his wound. He “prayed earnestly for mercy”, acutely aware 
that his condition might claim his life. He survived the recurring infection, and 
embarked from Egypt in September, but his wound was still opening when he landed 
in Britain at the end of 1801. He never fully recovered, and was enrolled as an out-
pensioner at the Chelsea Hospital.123 Others were not so fortunate. One soldier, who 
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for a time occupied the bed next to Bilannie, “had been slightly wounded: a musket 
ball having grazed the front of his leg; he was able to walk about with little 
inconvenience.” Within a few days, “His wound had got much worse…it was soon 
found necessary to amputate his leg, an operation which he did not survive long.”124 
The bereavement following the deaths of comrades in this manner was often written 
about. As the army prepared to march on Cairo, Daniel Nicol made one last visit to 
his wounded friends in the hospital sheds at Aboukir. Recalling his visit brought him 
considerable grief: “few that had limbs taken off recovered. This day I shook hands 
with many a one I never saw again.”125 
 
One condition the British had not previously encountered was “Egyptian” ophthalmia, 
a severe form of bacterial conjunctivitis, that was highly infectious and capable of 
rendering its victims blind.126  This ailment was endemic to Egypt; it was so 
widespread, wrote Captain Thomas Walsh, “that eyes perfectly sound and uninjured 
are very seldom to be seen.”127 Its prevalence was probably due to the economic 
distress of the common Egyptians, who lived in appalling poverty under the rule of 
the Mamluks. Poor sanitation, crowded living conditions and inadequate clean water, 
all contributed to the spread of the disease. The number of cases peaked during the 
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flooding of the Nile, as suburbs and villages on the banks of the river were submerged 
and standards of hygiene deteriorated.128 
 
Unsurprisingly, ophthalmia was rapidly transmitted to the British soldiers. One of the 
most complete reports on the disease was written by James McGrigor. Almost as soon 
as the Indian expeditionary force arrived in Egypt, at Kossier, McGrigor reported that 
ophthalmia “prevailed very generally” among the troops. By October 1801, having 
reached Alexandria, McGrigor stated that “the great degree of violence in which this 
disease was now seen”, was “really alarming.”129 George Billanie was dismayed at 
the volume of ophthalmia sufferers who passed through his hospital tent. He declared: 
“There was hardly an individual who did not suffer, more or less, the consequences 
of this painful malady.”130 Nothing had been encountered before that was comparable 
to the horrendous symptoms of this disease. Accompanied by fever, an ophthalmia 
sufferer’s eyelids commonly swell to such an extent they cannot be opened. The eyes 
become irritable, discharging pus, and any direct light causes pain. The main cycle of 
the disease usually passes in two weeks, the majority of British soldiers in Egypt 
recovered without medicine. However, there were numerous cases in which 
inflammation lasted for months, and many of these unfortunates were permanently 
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blinded in one or both eyes.131 Captain Vincent recalled in gruesome detail the agony 
of “several hundred” men, who “were attended with a most excruciating torment; in 
the course of a few days the eyes became so inflamed and swelled, as literally to burst 
in their sockets, and through this produce total blindness…”132 Soldiers were not the 
only sufferers. John Nicol, a sailor on board HMS Goliath, had been employed with 
supplying provisions and water to the army, when he contracted the disease. 
Following the sailor’s tradition for storytelling, Nicol revealed in detail the pain that 
he endured:  
 
My sufferings were most acute. I could not lie down for 
a moment, for the scalding water, that continually 
flowed from my eyes filled them and put me to 
exquisite torture. I sat constantly on my chest with a 
vessel of cold water bathing them. If I slept I awoke in 
an agony of pain.133  
 
The horrific nature of their wounds and the painful symptoms of disease had a 
profound psychological effect on British servicemen. Until the twentieth century, the 
most commonly diagnosed psychological condition in the military was homesickness 
or ‘nostalgia’. It was often triggered by dates in the calendar such as Christmas, by 
letters received from loved ones at home, or by the onset of illness or extreme 
hardship. Instances of homesickness are difficult to establish with any precision, as in 
medical circles the term “nostalgia” was used to refer to a range of mental disorders. 
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Although the condition appears not to have been markedly present in the British army 
during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars in comparison to the French legions, 
there are records of depression and suicide in the mortality statistics of campaigns in 
exotic theatres far from home, especially the West Indies.134 Egypt was no exception. 
After suffering from a range of maladies, including fever and a violent bout of cholera, 
Captain Warren Marmaduke Peacoke, of the 2nd Guard Regiment, wrote of his longing 
to be “under the shade of some friendly tree in England”.135 George Billanie, wounded 
in his ankle, and who at the time also suffered from a mild case of ophthalmia, 
expressed a similar feeling. Referring to disease as the by-product of a wicked society, 
Billanie wrote: “from Egypt, the land of bondage, I cast a longing eye to my native 
home, and wished myself there, that I might enjoy the benefits of a Sabbath, the 
instructions of religious teachers, and freedom from the society of the wicked.”136 
Sergeant Robertson, severely dehydrated during a desert march, expressed a longing 
for his native Scotland.  
 
I have no doubt that many a poor fellow, suffering from 
burning thirst – his throat parched, and his tongue 
cleaving to the roof of his mouth – was, like myself, 
thinking of the hills and rills of our dear loved Scotia, 
‘the land of the mountain and the flood.’137  
 
According to Carl Thompson, who has explored the romance attached to the notion 
of suffering in travel, one of the main reasons behind a traveller’s emphasis on their 
suffering was the real political and social power these stories could wield. Stories of 
misadventure, especially during the Revolutionary period, were politically charged. 
This was especially the case for tales of shipwreck or maritime misadventure. Political 
commentators frequently imagined British society as a ship, or referred to the ship as 
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a microcosm of society, hence maritime narratives could easily become suggestive of 
wider debates. For example, the troubled relationship between a captain and his crew, 
called on readers to reflect on the level of authority invested in a sea captain, and 
whether there were ever legitimate grounds for seamen to oppose their superiors.138  
One could apply a similar argument to the British army. A company or regiment might 
be referred to as a microcosm of British society, and the suffering that soldiers endured 
in Egypt could be interpreted as an appeal for readers to reflect on the quality of 
planning, organization and leadership in the military services. In some ways, this 
argument lacks substance: maritime narratives were politically charged in part 
because Britain had an intense preoccupation with the sea, and was reliant on the 
Royal Navy for prosperity and security.139 Nevertheless, there were instances during 
the Egyptian campaign where soldiers attributed their suffering to poor decisions or 
planning by their superiors. Daniel Nicol’s narrative provides a detailed example. On 
17 May, as the army camped at Algam on the bank of the Nile, Nicol and his regiment, 
the 92nd, were heading to the boats for their rations and water. Before they could do 
so, “an Arab was seen riding into the camp at full gallop… he gave intelligence that 
the French were in the desert to our right and rear. On this alarm… our brigade got 
under arms.” General John Doyle, the brigade commander, had promised to provide 
the men with rum, bread and water before they marched. Unfortunately, “just as he 
and the rations came in sight the order to march was given, and we entered the desert 
very ill prepared indeed.” In a climate where temperatures could reach 40 degrees, 
spending a few minutes to provision the men with adequate water should have taken 
precedence over catching the French detachment. The British followed their Arab 
guide as quickly as they could, and, after marching seven miles, forced the party of 
600 Frenchmen to surrender. However, dehydration took its toll on the British army. 
Nicol unhappily remembered:  
 
This was the worst day’s march we had in the country. 
Very few men had time to get water in their canteens, 
at every step we sank over the ankle in light sand, and 
for three paces to the front we slid one back. The sun 
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was very hot and not a breath of wind. Hundreds of our 
people dropped down and had to be taken up by the 
camels and I am sorry to say that some of the men of 
our brigade while in this helpless condition were killed 
by the Bedouin Arabs for the sake of their arms and 
accoutrements.140 
 
In these hot conditions, it was sensible for officers to soften the physical demands 
they put on their men whenever possible, but some refused to do so. Nicol was furious 
at Colonel Spencer, his brigade commander, who had told Hutchinson there was no 
need for the camels the general provided to help the men carry their equipment on 
their march from Cairo to Aboukir in July. The 92nd, along with the other regiments 
of Spencer’s brigade, suffered accordingly.141 Irrespective of their political impact, 
there is evidence to suggest that accounts of soldiers’ suffering earned them respect 
from their readers. This is apparent in a review of Francis Maule’s Memoirs of the 
Principal Events in the Campaigns of North Holland and Egypt, published in the 
Monthly Review. Although the periodical considered Maule’s book “extremely 
defective”, there was a sense of respect for the ordeals described within it. “the 
annoyance experienced by the troops in so hot a climate was greater than persons 
accustomed to the enjoyment of a moderate temperature can possibly conceive.”142 
Another example can be found in an anonymous letter to the Christian Observer, 
published in 1803. It declared: “I can scarcely express how much gratitude I feel 
towards those men who have gone forth so cheerfully to assert our rights and defend 
our cause, amidst the tainted gales of Cairo, and the burning sands of Alexandria.”143  
 
The soldiers’ emotional responses to the environment were not solely concerned with 
negative feelings; they were incredibly varied, ranging from despair to delight. 
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Representations of the environment was a medium through which soldiers could 
transmit the extreme psychological experience of war to their readers. The sight of the 
river Nile, after days or perhaps weeks of marching and fighting in stifling conditions, 
commonly provoked extreme emotions of joy among the soldiers. For several 
memoirists, the moment in which they reach the Nile served as an important turning 
point in the narrative. Up to this point, the British had conducted the campaign on 
dull, dry, arid terrain, in which fresh water was scarce. 144  They had defeated the 
French in several engagements and one pitched battle. Once the British reached the 
Nile and seized Rosetta and Rhamanieh, no further sizeable engagements took place. 
Reaching the Nile therefore had symbolic significance, providing visual confirmation 
that the worst privations of the campaign were over, and the misery of the desert was 
replaced by the joys of the fertile Nile delta. In several cases, this moment sets up the 
remainder of the narrative, as a British victory became increasingly assured. One of 
the best examples of this turning point was written anonymously by one of 
Abercromby’s staff officers. Describing the landscape immediately surrounding 
Alexandria and Aboukir, he wrote:  
 
…from the day of our landing until after the action on 
the 21st, my ideas of Egypt, and the conjectures I 
formed, were not particularly favourable;… the eye 
ranged over a vast space of country, yet met nothing but 
a continuation of that dreary, glaring, white sand, which 
fatigued and oppressed the eye, and bespoke only 
intense heat, and its comitant agrémens.145 
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The staff officer was wounded in battle on 21 March, and was removed by boat to the 
hospital at Rosetta. He described his condition as “faint, debilitated and miserable, 
with a nasty fever”, which, quite understandably,  
 
oppressed my spirits dreadfully; but the sudden 
transition from barren hot sand, and every thing that 
proclaimed a desolate and melancholy country, into the 
cheerful verdant soil which, either side of the Nile, 
presented to my feverish, but now all-devouring eye, 
gave such a fillip to exhausted and desponding nature, 
that, as if roused from lethargy, inspirited and revived 
by the unexpected novelty of the scene, I involuntarily 
rose up in the boat, and felt a degree of strength for a 
long time quite unknown to me. Every minute added to 
the beauty of the scene, and to my strength.146 
 
Reflecting on this scene, he wrote:  
 
I never can forget my first trip up the Nile; which must 
at all times gladden and rejoice the poor unfortunate 
fellow who, like myself, shall enter it, either from a 
long séjour on board ship or from the barren plains of 
Alexandria. I confess the effect it produced upon me, 
was that of doing for me more than all the medicins, or 
medicines in the country; I felt myself, for the moment, 
a renovated man.147 
 
Having reached the Nile, the officers’ description of his suffering ended abruptly. It 
is replaced by a description of his recovery and of his walks through the landscape 
filled with a dazzling array of produce – orange, citron, lemon, fig, banana, olive and 
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date. “Nothing can be more grateful than an afternoon’s stroll into these wildernesses” 
he wrote contentedly.148  
 
A similar turning point was conveyed by members of the Anglo-Indian army, once 
they reached Qena, on the banks of the Nile, after marching across the desert from 
Kossier, on the coast of the Red Sea. Marching by night, the Nile suddenly appeared 
before them as dawn broke. Lachlan Macquarie, the deputy adjutant-general to the 
Anglo-Indian army, wrote:  
 
On the appearance of the day this morning we were 
most agreeably surprised with the change of Scene now 
before and around us in comparison with the wild 
dreary and arid Desert we have been travelling in for 
some days past. We are now at length arrived in a 
cultivated country and everything here is green and 
beautiful.149  
 
Charles Hill struggled to convey the striking appearance of the Nile before him: “the 
contrast between this and the desert may be much easier imagined as it struck us than 
described.”150 The tendency for military servicemen to describe the arrival at the Nile 
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as a turning point in the narrative suggests that soldiers were tapping into the 
Romantic fascination in the misfortune of travellers among British reading audiences. 
Military memoirists often competed with the most popular travelogues and, at times, 
appropriated not only their writing conventions but also their structure. The voyage 
to the war-zone, the suffering of combat and campaigning, and the joy and relief at 
military victory, returning home, or merely surviving, draws comparison with 
framework of the ‘suffering’ travel narrative.151  
 
Aspirations for imperial intervention 
In spite of the suffering they had endured in the Egyptian environment, it is apparent 
that British soldiers discussed the possibility of further imperial ventures in the 
country. The picturesque was vital in this regard. Picturesque tourism was one of the 
primary ways in which British officers engaged with the landscape during their 
recreational hours. This had become a popular activity from around 1775; the search 
for and appreciation of natural, pastoral scenery became a means by which Britons 
could escape physically, imaginatively and intellectually from the growing pressures 
and complexities of metropolitan life. It seems that for some officers in Egypt, the 
picturesque offered a temporary escape from the strains of the campaign.152 
 
Crucially, as Jeffrey Auerbach notes, literary and visual representations of the 
picturesque employed a consistent set of principles or formulae. As a result, diverse 
regions such as South Africa, India, Australia, the Pacific Islands and Egypt were 
presented through the picturesque lens in remarkably similar ways. The picturesque 
had initially been used to represent English landscapes, and depicting imperial 
landscapes in these terms served to portray these regions as similar to, rather than 
different from Britain. In other words, the picturesque helped to homogenize 
representations of landscapes in Britain and its imperial regions. It created a concept 
of sameness rather than difference. Although there was some freedom to capture and 
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convey local differences, everywhere the picturesque was deployed it served to 
conceal hardships and beautify unattractive or unpleasant features of life on the 
imperial frontiers.153 David Cannadine has identified this process as “the 
domestication of the exotic”: Exoticism was still expressed in the picturesque, but was 
largely stripped of its alien otherness, allowing the British viewer to remain in their 
visual comfort zone.154 One must be careful however, not to overemphasize the 
similarities between picturesque representations of Britain and the imperial frontier. 
Although there was a general resemblance they were not identical. The picturesque in 
Britain emphasized novelty and rugged, unkempt beauty, but representations of the 
colonies, particularly India, could be slightly different. In reaction to the dangers of 
the Indian climate, and the perceived violence and oppression of its inhabitants, 
picturesque representations of India were softer and more regularized, with gentle 
curves and delicate colouring.155  These “feminine” qualities of the landscape 
provided a subtle visual representation of the gendered relationship between ‘manly’ 
Britain and ‘effeminate’ India. 156 
 
Picturesque painters achieved “the domestication of the exotic” using a standardized 
set of techniques. They frequently used a Claude glass, a small convex mirror that 
brought every scene within the compass of a picture, and they produced pictures with 
an identifiable structure and tint. Picturesque paintings were commonly divided into 
three distances: foreground, middle ground and a hazy background. Features such as 
trees and ruins were positioned to create a balanced composition, and frame the 
viewer’s attention. Ruins, small settlements or bodies of water were frequently the 
central feature of the picture, the whole of which was commonly tinted with a soft 
golden light.157 One can discern this approach among British officers in Egypt. 
Indeed, views were often described as if they were paintings. A good example of this 
is Thomas Walsh. After the surrender of Alexandria in September 1801, he 
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accompanied Eyre Coote and George Ludlow on a boat trip to Cairo. He described 
the impressive view before him as they sailed from Rosetta:  
 
Nothing at the moment could surpass the beauty of the 
scene; and to our eyes, so long unaccustomed to any 
kind of verdure, the environs of Rosetta, and the shaded 
banks of the Nile, could not but exhibit a prospect 
highly delightful. This reviving verdure, both sides of 
the river thickly covered with date and other trees and 
numberless villages not half a mile asunder scattered 
along the banks, render the whole of the picture quite 
enchanting, nor could we keep our eyes from the beauty 
of the scene for the remainder of the day.158  
 
The conventions and features of picturesque are apparent in this description. Walsh 
could easily have been describing the features of a painting. The image he depicted is 
centred on the Nile, the shaded banks in the foreground provide the frame. In the 
middle-ground and background he described the winding river flanked on either side 
by trees and “numberless villages” - his use of this phrase gives the scene a sense of 
grandeur. One might argue that the description he provides paints a mental image 
similar to Claude Lorrain’s paintings Landscape with Ascanius Shooting the Stag of 
Sylvia (1682), or A view of the Roman Campagna from Tivoli, evening (1644-5). Both 
of these popular picturesque paintings show a lush valley, with a winding river 
flowing from foreground to background, bordered by trees, shrubs and ruins. The 
small size of the buildings, animals and people dotted across the scene provides a 
sense of size to the view represented within these paintings.  
 
Cooper Williams’ narrative provides another example of a military memoir which 
adhered to picturesque principles. He served as the reverend on board the HMS 
Swiftsure, a 74-gun third-rate ship of the line, which took part in the battle of the Nile. 
After the battle, a small squadron remained stationed off the coast of Aboukir to 
maintain the blockade of Alexandria. The Swiftsure was part of this squadron. In 
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January 1799, when the Swiftsure sailed to Acre to acquire supplies for the blockading 
fleet, Williams obtained leave to go on shore at Haifa, fifteen miles south of Acre. 
Accompanied by a party of officers, he proceeded to ascend Mount Carmel which 
overlooked the city. Williams recalled the scene on reaching the summit:  
 
From this height we had a delightful view of the 
surrounding romantic country. Directly under us 
appeared the town of Caiffe; [Haifa] to the right 
extended a level plain of apparently rich land, watered 
by the rivers Belus and Kishon, and bounded by the 
mountains of Nazareth…. Over these mountains, at the 
distance of twenty miles, the towering heights of Mount 
Lebanon raised their snowy heads. The summit of 
Carmel, though perfectly wild and uncultivated, had its 
peculiar beauties. Small grass-plots of the finest 
herbage were surrounded by flowing shrubs of various 
kinds; among which the arbutus and dwarf-oak bore a 
conspicuous character.159 
 
Williams’ description, and the two engravings of this scene which accompanied it on 
the following pages, was set very much by the conventions of picturesque painting. 
The view he described (and later engraved) was centred on a small settlement and a 
body of water - Haifa on shores of eastern Mediterranean. The view was framed by 
the trees and shrubs of Mount Carmel in the foreground. In the hazy background were 
the snow-tipped mountains. Through the use of picturesque principles in his 
description and engravings, one can see a resemblance between his mental (and 
physical) images of Haifa, and William Daniell’s paintings Penmuan-maur, taken 
from near Aber, N. Wales (1815), and View from Portsdown Hill (1824).160 
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Representing the Egyptian landscape as visually familiar to Britain made it desirable, 
and such feelings were also expressed as British personnel reflected on the 
productivity of Egypt. On reaching the Nile, British soldiers were struck by the sheer 
fertility of the ground on which they marched. “I have seen plenty of barley and all 
other grain” wrote Daniel Nicol, “and at this season, standing on one of the raised 
banks and looking east over the river across the Delta which is level as far as the eye 
can reach, to see the fields bringing forth their yellow treasure is a very pleasant 
sight”161 Lieutenant Aeneas Anderson agreed: “The environs of Rosetta are well 
cultivated, and produce an abundance of wheat, barley, rice and different kinds of 
delicious fruits and vegetables…”162 This description of a highly productive landscape 
was interspersed with melancholic accounts of agricultural regression. Writing on this 
subject was common in descriptions of Alexandria and Aboukir. This area was known 
to have been lush and fertile in past centuries, a result of regular irrigation with fresh 
water from the canal linking Alexandria to the Nile delta. Over time, the canal, built 
under Ptolemy I, became clogged with silt and the irrigated fields dried up. By 1801, 
it was no longer navigable and barely produced sufficient water to supply the wells in 
Alexandria.163 Major Francis Maule reflected on this deterioration: 
 
All this coast, was in ages back, well inhabited, 
containing cities, towns and well inhabited countries… 
At the present day, the eye discovers….to the south and 
west… nothing but a void still more discouraging, of 
sterile sands, without even a solitary house or tree, a 
boundless horizon of barrenness.164 
 
Charles Hill, expressed the same opinion. “it is plainly to be seen that this Peninsula 
[at Aboukir] must formerly have contained the largest (and I believe I may say) the 
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largest city in the world at present. It is a most desolate wretched view, not a tree, not 
a blade of grass, nor a bush to be seen…”165  
 
The seemingly deplorable condition of Aboukir provided Britain with a pretext to 
intervene, to help improve the lot of the inhabitants, and return the region to its former 
splendour. Writing in the context of the Enlightenment and Britain’s profound 
agricultural transformation, soldiers acknowledged the productive soil, but 
condemned poor standards of cultivation. Outlining potential improvements enabled 
soldiers to demonstrate their own refinement, and express the profound sense of 
technological superiority that they felt over ‘Eastern’ powers. In the words of Robert 
Wilson:  
 
Egypt, from its fertility, is a most valuable colony to 
any power…. every thing which the wants and luxuries 
of Europe demand might here be cultivated. From her 
locality, Egypt would soon again recover by commerce 
considerable splendour, if a good government did but 
direct the resources.166 
 
Wilson asked his readers “to what vast extent would it expand, when cherished and 
protected by the regulations of an adequate government.”?167 Francis Collins was one 
of the foremost commentators on agriculture. Little is known about him, other than 
he was formerly a lieutenant who had served on HMS Dolphin. He had been on tour 
since 1796 and had visited Portugal, Spain, Sicily and Asia Minor. By chance, Collins 
was camped at Marmaris Bay in December 1800 when the flotilla of Abercromby’s 
expeditionary force arrived to prepare for the landing in Egypt. Collins decided to 
accompany the army. After the campaign, he denounced Egypt’s lack of productivity.  
 
Egypt has been long considered a farm…Unhappily for 
this country, its governors, in general, acting on a 
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narrow and selfish principle, instead of a broad and 
liberal policy, have checked its abundance… had they 
been equally solicitous to encourage its resources, as 
they are expert in drawing supplies, it would have 
yielded half as much again.168  
 
George Baldwin, the former consul who accompanied the Egyptian campaign in an 
advisory role, provided the most remarkable plea for intervention in the country. In a 
letter to Henry Dundas, written in September 1801, and published a year later in his 
Recollections, Baldwin claimed  
 
If Egypt could be improved in any proportion to the 
susceptibility of improvement, I would not hesitate to 
say that we might reckon upon a circulation of two 
thousand ships of commerce in one year from Egypt to 
the ports of England… If it can be held to England, she 
may talk of jewels in her crown, but a brighter than this 
she will not possess.169 
 
Interestingly, references to agricultural regression in support of imperial intervention 
was rare among officers of the East India Company. Reflecting the priorities of the 
East India company throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, most 
company officers put forward geo-political justifications for colonization, rather than 
referring to the financial benefits or the suffering of the local population. Charles Hill, 
for example, wrote:  
 
This must at all events prove a new and very interested 
Expedition in regard to the Eastern Empire. The French 
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must have it, as our possessions in India be in the 
utmost danger – nothing can be more easy for them than 
wafting their army in small craft from the Red Sea to 
any part of the Malabar coast.170  
 
The criticism of Egypt’s agricultural industry, and the conviction it could be improved 
through British intervention, was a view that had been framed in part by prevailing 
cultural values and practices in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Britain. 
The bulk of civilian travel literature published in this period condemned Egyptian 
agriculture in a very similar style to the soldiers. William Eton, who first published A 
Survey of the Turkish Empire in 1798, wrote: “In the beautiful country and climate of 
Egypt, it is distressing to consider how little the advantages of nature are 
cultivated…”171 Perhaps the two most vehement critics of Egyptian agriculture in this 
period were the Comte de Volney and Claude-Étienne Savary, whose travelogues 
proved hugely influential to the French expedition to Egypt, and were translated and 
widely read in Britain. They described “the art of cultivation” in Egypt as being “in 
the most deplorable state; the husbandmen is destitute of instruments… his plough is 
frequently no more than the branch of a tree”.172 Much like their military counterparts, 
the comments by travel authors provided a moral justification to intervene in Egypt, 
by portraying imperial expansion as a sentimental response to the lack of 
development. 
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‘Eastern’ diseases and medical topographies  
The aspiration expressed by British soldiers to acquire or exploit the Egyptian 
landscape was tempered to some extent by widespread concerns about ‘eastern’ 
diseases. The connection that soldiers made between Egypt on one hand, and India 
and the West Indies on the other, was vital in driving these concerns. In this period, 
several philosophes and medical practitioners were convinced that physical diseases 
were determined by climate and geography.173 By the start of the Egyptian campaign, 
India and the West Indies had become infamous in military circles for the high 
mortality rates from disease. As Egypt was geographically close to India, it was 
assumed that the two countries possessed a similar climate, which held within it lethal 
diseases of a similar nature. Therefore, the encounters with disease in India and the 
West Indies helped to develop a subconscious fear of sickness, which in Egypt was 
largely unwarranted. In India, wounds healed poorly in the humid, damp weather, and 
large parts of the country were malarial, but the greatest killer was cholera, which 
raged with great potency during this period. Soldiers were petrified of the disease, and 
rightly so. Its onset was sudden and unexpected, its symptoms were shocking and 
agonizing, and its mortality rate alarmingly high; approximately half of those who 
contracted the disease in India died. Officers employed by the East India company 
embarked from Britain with a sense of trepidation, as few survived their term of 
service. During the period 1796-1820, 201 of the Company’s officers retired on 
pension, and 1,243 were killed in action or died of sickness. Between 1760 to 1834, 
only about ten per cent of the Company’s officers survived to draw their pensions.174 
 
British losses to yellow fever and malaria in the West Indies campaigns were 
proportionally even higher. The fear of West Indian service among British troops was 
fully justified as entire regiments could be swiftly destroyed. For example, within 
three months of their arrival in Saint Domingue during the summer of 1794, the 23rd 
and 41st regiments had lost more than forty per cent of their total strength. Within a 
                                                        
173 See, for example: George Power, Attempt to investigate the cause of Egyptian ophthalmia 
(London: 1803); McGrigor, Medical Sketches; Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, trans and ed. Anne 
M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989).  
174 Richard Holmes, Sahib The British Soldier in India 1750-1914 (London: Harper Collins, 2006), 
402-405; 470-474.  
 98 
year, both had buried more than three quarters of their men. Estimates on the total 
death rates in the West Indies during the wars vary, but it was clearly a human disaster, 
with conservative estimates claiming 44,000 deaths, between 30 and 40 per cent of 
those sent to fight.175 These losses were felt more keenly through the lack of any 
tangible military gains in the West Indies during the Revolutionary Wars. Between 
1793 and 1798, Britain directed her primary military efforts towards the French West 
Indian colonies. By 1798, when commitments in the West Indies were cut back, 
Britain had remarkably little to show for its efforts.176 
 
After the sobering encounters with tropical diseases throughout the 1790s, it is 
understandable that there was considerable opposition among policymakers to the 
Egyptian campaign. When Henry Dundas finally pushed the proposed expedition 
through the cabinet on 3 October 1800, the King made his reservations about it clear. 
Recalling the difficulties caused in the American war by ocean supply lines, George 
predicted that the force sent to Egypt would starve, and even if it found supplies, 
disease would wither away the British forces just as in the West Indies. Others held a 
similar view. In a heated exchange with Dundas, William Windham, the Secretary at 
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War, told him that he had lost one army to Yellow Fever and now he would lose 
another to the plague.177  
 
These concerns proved to be unwarranted. Casualty figures for disease in Egypt are 
extremely difficult to establish precisely, but Captain Vincent, who recorded 3,691 
casualties in combat, stated that “the diseases of the horrible climate were much more 
destructive.” Sir David Dundas, the acclaimed general and military theorist, estimated 
casualties from disease during the campaign at 1,000.178 A good portion of the 
casualties sustained recovered from wounds or sickness, thus the number of men 
killed or invalided out of the army was relatively small: no more than fifteen per cent 
of the 22,000 men in Egypt at the conclusion of the campaign. When one compares 
the mortality rates in Egypt with those in India and the West Indies, it is abundantly 
clear that Egypt was far safer for British soldiers than other exotic climates, and even 
some areas of Europe.179 For instance, in 1809 over half of the 40,000 troops taking 
part in the Walcheren campaign in the Netherlands were incapacitated by disease, and 
4,000 died.180 Despite this, only a small minority of soldiers recognized that Egypt’s 
reputation was undeserved. Lieutenant Thomas Evans was one of the few. He wrote:  
 
We have had, a number of men sick, which could not 
fail being the case in any part of the world where so 
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large an army is assembled, but this I can with truth 
assert, that (wounds received in battle excepted)… in 
the Island of Minorca, which is considered healthy… 
and at the same period of the year, the troops there had, 
in proportion, more than double the present number of 
sick, and in the West Indies I have known it to exceed 
treble its number.181  
 
Evans’ outlook was rare. It was more common for Egypt to be regarded in a similar 
light to the deadly tropical climates in India and the West Indies. Robert Wilson 
believed that the multitude of ailments succeeded in “distinguishing Egypt to the 
world as an almost uninhabitable country”.182 Following an account of the excessive 
heat, Francis Maule wrote: “Life indeed here is almost insupportable”.183 It was 
unsurprising, according to one officer, that the French capitulated in Egypt, for “they 
were perfectly sick of it…and they sincerely pitied the lot of their supposed 
successors.”184 Using the work of the renowned naturalist and traveller Edward Daniel 
Clarke, George Billanie wrote: “strangers, and especially the inhabitants of Northern 
countries, where wholesome air and cleanliness are among the necessaries of life must 
consider Egypt as the most detestable region upon earth.”185 
 
How did British soldiers reach such an emphatic conclusion? One must concede that 
the mortality rates in Egypt do not take into account the number of hospital 
admissions, nor the total number of cases of disease. Ophthalmia, one of the most 
common diseases amongst soldiers in Egypt, was not fatal, despite its agonizing 
symptoms, and victims often made a full recovery. By contrast, the common diseases 
in India and the West Indies - yellow fever, malaria and cholera - were frequently 
lethal. The prevalence of ophthalmia among the army is evident from the rapid 
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transmission of the disease to civilian populations at Gibraltar, Malta and Britain, 
particularly after peace was declared in May 1802, as many regiments were returned 
to England and disbanded. In 1806, Arthur Edmondson, the young Scottish surgeon 
to the second regiment of Argyleshire Fencibles, wrote that the disease was present 
“in the most distant parts of Great Britain, and…familiar to almost every medical 
practitioner…”186 Research on ophthalmia attained considerable political importance, 
and even received the backing of George III. A direct consequence of this was the 
establishment of the Royal Infirmary for the Diseases of the Eye in 1805.187 
 
Aside from this, there is evidence to suggest the existence of a subconscious fear of 
‘eastern’ disease in British popular culture throughout the latter half of the eighteenth 
century. A common concern was that diseases contracted in the orient could be moral 
as well as physical. There was genuine anxiety that the perceived decadence and 
corruption of ‘eastern’ societies was contagious. Montesquieu was crucial in this 
formulating these anxieties. His Spirit of Laws argued that the hot climate of the orient 
had a debilitating effect on the morals of the people, so that “the effeminacy of the 
people in hot climates has almost always rendered them slaves, and the bravery of 
those in cold climates has enabled them to maintain their liberties.”188 For this reason, 
Montesquieu defined despotism as an exclusively oriental regime, only to be found in 
the hot regions of the orient. Montesquieu’s interpretation of oriental despotism in his 
Spirit of Laws became the landmark verdict on the nature of ‘eastern’ societies for 
British writers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.189 Travel authors 
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such as William Eton, François Baron de Tott and the Comte de Volney, all shared 
Montesquieu’s core beliefs concerning ‘eastern’ despotism and decadence, and 
commonly wrote of the destructiveness of various maladies under the eastern climate, 
especially bubonic plague.190 Throughout the late eighteenth century, Montesquieu’s 
ideas were adopted and revised by the British to help consolidate their rule in India. 
British superiority could be explained in terms of climate: the cool temperatures of 
Europe produced men more suited to command than the enervating climate of India. 
However, the need for longer periods of residence in India following Britain’s 
imperial successes, meant that increasing numbers of Britons would be exposed to the 
debilitating and corrupting influence of the climate. The question arose whether 
Britons themselves would acquire the traits of their subjects; characteristics which had 
caused India to fester and decay.191 
 
In this context, the possibility that ‘Eastern’ corruption could be transmitted to Britain 
was frequently cited by opponents of empire, and was an important element in the 
attacks on Nabobs and leading figures in India such as Robert Clive and Warren 
Hastings. Lord John Cavendish, a prominent Whig MP of the old school, “wished to 
God every European could be extirpated from India and the country resorted to merely 
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on the principles of commerce.”192 John Logan, the popular preacher, historian and 
hack writer, warned in his lectures on Asian history in Edinburgh in 1780 that “Even 
the Grecian virtue gave way to the luxury and voluptuousness of the East.”193 The 
King expressed similar concerns, remarking that a mismanaged India could be the 
ruin of Britain.194 Imperial anxieties were also reflected in fictional writings, which 
associated the orient with danger, corruption and sensuality. Novelists and poets used 
the orient as an environment in which they could express their most nefarious 
thoughts, feelings and desires. One of the most influential novels of this genre was 
William Beckford’s Vathek (1786).195 Many of these concerns were poignantly 
illustrated by Robert Southey in Letters of England, written in 1807. Under the 
pseudonym Don Manuel Alvarez Espriella, in an account of a tour of Britain from a 
foreigner’s viewpoint, Southey wrote: “At present, as the soldiers from Egypt have 
brought home with them broken limbs and ophthalmia, they carry an arm in a sling, 
or walk the streets with a green shade over the eyes.”196 Southey’s image of soldiers 
who returned from Egypt sick and broken, had undoubtedly been influenced by 
descriptions of disease in the Egyptian campaign.  
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It is perhaps surprising then, that concerns over a corruption of morals was not a 
feature of British military writing in Egypt. The military was, after all, an instrument 
of imperial power, and generally supported the empire: it gave them work. This was 
especially the case for those who comprised the expeditionary force from India. As 
members of the East India Company’s forces, their career prospects were largely tied 
to the Company’s own fortunes. Indeed, the British forces in Egypt generally appear 
to have regarded the expansion of the empire as a positive process. Nevertheless, the 
fusion of concerns in Britain, about the contagiousness of physical and moral diseases, 
may have amplified the general fear of British soldiers towards a variety of diseases 
found in the ‘east’.  
 
Reading the Bible may have also contributed towards such thoughts. For some of the 
pious soldiers in Egypt, the presence of disease, the hot climate and the multitude of 
irritating vermin appeared to confirm the existence of “Egypt’s ancient plagues”. 
These were the ten biblical calamities, which, according to the book of Exodus, the 
God of Israel inflicted upon the country to persuade the Pharaoh to release the 
Israelites from slavery.197 Five of the ten plagues the soldiers accounted for: hordes 
of frogs, vast swarms of lice, fleas and gnats, great clouds of flies, boils or buboes on 
the skin and swarms of locusts.198 George Billanie wrote: 
 
The latest descendants of the Pharaoh are not yet 
delivered from the evils which fell upon the land, when 
it was smitten by the hands of Moses and Aaron;… the 
“plague of flies,” “the murrain, boils and blains,” 
prevail so, that the whole country is “corrupted” and 
“the dust of the earth becomes lice, upon man and upon 
beast, throughout the land of Egypt.” This application 
of the words of sacred Scripture affords a literal 
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statement of existing evils, such one as the statistics of 
the country do now warrant.199 
 
Another highlander, Sergeant Nicol, came to the same conclusion: “We all agreed 
after we had marched through the country that the Scripture account of it was perfectly 
correct; and the universal remark was that a remnant of the plagues of Moses still 
existed in it.”200  
 
Aside from the subconscious fear of ‘eastern’ disease, there is another explanation as 
to why British soldiers regarded Egypt as a deadly environment similar to India. This 
can be attributed to the ongoing efforts in this period to create a medical topography 
of the world. The tremendous losses of the British military in tropical climates resulted 
in concerted scientific efforts to indicate which areas of the globe were suitable for 
European soldiers. James McGrigor, the superintendent surgeon to the expeditionary 
force from India, was one the leading writers on the medical topography of Egypt. He 
had served as a physician in Europe, India and the West Indies, and wrote extensively 
on Egyptian diseases in his Sketches. McGrigor argued that the Egyptian climate 
occupied the middle ground between temperate Europe and tropical India, and the 
diseases endemic to the country reflected this.  
 
In respect to the soil and climate of Egypt, as giving rise 
to disease, they are of considerable variety. In a country 
of such extent, stretching from the tropic on the one 
side, to the shores of the Mediterranean, on the other, 
this might be expected. If, in Lower Egypt, and on the 
bleak shores of the Mediterranean, we saw the diseases 
of Europe, and met with the inflammatory diathesis; in 
Upper Egypt, and as we approached the tropic, we met 
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with the same diseases, and succeeded with the same 
treatment, as in the peninsula of India.201 
 
McGrigor’s treatment of dysentery in Egypt was crucial in forming this view. 
Dysentery was “by far the most-generally prevailing, as well as the most fatal disease 
in the army”.202 The sheer number of serious cases convinced McGrigor that he had 
encountered a new form of the disease: “… it was not till after much doubt, hesitation, 
and careful observation, that I became convinced, in Alexandria, that, with the change 
of country and climate, we had a different disease.”203 McGrigor believed there were 
two species of dysentery: one in Europe and another in the tropical climates of India 
and the West Indies. The dysentery in Egypt was a blend of these two forms, a 
combination produced by Egypt’s geographical location between Europe and India. 
“Between diseases, as they occur in Europe and in Asia, there are just as many shades 
of difference as between the plants of those opposite regions, or in the colour of the 
inhabitants.”204  
 
One can speculate whether McGrigor’s conclusion derived from a more general belief 
that Egypt was located on the boundary between the occident and the orient. If this 
was the case, he appears to have placed Egypt closer to the orient than the occident. 
In his observations, he suggested that the Egyptian environment, and the dangers it 
posed to Europeans, was closer in resemblance to India and the West Indies than 
Europe.  
 
In the West-Indian islands, as well as on the shores of 
India, I have repeatedly and uniformly observed the 
sick-list of European corps more than doubled by the 
third week after the setting of the monsoon. In these 
countries a very considerable increase of sick is 
likewise found to take place on the change from the 
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rainy to the dry season. The change of season in Egypt 
had nearly an equal influence on the health of the army 
while there.205 
 
McGrigor’s detailed observations on the plague were crucial in the connection he 
made between Egypt and the tropics. Although the bulk of the British fighting force 
which landed at Aboukir avoided contracting the plague during the Egyptian 
campaign, the hospitals established at Aboukir and Rosetta both suffered outbreaks, 
as did the expeditionary force from India.206 The disease never seemed to have been 
totally absent in Egypt, and its prevalence among the population appeared to be a 
seasonal occurrence to the British. McGrigor denominated the “season of plague” 
“from November or December of one year, to June of the year following… the disease 
constantly stops at the period of summer solstice.”207 The first cases of plague 
appeared in the Indian army on 15 September 1801. McGrigor was among the first to 
treat them. The symptoms of the patients and the mode of treatment McGrigor 
adopted, led him to remark on the similarities between the plague in Egypt, and yellow 
fever, which he had encountered during his service in the West Indies between 1795 
and 1796.  
 
…after seeing the first cases which occurred in the 
Indian army, and attentively studying the histories of 
some of the cases which subsequently appeared, it 
struck me that there were many points of resemblance 
between this disease and the destructive [yellow] fever 
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of the West Indies, which, some years ago, I saw a good 
deal of in several of the islands there.208  
 
McGrigor began his Sketches with a list of similarities between the plague and yellow 
fever. For the victims of both diseases, the attack was sudden, and head pains were 
the initial complaint. In most cases of the plague, and in some of yellow fever, 
swellings could be seen on the body around the glands. Finally, in cases where “we 
could excite a flow of saliva”, the patient had a chance of recovery, and “in those 
cases which proved fatal, it was found impossible to produce salivation.”.209 Although 
McGrigor by no means considered these two diseases to be the same, he believed that 
their resemblance with one another derived from the similar environmental conditions 
in the West Indies and Egypt. The heat and humidity of Egypt endowed the plague 
with similar characteristics to yellow fever, but “in different countries and in different 
seasons in the same countries, the plague assumes very different appearances.”210 
 
For other British officers without medical expertise or experience in the West Indies, 
the plague appeared to be the result of Egypt’s unique geography. Captain Vincent 
considered the cyclical outbreaks of plague to be the result of “the falling of the Nile, 
and is occasioned by the noxious vapours arising from the filth, dead fish, reptiles… 
which are left scattered on the banks of that river…. And which the scorching sun of 
this climate soon renders putrid.”211 Robert Wilson was fascinated by this subject, and 
provided a detailed explanation on the yearly cycle of plague. After the Nile waters 
receded, he claimed that they leave “a rich slime” which forms the highly productive 
soil. When this slime is separated from water, “corruption ensues, and continues until 
all the putrid juices are totally absorbed by the heat of the sun”. This process created 
a “corrupted state of atmosphere”, which taints and destroys the human body. The 
plague ceases at the summer solstice “when the Nile is supposed to receive the first 
increase.”212  
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Whatever the cause for the diseases in Egypt, it was clear to James McGrigor that 
British soldiers were not suited to serving in the country. “We have often seen the 
changes effected on a European habit by a removal to a tropical or to a warm climate”. 
The Indian sepoys, by contrast, lost proportionally far fewer men to sickness. Again, 
the observations McGrigor made on this subject associated the Egyptian climate 
closely with that of India. Accustomed to the hot climate of their homeland, it 
appeared naturally easier for the sepoys to adjust to the conditions in Egypt. They bore 
the desert march well, and remained the “healthiest of all British forces”. This was 
one of the first occasions when sepoys served in campaigns abroad; the promising 
results naturally advocated the future employment of sepoys in foreign service. 
Particularly impressive was the 1st Bombay regiment. Despite many of its sepoys 
contracting a fever while ship-board during the passage from Bombay to Kossier, the 
regiment “effected the march across the desert of Thebes, as well as that over the 
isthmus of Suez, with less difficulty than any corps in the army.” 213 Reflecting on the 
health of the Indian army, McGrigor wrote: 
 
In general we observed that the native troops endured 
this [climate] better than the European. It ought not to 
be forgotten that,… detachments from the native corps 
were employed, some time before the march of the 
army, in clearing the roads, digging wells, and on other 
duties of fatigue more harassing than any that fell to the 
lot of any other part of the army. Nevertheless, these 
men continued in a high state of health.214 
 
This circumstance was not an isolated occurrence; McGrigor had seen native 
regiments fare much better than the British before. During his service in the West 
Indies, the native West India Regiments proved far more resistant to yellow fever. 
McGrigor argued that the resistance the natives had developed was the result of 
acclimatization. Prior to the Egyptian campaign, no Indian corps “had been less than 
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two years in a warm climate”.215 Time to adapt to the conditions was crucial, and the 
88th regiment of sepoys provided an example of this: 
 
The first year after the arrival of the 88th regiment in 
India, they suffered considerably. During the month 
after that on which the monsoon set in, one hundred and 
forty, or more than one fourth of the corps, were ill of 
hepatitis and dysentery. In the second year of the 
regiment being in India, only seventy were admitted 
into the hospital in the course of the same month, and 
this number was not quite one tenth of the corps. Here, 
then, we appear to have gained considerably by being 
one year inured to the climate.216 
 
McGrigor’s observations here correlate with the general medical opinion of the time. 
It was widely believed that, irrespective of their background, Britons who survived a 
few years in India, or any other tropical country, would enjoy a state of health superior 
to those who had lived in colder climates.217 For newcomers to hot climates, it was 
generally believed that the mortality rates could be reduced by avoiding excessive 
consumption and exercise. This was a belief which stemmed partly from the 
observation of Hindu diets over the late eighteenth century, and partly from prevailing 
doctrines in physiology, which credited high temperatures with the ability to hinder 
digestion. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, company soldiers fresh from 
Britain were recommended a diet composed primarily of vegetables, and were advised 
to avoid meat and alcohol.218 McGrigor recommended a similar diet for the soldiers 
in Egypt: 
 
…one reason may, with probability, be brought forward 
to account for the very great difference, in point of 
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health, between European and Indian corps, viz. the 
great intemperance of the European in eating and 
drinking. A native of India is astonished, at first, to see 
the meals of animal food devoured, and the quantity of 
spirits drank, by Europeans. There can be little doubt, 
that the nearer we approach to the mode of living of the 
natives, the more nearly we shall attain their state of 
health.219 
 
Above all, he claimed “intemperance… always appeared as a principal cause of the 
diseases which have prevailed.”220 When access to alcohol was restricted, the British 
benefitted from a good state of health. During the voyage down the Nile, from Qena 
to Cairo, “the men had no spirits delivered out to them; and I am convinced that, from 
this, not only did they not suffer, but that it even contributed to the uncommon degree 
of health which they at this time enjoyed.”221  
 
The superior health of the Indian Sepoys in Egypt may have been a consideration 
when, after the French capitulation, Hutchinson proposed an amalgamation between 
the British and Indian troops that were to be left to garrison Alexandria. The proposal 
was abandoned after the determined opposition it received from General Baird. He 
lectured Hutchinson at length on the incompatibility of such a merging. His primary 
concern was that any unification of forces would damage the fragile authority of the 
British over their Indian troops. The current discipline and confidence of the sepoys 
had been achieved “by a long series of attention to their customs and prejudices”. It 
was impossible for a stranger to command them “without offending some of their 
customs, which tho’ to appearance trifling, are to them of material consequence.” 222 
Moreover, the pay and allowances given to the sepoys were greatly different to those 
given to the British ranks. As a result, Baird argued: 
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The jealousies that would arise, should the corps be 
blended on unequal allowances , must be unpleasant to 
every rank, but as far as regards the inferior ones, would 
be dangerous… This difference would immediately be 
known to the troops… [and would] lead to 
consequences of the most serious nature.223 
 
Baird’s comments here reveal an awareness and understanding of the complex and 
fragile state of British authority over Indian sepoys. They could not be easily 
amalgamated with British troops, who differed from the sepoys in their pay and in the 
daily living requirements, such as types of food. Baird does not mention another likely 
reason for his opposition: should a merger take place he would lose command over a 
large portion of his troops.  
 
Although the prevalence of diseases in exotic climates such as Egypt provided 
powerful reasons to oppose the expansion of the British empire, paradoxically, disease 
also provided a moral purpose and justification for imperial conquests. Explaining 
this contradiction requires reference to Mary Louise Pratt in her seminal 
interdisciplinary work, Imperial Eyes. She points out that the British portrayed their 
scientific research and exploration as innocent intellectual exercises, concerned with 
furthering human knowledge. Such practices were idealized as a means by which 
Britain could do good in the world, by combatting the inequality and suffering that 
existed in foreign societies.224 Cultivating scientific research was one way in which 
British governors such as Warren Hastings, Charles Cornwallis and Marquees 
Wellesley, could claim their rule of India honorable and righteous. Hastings in 
particular referred to his sponsorship of the sciences when defending himself from 
impeachment in 1787.225 
 
                                                        
223 Ibid. 
224 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, 
1998), 7, 74-75, 81. See also: Richard Drayton, ‘Knowledge and Empire’ in The Oxford History of 
the British Empire: volume II: The Eighteenth Century, ed. P. J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 250. 
225 Drayton, ‘Knowledge and Empire’, 248.  
 113 
Despite appearances, this research was not innocent. Although intellectual research in 
imperial regions was not defined solely by the requirements of empire, there was a 
conviction that the knowledge acquired should be put to practical and profitable use 
in ways that advanced British interests.226 Much like the Indian theatre, one can argue 
that the enthusiasm of British medical practitioners in their study of diseases in Egypt 
provided a powerful rationale for greater intervention in the region.227 British 
physicians felt that they possessed the technical and scientific expertise to treat and 
potentially cure the diseases they had encountered in Egypt. James McGrigor 
summarized this line of thought:  
 
Egypt had been called the cradle of the sciences. From 
this we acknowledge, that the arts were derived to 
Greece, and subsequently the world. It would surely be 
the noblest gratification, if in return, at this period, 
Europe, by extending her benefits and improvements to 
Egypt and to Greece, could free them from the most 
cruel scourge of countries, once the most civilized and 
polished in the world. It would in some measure 
compensate and console them for the low state of 
degradation into which they have fallen.228 
 
For McGrigor, the introduction of British technology and medical science into Egypt, 
would be a reciprocal act of charity. Readers in Britain were receptive to these ideas. 
In a combined review of the recent publications by Aeneas Anderson, Robert Wilson, 
William Wittman, and the French General Jean Reynier, the Edinburgh Review 
concluded that: 
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It is highly probable, that the virulence of the plague 
would so far yield to the cleanliness, the watchfulness, 
and the science of Europeans, as to be ranked with 
ordinary fevers in danger and malignancy. We may 
carry our views still farther, and consider the powerful 
influence which Egypt, colonized by Europeans, would 
exercise upon the civilization of Africa. We may amuse 
ourselves with the imaginary spectacle of Europe 
carrying to the banks of the Nile the arts and sciences, 
which she received from thence 3000 years ago; and 
raising from the dust those venerable cities which were 
animated with commerce, and adorned with learning, 
ages before the naked savage of Europe could delve, or 
spin, or govern, or obey.229 
 
The research on ophthalmia provides a good example of justifying imperialism on 
charitable grounds. The disease provoked a morbid fascination because it was exotic, 
widespread, horrid and seemingly incomprehensible. Ophthalmia revealed a large gap 
in British medical knowledge with regard to ocular ailments, which practitioners 
sought to rapidly fill.230 A succession of works on ophthalmia followed in the wake 
of the Egyptian campaign, over twenty publications on the subject appeared before 
1820.231 This research was largely unfettered, and characterized by a profound 
curiosity and confidence. There was a strong conviction that with the knowledge of 
modern western science, effective modes of treatment for ophthalmia and other 
exotic, tropical diseases would be found. News of experiments conducted on the 
imperial periphery attracted attention in British newspapers and periodicals, and in 
this way the colonies acted as proving grounds for young and ambitious medical 
practitioners.232 It is no coincidence that a number of those who served in Egypt rose 
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to considerable distinction later in their careers. The most eminent of these was James 
McGrigor, who gained an enviable reputation for his conduct as superintending 
surgeon of the Indian expeditionary force. He was promoted to deputy inspector-
general in 1805, chief inspector-general in Portugal in 1811, and director-general of 
the army medical services in 1815.233 
 
Conclusion 
British military personnel saw the Egyptian environment in a number of different 
ways. The troops in Egypt collectively displayed a blend of the idioms and quirks of 
travel writers, and the stresses and anxieties of soldiers. Exclusive to the writing of 
soldiers was their strategic appraisals of the landscape. They discussed how cities 
might be attacked or defended, and speculated – with the benefit of hindsight – how 
the campaign might have progressed differently had they been fully aware of the 
topography at the time. These strategic surveys were not as common as one might 
assume. It was a taboo subject in military circles during off-duty hours and was not a 
popular or fashionable topic to discuss in memoirs. It was more common for strategic 
features to be conveyed through detailed maps. By the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, maps were becoming increasingly vital to military strategy, and the lack of 
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accurate maps prior to the British campaign appears to have stimulated the creation 
of such documents by military memoirists. With little topographical knowledge of the 
Egyptian terrain, a predetermined tactical doctrine was impractical, and soldiers were 
forced to adapt to the landscape they encountered. In these circumstances, the rifle 
detachments of the British regiments excelled, as they fulfilled the role of light and 
regular infantry on different occasions. Their performance encouraged the creation of 
dedicated light infantry regiments, which would serve with distinction in the 
Peninsular War.  
 
Perhaps the most popular subject discussed by military memoirists, was the suffering 
they endured during the campaign. The accounts of heat, dehydration, unbearable 
conditions in sandstorms, irritating pests and the prevalence of infection and disease, 
provided a medium through which soldiers could transmit the extreme physical and 
psychological experience of war to their readers. This enabled them to establish 
themselves among reading audiences as sentimental heroes, who endured the 
misfortunes and rigours of war to defend the nation. The soldiers’ description of their 
suffering highlights that they were not ordinary travellers: their travel itineraries were 
determined by the exigencies of war, often taking them to remote and inhospitable 
regions; and they travelled in all weather conditions. Yet as we have seen, soldiers did 
benefit from certain advantages. The size of the army gave the individual soldier a 
greater sense of security, and they could easily acquire extra provisions from the Arab 
merchants who were attracted to the British camp.  
 
Many of the diverse responses of soldiers towards the environment strongly 
resembled the writing of civilian travellers. It is important to remember that military 
memoirs competed with popular travelogues, and for this reason, contained a similar 
structure and narrative arc. It was common for military memoirs to contain a symbolic 
turning point, usually the moment that the soldiers reached the Nile, when the misery 
of combat, heat and dehydration was replaced by the joy of the picturesque and fertile 
landscape of the Nile delta. From this point on, the worst privations were in the past, 
and British victory was more assured, which set up the remainder of the narrative for 
a satisfying and happy conclusion.  
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Soldiers were at pains to emphasize their suffering, but despite this, many seem to 
have favoured some form of further imperial intervention in Egypt. The picturesque, 
used by several officers to describe the landscape, played an important role in this 
regard. The literary and visual representations of the picturesque employed a 
consistent set of principles, techniques and formulae, which helped to homogenize 
representations of landscapes in Britain and its imperial regions. This allowed writers 
and artists to ‘domesticate the exotic’, and by doing so, render these foreign 
landscapes desirable. This desirability was reinforced by the productivity of the Nile 
delta, which, given the lack of proper cultivation, could be improved upon and 
exploited under British instruction to the benefit of all.  
 
This desire to acquire or exploit Egypt’s productive landscape was juxtaposed with 
concerns over the moral and physical diseases within the country. Although the 
number of casualties from disease during the Egyptian campaign was relatively low, 
Egypt came to be regarded in a similar manner to the deadly tropical climates in India 
and the West Indies. This assumption was largely unfounded and derived from several 
factors: the geographical proximity of Egypt to India, the biblical account of the ten 
plagues of Egypt, and the warm climate, which was thought to have an enervating 
effect on the human body, all contributed towards the belief that Egypt posed a deadly 
threat to Europeans. This fear of eastern climates was encapsulated by the ongoing 
efforts to create a medical topography of the world. James McGrigor’s observations 
on the ailments he treated led him to suggest that the diseases within Egypt reflected 
its geographical position on the boundary between the orient and the occident. It 
seemed that Egypt was not a country well suited for European soldiers. The Indian 
sepoys enjoyed a higher state of health than their British comrades during the 
campaign, and it seemed a period of acclimatization was necessary. It is ironic that 
the fear of disease in Egypt also provided a rationale for an increased involvement in 
the country. Disease provided British physicians, who possessed an enthusiastic 
curiosity and a confidence in the superiority of British medical sciences, with a 
powerful moral right to intervene. It was a sympathetic response to the suffering 
endured by the victims of such ailments.
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2. 
Campaigning in an antique land: military 
encounters with antiquity 
 
 
In June 1801, after four months of fighting, the British army secured the surrender of 
the French garrison at Cairo. As the terms for this surrender were being negotiated, 
the commander in chief, General Hutchinson, organized three tour parties each day to 
depart from the British camp and visit the Pyramids at Giza. Sergeant Robertson in 
the 92nd Gordon Highlanders accompanied one of the parties on 5 June. He clearly 
enjoyed himself thoroughly, enthusiastically telling of his attempt to ascend the 
pyramid, being “obliged to give up the attempt”, because “the height was rather too 
much for my head”. He returned to the British camp with his comrades, “highly 
gratified with our excursion, and astonished at what we had seen.” For many of the 
common soldiers, knowledge of Egypt was, as previously noted, limited to passages 
within the Bible, and some were even unaware of the existence of the great 
monuments of antiquity before the campaign. Robertson was one such example, and 
the daytrip had been a revelation.  
 
For my own part, not having read much, and never 
having even heard that there were such colossal 
structures in the world, I felt a degree of surprise, not 
unmingled with awe, on beholding the vastness and 
grandeur of what will ever continue to strike every 
spectator as the greatest effort of architectural labour 
that has yet been reared.1  
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The British officers’ representation of the Pyramids was very different. Captain 
Charles Hill, in command of a company of Indian sepoys, wrote:  
 
It is a matter of great wonder to me, how they could 
ever have been styled as a Wonder of the World – It 
could never have been for their beauty or duration – as 
they resemble a pile of shot which may be seen in every 
arsenal, and which (like them) would stand for ages if 
not pulled down.2 
 
Major-General John Moore formed a similar opinion: “They form immense piles of 
building without beauty.”3 Not all officers condemned the architecture of the 
Pyramids - far from it – but it is telling that these two men did. For Charles Hill and 
John Moore, the monolithic simplicity of ancient Egyptian architecture was too crude 
and unsophisticated in comparison to Greek or Roman designs. Clearly, British 
military personnel responded in different ways to ancient Egyptian ruins and 
antiquities during their service in Egypt. The first objective of this chapter is to 
emphasize the diversity of these responses. As we shall see, this diversity is most 
apparent between the officers and the common ranks.  
 
Throughout the Egyptian campaign in 1801, British forces spent considerable time in 
close vicinity to objects and structures from antiquity. The encounters with antiquities 
provoked almost unanimous curiosity among military personnel, regardless of their 
differing opinions on such objects. For soldiers and sailors of all ranks, this was an 
opportunity to immerse themselves in an exotic, ancient and mysterious civilization. 
Their interest in antiquities in Egypt was often expressed through the archaeological 
study and collection of objects. Soldiers had always taken mementoes from 
campaigns, a process encouraged by civilian cultures of collecting in late eighteenth 
                                                        
2 Diary of Captain C. Fitzmaurice Hill, The British Library, (BL) MSS Eur D108, p.103.  
3 Sir John Moore, The Diary of John Moore, ed. Sir J. F. Maurice, vol. 2 (London: E. Arnold, 1904), 
30. 
 120 
century Britain,4  but in Egypt, the soldiers expressed a distinctive military 
understanding and appreciation of the antiquities they saw and acquired. These objects 
were not only souvenirs, but trophies of their victory in Egypt. The pursuit of 
antiquarian scholarship was not at odds with their military occupation. There is some 
evidence that the techniques of draughtsmanship, surveying and cartography that were 
considered key to military proficiency in this period also enjoyed a great deal of 
overlap with the techniques associated with antiquarian study. As Christopher Evans 
highlights in his article about the Victorian officer-archaeologist Augustus Pitt Rivers, 
military experiences provided the basic skill-sets by which one could approach 
archaeological fieldwork.5 This can be seen from the mid eighteenth century, as some 
of the earliest archaeologists were military officers. Major William Roy, the founder 
of the Ordnance survey, is perhaps the best example: between 1747 and 1752, while 
working on a military survey of the highlands, he made accurate sketches of the 
Roman remains found there. He pursued antiquarian research thereafter and was 
elected a fellow of the Society of Antiquaries in 1776, which published his Military 
Antiquities of the Romans in North Britain three years after his death in 1790.6 James 
Douglas provides another example: his brief military career gave him the suitable 
skills to conduct excavations at Roman and Anglo-Saxon sites in Chatham, Ashford 
and Leicestershire throughout the last three decades of the eighteenth century.7  An 
interest in archaeology was by no means unusual. In this period increasing numbers 
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of Royal navy officers recorded historical sites and monuments during their coastal 
surveys, and old ruins or fortifications were regularly documented by engineers and 
sappers on overseas service.8 
 
Writing about Egyptian antiquities and their collection has often been associated by 
scholars with imperialism, irrespective of military or civilian authorship. In the last 
decade, this subject has been closely examined by Holger Hoock and Maya Jasanoff. 
Hoock contends that the pursuit of antiquities played a central role in promoting 
national and imperial prestige during the “cultural war” that took place between 
Britain and France throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. With 
Napoleon expanding French national collections, particularly with Italian artworks, 
British ministers and officials invested national pride in the British Museum. Ancient 
antiquities of great empires were shamelessly appropriated to aggrandize and 
legitimize the British Empire.9 There were instances during the Egyptian campaign, 
where soldiers or sailors appropriated ancient relics for national or imperial gain. 
Perhaps the most famous example of this was the seizure of French collections of 
antiquities after their capitulation at Alexandria. The treaty of Alexandria, which 
finalized the French surrender in Egypt, demanded that the French “hand over all 
antiquities found by them and to relinquish all rights to any seized at sea by the naval 
blockade.”10 The items seized from the French at Alexandria constituted the largest 
haul of eastern artefacts ever seen, and soon filled the British Museum. The Rosetta 
Stone became the central piece of this prestigious collection, and still bears the marks 
to this day of its status as a trophy to British imperial prowess. Inscribed on the left 
edge of the stone, are the words “Captured in Egypt by the British Army | 1801”11 The 
arrival of the collection made national news and captured the imagination of the public 
in Britain. After the Egyptian campaign, archaeologists were increasingly able to call 
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upon administrative, financial, diplomatic and military resources in their attempts to 
acquire antiquities. The British Museum’s collection steadily grew in succeeding 
decades, to include the Parthenon marbles, ornamental pillar tombs and giant winged 
human headed lions and bulls from Mesopotamia. Hoock believes that the number 
and scale of objects in the Museum’s display, testify to the considerable investment 
of the British military and imperial state in archaeological enterprises.12 
 
Building on Hoock’s thesis, one could argue that the pursuit of antiquities had a direct 
importance for the British Empire. The French invasion of Egypt had significantly 
enhanced the profile of the region in British imperial planning, and opened up a new 
sphere of British ‘informal empire’ in the Middle East.13 Following the threat posed 
by the invasion to the Indian Empire, Britain became concerned with safeguarding the 
two routes to India which ran via Egypt and the Red Sea, and Mesopotamia and the 
Persian Gulf. Egypt, above all, was considered crucial, as Henry Dundas, the secretary 
at war, wrote on the subject, “The possession of Egypt by any independent nation 
would be a fatal circumstance to the interests of this country.”14 Although the British 
left no lasting impression on Egypt when the last of their forces evacuated the country 
in 1803, it is telling that plans had been made for a permanent occupation.15 That same 
year, the Peace of Amiens foundered because Britain refused to abandon Malta, 
fearing that the island would be used as a springboard for a second French invasion 
of Egypt. The occupation of Malta alone was deemed insufficient to prevent French 
intervention in Egypt, and the security of the British Empire appeared to rest on 
finding ways to maintain an informal presence and authority in this area. The 
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fascination with antiquities, and the attempts to acquire them, was one of the ways in 
which the British could maintain an influence and a low-level presence. It is no 
coincidence that many of the archaeological discoveries in the Middle East in the first 
half of the nineteenth century were close to these two routes to India.16 
 
One must be careful however, not to overemphasize the importance of antiquities in 
aggrandizing British prestige. Hoock’s focus is on the collection of high-status objects 
which were passed onto state institutions; he is less concerned with smaller, lower 
value items which ordinary soldiers collected, or their personal reasons for doing so. 
Maya Jasanoff’s interpretation of collecting takes personal interests more into 
account. She regards collecting as a highly complex process, motivated by a 
combination of factors, such as imperial rivalry, a genuine interest in antiquity, the 
prospect of great financial reward, and the opportunity for the collector to refashion 
their self-image and social status. The unmethodical and ill-advised actions of 
collectors on imperial frontiers, Jasanoff argues, resembled the disorganized and 
piecemeal acquisitions that formed the British empire.17 A second objective of this 
chapter is to build on the work by Hoock and Jasanoff, by examining the motivations 
behind collecting among British servicemen in Egypt. Some of the soldiers in Egypt 
were keen collectors, and appear to have been motivated by a combination of factors. 
The collection of larger items was motivated not only patriotism, but by an egotistical 
desire to improve their own standing among their peers and wider audiences.  Smaller, 
personal items were acquired for different reasons: they were used as a physical 
validation for their experiences, and as souvenirs or military trophies, taken as rewards 
for enduring the hazards of the campaign. 
 
Viewing the ruins and antiquities 
For officers such as Charles Hill and John Moore, their accounts of Egyptian ruins 
and antiquities were informed by classical learning. In British gentlemanly education 
in this era, there was a heavy focus on the works of Greek and Roman historians and 
philosophers, and the Latin and Greek languages. It became customary for young 
gentlemen to undertake a Grand Tour to Italy, where individuals could visit the great 
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Roman antiquities and compare their nation with the civilizations of old.18 Although 
traditionally dominated by the aristocracy, tours to Europe – especially Italy – were 
increasingly popular among travellers from the professional classes in the last quarter 
of the eighteenth century.19 British tourists who followed or hoped to follow a military 
career frequently embarked on a grand tour of sorts: they attended the Prussian 
military reviews at Berlin, Magdeburg or Silesia, and visited areas of interest en-
route.20 John Hely-Hutchinson was one such individual. While on half-pay between 
1781 and 1792, he travelled the continent and studied at the Strasbourg military 
academy.21 John Moore was perhaps the most famous grand tourist in the British army 
in Egypt. In 1772, he accompanied his father on a tour of France, Switzerland, 
Germany and Italy. He developed a fondness for Roman designs which probably 
influenced his dislike of Egyptian architecture.22 For the soldiers in Egypt who had 
toured in their youth, the campaign provided an opportunity to continue their cultural 
refinement. For the soldiers who had not experienced the Grand Tour, Egypt provided 
a limited opportunity to discover what it may have been like. Descriptions of Egyptian 
antiquities enabled soldiers to display the taste and connoisseurship associated with 
polite masculinity.23    
 
According to Nigel Leask, the status of Greco-Roman civilizations as the founders of 
modern European society gave their designs a cultural exclusivity in Britain. Any art 
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and sculpture that was radically different from this style was inherently inferior.24 This 
preference for Greco-Roman designs is most conspicuous in the soldiers’ accounts of 
Pompey’s Pillar, a giant Roman triumphal column located on the southern periphery 
of Alexandria. Very few memoirists fail to mention their visit to the Roman column, 
and the vast majority were amazed. While the lower ranks focused largely on the size 
of the pillar, officers focused more on its qualities as a work of art. The prevailing 
view was encapsulated by Robert Wilson: “At a distance the appearance is noble; 
approached closer, the pillar is lovely beyond description. The dimensions are so 
stupendous…. The eye rests on this pillar with delight, as the chef d’oeuvvre of the 
arts.”25 To demonstrate their cultural refinement, the officers translated the Greek 
inscriptions on the pillar, discussed the life of Pompey after whom the column was 
named, and debated at length who had ordered its construction.26 Charles Hill and 
John Moore – the officers who had been unimpressed by the Pyramids at Giza – were 
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among the greatest admirers of Pompey’s Pillar. It was, according to Hill, “very well 
worth seeing, the shaft is very beautiful and one entire column of granite”.  For Moore, 
the column was “a most beautiful object. It is difficult to conceive how a single pillar 
can convey so much majesty and beauty.”27  
 
Although ancient Egypt was never quite as fashionable or popular as Greece or Rome, 
it nevertheless attracted considerable interest, especially after theories emerged that 
the Ancient Greek and Roman civilizations may have had their origins in Egypt.28 
Many of the soldiers expressed excitement at their proximity to ancient history. One 
officer, a member of the expedition sent from Bombay under the command of General 
Baird, wrote of the ancient port of Alexandria: “at every step you meet with beautiful 
granite pillars, obelisks & marble columns which evince the magnificence & 
splendour that formerly existed”. The officer spent much of his time in the city 
speculating on the location of Alexandria’s two legendary structures from antiquity – 
the library and the lighthouse. He became convinced after much deliberation that the 
ruins of a large building not far from the sea must have been the library.29 James 
McGrigor, the superintendent surgeon to this force, was fascinated by the history of 
the route that his army took from Kossier to Cairo. It was, he declared, “a route 
unattempted by any army for perhaps two or three thousand years.”30  
 
This sense of excitement was also discernible among the ordinary soldiers. The rank-
and-file had far less freedom than their superiors when off duty – they were not 
permitted to enter Alexandria after the surrender of the French garrison. Nevertheless, 
the ranks discovered pieces and fragments of artefacts as they campaigned through 
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Egypt. During the initial stages of the campaign after landing at Aboukir in March, 
and in the final month of the siege of Alexandria in August, the soldiers worked in 
parties among the ruins around Alexandria, digging up sand to construct batteries and 
crude fortifications. In the process they uncovered “fine pillars”, “blocks of marble” 
and “ornaments of ancient palaces”, which they placed in their breastworks and 
redoubts.31 Thomas Walsh included a sketch in his journal of one such stone that his 
men had uncovered while constructing a redoubt.32 The unearthing of artefacts 
produced a palpable sense of excitement among the soldiers from their proximity to 
ancient civilizations, and the ‘great men’ associated with them. The Bible largely 
shaped the common ranks’ prior knowledge of Egypt, and for the more devout 
individuals, there was an additional thrill at viewing the lands and objects described 
in the Old Testament. Daniel Nicol, who had unearthed several relics, conveyed these 
feelings:  
 
…it made me and many others reflect on the ancient 
glory of Egypt of which there are so many evidences in 
the barren peninsula of Aboukir. I saw in these ruins the 
fulfilment of Scripture and from the description which 
I read on board ship after I knew we were bound for this 
place, I supposed such a city might have stood in this 
vicinity… These reflections gave great interest to our 
operations. We were now upon Scripture ground; we 
had come from a distant island of the sea to the country 
of the proud Pharaohs to carry on war where 
Nebuchadnezzar and Alexander the Great, Caesar, and 
other great warriors had put armies in motion.33 
 
A common feature of the British military’s description of Egyptian places, structures 
or objects was the frequent reference to events of historical or religious importance. 
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This practice may have been a sales tactic: it looked good, demonstrated cultural 
refinement, and served as a form of authentication for the events in the narrative. Such 
writing habits were framed in part by prevailing cultural values in late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century Britain. Claude-Étienne Savary’s Letters from Egypt, 
translated into English in 1787, is one of the most conspicuous examples. His account 
contains detailed descriptions of Egyptian ruins and antiquities, often accompanied 
with historical context. He mentioned several Egyptian dynasties, the Romans, 
crusading kings and the Mamluks, and embellished his prose with quotations from 
ancient sources such as Strabo and Herodotus.34 As Nigel Leask notes, the frequent 
reference to history may have also arisen from the lack of association with Egypt and 
its people, which led travellers – both civilian and military – to “temporalize” the land 
and its inhabitants, by comparing them with more familiar classical, biblical or 
medieval worlds.35  
 
Perhaps the best examples of the frequent reference to history are the accounts of two 
naval officers serving on board HMS Swiftsure on blockade duties off the coast of 
Alexandria. From October 1798 to February 1799, the Swiftsure docked at Rhodes, 
Acre and Limassol to collect provisions for the blockading fleet. Much like the 
accounts of the soldiers from the campaign two and a half years later, the memoirs of 
officers on the Swiftsure are littered with detailed narrative history of these places, 
written to display their gentlemanly knowledge and historical appreciation of the 
region. Both John Theophilus Lee, a young midshipman, and Cooper Williams, the 
Swiftsure’s reverend, focused their narrative histories on the Crusades, an era 
endowed with romantic importance in Britain. One suspects that historical or mythical 
details were employed when the factual narrative was thin, as would have often been 
the case on board a ship of war employed on blockade. They described how Rhodes 
had evolved under the dominion of the Romans, the Knights Hospitaller and later the 
Ottomans, and speculated on the appearance of the Colossus of Rhodes, and the 
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method by which it had been constructed. At Acre, they recalled that the city served 
for a time as the capital and headquarters of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, that it had 
been defended by Richard I against Saladin, and later witnessed a Muslim assassin’s 
attempt on Edward I’s life. Finally, during their time at Limassol, Williams and Lee 
wrote of Richard I’s visit to Cyprus, on his voyage to and from the Holy Land.36 In 
one example, while on the summit of Mount Carmel, overlooking the town of Haifa, 
just south of Acre, Lee listed all of the sites of religious importance which, to his 
knowledge, were in the vicinity. 
 
To the north of Acre is the ancient Samaria, … a city 
which Herod raised to great magnificence. A church is 
shewn where St. John was imprisoned and beheaded, 
and the dungeon where his blood was shed is also 
exhibited;… A little further is seen Naplos, the ancient 
Sychem. On one of the two mountains, on each side of 
this city, the children of Israel were commanded to set 
up great stones inscribed with the Holy Law, and to 
erect altars. At a small distance from Naplos is Jacob’s 
well, famous for our Saviour’s conference with the 
woman of Samaria...37 
 
Lee was fortunate to accompany the British consul at Acre on a visit to Jerusalem, 
and he recounted an impressive range of religious sites he visited. These included a 
mosque on the site of Judas’ betrayal, a convent where Jesus was allegedly confined 
before crucifixion and another where the last supper supposedly took place, the house 
in which the Virgin Mary died, and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, “an object of 
interest to all who visit”.38 William Wittman, the surgeon to the British military 
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mission attached to the Grand Vizir’s Ottoman army from July 1800 to the conclusion 
of the Egyptian campaign in October 1801, provides another example. In autumn 
1800, while camped at Jaffa, the military mission had very little with which to occupy 
themselves, so Wittman resolved to visit the Holy Land. Although the trip may have 
been devised merely to alleviate boredom and escape the disease ridden Ottoman 
camp, Wittman thoroughly enjoyed himself. He listed the many sites of religious 
significance he visited, which included “all the interesting places which respected our 
Saviour previously to his death”.39 Although descriptions of historical sites were 
common within military memoirs, they were not always well received. In a review of 
Major Francis Maule’s Memoirs, the Monthly Review considered that  
 
The Major has trespassed chiefly when he goes out of 
his professional line, and attempts to interweave 
historical notices with the description of the events that 
passed under his eye. He cannot, for example, sail up 
the Mediterranean without summoning to his reader’s 
recollection the battle of Lepanto...40 
 
Surprisingly, it was rare for British military personnel to directly associate, compare 
or identify themselves with the crusades during the Egyptian campaign. Although 
Edward Gibbon and David Hume argued that the romanticism and chivalry of the 
crusades had faded by the latter half of the eighteenth century, recent scholars believe 
this was not the case. Marc Girouard and Adam Knobler have discussed how the 
British popular imagination of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century looked 
fondly upon the crusades, complete with notions of medieval chivalry and 
gentlemanly honour. The romance of the crusades and crusading remained an 
important influence on romantic literature at this time, such as in the work of Sir 
Walter Scott. The crusading metaphor was readily transferable: it provided a simple, 
easily understandable vision of moral absolutes: good and evil, without any confusion. 
For this reason, the crusades of the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries provided 
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the perfect historical precedent for contemporary dilemmas. It romanticized warfare 
by contextualizing current conflicts as wars with true and just causes. A key element 
of the crusader knight’s sacrifice was his parting from home, family and friends to 
embark on an uncertain and dangerous mission which drew similarities with the 
experience of British soldiers in the French wars.41 Furthermore, one may argue that 
the events prior to the Egyptian campaign lent themselves to crusading imagery. 
Napoleon, leading a secular force, posed a threat to most of European Christendom. 
In 1798, he had expelled the Knights of St John from Malta on his way to Egypt, thus 
formally ending the crusades. However, there were several obstacles to an 
identification with the crusades during the Egyptian campaign. Perhaps the most 
significant of these was Britain’s alliance with the Ottoman Empire. The British 
fought alongside, rather than against Muslims. Moreover, few British soldiers 
mourned the destruction of the Order of the Knights of St John. Prior to Napoleon’s 
arrival, Thomas Walsh thought the order “had begun evidently to decline; it's [sic] 
navy had become so insignificant, as scarcely to deserve the name; it's military ardour 
had subsided”. Walsh concluded the Order fully deserved its ignominious end, their 
resistance against the French “may probably be better termed a deliberation between 
cowardice and shame.”42 The closest that British soldiers came to an association or 
identification with the crusades were a few short lines indicating an interest in the 
crusading knights. For instance, as the British flotilla sailed past Rhodes on its voyage 
to Marmaris, Daniel Nicol wrote:  
 
The island was the residence of the Christian knights 
after their retreat from the Holy Land…I felt a more 
than usual interest in looking at those places, from what 
I had read of them in history and Scripture; I stopped 
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aloft on the foremast crosstrees until I could discern the 
objects no longer.43 
 
What is interesting about these military accounts of historical and biblical sites was 
the level of detail often included. Monuments, objects and ruins were described in 
terms of their dimensions and the materials and methods employed in their 
construction. It was common for officers to closely study and measure objects and 
buildings of interest. William Wittman, for example, stated that the exact dimensions 
of the Great Pyramid had been subject to much dispute in recent years. He proceeded 
to compare measurements from different sources before supplying those undertaken 
by British engineers during the campaign.44 Captain Charles Hill observed similar 
measurements being taken of Pompey’s Pillar: “so many people have taken them 
[measurements] that it will always be easy to find them.”45 An important factor to 
consider here, highlighted by Michael Greenhalgh, is that the recording of precise 
detail may have been useful for military purposes. Greenhalgh focuses on the French 
military’s use of ancient structures in the early nineteenth century, and he argues that 
scholarly interest in these buildings was valuable as it provided essential information 
on the still-usable Roman infrastructure during the French takeover of Algeria.46 
There is evidence to suggest that the British soldiers in Egypt looked at the ancient 
structures and the landscape in similar ways. On 28 April 1801, William Wittman 
entered the fort of Salahieh, on the eastern border of the Nile delta. It had probably 
been built by the Ottomans in the fifteenth century, and had been garrisoned by the 
French from late 1798. A few days prior to Wittman’s arrival, the French garrison had 
evacuated the fort and retreated towards Cairo. Wittman considered it an excellent 
military post, and its merits were later taken into consideration during the British 
occupation. 
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It possesses considerable strength, and its provided 
with a wet ditch, well palisaded.  Sixteen guns appeared 
to have been mounted; and a part of these were found 
spiked….Within the fort is a mosque, the lofty minaret 
of which had served for a look-out. There had also been 
an excellent barracks, now in ruins, within the fortress: 
it appeared to me that they were capable of receiving a 
thousand men. Considering that it was built on a plain, 
this fortress is of a very extraordinary construction.47 
 
The evaluation of ancient structures for military purposes can also be seen in Robert 
Wilson’s narrative. After the surrender of the French garrison at Alexandria, Wilson 
discussed how Egypt might be defended from a second French invasion. Having made 
a detailed survey of Alexandria’s ancient defences, he considered the city key to the 
defence of Egypt. Its harbours and the nearby coast provided the most suitable landing 
conditions for an invading army “since in that harbour alone security can be found for 
shipping of any burthen throughout the year.” However, if Alexandria could be 
successfully defended, “France dare not expose another armament to disaster in 
Aboukir Bay, which cannot be fortified against the entrance of hostile fleets. The 
importance therefore of rendering Alexandria superior to a coup de main is 
obvious”.48 To assist in the defence of Alexandria, Wilson suggested restoring the 
city’s unique defensive advantages that had existed in antiquity. He recommended 
that lake Mareotis should be kept full of water throughout the year. The position of 
this lake meant that when full, Alexandria was positioned on a narrow, easily 
defendable isthmus. This had been the case in antiquity, but the lake dried up as the 
canals linking it to the Nile had not been maintained. In April 1801, the British had 
cut through the narrow isthmus between the lakebed and the sea to assist in defending 
themselves from the French garrison in Alexandria. This had only been a temporary 
expedient however, the lake was still likely to dry up, and Wilson proposed making 
this solution more permanent, as it had been in antiquity. “The complete insulation of 
the city by the sea would secure the proposed object, and is a plan against which very 
                                                        
47 Wittman, Travels in Turkey, 292.  See also: 413.  
48 Wilson, History, 247. See also: Nicol, Experiences, 52-53. 
 134 
few objections, if any, could be advanced…Any debarkation at Aboukir would then 
be of little advantage”49  
 
Reflecting on the ruined condition of these ancient structures, British servicemen 
offered different explanations for the decay of Egyptian civilization. Here, one can 
see a disparity between the accounts of the ranks and those of officers. The rank and 
file tended to see the state of Egypt as a consequence of Biblical punishment, and as 
confirmation of the predictions of Ezekiel and of the existence of the ten plagues of 
Egypt in the Book of Exodus. George Billanie, a private in the 92nd Highlanders, 
wrote:  
 
We all agreed after we had marched through the 
country that the Scripture account of it was perfectly 
correct; and the universal remark was that a remnant of 
the plagues of Moses still existed in it… I saw in these 
ruins the fulfilments of Jehovah’s threatenings, and an 
evidence of the truth of the Scriptures… The prediction 
is now fully verified, that Egypt, once the first of 
nations, should become the basest of kingdoms: Ezek. 
Xxix. 15, 16. It is sunk so low in ignorance and 
wretchedness, that, if it were not for the many elegant 
and stupendous remains of antiquity existing in the 
country, the voice of history, strong as it is, could 
scarcely be credited, that it was one the first of nations 
and the seat of the arts and sciences. It is a land of 
pestilence and disease.50  
 
Officers, by contrast, interpreted Egyptian decay within a secular framework 
concerning the rise and fall of civilizations. In broad terms, there were two popular 
interpretations of history at the beginning of the nineteenth century: cyclical and 
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progressive. According to the traditional cyclical view of history, empires were 
subject to decay and degeneration as they lost their martial character under the 
corrupting influence of luxury and despotic government. The history of the Roman, 
Spanish and Ottoman Empires carried dire warnings for future civilizations. This was 
the implicit message of Edward Gibbon’s famous work, The Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire, and was made overtly clear in Adam Ferguson’s History of the Roman 
Republic. Gibbon and Ferguson emphasized the melancholic and humbling lessons 
that could be learned from the ruined civilizations of history, in order to prevent 
modern empires from experiencing similar failure.51 At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the cyclical view of history remained prominent among classical 
republican thought in the Scottish enlightenment, and continued to provide a powerful 
language for understanding national differences.52 However, cyclical interpretations 
had begun to be replaced by more linear ‘progressive’ accounts, which emphasized 
constant progression. This idea was central to Condorcet’s Sketch of a historical table 
of the progress of the human spirit (1793) and to Turgot’s 1750 speech ‘On the 
Successive Progress of the Human Spirit’. According to this paradigm, ancient 
civilizations had to be seen in ascending order as the human spirit progressed - more 
recent societies were better. Thus Egypt had initially been pioneering, but this spirit 
had been sapped by superstition and decadence. Viewed in this way, Egypt’s great 
antiquity put it behind later civilizations; its long history, which had once been a 
source of admiration, now became a reason to despise it as static and sterile.53 
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The reflections of the officers in Egypt on the ruins of antiquity suggest their views 
were more inclined to cyclical rather than progressive interpretations of history. They 
looked at the antiquity of Egypt with sadness and admiration, rather than hostility, and 
looked for lessons to be learned from the ruins of Egypt.  Robert Wilson summarizes 
this chain of thought, as he viewed the Pyramids at Giza.  
 
When… reflection directs the thought to the surprising 
works of genius and learning of those ages in which 
these were constructed, and contrasts the present abject 
race of their posterity, the mind cannot but lament the 
degradation of such a portion of human nature, and 
consider the Pyramids as a monument for melancholy 
instruction.54 
 
Reference to such sombre thoughts can also be found in soldiers’ descriptions of 
Alexandria. By 1801, the once thriving ancient Egyptian port was little more than a 
backwater; the city had once boasted a population of over a quarter of a million, but 
had since fallen to an estimated 24,000 inhabitants. Its importance had long since been 
eclipsed by Rosetta and Damietta which were linked by navigable canals directly to 
Cairo.55 Although the soldiers enjoyed viewing the various monuments of antiquity 
around Alexandria, their ruined condition provided powerful visual evidence that the 
prosperity the city had enjoyed had withered away. Thomas Walsh for instance, wrote:  
 
Alexandria, once the capital of the commercial world, 
is now converted into a desolate heap of ruins… The 
remains of beautiful marble and granite pillars, mixed 
and confounded with the miserable ruins of Arab 
dwelling, present themselves at every step, and force 
upon the mind a melancholy comparison of the ancient 
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splendour of the emporium of the world with its present 
degradation.56 
 
Feelings of melancholy were most conspicuous in Francis Maule’s writings. They 
contained reminiscences on the vulnerability of even the most prosperous civilizations 
when subject to the decaying influence of time. In a description of the Egyptian 
capital, Maule wrote, “Grand Cairo, so renowned in history for the splendour of its 
palaces, its magnificent buildings, and its great extent, now present a very different 
aspect. Like the rest of the country, it has fallen into insignificance and decay, and is 
the abode of ignorance and barbarism.”57 Maule’s expressions of sorrow were most 
intense during his visit to Memphis, one of the ancient capitals of Egypt. Although 
the foundations “give high ideas of its former splendour and magnificence”, there was 
little other sign of the greatness of Egypt’s former inhabitants:  
 
One traces nothing very remarkable in the ruins of the 
city. Ages have rolled over them, and left nothing but 
confused and indescribable masses of stone and 
rubbish. Such is the fate of the once magnificent cities 
of the world. They are the work of man, and they perish 
like himself. Thebes, Memphis, Alexandria, which 
were once the glory and terror of the earth, are now no 
more.58  
 
Reflecting on the ruins in Egypt generally, Maule wrote: “One would imagine it to be 
a terrestrial paradise. To me, it appeared like its once celebrated cities – a country 
which had long been buried.”59 Interestingly, Maule included in his account an extract 
from Vivant Denon’s Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt. A French artist and 
archaeologist, Denon took copious sketches and notes from Egyptian ruins during 
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General Desaix’s campaign against Murad Bey in Upper Egypt in 1799 – sometimes 
even when under fire. The lively, heavily illustrated account that he published in 1802 
was enormously popular, and is regarded as the chief stimulus behind ‘Egyptomania’ 
that took hold in Britain and France in the early nineteenth century. The extract Maule 
included reflected his own gloomy feelings on the ruins:   
 
Nothing is so melancholy to the feelings as to march 
over these ruined villages, to tread under foot the roofs 
of houses, and the tops of the minarets; and to think that 
these were once cultivated fields, flourishing trees, and 
the habitations of man. Everything living has 
disappeared. Silence is within and around every wall; 
and the deserted villages are like the dead, whose 
skeletons strike with terror.60 
 
Such a reaction was heavily influenced by the melancholic reflections on ruined 
architecture that were common among the writings of Grand Tourists, particularly 
when their itineraries took them to Italy. The great Roman ruins and antiquities were 
less obvious than they are today, for in the eighteenth century much of Imperial Rome 
lay beneath crumbling medieval walls and buildings, and the rubble and rubbish that 
had accumulated over hundreds of years.  The Palatine hill was overrun with gardens 
and weeds, and the Coliseum was left neglected, rented out to citizens who kept sheds 
for their animals there.61 The state of Rome’s renowed gladiatorial area in 1764, 
supposedly inspired Edward Gibbon to write his great work, The Decline and Fall of 
the Roman Empire.62 Grand Tourists wrote of the “pitiful contrast” between current 
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conditions and the “former greatness of Rome… to which they felt themselves… the 
rightful and magnificent heirs.”63 In the same year as Gibbon’s visit to the Coliseum, 
Oliver Goldsmith published his poem The Traveller, which directs the reader’s 
attention to:  
 
those domes, where Caesars once bore sway, 
Defac’d by time and tottering in decay, 
There in the ruin, heedless of the dead, 
The shelter-seeking peasant builds his shed...64 
 
Clearly classical traditions and the preference for Greco-Roman designs played an 
important role in forming the British servicemen’s melancholic perceptions of 
Egyptian antiquities. Although Egypt was never as fashionable as Greece or Rome, 
there remained an excitement about their proximity to Egypt’s ancient past. The detail 
with which soldiers recorded Egypt’s ancient objects reflected the emerging interest 
in antiquarian studies and held a military significance: it allowed the British to 
appraise the military utility of these ancient structures. 
 
Collecting antiquities 
Another practice, common among tourists of this period, and widely adopted by the 
soldiers in Egypt, was the collection of antiquities. Soldiers sought small idols and 
sculptures, or chipped pieces from larger monuments, such as sarcophagi, columns 
and statues, sometimes smashing these relics to pieces in the process, in order to 
obtain a souvenir. Military personnel had always taken mementoes and trophies from 
campaigns and such habits were encouraged by cultures of collecting in late 
eighteenth-century Britain.65 As mentioned in the introduction, this subject has been 
examined in the past decade by Holger Hoock and Maya Jasanoff. Hoock highlights 
that the pursuit of antiquities played a central role in promoting national and imperial 
prestige during the “cultural war” between Britain and France. Ancient antiquities of 
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great empires were appropriated to aggrandize and legitimize the British empire.66 
However, Hoock’s focus is on the collection of high-status objects which were passed 
onto state institutions, and as a result he is less concerned with the personal motives 
that drove individual collectors, or their collection of lower status items. A closer 
examination of the collection and appropriation of antiquities and monuments by 
soldiers during the Egyptian campaign reveals that these practices were not motivated 
solely by a patriotic desire to further national prestige. As Maya Jasanoff has 
emphasized, there was a combination of motives behind an individual’s collection of 
artefacts. For the soldiers in Egypt, these motives included a genuine interest in 
antiquity, the prospect of financial reward, the opportunity for the collector to 
refashion or improve their social standing, and the desire for a memento to reward an 
individuals’ personal endurance of hardships throughout the campaign.  
 
If we look closely at the individual soldiers involved in the acquisition of the Rosetta 
stone, one can see that these men were less motivated by patriotism, and more by their 
own ambition. In 1810 Colonel Hilgrove Tomkyns Turner wrote an account to the 
Society of Antiquaries of London of how he had personally seized the Rosetta stone 
from the French. Turner had been a member of the Society of Antiquaries since 1798, 
and had published A Short Account of Ancient Chivalry a year later.  One can assume 
this was why he was chosen for take charge of the captured antiquities. He arrived in 
Egypt on behalf of the Prince of Wales, looking for objects with which he could adorn 
the Prince’s armoury in England. Although he would have welcomed this opportunity 
for advancement that the Rosetta stone had opened, he would also have felt pressure 
from his Society peers to retrieve the Rosetta stone for Britain.67 He claimed that the 
French made his task exceedingly difficult. The stone had been “covered with soft 
cotton cloth and a double matting” when Turner had first seen it. However, when he 
arrived at General Menou’s house to have it removed, “the covering of the stone was 
torn off and it was thrown upon its face, and the excellent wooden cases of the rest 
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were broken off”. Turner asked General Hutchinson for assistance, and was provided 
with a detachment of artillerymen and a gun-carriage or “devil-cart.” They 
successfully moved the stone “with some difficulty from the narrow streets to my 
house, amid the sarcasm of numbers of French officers and men”. 68 Once he had 
removed the stone, several of the savants came to his quarters and asked to take a 
plaster cast of the stone for posterity, which he allowed “provided the stone should 
receive no injury”. He accompanied the stone on board the Egyptienne frigate, and 
arrived at Portsmouth in February 1802.69  
 
Turner’s account would have its readers believe he had wrested the stone from the 
clutches of an embittered enemy, and an article by Jonathan Downs brings the 
accuracy of this report into doubt. Downs highlights that the renowned traveller and 
scholar, Edward Daniel Clarke, told a very different story in his memoirs, published 
shortly after Turner’s statement and apparently in direct response to his claims. Clarke 
and his two academic companions had arrived at Alexandria shortly after the French 
surrender. They had been well received by the French scholars who had cared for the 
Rosetta Stone up to this point. According to Clarke’s memoirs, the stone was not 
captured, but handed over secretively in the quiet backstreets of Alexandria by these 
same scholars to Clarke and his companions.  Clarke was unequivocal that Turner had 
not been there. “…Mr Cripps, Mr Hamilton and myself being the only persons present 
to take possession of it.”70 
 
Downs believes Clarke’s story to be more plausible than Turner’s because he shares 
the credit with colleagues and portrays the French in a positive light, something that 
in 1810 when Clarke began to publish his multi-volume travel memoirs, would have 
been unpopular in some quarters. It seems reasonable to presume that the French 
scholar who had delivered the stone was happier to hand it over to three affable 
scholars, rather than giving it to the British army.  Menou might have even ordered 
the clandestine hand-over himself, enabling him to lay the blame for its surrender on 
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the treachery of his subordinates. Clarke portrays a handover that was characterized 
by confusion and divided loyalties, with the stone delivered in a spirit of preservation 
from one scholar to another.71  
 
If we assume Turner falsified his account, it seems he did so seeking the plaudits of 
his peers in the Society of Antiquaries. This is most apparent with regard to the 
savants’ plaster cast, noting that it was done “leaving the stone well cleaned of the 
printing ink, which it had been covered with.”72 Turner clearly aspired to pursue some 
sort of antiquarian career: he remained in Egypt at his own expense long after his 
regiment had left the country, in order to serve in an antiquarian capacity. His 
ambitions were at least partly realized. Although he may not have been directly 
responsible for the acquisition of the Rosetta Stone, he was involved in the collection 
of other antiquities and oriental manuscripts, the vast majority of which would end up 
in the British Museum. After his return to Britain, he made a lithograph of a Roman 
statue he found and published an inscription on Pompey’s Pillar in Archaeologia, the 
publication of the Society of Antiquaries, in 1806. Turner’s letters to the Prince of 
Wales, during the campaign in Egypt ensured him royal favour, and he held a 
succession of royal appointments at court. From 1803 he was groom of the 
bedchamber to George III, and was keeper of the king's collection of prints. He used 
this influence to make an appeal for some remuneration for his antiquarian services 
in Egypt, and – most important to him personally – tried to become a trustee of the 
British Museum. This appointment was refused, and there is no record whether he 
was successful in obtaining any recompense.73  
 
One can discern a blend of personal and patriotic motives in the records of other 
acquisitions, or attempted acquisitions. At the end of 1801 Lord Cavan, the major-
general who succeeded to the command of the British army in Egypt when Hutchinson 
embarked for Britain in October, attempted to have one of Cleopatra’s Needles, a trio 
of giant ornamental obelisks, transported to England. The efforts that were made to 
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remove one of the obelisks, which had fallen onto its side, were detailed by William 
Rae Wilson, a traveller, writer and fellow of the Society of Antiquaries, who visited 
the needles over a decade after Cavan’s attempt to remove them:  
 
several officers of rank proposed to convey the Obelisk, 
which lay horizontally, to England, in order to be 
exhibited in some proper situation, as a monument of 
British achievements, and which had evidently, at one 
time entered to the contemplation of Buonaparte to 
remove to France.74  
 
This quotation is significant for it clearly outlines several motivations behind the 
British attempts to acquire antiquities. Lying on its side, the British thought the needle 
should be presented in “some proper situation”. This would be accomplished by 
removing it to Britain, where it would act as “a monument of British achievements”. 
The knowledge that the obelisks had interested Napoleon increased their value to 
British prestige.  
 
According to Charles Hill, Cavan directed a party of  “Four Captains, 8 subalterns and 
500 men” who were “daily given to work at the fallen Needle of Cleopatra” A pier 
was constructed approximately 100 feet into Aboukir Bay. The Needle, weighing 
“about 200 tons”, was to “have been launched along this pier into a ship cut down for 
the purpose of receiving it, a false keel built on the Needle and jury mast strap’d in 
it.” In the event, the party was barely able to move the needle, and much of the pier 
was destroyed by boisterous weather.75 It was clear that removing the obelisk to 
Britain would be an expensive project. According to William Rae Wilson, 
“subscriptions were set on foot among the officers of the army and navy serving in 
Egypt, to raise a sum to transport it to London.”76 No monetary assistance was offered 
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by the British state, and the funds raised for the project were from private sources. 
Cavan wrote a series of letters, principally to the naval commanders in the 
Mediterranean - Lord Keith and Sir Richard Bickerton - as well as General Fox at 
Malta. Copies were also sent to individuals further afield known to have an interest in 
the matter, such as John Hely-Hutchinson and Lord Nelson. In his letter to General 
Fox, written on 12 January 1802, Cavan explained his plans to have the needle moved, 
so that it may “perpetuate on British ground the memory of the late events in the 
country”, and outlined the progress made.  
 
We have been for some days past busily employed 
about the fallen Needle stone of Cleopatra both in our 
minds and bodies, the former employed in planning 
schemes for its transportation, and the latter in 
constructing a wharf to launch it from, which is already 
advanced more than twenty yards into the sea.77  
 
Cavan asked Fox to “sanction and patronize the measure”, and requested that “you 
will make our intentions known to the officers under your command who have served 
in Egypt…At present one third of the total amount will be required and we most 
earnestly beg that it may be remitted without delay.” Cavan was optimistic, and 
reassured Fox that any contributions would be used wisely.78 Along with this letter, 
Cavan sent Fox a list of men from the forces currently in Egypt who had subscribed 
to this scheme at a meeting of general officers on 8 January. 37 officers attended the 
meeting and 19 were recorded to have subscribed. In total the contributions amounted 
to £1045.79 These private donations certainly give some sense of the interest of British 
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servicemen in acquiring Egyptian antiquities for national prestige, but it is likely that 
their career ambitions also influenced their generosity. The Needle possessed 
significant cultural capital, and had it been successfully moved to Britain, it would 
have promoted the reputation and standing of the subscribing officers in military and 
antiquarian circles. In the event, the contributions did not prove sufficient. On 20 
January, eight days after his initial letter, Cavan wrote to Fox informing him that the 
project had been abandoned: “the subscription of the troops in Egypt, amounting to 
£4000 was nearly if not quite sufficient to cover every expense.”80 Despite this, 
Cavan’s men “resolved that some memento should be left on the spot.” They hauled 
the obelisk onto a slab of white marble detailing the heroic actions of the British forces 
during the campaign in Egypt.81 This act may have been trivial, but it represents an 
attempt to appropriate the cultural capital intrinsic to the obelisk despite the failure to 
acquire it.  
 
Another episode of cultural appropriation concerns Pompey’s Pillar. After the 
surrender of the French garrison, the British determined to remove the cap of liberty 
which French soldiers had fixed on a strong pole on top of the pillar earlier in 1798. 
In December 1801, Lieutenant George Meredith of the Royal Marines asked his 
commander for permission to “destroy so conspicuous a trophy of the Triumph of 
France”, and replace it with “our insignia more worthy so exalted a situation”. 
Whether his request was granted is unclear, nevertheless a few audacious soldiers, 
cleverly using a series of ropes, scaled the twenty-six metre high column. On reaching 
the top, they replaced the cap with a British flag, and, in an extraordinary scene, these 
men sat drinking a bowl of punch they had brought with them, enjoying the view and 
toasting to the king and their climbing skills. The soldiers’ act of substituting the cap 
of liberty with the British insignia, represents an attempt to appropriate from the 
French the cultural capital intrinsic to Pompey’s Pillar.82 One can argue however, this 
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was not the only motive. Climbing the pillar was a physically difficult task, and 
required a head for heights. It was an achievement of which an individual could be 
proud, and provided a tale with which to amuse their friends and relatives.  
 
Similar motives can be discerned in the collection of smaller personal items.  After 
enduring the hazards of campaigning and combat, soldiers often looked for 
mementoes and trophies as a reward. For many soldiers, the collection of ancient 
objects fulfilled this role. Sergeant Robertson provides an example of this. During his 
visit to the Pyramids, some of Robertson’s comrades “had provided themselves with 
a sledgehammer and some torches, with the design of exploring the interior.” After 
creating an entrance, they reached a large room containing “a marble chest or coffin”. 
The sledgehammer was used to smash the sarcophagus “as we all seemed determined 
to have something as a memorial of our visit to the pyramids…. I still retain my share 
of the spoil, which I am willing to show to those interested in antiquities.”83 The use 
of the term “spoil” is significant here. It suggests that Robertson thought of the piece 
of the sarcophagus he took as a reward for the British victory over the French, and for 
enduring the dangers of the campaign. This line of thought was far removed from the 
established cultures of civilian collecting. Civilians referred to antiquities they 
acquired as “souvenirs”, “mementoes”, “artefacts”, “antiques’, “relics” or simply 
“objects”.84 Hilgrove Turner, who accompanied the Rosetta Stone on its voyage from 
Alexandria to Deptford, wrote about the relic under his care with the same militaristic 
thinking adopted by Robertson. He wrote of the stone as “a proud trophy of the arms 
of Britain (I could almost say spolia opima), not plundered from defenceless 
inhabitants, but honourably acquired by the fortune of war.”85 Turner’s use of the 
Latin phrase “spolia opima” is noteworthy: it denotes the “rich spoils” such as armour, 
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arms and personal effects that a Roman general stripped from the body of an opposing 
commander slain in single combat. The spolia opima were regarded as the most 
honourable form of war trophies that a Roman commander could possibly obtain.86 
Other soldiers commented on the use of antiquities as rewards or trophies. Describing 
the effect of the Pyramid tours on the morale of his men, Robert Thomas Wilson 
thought they “seemed to find a recompence for many of their toils, to exult more in 
their triumphs, and feel the enjoyment which travellers must experience on attaining 
the ultimate object of their research: their minds aggrandised with honest pride, and 
honourable reflections.”87  The desire for a trophy also helps to explain why soldiers 
broke small pieces off Pompey’s Pillar for themselves. One private wrote: “Our 
soldiers were so very eager to have pieces of the stone, that they broke bits off it, and 
would I suppose, have half broken it down, but our Commander in Chief ordered a 
centinel over it, that no person whatever should touch it.”88 
 
Given this military approach to collecting, it is interesting that the British allowed the 
French savants to keep their natural specimens they had collected after the capitulation 
of the French garrison at Alexandria. According to Hilgrove Turner, the savants had 
been permitted to keep these items “on the consideration that the care in preserving 
the insects and animals had made the property in some degree private”.89 One could 
argue that the status of these objects as private property had little bearing on the 
decision to allow the savants to retain them. The British had simply ignored French 
claims that the “artificial” antiquities, such as the Rosetta Stone, were also private 
property. This may indicate a lack of British interest in these natural artefacts, which 
were of scientific interest but did not have the trophy value of antiquities. 
 
Despite their military understanding of collecting antiquities, British soldiers did at 
times adhere to the established civilian conventions for collecting. Such traditions 
were well entrenched in Britain by the end of the eighteenth century, thanks to Grand 
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Tourists, who often purchased antiquities and paintings from foreign lands which they 
displayed in their homes. It was a practice that had grown in the latter half of the 
century, encouraged by the excavations at Herculaneum, Pompeii and around Rome, 
to the extent that the souvenir trade became a crucial component of the economy in 
the Italian capital.90 Although never as fashionable as Roman or Grecian objects, there 
was considerable demand for Egyptian antiquities and artwork in the ‘Egyptian style’. 
Long before the British and French campaigns in Egypt, wealthy collectors acquired 
items such as shabtis, scarabs, stelae and canopic jars. One of the pre-eminent 
connoisseurs of these objects was Sir Hans Sloane, who possessed approximately 150 
Egyptian antiquities. His collection provided the foundation of the British Museum 
after his death in 1753.91 Contemporary artwork in the Egyptian style was also 
fashionable. Egyptian pottery was popularized by Josiah Wedgewood, who 
introduced into production a perfected style of stoneware “Egyptian black” vases. 
China makers of all kinds also appropriated Egyptian patterns and figures, such as 
lions and sphinxes in their designs.92 
 
The British soldiers were receptive to this culture of collecting, and it appears that 
Egypt provoked a genuine antiquarian passion among some individuals. A good 
example of this is Hilgrove Turner. He remained in Egypt at his own expense long 
after his regiment had left the country, in order to serve in an antiquarian capacity.93 
The British passion for antiquities proved a useful source of income for the local 
Egyptians. Some of the officers, who were unwilling to search for objects themselves, 
could employ local Arabs to do it for them. Discussing these Arab antiquity collectors, 
Robert Wilson wrote: “The curiosity of travellers is a considerable profit to them, and 
they are incessantly employed in collecting numerous little idols and broken 
fragments of statues and sculpture, which are found in immense quantities.”94 William 
Wittman was one the Arabs’ customers. During the time he spent at Giza, Wittman 
busied himself with engraving his name on the Great Pyramid, and undertaking an 
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expedition to a variety of catacombs, in the search for a perfectly preserved mummy. 
He had little time to search for mementoes of his visit, and wanting souvenirs, he 
purchased a few “curious Egyptian idols” that had been found by the Arabs.95  
 
Although the British sailors of the blockading squadron in 1798 never landed on the 
Egyptian shore, they nevertheless engaged in the pursuit of antiquities. In November, 
the crew of the Swiftsure was ordered to careen some of the Ottoman gun boats 
attached to the blockade squadron. A makeshift dock was excavated on Nelson’s 
island, to allow the boats to be tilted onto their sides, exposing their hulls for cleaning 
and repair. The excavations uncovered “several Egyptian reliques of great antiquity”, 
and “Some copper coins… of very ancient date.” Cooper Williams displayed 
particular interest in these artefacts, making notes and sketches of them, which he 
included in his memoir.96 One of these objects, an alabaster figure that appeared to 
have been worn as an amulet, Williams kept until he reached Palermo later in 1799. 
There, he presented it as a gift to Sir William Hamilton; the others he kept for 
himself.97 Williams’ gift to Hamilton was likely an attempt to attain patronage and 
influence in antiquarian circles. Hamilton was a keen antiquarian, archaeologist and 
volcanologist; he was a member of the Society of Dilettanti and fellow of the Royal 
Society, from which he had received the Copley Medal in 1770. Williams’ desire to 
further his antiquarian prospects demonstrates that military personnel could develop 
a passionate interest in archaeology and antiquarianism despite their military 
priorities.   
 
Clearly, there were a variety of motivations behind the military collection of 
antiquities.  Soldiers were receptive to civilian cultures of collecting and there were 
some who displayed a genuine interest in ancient objects. Yet, aside from this, there 
was a distinctive military appreciation of ancient antiquities. They were considered 
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trophies or rewards for enduring the hazards of campaigning, and were employed in 
attempts to validate the soldiers’ experiences, and promote their social standing.  
 
Interestingly, the approach of soldiers to the antiquities in Egypt draws comparison 
with the habits of collecting in the Iberian Peninsula. Gavin Daly has examined this 
practice in a recent article. The weight of evidence suggested to him that plunder for 
necessity and opportunism became normalized in the Peninsula, but there was also a 
spirit of collecting, especially among officers. The British generally thought 
themselves to be in a backward Peninsular world, largely removed from what they 
considered civilization. This lack of respect, and at times loathing towards the local 
inhabitants, helped break down cultural restraints on plundering civilians.98 A similar 
argument can be applied to the Egyptian campaign. Much like accounts of the 
Peninsular War, British soldiers made scathing remarks about the local inhabitants. 
They were primitive, dishevelled and predominantly Muslim. Robert Wilson 
described them as “the most timid and abject wretches in the world.” Their manners 
were considered “brutishly obscene”, and for Thomas Walsh, they presented a 
“miserable and calamitous sight”.99  
 
Comparing ancient and contemporary Egypt 
In British accounts of ancient ruins and antiquities in Egypt, one can detect an 
emphasis on the inferiority of the current inhabitants to their antique ancestors. This 
was made overtly clear by Lieutenant Thomas Evans, of the 8th Regiment. In his 
account of Rosetta, he argued that the numerous buildings in a state of disrepair 
demonstrated the inferiority of Egypt’s present inhabitants to their fore-bearers.   
 
…this City has principally arisen from the wrecks, and 
on the ruins of others, as, on examination, you discover 
in the greater part of their public buildings, Mosques in 
particular. Pillars with inscriptions almost defaced, and 
put to uses foreign to what they were first intended for, 
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sculpture and the different works of the fine arts all 
mutilated and reversed, without the least attention 
having been paid to uniformity of size and place, but 
jumbled together in that kind of style, which at once 
demonstrates the ignorance and barbarity of the 
succeeding generation to that which originally 
inhabited and adorned this, once beautiful city.100  
 
It is possible to see these observations as responses to anxieties that arose concerning 
Britain’s identity as a progressive, developing society in this period. As Christopher 
Bayly highlights, at the end of the eighteenth century Britain’s identity and its sense 
of pre-eminence was very recent, fragile and contested. It was easily threatened. The 
new awareness of other cultures which accompanied the expansion of the British 
Empire brought with it potential challenges to Britain’s sense of supremacy. 101 Martin 
Bernal, in his controversial Black Athena, has outlined this challenge in detail. 
According to Bernal, the traditional view among Greeks in the classical ages 
stipulated that Greek culture had arisen as the result of colonization by Egyptians and 
Phoenicians, around 15000BC. For eighteenth and nineteenth century romantics and 
racial theorists, it was simply intolerable for Greece, which was seen as the 
embodiment of European civilisation, to have been created from a mixture of 
Europeans and colonizing Africans.102 The ruined splendour of ancient Egypt 
provided evidence for the existence of an Egyptian empire that had colonized Greece. 
The vast age of Egyptian monuments also questioned the legitimacy of the Biblical 
narrative. In response to these revelations, a new model for interpreting the origins of 
European civilization was needed, and the traditional view was replaced by one which 
emphasized the Aryan origins of Greek culture. European scholars sought to 
undermine ancient Greek sources that had indicated the importance of Egypt, while 
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emphasizing the independent creativity of Greece. John Potter, for instance, published 
four volumes on Greek political institutions in 1697, which, with numerous editions, 
remained a standard text on this subject until 1848. He asserted that Athens, unlike 
the rest of Greece, had never been conquered by the Africans, and that Greek culture 
and institutions had come from Athens. Thus he was able to detach Greece from 
Africa and the Near East without challenging the ancient authority of the invasions.103  
 
Perhaps the most influential figure on the origins of European civilization was Sir 
William Jones, whose research on Sanskrit proved instrumental in moving the origin 
of European civilization away from Egypt, towards India. In 1786, he revealed that 
Sanskrit bears a strong affinity to Greek and Latin. From this, Jones argued that 
Sanskrit and European languages probably had a common unknown ancestor, but it 
was generally thought that Sanskrit itself was the original Indo-European language. 
For Christian apologists who sought to defend the authority of the Bible, this was firm 
evidence for diffusionism: the theory of the dispersal of all cultures from a common 
source.104 This resulted in an extraordinary enthusiasm for all aspects of Indian culture 
that raged from the 1790s to the 1820s, and India replaced Egypt as the exotic ancestor 
of Europe.105  One of the most notable authors on this subject was Francis Wilford. 
The ten articles which he contributed to Asiatic Researches between 1799 and 1810 
attempted to syncretize Sanskrit and Judeo-Christian universal history. He announced 
the putative discovery of a Sanskrit version of the Noah story, which corroborated the 
Biblical narrative and subordinated Egypt to India in terms of chronological priority 
with the presupposition that ‘later is better’.106  
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Much like Francis Wilford, it appears that some of the British soldiers in Egypt were 
keen to prove the superior ancestry of India over Egypt. This was most apparent 
among East India Company officers, as they visited the Ancient Egyptian temple of 
Dendera, located on the opposite bank of the Nile to Qena. When Captain John 
Budgen, one of General Baird’s aides-de-camp, went to see the ruins of Dendara, he 
took two sepoys of the Brahmin caste with him. In one of the buildings Budgen 
deemed to be the oldest, “The Sepoys discerned effigies of their God Vishnu, very 
much mutilated, & they observed they had almost all the figures that were carved on 
the walls & pillars, in their temples in India.”107 Another company officer made a 
similar claim: “Some intelligent Hindooo [sic] Sepoys who were with us instantly 
recognized the figures on the walls, similar to those in their pagodas in India, and one 
of them who understood the sanscrite [sic] gave us a written description of them.” 108 
These two statements, asserting the presence of Hindu gods in an Egyptian temple, 
indicate the Indian origins of ancient Egypt.  
 
One might argue that the British collection of Egyptian antiquities itself formed 
another psychological reaction to the doubts concerning Britain’s identity as a 
progressive, developing society in this period. The inability of the Egyptians to 
maintain the antiquities, to the extent that it was necessary to acquire them for proper 
preservation, implied that Egypt had undergone moral and cultural decline. There are 
numerous British accounts of improper treatment of antiquities, and Hilgrove Turner 
provides one of the most extraordinary examples. He described a valuable 
sarcophagus that had been taken from a mosque destroyed by the French, and after 
the capitulation of Alexandria, had been taken by the Ottomans as a prize. It was 
placed on the captured French privateer Corse, which had also been given to the 
Ottomans. “The sarcophagus was considered by the Turks to be an especial antidote 
to all diseases and particularly to the plague, and a fee of six paras was paid to the 
Iman by those who touched it with their tongue in order to obtain a cure”. The British 
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had desired the sarcophagus and the unusual conditions in which it was stored 
encouraged them to make attempts to acquire it. Turner was sent to the Capitan Pasha, 
the Grand Admiral of the Ottoman navy, to demand its delivery, and it was reluctantly 
presented to the British.109 Other soldiers’ accounts accused the locals of vandalism: 
John Budgen and Charles Hill, who wrote of their visit to Dendera, blamed the ruined 
condition of the temple on the locals: “the Arabs have endeavoured to destroy this 
immense monument of ancient architecture by every means in their power, and have 
broken most of the figures that adorned the outside of the building.”110 The faces of 
the statues, and columns, in particular, had “been defaced by the blind zeal of the 
Mussulmans.”111 On viewing Pompey’s Pillar after the surrender at Alexandria, 
Thomas Walsh noted “The French have repaired the foundation supporting the 
pedestal, which had formerly been destroyed in part by the brutal rapacity of an Arab; 
who, imagining some treasure lay concealed under it, attempted, but happily in vain, 
to blow up this beautiful column.”112 During his stay at Haifa, Williams found an old 
monastery, “a large handsome building”, that had been “occupied by a detachment of 
the Turkish army, who had miserably defaced it: part of the chapel was destroyed, and 
only the walls remained.”113  
 
Although racial thinking played a significant role in these British attitudes, one must 
be careful when referring to conceptions of race in this period. As Colin Kidd and 
Roxann Wheeler note, the British understanding of race at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century was more fluid than is the case today. Throughout the eighteenth 
century, conceptions of religion, civility, clothing and rank were more important to 
Briton’s assessment of themselves and other people than physical attributes, such as 
skin colour. In explaining human variation, most eighteenth century Britons would 
have looked to the monogenic biblical account of creation and the common descent 
from Adam and Eve. The subsequent changes in complexion and culture sprang from 
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natural and climatic occurrences as people dispersed over the earth.114 The final 
decades of the eighteenth century witnessed a gradual change: Britons began to 
believe that human differences were less superficial, and were not altered by changes 
in the climate or education. Various causes for this shift have been discussed by 
scholars, such as the secularizing influence of the Enlightenment, the mounting public 
pressure to discuss the economic and moral viability of the slave trade, and the 
expansion of Britain’s empire into territories populated by different races.115 One must 
emphasize the gradual nature of this change in racial ideology. By the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, there was a confusing mix of interpretations on the causes of 
human difference, and the subject was becoming a popular strand of intellectual 
inquiry. Many of these ideas were expressed through the Scottish Enlightenment, in 
publications such as Adam Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), 
John Millar’s Origin of the Distinction of Ranks (1771) and Adam Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations (1776).116 A popular topic at beginning of the nineteenth century, according 
to Colin Kidd, was how the growing conviction in racial difference might be 
reconciled with the monogenic Biblical narrative.117 As Roxann Wheeler observes, 
European academics at this time began to refer to the “four stages theory”, in an 
attempt to categorize the variety of newly encountered peoples and societies. This was 
a hierarchical formula through which all societies could be compared. At the top of 
this hierarchy was commercial civilization, of which Britain was the prime example; 
at the bottom lay the most primitive hunter-gatherer societies, which were located in 
the orient, the Americas or the Pacific.118  
 
The fluidity in ideas about race and civilization in Britain can be seen in the writing 
of soldiers in Egypt. The soldiers expressed their sense of superiority with reference 
to a diverse range of subjects. For many, the most important indicator of this was the 
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physical appearance of modern Egyptian society. Their damning accounts also 
allowed military personnel to demonstrate to their audiences their cultural refinement 
and sophistication. By stressing their disgust at Egyptian settlements, with adjectives 
such as “chaotic”, “unrefined”, “dirty” and “ugly”, the soldiers could identify 
themselves with opposing, more positive terms, such as order, refinement, hygiene 
and the picturesque. An abhorrence at the sight and stench of Egyptian dwellings is 
commonly emphasized; this was an age in which there was a growing intolerance of 
filth and foul odours that were considered a threat to health and morality.119 The 
accounts of Cooper Williams and John Lee, as they explored Haifa, provide an 
example of this.  
  
This place had by far the most miserable collection of 
human habitations I ever beheld:… The streets exhibit 
a frightful specimen of human misery, being very 
narrow and full of mud; and to add to the disagreeable 
picture, dead carcasses of dogs, horses or camels, were 
suffered to rot in the public ways without being 
removed. The houses… are no better than hovels.120  
 
It is striking that the soldiers described these Egyptian dwellings in terms that were 
commonly used for animals. One of the first settlements the British forces 
encountered after landing at Aboukir, was Idku, a small village located on the coast 
roughly half way between Alexandria and Rosetta. Thomas Evans described it:  
 
This is the first Village I have seen in Egypt and a 
miserable figure it cuts,… the streets are not more than 
two yards wide, without any pavement whatever, and 
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so filthy are they that the swine of other countries will 
bear a fair comparison to the wretched occupants.121 
 
To Evans, the “odd manner in which the houses are built” resembled “in their 
appearance so many pigeon houses”.122 Another officer wrote:  
 
By describing one village you describe all; invariably 
built…an assemblage of flat-roofed square mud-huts; 
few houses with upper stories or walls of brick; oval 
kennels of mud, without any window, and only a small 
hole, through which they creep… they are beastly 
dirty.123 
 
Equating Egyptian dwellings to those of animals reveals the soldiers’ conviction in 
racial, cultural and social superiority, but it also demonstrates the soldiers’ attempts 
to describe their unfamiliar, alien environment with familiar terminology. The use of 
terms such as “kennels” and “pigeon houses” conveyed an image that readers in 
Britain could recognize.  
 
Robert Wilson provided one of the most interesting accounts of Egyptian abodes. He 
referred to the lodgings in terms often used for animals, but he also drew a contrast 
between Egyptian and Irish housing: “All language is insufficient to give a just idea 
of the misery of an Egyptian village; but those who have been in Ireland may best 
suppose the degree, when an Irish hut is described as a palace, in comparison to an 
Arab’s stye, for it can be called no other name.”124 As Catriona Kennedy argues, the 
identification of similarities between Ireland and other foreign cultures and landscapes 
exposed the fault lines within the United Kingdom at this time. Ireland was one of the 
British army’s major garrisons; a large proportion of the soldiers in Egypt would have 
                                                        
121 Evans Diary, 126, 136.  
122 Ibid.  
123 Anon., Non-Military Journal, 47-48. 
124 Wilson, History, 99-100. See also: Walsh, Journal, 202-205; Wittman, Travels in Turkey, 291; 
Evans Diary, 130. 
 158 
served there at some point. Ireland functioned as a synonym for squalor, poverty and 
backwardness. It served as the “other within”, and a point of reference for the “other 
without”. Comparisons with the proverbial Irish cabin can also be found in the 
Peninsular campaigns, as British soldiers commented on the housing of Portuguese 
peasantry.125 
 
The British soldiers’ criticism of Egyptian buildings was most noticeable in their 
accounts of Cairo. The Egyptian capital was enormous, consisting of an estimated 
500,000 inhabitants, making it arguably larger than Paris, and second only to 
Constantinople as the most populous metropolitan centre in the Near East. It was a 
renowned trading centre, with large seasonal caravans, consisting of hundreds of 
camels from distant locations such as Aleppo, Mecca, Darfur and even Timbuktu, 
2,000 miles away on the other side of the Sahara Desert. Within the precincts of Cairo 
there were over 300 mosques, whose minarets dominated the skyline.126 Cairo boasted 
a long and famous history; it was heavily associated with the ancient Egyptians, the 
pyramid complex at Giza and Saladin. Dozens of military memoirists were anxious 
to visit the city, learn its history, and relate this knowledge to their readers. What they 
discovered failed to fulfil their expectations. There was little sign of the industrial or 
infrastructural development that had been taking place in Britain. By the late 
eighteenth century, many of the middle and upper classes had begun to commute daily 
into urban centres such as London, Bath and Glasgow after the establishment of 
regular coach services. Nothing of the sort existed in Cairo. Transport networks 
remained unchanged since the middle ages; the streets were narrow, winding, 
irregular, dirty, malodorous and hopelessly overcrowded, making travel through 
Cairo slow, unpleasant and only possible on foot. Traversing the city became a test of 
endurance, as the narrow congested streets became airless and swelteringly hot. The 
atmosphere was blighted by smog from thousands of household cooking fires, many 
of which used dried dung for fuel. This urban environment fitted well with the 
soldiers’ conviction that Levantine peoples lacked a capacity for organization and 
refinement. 
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By 1801, many British soldiers were aware of the numerous accounts of Cairo by the 
French forces that had occupied the city since 1798. Thousands of letters from French 
soldiers had been intercepted in the Mediterranean by Nelson’s naval squadron; many 
of which, including Napoleon’s private correspondence, were promptly published in 
Britain. They conveyed a sense of enormous disappointment that arose partly from a 
profound culture shock.127 According to Robert Wilson, “The English, instructed by 
their error, expected little, yet did not reduce their ideas low enough.”128 The number 
of ugly structures, or buildings in a state of disrepair, was central to British criticism 
of Cairo. One officer in the Anglo-Indian expeditionary force, wrote “the Houses are 
lofty and the streets extremely narrow…. the European Traveller looks in vain for 
elegance or taste in any of the Buildings of this Capital.”129 Such a view arises partly 
from British ignorance. Although Cairo was certainly less economically developed 
than British conurbations, many of the damaged buildings bore scars from the 
numerous insurrections against the French occupation. During the most severe revolt 
in October 1798, the French bombarded the city. Napoleon’s orders to General Bon, 
whose division cleared the streets of rebels, stated: “all houses which throw stones at 
you in the street are to be burnt to the ground”.130 Many British soldiers were aware 
that the French were at least partly responsible for the condition of Cairo. However, 
it would have been difficult to attribute the ruins to a particular cause, and the British 
may have underestimated the extent of the destruction wrought by the French.131 
 
The combination of war-torn buildings and bustling, oppressive streets, meant that 
Cairo proved to be a nasty shock for the soldiers hoping to undertake a recreational 
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tour of the city. Daniel Nicol’s narrative presents a good example of this. His curiosity 
was piqued by the huge citadel that loomed over the city, and he obtained permission 
to visit the ancient fortress after the capitulation of the French garrison. The castle 
seemed only a short distance from his bivouac in the British camp on the outskirts of 
Cairo, and he set out with orders to return to camp by nightfall. Unfortunately, Nicol 
failed to take into account the severe crowd congestion, a problem exacerbated by the 
forces of the Ottoman Grand Vizir, which had occupied the city.132 “The streets in 
Cairo are narrow and we were like to be choked with the dust or squeezed against the 
brick houses. At length the street got quite blocked up; there were so many animals, 
camels, mules, and asses, that no movement could be made out one way or other”. 
What Nicol had anticipated to be a pleasant excursion turned out to be the opposite. 
It is obvious from the very little he wrote on the subject, that Nicol barely had time to 
inspect the citadel. After spending hours in the stiflingly hot, overcrowded streets, 
Nicol was “right glad when we got out of the confusion” and happy to leave behind 
Cairo, “with its narrow streets, brick and mud buildings, and its poor half-naked 
inhabitants.”133 Thomas Evans, who devoted the 13 and 14 July to exploring Cairo, 
was also caught in the dense crowds: “the streets from being narrow, and the 
population prodigious, renders them very difficult passage; in their crowded state it is 
a common thing, to observe a proportion of the people carried along with the torrent 
for a considerable distance”.134 Both Nicol and Evans invested considerable time and 
effort into these excursions, their cultural and recreational experience of Cairo was 
important to them. Yet despite this, these men could not move beyond the feelings of 
discomfort which derived from the unfamiliar environment the Egyptian capital 
presented to them. 
 
Soldiers with experience of India tended to see Cairo differently. Lachlan Macquarie, 
the Deputy-Adjutant General to the Anglo-Indian army, was more familiar with the 
hot, bustling streets. In late August, he and Colonel Lloyd of the 86th Regiment 
                                                        
132 Hill Diary, 110.  
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…rode through all the squares, principal streets, and 
Public Markets within the City. We afterwards 
proceeded to the Ancient Citadel on the mountain close 
to the town. From the Citadel we had a very noble grand 
view of the whole of this immense extensive city, - The 
River Nile for a great distance above and below the 
Town, the Sea Port Town of Bulac, with its harbour full 
of shipping, the Island of Rhoda with the encampment 
of the Indian Army, the Town and Fortifications of 
Giza, and the distant view of the Pyramids and 
surrounding country, together with the grand immense 
Aqueduct that formerly conveyed the water from the 
River into the city, formed altogether such an 
assemblage of grand and beautiful objects of Nature 
and Art as I have never seen combined before.135 
 
Charles Hill, who had also served in India, shared Macquarie’s opinion. He wrote that 
the citadel was “well worth seeing”, and that “I am of opinion that this was formerly 
a very noble city”.136 
 
The views of Macquarie and Hill were a minority; it was far more common for 
military narratives to express profound shock at the seemingly primitive state of 
Egypt. This response was not unique to military personnel; it was formed in part by 
prevailing values and practices in Britain at a time of rapid industrial development, 
and was a common theme among civilian travelogues. William Hunter, in his account 
published in 1796, wrote that the villages in Egypt “have a wretched 
appearance,…..the chief materials of which they are built, are mud and twigs.” Their 
homes, he claimed had “more the appearance of a dungeon than a dwelling house.”137 
                                                        
135 Auchimuty, ‘Lachlan Macquarie’, 96.  
136 Hill Diary, 107-108.  
137 William Hunter, Travels through France, Turkey, and Hungary, to Vienna, in 1792 (London: 
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Of all the travelogues of Egypt published in this period, the Comte de Volney’s 
Travels stands out for its long, detailed and passionate denunciation of Egyptian 
abodes. He effectively conveyed both the disappointment he felt on encountering 
Cairo, and his conviction in the superiority of European capitals:  
 
When we hear of Grand Cairo, we are led to imagine 
that it must be a capital, at least, like those of Europe; 
but if we reflect that, even among ourselves, towns have 
only begun to be rendered convenient and elegant 
within these hundred years, we shall easily believe that, 
in a country where nothing has been improved since the 
tenth century, they must partake of the common 
barbarism; and indeed, we shall find that Cairo contains 
none of those public or private edifices, those regular 
squares, or well-built streets, in which the architect 
displays his genius. Its environs are full of hills and 
dust, formed by the rubbish which is accumulating 
every day, while the multitude of tombs, and the stench 
of the common sewers, are at once offensive to the 
smell and the sight. Within the walls, the streets are 
winding and narrow; and as they are not paved, the 
crowds of the men, camels, asses, and dogs, which 
press against each other, raise a very disagreeable 
dust.138 
 
It is unsurprising then, given the popularity of Volney’s and Hunter’s travelogues, 
that the vicious criticism British servicemen levelled at Egyptian inhabitants was well 
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received by readers in Britain. The Critical Review, for instance, praised one officer’s 
journal for its description of the common people, which “conveys such a variety of 
wretchedness.”139 
 
Conclusion 
British servicemen looked at and responded to Egyptian ruins and antiquities in a 
number of different ways. Although soldiers came to Egypt to wage war, this did not 
prevent them from exploring ancient ruins; antiquarian pursuits were not at odds with 
the military occupation. One might even argue that antiquarianism in Egypt held a 
strategic importance, as it enabled Britain to maintain a low-level presence in the 
Levant after the campaign, and provided detailed information on ancient structures 
that might be used for military purposes. The variation in responses to antiquities is 
most discernible between the officers and the lower ranks. Without the classical 
education that officers possessed, the ordinary soldiers’ experience of antiquities was 
surprising and revelatory. They relished exploring and learning about ruins, of which 
they had little or no knowledge, and looked to the Bible and the ten plagues of Egypt 
to explain the decayed state of Egyptian civilization. Officers, by contrast, were well 
read about classical antiquities, some had embarked on Grand Tours to Greco-Roman 
sites in their youth. The exploration of Egyptian ruins allowed these men to continue 
their cultural refinement. They explained the degenerated condition of Ancient Egypt 
with reference to secular interpretations of history; the cyclical view being the most 
popular.  
 
The curiosity and excitement about antiquities frequently resulted in attempts to 
amass collections of these objects. Soldiers collected small objects, such as pieces of 
sarcophagi, primarily for themselves. The antiquities they acquired were considered 
mementoes, but were also thought of as trophies of their victory or rewards for 
enduring the hazards of campaigning. Personal, self-centred motives can be discerned 
in the procurement of larger objects. As Hilgrove Turner’s account demonstrates, his 
‘acquisition’ of the Rosetta stone was motivated more by personal ambition than 
patriotism. The collection of these antiquities was justified in part by the allegedly 
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uncivilized, undeveloped state of contemporary Egypt. The inability of the modern 
inhabitants to maintain the ruins from antiquity made it necessary for Britain to 
acquire them, to ensure their preservation and appreciation. Numerous soldiers 
implied that the inhabitants were responsible for the poor condition of Egypt’s ancient 
structures. The dirty, smelly and crowded appearance of the modern cities of Egypt 
reinforced this view of Egyptian stagnation and decline, and pre-empted any challenge 
ancient Egypt may have posed to Britain’s sense of its own pre-eminence.
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3. 
“Among the most savage nations”: British 
conceptions of identity and difference in 
Egypt 
 
 
I always conform to the customs of the people amongst 
whom I live, as much as any man can do, and am the 
last person in the world to condemn manners….. 
because they differ from ours in England; but confess 
that it would be necessary I should live a little longer 
amongst… the Turks and Arabs, before I could adopt 
almost any one of their habits: every thing seems to be 
done diametrically opposite to the way we do it…1  
 
This quotation, written anonymously by an officer on General Abercromby’s staff, 
encapsulates one of the defining features of British interaction with Near-Eastern 
peoples in Egypt between 1798 and 1801. The officer, like many of his comrades, was 
acutely aware that he had entered a very different country from his own. These 
conceptions of identity and difference that were expressed by British servicemen were 
complex, inconsistent and filled with ambiguities and contradictions. As highlighted 
by Colin Kidd, Roxann Wheeler and Dror Wahrman in the previous chapter, this was 
the result of the fluid perceptions of difference at this time. Throughout the eighteenth 
century, conceptions of religion, civility, clothing and class were more important to 
Briton’s assessment of themselves and other people than physical attributes, such as 
skin colour, but in the final decades of the eighteenth century this began to gradually 
change. Britons began to believe that human differences were less superficial, and 
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were not altered by changes in the climate or education.2 This realignment towards 
more racial conceptions of difference only became fully visible a few decades into the 
nineteenth century, with the emergence of scientific racism.3  
 
The influence of the religious divide between European nations and the Near East was 
also in flux throughout the eighteenth century. One of the most significant works on 
this topic has been written by Malcolm Yapp.4 He argues that Europe’s sense of 
difference from the East dates from the medieval idea of Christendom as a single 
Christian community. Christians saw relations between Christianity and Islam in 
terms of religio-military confrontation, a view enhanced by the fall of Constantinople 
in 1453. Calls for Christian unity against the Islamic threat were led by the papacy, 
which became the theme for the next three centuries.5 As the Ottoman threat against 
Europe began to diminish after the siege of Vienna in 1683, European writers 
gradually dropped the language of Christianity, referring to themselves as Europe, 
rather than Christendom from the beginning of the eighteenth century. Although the 
religious divide had begun to fade, Yapp argues there was a “cultural entity at the core 
of Christianity” which prolonged the concept of ‘Christendom’ under the new term 
‘Europe’. New, seemingly secular, concepts were introduced to explain and maintain 
the differences that existed between Europe and the Near East since the Crusades. 
Montesquieu was fundamental in this regard. To explain why there were different 
types of government in Europe and the East in his Spirit of Laws, he referred not only 
to religion, but to various secular principles based on observation: the Ottoman 
Empire was a despotic government because it was too large, because its religion was 
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conducive to despotism through the doctrine of fatalism, and the position it accorded 
to women, and because of the corrupting influence of the climate on the human mind.6  
 
By 1801 therefore, there was a confused mix of both traditional and new conceptions 
of difference, which is reflected in the writing of the British army in Egypt. The 
objective of this chapter is to explore the different, sometimes ambiguous and 
contradictory ways in which British servicemen in Egypt conceived of their identity 
and a sense of their difference from Near Eastern culture as they described encounters 
with Egyptian and Ottoman peoples. Among the confused mix of images in the 
writing of servicemen, the one consistent theme which emerges is that the people 
encountered in Egypt were seen as polar opposites to Britons. This thinking owes 
much to Montesquieu’s analysis, which was vital helping to shape the concept of 
Europe by outlining what it was not. The European traveller visiting the Near-East 
saw his own society in reverse – a distorted image which Malcolm Yapp calls the 
“Turkish Mirror”. Over time, the features of the Near East persistently altered to 
reflect Europe’s perceptions of itself.7 This was a feature of some of the most popular 
travelogues in the eighteenth century, such as Savary’s Letters from Egypt, Volney’s 
Travels through Syria and Egypt, and Voltaire’s Essay on the Manners of Nations. 
British servicemen looked at the Egyptians and Ottomans in Egypt in similar ways to 
the travellers Yapp examines. The soldiers altered the features and characteristics of 
the Egyptians and the Ottomans to reflect their perception of themselves.  
 
Religion in the British military  
Although the religious distinction between Europe and the Near East had begun to 
fade from the beginning of the eighteenth century, religion remained one of the 
primary signifiers of difference between British soldiers and the Muslim inhabitants 
of Egypt. Thus, it is necessary to establish the extent of religiosity in the British forces 
at this time. Much has been written by scholars and contemporaries of the period about 
the soldiers’ sordid and immoral habits, and their contempt for religious compulsion. 
Despite this, the evidence suggests that there were few convinced atheists in the ranks. 
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The British army of the eighteenth century was in theory, and to a certain extent in 
practice, a Protestant institution. Until 1774, when new dispensations were 
implemented, all new recruits were required, in theory, to declare their Protestantism 
upon enlistment.8 Only those who swore allegiance to the Protestant monarch and 
publically confessed to the Thirty-Nine Articles were eligible to serve.9 Churchgoing 
was compulsory, attendance at public worship on the Sabbath being required under 
the Articles of War. Army chaplains were attached to each regiment and were 
responsible for the spiritual welfare of the troops. Both the Articles of War for the 
British Government and the Articles of the East India Company regulated religion in 
their armed forces in a very similar manner. They employed many of the same words 
to emphasize the requirement for attendance at divine worship.10  
 
One could argue that the army’s regulations, intended to ensure at least a show of 
piety, were conducive to the promotion of personal faith. For soldiers who served 
abroad, army life could be extremely dangerous, particularly during garrison duty in 
India or the fever-ridden Caribbean. The fear of death took a considerable 
psychological toll. Combined with a lack of funds, isolation from local society and 
the boredom of garrison life, soldiers had plenty of time to dwell on the perils of their 
occupation. It is unsurprising therefore, that many turned to religion when coming to 
terms with their hazardous service.11 Given the importance of the church in rural 
communities, religion may have also been a way of maintaining domestic ties and a 
civilian identity. Encouraging the soldiers’ piety was thought to improve their 
discipline and efficiency as George Billanie, a former private in the 92nd Gordon 
Highlanders, remembered. “On the whole, I passed comparatively easy and quietly 
through the army, and without a doubt, the remaining restraints of early instruction 
was one particular means of preserving me from many evils and dangers; and in this 
                                                        
8 Michael Snape, The Redcoat and Religion: The Forgotten History of the British Soldier from the 
Age of Marlborough to the Eve of the Frist World War (London: Routledge, 2005), 11, 18, 139, 240.   
9 Hiliary M. Carey, God’s Empire: Religion and Colonialism in the British World, c.1801-1908 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 42.  
10 Richard Holmes, Sahib The British Soldier in India 1750-1914 (London: Harper Collins, 2006), 
459.  
11 Ibid., 142-143. 
 169 
respect proved an invaluable blessing to me.”12 It was partly for this reason that the 
armed forces were occasionally targeted by philanthropic groups who sought to 
encourage piety. The Naval and Military Bible society, which came under the 
patronage of the commander-in-chief, the Duke of York, was a charity established in 
1780 with the specific purpose of distributing Bibles and prayer books throughout the 
military forces. It continued to do so during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars 
with great success.13 The enduring importance of Christianity to the British army 
throughout this period was encapsulated by the Duke, who combined his role as 
commander-in-chief with that of the lay Bishop of Osnabruck.14 The impact of the 
army’s distribution of Bibles and other religious literature is difficult to gauge, as the 
success of the project was dependent on the private attitudes of the soldiers 
themselves. There were several instances of soldiers adopting an indifferent attitude 
towards items of this nature, but there were some who undoubtedly were inspired by 
the texts they received. Billanie recalled that reading his Bible and “several religious 
books” given to him, led to a “hunger and thirst after personal holiness”.15 
 
There were several openly pious soldiers and sailors who participated in the Egyptian 
campaign or fought at the battle of the Nile. It was relatively common for those who 
wrote letters or diaries during the wars, or memoirs after their discharge, to consider 
their experiences explicitly in religious terms.16 Soldiers’ writings contain numerous 
prayers to God as they recollected the dangers of combat in the Egyptian campaign. 
As the expeditionary force sailed to Egypt, Billanie told himself that God was wise 
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and just, and took solace from his belief that God would not punish him more than he 
deserved for his sins.17 James Downing, an evangelical convert and former private 
who had been blinded during the campaign, wrote in verse how he had prayed during 
combat to prevent panic. “I know at first through fear of death, / You eagerly will say, 
/ O Lord have mercy on my soul, And rescue me this day. / … My brother soldiers, 
pray reflect / Upon your awful state, / Pray to the Lord for pard’ning grace, / Before 
it be too late.”18 Several army officers were well known for their religious qualities, 
such as Sir Rowland Hill, the nephew and namesake of a leading figure in the 
evangelical movement, the Anglican clergyman Rowland Hill. Sir Rowland was 
renowned for his humanitarian treatment of his men and for the mildness of his 
language and temper. He commanded the 90th regiment during the Egyptian campaign 
and was severely wounded by a musket ball to the head in the action on 13 March.19 
Many of these pious servicemen assumed that non-believers, like all enemies of 
religion, were prone to meeting an unfavourable end. Foot guardsman John Stevenson 
thought it unsurprising that his sergeant-major, who had been “the greatest enemy to 
religious men that I ever knew in his rank”, was killed during the landings at Aboukir 
Bay in 1801, “while all those whom he had persecuted came home safe”.20 The 
reverend Cooper Williams, who served on board HMS Swiftsure, maintained a similar 
outlook. He thought the British fleet at the battle of the Nile had acted as the 
instrument of God’s retribution against the secularist French foe. “The finger of 
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Providence has been visible from the entrance of the British fleet into the 
Mediterranean to the conclusion of the important action in the Bay of Aboukir.”21 
 
Some of the religious regulations in place in the army were to some extent also present 
in the navy. On promotion to lieutenant, all naval officers were sworn in to the Test 
Act of 1673 which required all persons “to take the oaths of allegiance and supremacy, 
receive the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper according to the rites of the Church of 
England, and subscribed to the declarations against transubstantiation.”22 This act 
excluded men of other religions, such as Catholics and Jews, from becoming officers 
unless they gave up their religion but it did not apply to common seamen. Non-
Protestants were often pressed into the navy, and forced to tolerate compulsory 
attendance at church services aboard ship. The frequency of religious services could 
vary, and depended on the weather and the religious convictions of the captain. There 
were some who acquired a reputation for their devoutness, such as Captain James 
Gambier, whose command of HMS Defence in 1793 was criticized for letting his men 
not work on Sundays.23 For Daniel Goodall, a sailor serving on board HMS Temeraire 
from 1801, the average seaman might not be outwardly pious, but possessed religious 
beliefs.  
 
The comparative solitude of his life on shipboard, and 
the sublimity of the dangers he is often called upon to 
encounter, are not without their effects … and hence it 
will be found by those who may take the trouble to look 
beneath the surface of that air of recklessness and dash 
so generally characteristic of Jack ashore, that there is 
underlying it a strong foundation of simple, honest 
faith… Vice and dissipation I have witnessed in large 
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measure…, but I never met an infidel among seamen – 
certainly not among those who had been afloat for any 
length of time.24 
 
The range of practicing Christians in the army and navy gives credence to Linda 
Colley’s view in her seminal Britons: Forging the Nation that Protestantism was at 
the core of what it meant to be “British”.25 This form of Protestant, anti-Catholic 
nationalism smoothed over significant divisions between the different kinds of 
Protestantism within Britain, especially that which separated Nonconformity and the 
two established churches of England and Scotland. British anti-Catholicism reached 
a peak in the 1790s, in the aftermath of the French Revolution and with the onset of 
war, the Irish rebellion, and the lingering question of Catholic emancipation.26 There 
is evidence to suggest that soldiers were central agents in the growth of anti-
Catholicism. According to historian Colin Haydon, a noticeable number of soldiers 
were tried for their role in the 1780 Gordon riots.27  
 
Nevertheless, it is important not to overemphasize anti-Catholicism and the strength 
of piety within Britain’s armed forces. The army was not aggressively Protestant, and 
soldiers who wrote on this subject, particularly evangelicals such as George Billanie 
and Francis Collins, probably did not represent the general level of spirituality in the 
army. Since the introduction of the oath of allegiance in 1774, ever-greater numbers 
of Catholics were recruited into the ranks, and a few Catholic gentlemen could gain 
commissions with the discretion and connivance of their fellow officers. 
Commissions for Catholic gentlemen became more frequent after the Irish 
Parliament’s Catholic Relief and Militia Acts of 1793, and with the ever-greater 
demands for recruits as the Revolutionary war progressed. Furthermore, the East India 
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Company was less concerned with the religious convictions of its recruits, and freely 
enlisted Catholics from the 1770s onwards. The presence of numerous Catholic 
soldiers within the army can be seen in the growth of Catholicism in Sheerness, 
Woolwich and Portsmouth - areas that contained a concentrated military presence. 
Nevertheless, Catholics were occasionally made unwelcome by their Protestant peers, 
and they remained a minority in both the ranks and the officer corps.28 This growing 
religious diversity made individual servicemen more aware of their own religious 
status and principles. A sense of their spiritual identity became a point of comparison 
on encountering other peoples.  
 
Clearly, the way in which the British army was organized was, in theory, conducive 
to the development of personal piety.  In practice, this was not always the case. This 
is most apparent with regard to army chaplains. Their primary duties were to see to 
the soldiers’ spiritual needs: they were to read public prayers every day and to 
administer Holy Communion at least four times a year. Besides this, chaplains were 
expected to keep a close eye on the conduct of officers and men, officiate at military 
marriages and funerals, and perform other pastoral duties such as visiting the sick and 
attending prisoners who had been condemned to death.29 The 1790s were a period of 
major reforms for military chaplains. In 1796, regimental chaplains were abolished, 
and a new, all-embracing Chaplain’s Department, consisting of commissioned and 
officiating chaplains, was created in their stead. These reforms were an attempt to 
tackle the habits of absenteeism and pluralism that were rife among chaplains and 
other regimental officers in the 1780s and early 1790s. Only one chaplain appears to 
have accompanied the Duke of York’s expedition to Flanders in 1793, and not a single 
chaplain attended Sir Ralph Abercromby’s 33,000 strong force to the Caribbean in 
1795.30 Notwithstanding the good intentions, the new Chaplain’s department failed to 
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eliminate absenteeism and inadequate pastoral care for soldiers serving abroad. 
Several major expeditions went overseas with very few or no commissioned chaplains 
being present throughout the Napoleonic Wars.31 The frequent absence of 
commissioned chaplains meant that the spiritual care of soldiers was transferred to 
their superior officers. Although never formally authorized, some officers performed 
various religious functions when occasion demanded. They were, for instance, often 
required to lead burial services.32 The new system did, unfortunately, create fresh 
problems, as once in the field, it was often uncertain who commanded the chaplains.33 
 
Despite the lack of pastoral oversight in Egypt, there is evidence to suggest that 
unofficial religious gatherings took place regularly. According to Francis Collins, 
such meetings acquired an added importance due to the Biblical significance of Egypt.  
 
Among the British soldiery were men of piety, who 
frequently experienced on those sands the application 
of these and similar promises; they held their meetings 
for divine worship at every opportunity, and in these 
deserts had such enjoyment of the favor of the love of 
God, as might be called “Joy unspeakable and full of 
glory.” It is a pleasing consideration to Christians, that 
by the late events in making Egypt a seat of war, the 
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knowledge of salvation, by the Lord Jesus, hath been in 
a wonderful manner conveyed to that memorable 
spot.34 
 
This practice followed a trend; there are records of prayer meetings among Methodist 
soldiers during the expedition to Holland in 1793-5,35 and George Billanie recalled 
the foundation of a (non-Methodist) religious society in the 92nd Gordon Highlanders 
in 1799. Nevertheless, these groups could be fragile bodies, vulnerable to the 
changing circumstances of its members. In 1799, Billanie remembered that soldiers 
quickly became complacent in their attendance of the religious society shortly after 
its foundation. During the campaign in Holland that year it failed to meet at all.36 
According to Richard Holmes, this was especially the case in India, where regulations 
were more relaxed over religious matters. Captain Albert Hervey, of the 41st Madras 
Native Infantry, noted that no more than two or three of the officers in his regiment 
ever went to church.37 There are indications that a similar relaxed attitude towards 
religious matters existed among General Baird’s Anglo-Indian expeditionary force, 
as there was an apparent lack of religiously-minded commentators in this army.  
 
An important factor in the development of British religious identity was the wars with 
secularist France, which undoubtedly increased sensitivity towards irreligion. 
Historians Callum Brown and Michael Snape have highlighted the significant impact 
of the wars on Britain in a religious context. With the demise of the Catholic Church 
in France, Snape argues that the traditional Protestant-Catholic divide that had 
characterized the wars between Britain and France throughout the eighteenth century 
was, to some extent, transformed into a Christian-heathen divide.38 The result of all 
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this was that religion became one of the central factors with which Britons defined 
themselves when traversing foreign lands.  
 
Identity and difference 
As the British soldiers entered Muslim Egypt, some appear to have become more 
attuned to their Christian identity. This is apparent in an account written by one of 
Abercromby’s staff officers. He expressed feelings of both sympathy and disgust 
towards the Coptic Christians in Egypt, who were greatly oppressed throughout the 
country, and had adopted the appearance and customs of indigenous Muslims.  
 
These poor Christians, from the constant terror in which 
they live and the system of tyranny and oppression 
exercised upon them by the true believers, 
(Mussulmen,) have dwindled into a race of the most 
despicable slaves, abject liars, hypocritical knaves and 
cheats, that exist upon the face of the earth… their style 
of dress is like that of the native, distinguished 
principally by the difference of turban; their manners 
and customs of smoaking, drinking coffee, lounging 
crossed legs upon sophas… are those of the Arabs, so 
that, except in religion, they differ not from the 
natives.39 
 
The officer found it “degrading” and “preposterous” that the Copts were almost 
indistinguishable from Arabs. “Human nature revolts at their melancholy state of 
subjection and cannot help pitying while she must despise them!”40 Two conclusions 
can be taken from this statement. Firstly, it is possible that the officer who wrote these 
comments experienced a “crisis of images” similar to that described by Zeinab Abul-
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Magd, in his examination of the French occupation of Egypt. This occurred when late 
eighteenth century travellers, such as Claude-Étienne Savary and C. S. Sonnini, as 
well as the savants who accompanied the French expedition, forged a false image of 
the Copts and the Egyptian inhabitants. They portrayed the natives as inferior and 
oppressed, waiting for an enlightened nation to liberate them. This image clashed with 
the reality of physical encounters, which revealed a people who were not desiring 
liberation.41 One could argue that a “crisis of images” can be discerned in the British 
officer’s comments. His sympathy for the Copts indicates that he considered them as 
oppressed fellow Christians in need of liberation: throughout his narrative he had 
frequently cited travelogues which conveyed this image, such as Savary’s Letters from 
Egypt. However, the image of the Copts as Christians could not be easily reconciled 
with the realities of their Muslim appearance, and this clearly unsettled the officer.  
 
Secondly, these comments suggest that there were limits to Christianity as a shared 
identity, as religious affinity was undermined by a sense of cultural differences. The 
officer regarded superficial features such as clothing, as more important than skin 
colour in signifying difference between peoples. One must place the officer’s 
comment in the context of the time. As highlighted by the work of Colin Kidd, Roxann 
Wheeler and Dror Wahrman, conceptions of difference were fluid in this period. 
Religion, civility, clothing and class were gradually being replaced as the primary 
signifiers of human difference by perceptions of race.42 Therefore, at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, there was a confusing mix of interpretations on human 
variation, and this can be seen in the soldiers’ accounts. One can discern the 
importance of clothing in Cooper Williams’ account, who expressed horror when, in 
preparation for an excursion to Jerusalem, he was advised to lose his European 
appearance, “I had provided a Turkish habit, and suffered my mustachios to 
grow…”43 However, a shift towards more racial understandings of difference can be 
seen in the writing of another officer, who described “an unfortunate Frenchman” who 
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had appeared at Alexandria after “living 14 months in the Desert”: “The poor unhappy 
fellow, almost starved to death, had in truth scarcely the appearance of a human 
creature; his unshaved chin and Arab garments, ill according with a European white 
skin, that shone brilliantly through his rags.” Evident from these comments is the 
belief that the Frenchman was unable to change his skin or race, in spite of his Arab 
dress and mode of living.44  
 
The growth of racial understandings of difference help to explain why British attitudes 
towards the French appear largely unaffected by Napoleon’s Islamic policy during the 
French occupation of Egypt. The French general made heavy-handed efforts to 
underscore his position as a pro-Islamic ruler of a Muslim country, and ingratiate his 
army with the locals. Before the end of 1798, many Britons were aware of Napoleon’s 
July proclamation to the Egyptians, in which he declared:   
 
The French are true Mussulmen. Not long since they 
marched to Rome, and overthrew the Throne of the 
Pope, who excited the Christians against the professors 
of Islamicism (the Mahometan religion). Afterward 
they directed their course to Malta, and drove out the 
unbelievers, who make war on Musselmen. The French 
have at all times been true and sincere friends of the 
Ottoman Emperors, and the enemies of their enemies.45 
 
Although sources are contradictory, it appears at one point that Napoleon planned to 
attend the ceremony of the Prophet’s Birth in Arab dress. Earlier, at dinner with his 
staff, he had appeared in this attire, but was greeted with bursts of laughter which 
prompted him to remove it.46 Despite his best efforts, the embarrassing failure of 
Napoleon’s Islamic policy probably helped allay British concerns about the French 
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association with Islam. Napoleon’s chief obstacle was that he and his army were not 
Muslim. Negotiations between Napoleon and the Egyptian sheikhs, about the 
conversion of his army to Islam, broke down over circumcision and the abstinence 
from alcohol. Although they imprisoned the Pope and respected Islam, the French 
remained infidels in the eyes of Egyptian Muslims.47 One exception to this was the 
French general Jacques-François Menou. He converted to Islam, participated in a full 
Muslim marriage ceremony, and even adopted the name of Abdullah. Menou’s 
correspondence with fellow officers indicates that he learned to speak Arabic, and 
could converse at length with his wife.48 Menou was very much an anomaly, even in 
the eyes of his own men. The thousands of letters from French soldiers intercepted in 
the Mediterranean by Nelson’s naval squadron in 1798 conveyed a sense of immense 
disappointment at what Egypt had to offer, and exposed the falsehoods behind 
Napoleon’s Islamic policies. By 1801 therefore, the British understood most 
Frenchmen had an intolerant attitude towards the Egyptian population. Some of the 
French soldiers were under the impression that Napoleon’s overtures towards the 
Egyptians were simply a cynical ruse, to mask his aggressive, imperial intentions. 
General Dupuis in Cairo wrote to a merchant of Toulouse, “We celebrate here with 
enthusiasm the festivals of Muhammad. We fool the Egyptians with our affected 
attachment to their religion, in which Bonaparte and we no more believe than we do 
in that of Pius the Defunct.”49 According to Juan Cole in his analysis of this passage, 
Dupuis’ dismissive reference to the Pope and Roman Catholicism reveal a vigorous 
anticlericalism and militant secularism. They produced in Egypt not open disdain for 
Islam but a calculated and cynical willingness to pretend respect for it as a means of 
deceiving the Egyptian public. “You won’t believe it”, Dupuis continued, “but I 
assure you that we are as fervent as the most fanatical pilgrims”.50 Other French 
officers made similar comments, “Nothing was forgotten in persuading the Egyptians 
that the army had the greatest veneration for the Prophet. The soldiers were politic in 
their expressions; when they returned to their quarters, they laughed at the comedy.”51  
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Interestingly, the British did not share French cynicism towards the festivals of the 
Nile and the Prophet’s birth. In fact, the celebrations attracted very little comment 
from British observers. It is possible that the British simply failed to notice the 
festivities; they were probably muted, given the unwillingness of the inhabitants to 
celebrate under infidel rule, and the British army was camped outside Cairo, hence 
only a minority could closely observe any of the festivities. Another important factor 
was the different objectives of the two opposing forces: whereas the French had 
planned for the permanent possession of Egypt, the British occupation was intended 
to be temporary. Therefore, there was little need for the British to make attempts to 
ingratiate themselves with the locals as the French had done. Perhaps most 
significantly however, British servicemen who had previous experience in India, may 
have been familiar with similar festivals held by the Indian inhabitants. Charles Hill, 
a captain in the East India Company who accompanied the expedition from Bombay, 
wrote a few short lines on the festival of the Nile on 9 August: “The natives making 
a great noise all last night, firing guns and small arms, fireworks, music, singing, (in 
short exactly like the Indian rejoicing.)” 52 
 
The sense of difference between Christianity and Islam was sometimes expressed in 
a gendered language. Christianity, regarded as “manly” was contrasted with 
“effeminate” Islam. This case was often made with reference to the Mamluks, the 
former rulers of Egypt, who allegedly partook in homosexual acts. Robert Wilson, for 
example, considered the habits and customs of the Mamluks as “degrading to 
manhood.”53 Another officer, described them as “so base, and so lost to manly 
feeling,… for they subject themselves not only to everything that is humiliating, but 
disgraceful to human nature.”54 Thomas Walsh wrote that they were “addicted to the 
most detestable and unnatural crimes, which is extremely prevalent in parts of the 
Turkish empire.”55 Such accusations were not completely unfounded; there had been 
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a prevalence of same-gender sex without moral censure in the Mamluk military 
system in medieval Egypt. It is difficult to judge how widespread this practice was, 
as Europeans tended to represent non-European enemies as depraved. According to 
Patricia Owens, the “sin of sodomy” had often been attributed to Europe’s enemies 
during the Crusades. As the military and political situation evolved, so did the 
discourse about sexuality. With the Ottoman expansion into the Near East and eastern 
Europe, same-gender sex became seen as a “Turkish vice”. Civilian writers had 
referred to Near Eastern peoples in this way throughout the eighteenth century. Joseph 
Pitts, author of A True and Faithful Account of the Religion and Manners of the 
Mohametans, noted in 1704 that “it is common for men there to fall in love with boys 
as ‘tis in England to be in love with women”.56 In 1787, Volney wrote in his travels 
that the Mamluks were:  
 
above all, addicted to that abominable wickedness 
which was at all times the vice of the Greeks and of the 
Tartars, and is the first lesson they receive from their 
masters. It is difficult to account of this taste, when we 
consider that they all have women, unless we suppose 
they seek in one sex, that poignancy of refusal which 
they do not permit the other.57  
 
One can argue that accusations of effeminacy contributed towards Britain’s imperial 
rationale. As Matthew McCormack has observed, gender was central to determining 
who should participate in political life. An involvement in politics required an 
individual to act and think in appropriate ways. Alleged effeminacy or femininity was 
politically disempowering; men who were poor, non-English or homosexual were 
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disadvantaged in political arenas.58 This image of effeminacy was used in British 
representations of other ‘eastern’ religions and cultures, such as India. Colonization 
was considered an emasculating process for those colonized, thus oriental 
civilizations were given female qualities. However, these gendered images of 
different peoples could be complex: Not all Hindu or Muslim peoples were subjected 
to this gendered stereotype. Sikhs, Gurkhas and Muslims could be exempted because 
of their martial traditions and history of aggression.59 As we shall see in far greater 
detail in the succeeding chapters, some of the Ottoman troops were described as “a 
fine manly race”, who possessed a “warlike disposition” and boasted a “reputation of 
being very courageous”.60 In other observations, the Mamluks were thought of as 
“brave men”, who “deserve to be spoken of”.61  
 
Another central point of contrast between British and Egyptian society in the soldiers’ 
minds, was the status and appearance of women. The condition of women in the Near 
East had always piqued European interest and imagination, but Billie Melman, in her 
acclaimed work on orientalism and gender, suggests that from the latter half of the 
eighteenth century, writing about oriental women became a mode by which Britons 
could evaluate their own approach to gender and domesticity. Generally, the condition 
of Muslim women was characterized in the European imagination by the denial of 
their public freedom, their servile status and polygamy.62 The visual impact of women 
clad in burkhas, and the exposure to Islamic domestic practices proved to be a jarring 
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experience for British soldiers, and was at odds with their sense of gender identities 
in Britain. It is unsurprising therefore, that the soldiers’ portrayals of Muslim women 
focused on their lack of freedom. One British staff officer provides a noteworthy 
comment on this topic. During his stay in Egypt, he visited a “Syrian family”, and 
made numerous observations on Muslim domestic life.  His account explained that a 
Muslim woman covered her face, and was at the mercy of her husband, who jealously 
guarded her, and forbade her to visit or receive friends. She “inhabits the top of the 
house, seldom or ever descends to the rooms below her own, nor dare she sit at meals 
with her husband, but attends like a servant, and does all the dirty and drudging 
work.”63 The immoral conditions in which Muslim women lived meant that they 
became callous, debauched and ignorant.  
 
They are the only women I ever saw of any country who 
have not naturally a little manner. These poor, stupid, 
ignorant animals have none;…  they hardly know how 
to speak: indeed, conversation is neither very brilliant 
or customary here, nor can it be, where every body is 
so closely confined and consequently so ignorant.64  
 
Such women, “whenever an opportunity offers, give full swing to their vicious 
inclinations.” After the French invasion, “A vast number of them lived with the 
French soldiers, and almost invariably destroyed by medicine, before birth, the 
creatures that would otherwise have seen the light, but would have been the children 
of christians! such is the influence of false religion upon their minds!”65 These 
observations provide a stark comparison with comments on gender ideology in 
Britain. The secluded, sly, ignorant, obtuse and promiscuous Muslim contrasted with 
the free-spirited, virtuous character of the British woman.66 Thomas Evans offered a 
similar portrayal of the status of Muslim women to the staff officer. He wrote: 
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…melancholy indeed is the state of the female in this 
country, doomed to a perpetual bondage from her 
earliest infancy, she has no other alternative than in a 
perfect resignation to the tyrannic will of the male for 
no purpose, … these monsters in the shape of men, 
acting under the influence of a religion, as inconsistent 
with reason, as it is barbarous in its tenets, deny that the 
women possess souls and consequently consign the 
wretched mortals, from the moment of their birth, to 
drudgery, pain and labour… 
 
Like the staff officer, Evans glorified British ideals of gender and domesticity, and 
compared the status of Muslim women unfavourably with that of British women. He 
concluded “what a happy contrast does the state of the female (the brightest part of 
the creation) in all civilized nations, exhibit”.67 For many of the British soldiers, the 
physical appearance of Muslim women reinforced their degenerate image. Often 
covered from head to toe in a loose dress and a veil, female attire was unnerving to 
British observers. Francis Maule thought they resembled “so many spectres”, 
Benjamin Miller described them as “quite frightful”, and William Wittman thought 
their appearance rendered them “very disgusting.”68 Thomas Walsh was most 
uncomplimentary. Muslim women were “so muffled up and concealed in long 
vestments as to leave nothing perceptible but their eyes, which are so ugly as to 
suppress any desire of seeing the rest of their persons.”69 
                                                        
67 Diary of Lt (later Gen) Thomas Evans, 8th Regiment of Foot, 1 May 1799 to 3 Sep 1801, National Army 
Museum, 95-09-101-1, pp.132-133.  
68 Major Francis Maule, Memoirs of the Principal Events in the Campaigns of North Holland and Egypt; 
Together with a Brief Description of the Islands of Crete, Rhodes, Syracuse, Minorca, and the Voyage in 
the Mediterranean (London: 1816), 205; Miller, Adventures, 21; Wittman, Travels in Turkey, 140.  
69 Walsh, in Miller, Adventures, 21. See also: Anon., Non-Military Journal, 30; Nothing Pertickler 
Happened: An Autobiography of William Billows, Queens Regiment, 1797-1817, National Army 
Museum, 11-10-7-1, p.76; Lieut. Aeneas Anderson, A Journal of the Forces Which sailed from the 
Downs, in April 1800… (London: 1802), 190, 277-278; Anon. [Billanie], Narrative of A Private Soldier in 
His Majesty’s 92nd Regiment, 114-115. 
 185 
 
It is clear British soldiers failed to notice the important role women played in Islamic 
society. Despite the upper-class norms of veiling and seclusion, behind the scenes 
Muslim noblewomen were political and economic powerhouses; many owned sizable 
properties and estates. In contrast to Britain, Muslim women did not lose control of 
their property when they married, and often owned important buildings for religious 
and charitable purposes. Thus, Muslim women left their mark on the architecture and 
physical character of the city in which they lived. Those who held great estates even 
engaged in trade through male agents. The custom of secluding females, was itself 
designed as a declaration of wealth. It was usually practiced only by the richest 
families, to show that the man of the house was so wealthy that he could afford 
servants to provide everything his household required.70 
 
Interestingly, the ways in which British soldiers encountered Muslim women differed 
significantly from those of French soldiers. The French occupation of Egypt, which 
lasted over three years, inevitably led to attempts by soldiers to find romance and a 
respectable social life. Many of the lower ranks resorted to local prostitutes, who were 
smuggled into the barracks. Their presence became a recurring problem for the 
military authorities, for they facilitated the spread of venereal disease. As a result, 
French officers purchased slaves, maintaining them for domestic service or sexual 
favours. Buying slaves was forbidden, but in practice the authorities turned a blind 
eye.71 Eugène Beauharnais, Napoleon’s teenage stepson, had bought a female slave 
from the market in Cairo, and he discussed her merits at length with François 
Bernoyer, a French civilian in charge of the design and production of uniforms in 
Egypt.  
 
…I assure you Monsieur Bernoyer, that I have never 
made such good use of my money. I have already spent 
6,000 francs to make her as beautiful as a queen. I love 
her to madness, for her spiritual and vivacious 
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personality has opened for me a source of inexhaustible 
pleasures.72  
 
Officers who purchased female slaves often commented on a kind of mystical bond 
between them, to which Beauharnais referred. The purchase of slaves was not limited 
to officers, the common ranks would pool their resources together to buy a slave, 
whom they employed to perform menial tasks in the barracks.73 There are no records 
of these kinds of relations between Egyptian women and British soldiers. Presumably 
the short duration of the British presence in Egypt, combined with the strict 
regulations which isolated them from the local population, limited the opportunities 
for soldiers to purchase slaves or fraternize with the local women.  
 
French soldiers justified their purchase of slaves by pointing out that in Egypt, slaves 
were better treated than domestic servants. General Doguereau argued “The slavery 
of blacks is a very happy estate in Egypt. Women are bought to keep women company 
or to busy themselves with housework.” He concluded “Their lot is much happier than 
that of poor Egyptians.”74 Saint-Hilaire concurred, “Slavery is different here than in 
America. It is a veritable option. My two slaves never call me anything but their father 
and I am so satisfied with their services that I dedicate to them the same amity.”75 
Although Egypt’s household slaves were admittedly better treated than those on the 
plantations in America, it was still a form of forced labour that denied human beings 
their liberty. This became clear when the surrendered French garrison of Cairo 
embarked for repatriation at the docks of Alexandria.76 According to Daniel Nicol, 
many of these Frenchmen were unable to bring their charges with them to France; 
only those who could prove they were lawfully married were allowed to embark.77 As 
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the French gradually boarded the transports between 31 July and 9 August, “the two 
contending Christian powers were employed in the traffic of women”. One British 
officer commented on the peculiar scene: 
 
there was a regular sale, on the part of the French, to 
our army, of the women of the country who had lived 
with them. Several of our soldiers bought very pretty 
ones for a dollar! and it was ridiculous enough to see 
them parading through the streets with their dingy 
properties under their arms.78 
 
The officer failed to notice, or perhaps chose to ignore, the irony of the soldiers 
partaking in a practice they had previously condemned. Instead, like many of the 
French soldiers, he considered it an act of sympathy, and an expression of masculine 
virtue of sorts.  
 
To the credit of both parties it was in general a transfer 
rather than sale of property, in order that the poor 
unfortunate wretches should have protection from the 
barbarity of the merciless Turks, who threatened and 
seemed determined to put to death every Arab woman 
who had been connected with a Christian.79 
 
The portrayal of such purchases as noble acts, coming to the aid of women in need, 
smoothed over any implicit accusations of hypocrisy. Article 12 of the capitulation of 
Alexandria tells a different story from that recorded by the soldiers. It stipulated that 
every inhabitant of Egypt, whatever their nationality, would be free to follow the 
departing French army without fear for their family or property. This enabled the 
Mamluk corps to embark for France with their entire families without hindrance. 80 It 
appears that the French soldiers would have been able to embark with their Egyptian 
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mistresses had they been willing to do so. Instead, many tried to sell their women to 
the British. It is also possible – although not mentioned in any British account - that 
in some instances the British persuaded the French to sell. 
 
Views of Islam  
Following the literary trend established by a range of enlightened philosophes 
throughout the eighteenth century such as Voltaire, Diderot and especially 
Montesquieu, Islamic society in the Near East provided British servicemen with a 
negative identity, a mirror image, with which their societal norms could be 
juxtaposed.81 One of the ways British soldiers did this was by comparing the 
seemingly irrational and ridiculous Islamic practices with the coherence of 
Christianity or the logic of secularism. For instance, gaming and gambling were 
forbidden by Islamic law, but William Wittman observed instances of this practice as 
he accompanied the Ottoman army. If caught, the perpetrators he claimed were 
promptly decapitated, and such a harsh punishment may have contributed towards the 
large numbers of deserters that Wittman reported.82 Another principle frequently 
mentioned by British observers was the abstinence from alcohol. To some it seemed 
bizarre because, as the artilleryman Benjamin Miller claimed, there was a range of 
other ways Muslims could intoxicate themselves if they so wished. The coffee house, 
Miller argued, was the Ottoman equivalent of the British inn or tavern.  
 
The Turks frequent these houses in the same manner as 
we do our inns but instead of liquors, wine or beer, they 
sit on mats in groups and drink coffee, and smoke 
themselves drunk by mixing opium with their tobacco, 
and you will frequently see a dozen of them lying quite 
senseless on the floor.83 
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The British soldiers’ opposition to the Islamic prohibition of alcohol may have been 
influenced by their own reliance on drink. The rum ration, typically distributed every 
day before breakfast, was essential in placating the men, with their inadequate food, 
poor pay and rigid discipline. With a steady supply of alcohol, soldiers developed 
drinking cultures and alcoholism became a problem; teetotallers were frequently 
ostracized by their comrades.84 When this steady supply was cut, the soldiers quickly 
grew frustrated. On 17 May, General Eyre Coote, in command of the besieging force 
at Alexandria, complained to the Duke of Gloucester that the long awaited supply 
convoy had arrived, but “not one drop of wine have they brought”.85 Despite the 
Muslims’ access to alternative methods of intoxication, Cooper Williams asserted that 
there were individuals who drank alcohol in private. During an excursion to collect 
water from the Nile during the blockade of Alexandria in 1798, Williams was invited 
by one of the Ottoman captains for refreshment aboard his vessel. Dinner proved to 
be a curious affair, for the Ottoman captain, “in defiance of the laws of Mahomet, set 
before us some excellent Candiote [sic] wine, of which he swallowed such large 
portions as plainly indicated his contempt for the ordinances of his prophet.”86 The 
numerous accounts of Muslims violating Islamic law, conveyed a sense that the 
principles of Islam were difficult to follow, impossible to enforce, and frequently 
violated.  
 
Another point of contrast and criticism for the British soldiers was the superstitious 
beliefs the local inhabitants allegedly possessed.  A focal point of British censure were 
the Sufi mystics. They were a type of sage, who followed a pious form of Islam, and 
were venerated by the Egyptian inhabitants. Their method of worship required a 
destitute - or even naked – appearance, and included contortions of the body that 
European observers regarded outlandish. To the British, these mystics were no more 
than madmen, who ruthlessly abused their false claims to divinity. One British officer 
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thought they were “Unfortunate persons who have lost their senses; idiots, and people 
subject to fits”, who “are all looked upon as saints, and respected as such.”87 French 
observers thought similarly. Étienne-Louis Malus, a French officer and member of 
the mathematics section of the Institut d’Égypte, wrote “These are the saints of the 
country; their life is a continual ecstasy and everything is permitted to them; many 
circulate through the streets at various times of the year naked as apes. They only live 
on alms from the public.”88 The engineer Édouard de Villiers du Terrage wrote that 
they “are a kind of madmen, extremely venerated, to whom everything is permitted, 
whose insults are an honour, even to the women who surrender themselves to them.89  
 
Aside from superstition, the Islamic conviction in predestination was thought to be 
inimical to the general progress of Near Eastern societies. William Wittman believed 
this to be one of the principal causes for the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Having 
allegedly spoken to Ottoman Muslims on the subject, he claimed that “They declare 
themselves sensible of the approaching decay of their empire; but at the same time 
received assurance from the Koran, that it is to rise again in greater splendour than 
ever…. In each adverse trial they express themselves by saying ‘it is the will of 
Heaven.’” For many British observers, Wittman included, predestination was a 
foolish superstition, one of many held by the Ottomans. In April 1800, he witnessed 
the launching of a newly constructed 74-gun ship-of-the-line. To Wittman’s 
astonishment, the ship had been ready for launch for some time, but “it had been 
deemed expedient to delay the launch until a favourable report should be made by the 
astrologers and dealers in magic, who at length predicted that the 2nd of April would 
be a favourable day.” To delay the launch at a time when the Ottoman navy was in 
dire need, seemed detrimental to their military fortunes. Wittman concluded “It is 
scarcely credible that such folly should exist… at the close of the eighteenth century. 
Can such people be formidable?”90 One might argue that Wittman’s comments were 
hypocritical. Although he perceived a contrast between the fatalism of the Ottoman 
military and his own beliefs, British Protestants could in fact be just as deterministic. 
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Many British Protestants adhered to a belief in divine providence guiding and 
protecting the British nation – yet Wittman criticized the Ottomans for similar beliefs. 
As Tony Claydon and Ian McBride argue, British Protestants saw themselves as 
fortunate that they had escaped Catholicism which plagued the European continent, 
and as a result, they came to feel that they alone were blessed, and had been favoured 
by God.91  
 
Some of the soldiers who held such views on Islam had strong ties to prominent 
missionaries. Evangelicalism was a prominent movement at the turn of the nineteenth 
century; as Britons became increasingly aware of the sheer number of non-Europeans 
living under their imperial rule, many British Christians developed a sense of 
responsibility to spread the Gospel to those without it.92 Apart from the appointment 
of chaplains, the British government did little to promote religion in the colonies. By 
contrast, voluntary missionary societies were quick to embrace the religious 
opportunities opened up by imperial expansion. The East India Company’s 
consolidation of its position in India in the late eighteenth century, presented the 
evangelical missionaries, they felt providentially, with the prospect of saving the souls 
of Hindu and Muslim peoples.93 The evangelical missionary impulse reached a peak 
around the turn of the nineteenth century; a wave of new missionary societies were 
founded in the 1790s, including the Baptist Missionary Society (1792), the (London) 
Missionary Society (1795), the Edinburgh (Scottish) and Glasgow Missionary 
Societies (1796) and in 1799 the Society for Missions to Africa and the East (known 
as the Church Missionary Society from 1812). Yet the evangelical societies were 
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unable to arouse more than cursory interest in spreading the Gospel in India. Their 
projects were limited by the confining of evangelical policy to British settlers and 
residents. Attempts to extend missionary preaching to Indians were unsuccessful; 
when the East India Company’s charter came up for renewal in 1793, the proposed 
clause enabling missionaries to preach to Indians was rejected. For a period of twenty 
years, until this decision was reversed, missionary societies in India were largely 
forced into inactivity. Petitions and letters to the East India Company requesting them 
to permit missionaries were ignored.94 Despite the missionaries’ assertions that they 
were purely interested in religious matters, many were politically suspect. There were 
men among them who had been, and a few still were, thought of as political radicals.95 
 
By 1800, the missionary movement had little to show for its efforts, but it was 
widespread, well-organized and growing; it was increasingly able to wield a 
significant influence over the general public. Although Bernard Porter has recently 
questioned whether there was any large scale imperial concern domestically in 
Britain96, and it is probably true that an active religious interest in the empire was 
confined to a minority of Anglican and evangelical missionaries, it is likely that the 
publications written by this minority had some sway over the general public. 
According to Allan Davidson, who has examined the attitudes of evangelical societies 
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towards India from 1786 to 1813, missionary propaganda “exercised an incalculable 
effect on shaping men’s attitudes and opinions”. For many people, he argues, the only 
source of information about non-European cultures and different religious practices 
came via the “missionary media”. Periodical publications, meetings for prayer, annual 
meetings with sermons, itinerant preachers, tracts, pamphlets, books, hymns and 
poetry, all contributed to keeping the missionary cause in the religious public’s 
attention.97 Such writing could have a significant political impact, and evangelicals 
across the Protestant churches formed a powerful lobby group; a point demonstrated 
by the evangelical movement for the abolition of slavery.98 
 
These evangelical missionaries undoubtedly played a role in validating imperial 
expansion. Evangelicals such as Charles Grant, Claudius Buchanan, William 
Wilberforce and John Owen were viciously critical of Indian religion and culture in 
their writing and preaching.  For instance, in a lengthy tract written in 1792, Grant 
wrote of the total degradation of Hinduism and Islam in India. “Discord, hatred, abuse, 
selfishness unrestrained by principles, prevail to a surprising degree.”99 While this 
helped justify their own expansionist religious policy, it also provided moral backing 
to British imperial expansion. Ironically, they had little interest in supporting or 
furthering imperial policy; their thinking was dominated by an eagerness to promote 
Christianity.100 Historian Brian Stanley summarized that “the Bible and the flag” went 
hand in hand in the history of Western imperial expansion. Although Stanley’s book, 
by his own admission, is now showing its age, the core of his thesis remains valid, so 
much so that Andrew Porter, in a more recent work, considers Stanley’s overarching 
argument to be “fast becoming established as one of the unquestioned orthodoxies of 
general historical knowledge.”101 Other more recent scholars concur with the essence 
of Stanley’s discourse. Rowan Strong, who conducted a sizeable literature review in 
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her work, believes the prevailing view of historians remains that British Christianity 
in all its variations, was generally supportive of empire while, at times, criticising 
some colonial practices as immoral or unjust.102 
 
Whatever their motivations, the actions and writings of missionary societies, ensured 
that spreading the Gospel to non-Europeans was being noticed by an increasing 
number of Britons in the decade prior to the Egyptian campaign. For evangelicals such 
as Wilberforce, Buchanan and Grant, Britain’s religious and moral dominance over 
all other nations meant it had a duty to civilize Indian peoples. The promotion of 
Christianity was also seen as the only course of action which provided the empire with 
long term security from internal dissention. British rulers and Indian subjects were 
thought to be dangerously divided by their different religions, and the spread of the 
Christian Gospel would draw both Britons and Indians into a wider Christian 
identity.103 
 
Francis Collins is a notable example of a soldier with evangelical connections. The 
preface to the first edition of his Voyages was written by the Scottish missionary John 
Campbell, who had been involved in the foundation of the British and Foreign Bible 
Society and, at the time of publication, was a director of the London Missionary 
Society.104 Collins’ affiliation with the missionaries is obvious in his writing. 
 
What melancholy and dreadful picture of human 
degeneray [sic] is here! that a nation, the most refined 
and polite, which boasted of its antiquity and 
superiority over all others, in invention, discoveries, 
wisdom, and learning, should exceed all others in their 
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gross, absurd and cruel superstitions and idolatries… 
What a necessity for a divine revelation and what an 
unspeakable blessing then is the gift of the Bible, which 
clearly reveals that Saviour who abolished death, and 
brought life and immortality to light by his Gospel.105 
 
Collins believed the promotion of Christianity would be a reciprocal act of charity. 
Before the introduction of Christianity from the Holy Land, Collins argued Britain 
was “among the most savage nations”, and its people were the “most stupid and cruel 
idolaters.” He contrasted “this gross ignorance, cruelty, and idolatry with the present 
state and circumstances of Great Britain”. Ignorance of the Christian faith meant 
society had no hope of health and prosperity.  Therefore, Collins proclaimed, “May 
Great Britain return the unspeakable blessing of the Gospel to these once highly 
favoured countries, from whence it proceeded to her, when in a state of ignorance, 
superstition, idolatry, and barbarism.”106 By using the terms “cruel” and “gross” to 
describe indigenous “idolatries”, Collins portrayed an image of religious suffering. It 
was clear to him that Islam posed an obstacle to national development; the decrepitude 
of Islamic civilizations such as the Ottoman Empire appeared to confirm this. 
Therefore, the promotion of Christianity, which implied the extension of British 
imperial aspirations in Egypt, would be a sympathetic response to the misery of the 
people. This act was also a form of spiritual repayment. The Holy Land had introduced 
Christianity into Britain, and now the favour could be returned.  
 
In part because of the supposed incoherency of Islam, Francis Collins thought that the 
conversion of great numbers of Muslims to Christianity was achievable. He claimed 
to have met one Ottoman, who   
 
…displayed an unusual openness and freedom, and 
expressed much respect for his English friends… He 
expressed his veneration for the Bible, which he 
considered the only written book of God…. His 
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suspicions of the truth of the Mahomedan religion, that 
his mind was impressed with the prospect of its fall, and 
the necessity of his countrymen being taught the true 
religion; a desire to be instructed more fully on the 
subject, and a wish for the more general instruction of 
his countrymen, many of the most intelligent of which 
were of similar sentiments.107  
 
Collins declared that this man was not an oddity. Some of the British soldiers had  
 
…formed a little society for the purpose of reading the 
Scriptures, and engaging in sacred worship… it is a 
fact, however strange, that many of the Mussulmen 
occasionally attended those meetings. And who shall 
say what blessed events may not the Lord accomplish 
by such slender means, who not unfrequently is pleased 
to choose weak things of this world to confound the 
things which are mighty.108 
 
Collins hoped “that these reflecting Turks, and others, will soon hail that instruction 
so many of them desire, by the diffusion of the Christian religion, in these benighted 
countries”.109 Reflecting on these comments, it is important to remember that Collins 
had evangelical connections, and was committed to depicting the Ottomans as 
sympathetic to Christianity, to win support for a more committed conversion effort in 
Egypt. Referring to the work of the British and Foreign Bible Society, Collins 
appealed for the distribution of translations of the Bible to the Ottomans.  
 
Their desire for the Bible (many mutilated parts of 
which are to be found in their Alcoran,) points out the 
desirableness of giving them a translation of its genuine 
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contents, in the Turkish language; also their doubts of 
the truth of many parts of their Alcoran, and that desire, 
so prevalent in many of them to attain the true 
knowledge of God.110  
 
The success which Collins reported in the Christian conversion of Muslims, naturally 
conveys a sense of overwhelming Christian superiority. No Muslim would convert to 
a different religion unless they thought it was inherently superior, righteous, coherent, 
and fulfilling.111  
 
Collins was certainly the most outspoken evangelical soldier in Egypt, but his views 
were not totally exceptional. Several soldiers reported a sense of enmity towards them 
by their Ottoman allies and the Egyptian inhabitants. They implied that European 
colonization and the conversion to Christianity would civilize these people and 
prevent such behaviour. As the British fleet from India to Kossier approached Jeddah 
at the end of April 1801, where they had intended to resupply, Charles Hill claimed 
to hear a report “that the Sheriff of Mecca is our Enemy and had threatened to put to 
death any Arab person that shall take an English sheikh [officer] into Jeddah.”112 Hill 
thought “It is the intent of the Sheriff of Mecca to make this unfavourable report of 
the Red Sea to prevent Europeans from exploring it”. He reassured himself that “it 
appears to me highly probable that the time is not far distant when Mecca itself nay 
even Constantinople as well as Egypt must succumb to European Government.”113  
 
Another interesting example of unprovoked Muslim hostility towards the British was 
noted by one of General Abercromby’s staff officers. Discussing the Ottoman soldier 
with whom they were allied, the officer wrote: 
 
…he thinks of nought – but – coffee – pipe – pipe and 
coffee. The maxim of this brute seems to be, let the 
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morrow take care of itself – sufficient to the day is the 
evil thereof. Ignorant, superstitious, intolerant and 
supercilious is the character of this self-sufficient 
being, our Noble Ally, whose haughty pride, vanity, and 
consummate arrogance, added to the immoveable 
detestation with which he looks upon us, and the 
inveterate horror in which he holds us as Christian dogs 
and infidels, places him in such a point of view, in such 
a light to the eye of a civilized being, that one is almost 
tempted to wish a partition of the Turkish empire 
between Christian powers, to teach these Mussulmen 
that we are at least human beings, and creatures of the 
same maker.114 
 
The staff officer entertained the possibility that modern civilization in Egypt might be 
possible with “the greater influx of Christians”, 115 but unlike Francis Collins, it seems 
he did not support the foundation of an evangelical imperial mission in Egypt. He had 
no doubt that an attempt to convert the inhabitants would be a long and bloody 
process, due to their fanatical hatred of Christians. Although the British received 
“every possible mark of attention, hospitality and attachment” and were looked upon 
“as a wonderful race” after the defeat of the French, the officer thought it “very 
possible, nay probable, that if the French were out of this country to-morrow, they 
would rejoice to see us follow them, for we are Christians!”116 Some of the Coptic 
Christians were seen to have cooperated with the French during the occupation of 
Egypt, and the officer suspected “that the moment our backs are turned very many 
will be massacred”. This, he asserted, was “the fate which all Christians in Egypt seem 
to await”. “With inhabitants like these”, the officer declared, “how difficult to civilize 
a country! Hard indeed that task in Egypt, where so many obstacles present 
themselves. The insurmountable one would be the fanaticism of the natives which 
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would produce constant assassination…”117 He concluded his argument with a 
favourable view of the French occupation: 
 
I confess that were it not for political reasons, … I could 
almost lament that the French, for the benefit of 
mankind, have not remained here; with the sea open to 
them, they might have brought about, after some time, 
such a change, that the country would have put on a new 
appearance, or more properly should I say, its old 
appearance; it is certainly to be made one of the finest 
countries in the world. I had rather the French should 
have the pleasure of making it so, than it should be our 
lot, thousands would fall in the attempt, and I doubt if 
success would be quite ensured.118 
 
By emphasizing the potential benefits of the French occupation, the staff officer’s 
comments shed important light on British images of the French enemy. Clearly the 
officer did not regard the French as the Catholic “other”, nor were they considered 
unchristian heathens as they had been during the years of the Jacobin Republic. 
Instead, the French were seen to some extent as a positive force and, in relative terms 
at least, were thought of as equals in social, cultural and technological refinement. 
This argument offers a revision of Linda Colley’s seminal Britons, in which she 
asserts that the common investment in Protestantism, and the threat of France as “the 
haunting embodiment of that Catholic Other” forged a common identity of Britishness 
over the eighteenth and early nineteenth century.119 The argument that British and 
French soldiers were drawn culturally closer together in opposition to Islam in Egypt 
complicates Colley’s assertion that the French consistently embodied the Catholic 
‘other’. This identification with the French also chimes with Gavin Daly’s research 
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on British soldiers in the Spanish Peninsular. Much as in Egypt, British criticism of 
the local religion – Catholicism – led to a level of sympathy for the French occupation. 
The British saw the Catholic Church as the greatest obstacle to progress in Peninsular 
society, and the French were seen, to some extent, as progressive liberators, at war 
with the Catholic church of the old regime. As a result, the French conflict with the 
Spanish and Portuguese drew a mixture of responses from British soldiers. The British 
were shocked and horrified at the appalling torture and murder committed by French 
soldiers against civilians and guerrillas, yet at times, they praised the French 
occupation for its impact on local Catholicism.120  
 
Other similarities between the treatment of Catholicism in the Spanish Peninsular and 
Islam in Egypt can be discerned. As Daly and Catriona Kennedy highlight, soldiers 
did not necessarily strongly identify themselves as Protestant prior to their arrival in 
the Peninsular, but as the campaign progressed they developed a keener sense of their 
Protestant identity, and a latent predilection for anti-Catholicism. This became one of 
the key foundations of the arrogant derision that the soldiers expressed towards the 
local Spanish and Portuguese, and distinctions were rarely drawn between 
Catholicism in Spain and Portugal.121 Similarly, the condemnation of Islam formed 
the basis for much of the criticism of the Ottomans and Egyptians, and the soldiers 
failed to distinguish between Sunni and Shi`ite Muslims, or between the range of 
national and ethnic groups in the Levant. The commanders of British forces in both 
Egypt and the Peninsula recognized the difficulties that could be produced by the 
hostility of their men to the local religion. Abercromby in Egypt, and Wellington in 
the Peninsular, both stressed to their men the importance of respecting the locals’ 
religious practices and not causing offence.122  
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There was, however, one crucial difference between the attitudes of British soldiers 
in Egypt and the Peninsular. In Egypt, the British and French also identified with one 
another as members of Christian nations. Despite the recent downfall of the Catholic 
church in Revolutionary France, British soldiers continued to refer to the French as 
Christian or the French nation as a “Christian power”.123 This indicates that culture 
and customs were more important than religion in creating a shared identity. On the 
one hand, a similar culture reinforced a sense of ‘Christian’ affinity with France, but 
on the other hand, as we have seen, the Coptic Christians, despite their shared religion, 
were seen as lying outside this shared identity because of their adoption of Muslim 
customs and costume. One must be careful drawing this conclusion however, for it is 
possible that the traditional image of the French as Catholic continued for some time 
after the secularization in the 1790s. However, for some Britons, it seems that 
‘Christian’ could act as a synonym for ‘European’, or more specifically ‘Western 
European’.  
 
Although Islamic customs and culture were often regarded as the negative reflection 
of Europe, for a minority of British soldiers they were not always seen in negative 
terms. A few British servicemen expressed genuine curiosity about the 
“Muhammadian” manners and customs. This interest came predominantly from the 
lower ranks. Presumably without the education and ready access to literature that 
officers enjoyed, the lower ranks were less exposed to the work of authors that were 
hostile towards Islam and Near Eastern society. One of the most inquisitive was 
Sergeant William Billows. During the siege of Cairo in June, the British and Ottoman 
armies camped alongside one another, allowing Billows to inspect the Ottoman camp.  
 
I used to like to walk through the Turks’ camp to see 
their dress and ways, you would see the officers sitting 
cross legged on a fine carpet or cushion, several 
together drinking coffee and smoked out of their 
beautiful pipes most of them 2 yards long or more, they 
would invite us into their tent or marque and sit down 
and take coffee with them – merely to hear us talk but 
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as they used no sugar we but seldom stopped any time 
at their invitation.124 
 
Daniel Nicol expressed a similar curiosity. On arriving at Itko with his regiment, Nicol 
wrote “This being the first town I was in in this country I was curious in examining 
it…” He  
 
visited a school and looked attentively at some boys 
receiving instruction from one of the lower mufti or 
clergy, a fine fatherly looking man. He showed us the 
books they were using, but we could make nothing of 
them, we supposed they might be some parts of the 
Koran. In writing, this was unaccountable to us, they 
began the line to the right and wrote towards the left of 
the line, then began at the right again and so on… The 
teacher was at great pains to explain things to us, and in 
return for his civility I showed him as I best could how 
we wrote and our method of teaching from a book I had 
in my pocket. He seemed to understand me and we 
parted good friends.125 
 
Given the intense curiosity that Billows and Nicol expressed, it is unlikely that their 
comments were intended as a critical commentary on their own religion. There was, 
however, a developing tendency in Britain at this time to use an admiration for Islam 
and the career of Muhammad as an indirect way of criticizing Christianity. Although 
Muhammad continued to be portrayed as an example of excessive ambition, he could 
also be seen as preaching a more rational, natural faith than Christianity. Joseph 
White, Professor of Arabic at Oxford, discussed this subject in the Bampton Lectures 
in 1784. He claimed Muhammad was “an extraordinary character [of] splendid talents 
and profound artifice… endowed with greatness of mind which could brave the storms 
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of adversity [by] … the sheer force of a bold and fertile genius.126 Chapter 50 of 
Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire is devoted to Muhammad 
and the rise of Islam. Muhammad, Gibbon believed, had “an original and superior 
genius” formed in solitude, as it must be: “conversation enriches the understanding, 
but solitude is the school of genius”.127  
 
For some observers, this admiration for Muhammad threatened to subvert 
Christianity. One evangelical-minded British official remarked that Islam was: 
 
…the only undisguised and formidable antagonist of 
Christianity… an active and powerful enemy… It is 
just because Muhammadanism acknowledges the 
divine original, and has borrowed so many of the 
weapons of Christianity, that it is so dangerous an 
adversary.128  
 
Despite being widely regarded as a false religion, Islam and Muhammad captured the 
political imagination of several late eighteenth-century writers, such as Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, Percy Bysshe Shelley and Edmund Burke. This was especially the case 
after the French Revolution. Humberto Garcia, in his study of sympathetic 
representations of Islam, emphasizes that the concept of an Islamic republic, with an 
enlightened Muhammad at its head, became a means for certain political groups in 
Britain to defend the French Revolution. In their support of French Jacobinism, 
English deists, such as Thomas Chubb, upheld Islam as tolerant in contrast to 
Christianity’s persecuting spirit, and believed that Muslims were closer to “the 
standard of reason” than Christians.129 The association between the new French 
Republic and Islam in British minds, heightened the sense of threat Islam posed, 
especially once Napoleon’s Islamic policy during the French occupation of Egypt 
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became known. Although Napoleon’s talk of conversion to Islam may have been 
fraudulent, his admiration for the Prophet Muhammad was genuine. He criticized the 
bloodthirsty doctrinal wars of early Christianity, with squabbles over the nature of the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and said admiringly,  
 
Muhammad was a prince; he rallied compatriots around 
him. In a few years, his Muslims conquered half the 
world. He rescued more souls from false gods, 
overturned more idols, and pulled down more pagan 
temples in fifteen years than the adherents of Moses and 
Jesus Christ had in fifteen centuries.130  
 
This admiration for the Prophet and Islam had been expressed in a minority of French 
works throughout the eighteenth century. The vast Encylopédie, the first modern 
attempt to encompass all knowledge in a single work, made the occasional reference 
to Islam as a code for criticism of the popular superstition and the dogmatism they 
saw in Catholicism. Other writers of the articles in this encyclopaedia saw the virtues 
of Arab Muslim science, and contrasted its achievements with European religious 
obscurantism.131 
 
Conclusion 
The British military’s portrayals of Egyptian customs and culture demonstrate the 
confused mix of both traditional and new conceptions of difference at this time.  
Among the variety of descriptions, it is clear that the exposure to Egyptian customs 
and practices appears to have been a jarring experience for many soldiers. The 
practices of the people the British encountered were almost uniformly treated 
negatively, as a mirror reflection of British society. In this regard British servicemen 
probably based much of their arguments on earlier travel works, who saw the Near 
East through a negative lens which Malcolm Yapp has labelled the “Turkish Mirror”. 
These critical arguments made by the soldiers were frequently ambiguous or 
hypocritical. William Wittman’s criticism of Islamic predestination is one example, 
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as he failed to appreciate the similarities between the fatalistic beliefs of Islam and the 
conviction of many British Protestants in divine providence guiding and protecting 
the British nation. Moreover, those who partook in the trade of slaves failed to notice, 
or perhaps chose to ignore, the irony of participating in a practice they had preciously 
condemned.  
 
The bewildering experience of Near Eastern customs and practices led several soldiers 
to support the foundation of a British imperial mission in Egypt. The Egyptian 
campaign took place at a time when the evangelical missionary impulse reached a 
peak in Britain, and there is a range of evidence which suggests that religion was an 
important element in British servicemen’s lives. It is unsurprising that some of the 
soldiers, such as Francis Collins, held ties with prominent evangelicals, but not all 
British servicemen thought this way. As the author of A Non-military Journal claimed, 
the attempt to convert Muslims would be a long and bloody process, due to the 
fanatical hatred of Christians. In his comments on this topic, the officer remarked on 
the potential benefits of the French occupation, which indicates a common cultural 
identity with the French in opposition to Near Eastern Muslim culture. Despite the 
demise of the French Catholic church during the Revolution, British soldiers 
continued to refer to the French as Christian or the French nation as a “Christian 
power”.132 There is an apparent lack of the traditional Protestant-Catholic divide 
between Britain and France during the Egyptian campaign, which, according to Linda 
Colley, dominated British thinking of the French throughout the long eighteenth 
century. This attitude draws comparison with the view of the French during the 
Peninsular campaigns, examined by Gavin Daly. In their writing, the soldiers in the 
Peninsular criticized the Catholic Church in similar ways to their observations on 
Islam in Egypt. In both Egypt and the Peninsular, British opposition to the local 
religion and culture led to a level of sympathy for the French occupation, who were 
seen, to some extent, as progressive liberators. There was however, a contradiction in 
attitudes in Egypt that was not present in the Peninsula. On the one hand, a similar 
culture reinforced a sense of ‘Christian’ affinity with France, but on the other hand, 
the Coptic Christians, despite their shared religion, were seen as lying outside this 
shared identity because of their adoption of Muslim customs and costume. For some 
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Britons, even though France destroyed the power of its church, its people retained 
Christian manners, refinement and culture. Those outside Europe without European 
manners could not be considered Christian.  
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4. 
“Rather out of our way of doing 
business”: British military appraisals of 
the Anglo-Ottoman alliance 
 
They are in general a stout, active, and hardy people, 
and are allowed to be individually brave. They are 
certainly material of which excellent soldiers might be 
formed; but under a Turkish Government everything 
becomes debased.1  
 
This passage, written by Major-General John Moore in his diary during his inspection 
of the Ottoman army in January 1801, effectively summarizes the British 
servicemen’s appraisal of their Ottoman allies during the Egyptian campaign. In the 
eyes of British military personnel, the Ottomans had great martial potential, but this 
promise was wasted by the corrupted and decayed state of their society and their 
inferior mode of warfare. As Moore alludes to in the quotation, military considerations 
were a crucial influence on British soldiers’ perceptions of the Ottomans. This was a 
distinctive feature of soldiers’ accounts that was not present in contemporary civilian-
authored travelogues or orientalist literature. Indeed, as Patrick Porter highlights, war 
is a crucial point of comparison through which military personnel can judge other 
civilizations.2 Although civilian travel authors and orientalists influenced the style and 
content of military literature, they were not subject to the same pressures and 
circumstances as military men. Therefore, the primary objective of this chapter is to 
explore the ways in which military writings about Ottoman military bodies in Egypt 
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were distinct from other forms of contemporary literature published about the 
Ottomans in Britain. 
 
A study of British perceptions of the Ottomans, at a time when these two nations were 
engaged in a military alliance against the French, provides an interesting avenue of 
investigation. The possibility must be addressed that British perceptions of the 
Ottomans were principally influenced by various problems that were inherent to 
combined operations between allied powers. By 1801, Britain had considerable 
experience working with and subsidizing a variety of allies. These military encounters 
followed a consistent pattern, whereby the British placed a great deal of reliance on 
overly optimistic estimations of the capability and commitment of their allies. In this 
regard, the Egyptian campaign was no exception. However, it was one of few 
operations in which British forces worked with a non-western, non-European power, 
and British servicemen became acutely aware of a divide between Ottoman methods 
of waging war, and their own. For this reason, the Ottomans came to be seen in a very 
different light from Britain’s other military allies in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century. A fundamental misunderstanding of the organizational structure of the 
Ottoman army, and the seeming lack of ‘western’ features within Ottoman forces, 
were vital in shaping the British military’s appraisal of Ottoman people. The second 
objective of this chapter is to explore how and why Anglo-Ottoman relations differed 
from Britain’s previous experience in military alliances. 
 
Martial images of the Ottomans 
Although British military servicemen considered the Ottomans primarily in negative 
terms, there were features in Ottoman society, and in the appearance of Ottoman 
soldiers, that were praised. British servicemen often considered the Ottomans to 
possess martial qualities, and admired these characteristics. William Wittman, the 
surgeon to the British military mission attached to the Ottoman army from July 1800 
to the conclusion of the Egyptian campaign in October 1801, thought the Albanian 
contingent, or “Arnauts”, possessed “very turbulent and indocile qualities”, and a 
“warlike disposition…. Being inured from their infancy to laborious exercises, they 
are hardy and vigorous; and the pursuits to which they are engaged give them an air 
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of savage fierceness well suited to their character.”3 John Phillip Morier, private 
secretary to the Earl of Elgin, who accompanied the Ottoman army on a special service 
mission from January to July 1800, described the light cavalry from Georgia and 
Circassia as “a fine manly race, extremely handsome, fair and well-shaped. They are 
inured to war from the constant hostile state in which they live… and from the 
frequent skirmishes which they have with the Russian troops on their frontiers.” The 
Albanians Morier considered “a warlike people” who “have the reputation of being 
very courageous”, but the bravest of all were a tribe of volunteer light cavalry named 
the Delhis, a title “which signifies madmen”. It was a term “well applied to them” as 
they “boast of never refusing to undertake the most hazardous enterprizes…”4 
 
The appearance of these Ottoman soldiers complemented their alleged warlike nature, 
and led the British to emphasize their physical prowess. Major Hudson Lowe, 
commander of a corps of 200 Corsican royalists in Egypt, and who later acquired fame 
as Napoleon’s “gaoler” during his governorship of St Helena, depicted the Ottomans 
as “invariably men of large stature”.5 Major Francis Maule wrote: “Strength and 
gravity are displayed in their gestures…. The Turkish janissary walks with a firm and 
manly step, and looks around with the dignity of a Colossus.” He described the 
Ottoman soldier as “perhaps the finest in the world in form and regularity of beauty.”6 
Sir Robert Wilson depicted the appearance of the Capitan Pasha, the Grand Admiral 
of the Ottoman navy, in similar terms, when the latter visited the British camp at the 
beginning of April: “His appearance was striking, his dark eye was expressive… and 
although he seemed to have bad health, he did not look more than 35 years of age: his 
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face was handsome, and his fine black beard beautiful”. The Pasha was in fact 44 
years old.7 
 
The nature and extent of these ‘martial’ characteristics was one of the distinctive ways 
by which British military servicemen judged Ottoman peoples. This conviction in the 
existence of martial qualities in Ottoman soldiers adds credence to recent research 
conducted on the concept of martial races in the British Empire, especially the work 
of Heather Streets. She examines the development of martial races over the nineteenth 
century, and claims that certain indigenous populations within the British Empire 
became seen to be culturally and biologically predisposed to war.8 After the Indian 
Mutiny in 1857, Streets contends that concepts of martial race became an influential 
factor on the British Empire’s recruitment policy towards Indian Sepoys, Punjabi 
Sikhs and Nepalese Ghurkhas.9 Although martial race theory had no direct influence 
on British imperial thinking before 1857, British appraisals of the Ottomans during 
the Egyptian campaign show that certain peoples were beginning to be considered 
‘martial’ at the start of the nineteenth century.  
 
Of the men who commended the appearance and warlike nature of Ottoman soldiers, 
Francis Maule stands out as the most admiring. He used his positive appraisal to 
implicitly critique various aspects of British society. According to Bernard Lewis, this 
was fairly common in the more positive surveys of the Ottoman Empire by European 
writers, who used it as a means for social commentary on the west.10 This is most 
apparent in Maule’s observations on the physical appearance of the Ottoman ranks. 
Their admirable figure he considered “in great measure” to result from “the climate 
which they inhabit, the food which they subsist, and the nature of their occupations.” 
The Ottomans, he wrote,  
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live on plain and healthy food; this, together with the 
purity of the air which he breathes, invigorates his 
muscular powers… He owes no hereditary disease to 
the intemperance, gluttony, or irregularity of his 
progenitors; no pernicious habits, the offspring of 
indolence and luxury, to which the more refined 
Christian is subject.11 
 
Maule argued that the physical prowess the current generation of Ottomans possessed, 
derived in part from the abstinence and harmonious lifestyle of their predecessors. 
This he contrasted with the “Christian” or European, who is subject to the 
“intemperance, gluttony, or irregularity” of his forbearers.12 By drawing this 
comparison, Maule suggests that although the Ottomans lived in a rudimentary and 
ignorant society, their primitive nature endowed them with an honourable simplicity, 
in which they were untainted by the corruption of commerce. Europeans, who enjoyed 
the luxury of a commercialized society, damaged their health and physical form. For 
Maule, Ottoman society may have been considered less civilized, but in some ways it 
could show how Britain might regenerate the more disreputable aspects of its 
society.13  
 
Maule’s comments demonstrate one of the ways in which images of the Near East and 
its people were filtered through the lens of classical republicanism: to expose the 
enervating and corrupting effects of a developing commercial society. Several 
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, such as Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, had 
written on this subject. Commercial expansion was considered to some extent, a 
positive force but, for Ferguson in particular, it violated the moral character and 
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structure of society. He was concerned that civilization might degenerate, that 
manners and government might be corrupted as citizens put their private, material 
interests before the public good. The old martial virtues and character of the Scottish, 
Celtic past would be irrecoverably lost. Of this process there was no surer indication 
than a willingness among citizens to entrust their defence to mercenary soldiers. 
Citizens who allowed others to be paid to fight for them lost a vital element of their 
virtue.14 While his name is of Scottish origin, Maule does not state his national lineage 
which leaves some doubt over the influence of classical republicanism on his writing. 
As a soldier, writing after the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, it is possible that 
Maule did not share Ferguson’s concerns about the decline in martial virtue, but was 
more concerned with a general degradation in the moral character of society.  
 
Although certainly not as outspoken as Maule, other British soldiers made similar 
remarks about the potential benefits of the supposedly primitive Ottoman society. 
Morier believed they could subsist on bread and onions, which allowed them to resist 
diseases that plagued Europeans. Wittman argued that “Having been accustomed from 
an early age to an abstemious mode of living, and inured to hardships”, Ottomans “of 
the inferior classes are well calculated for a military life.”15 Such comments suggest 
that the harsh environment, and the absence of luxury and commerce were thought to 
produce superior human forms. The implied criticism of British society within these 
memoirs was a fashion adopted from other forms of oriental literature available in 
Britain. The use of fictional and factual travelogues and romantic poetry as devices to 
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criticize domestic, social and political norms was well established by the end of the 
eighteenth century.16 
 
For Maule, Ottoman modes of dress set another example from which the British might 
learn. In a description of Ottoman clothing, he suggested that it contributed to their 
muscular prowess: 
 
They walk with bare legs; and when their cloaks are 
held up, their muscles appear to swell with boldness. 
Their arms are robust like those of a wrestlers. Their 
necks being never constrained with bandages, assume 
the fine proportion which nature has designed for 
them…. In a word, all their limbs being unembarrassed 
by those bands which impede our motions, and which 
nothing but habit could make us endure, preserve each 
its natural form, and display those admirable 
proportions, the perfection of which constitutes the 
summit of human beauty.17  
 
Maule’s observations highlight some of the faults he perceived in European clothing 
and fashion. The comment on “necks never being constrained with bandages” seems 
to be an observation on the restrictiveness of the neck cloth or cravat, which was worn 
by most eighteenth century gentlemen, and a forerunner to the necktie. Maule might 
also have meant to criticize the neck stock, the most hated article in the British 
soldiers’ inventory. The stock was a collar made of thick leather, which kept the 
wearer’s head in the proper soldierly posture. It locked the head in place, preventing 
it from turning and cut into the neck. This clamping of the head gave the soldier a 
healthy looking appearance, even if the wearer was malnourished. However, 
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prolonged wearing of the stock could provoke a series of health problems.18 Only the 
rank and file were obliged to wear the neck stock, and as an officer, Maule probably 
wore some form of cravat. However, he would have observed the discomfort of the 
rankers serving under him who were required to wear stocks.  
 
The neck stock was not the only article of clothing that caused problems for the 
soldiers. According to Scott Hughes Myerly, in his noteworthy examination of dress 
and discipline in the British military, the army’s obsession with proper appearances 
forced soldiers to wear numerous articles of clothing that could be detrimental to their 
comfort, health and fighting effectiveness. Maule’s statement “their limbs being 
unembarrassed by those bands that impede our motions” was probably intended as a 
broad critique of British clothing conventions, but it is possible that he meant to 
emphasize the problems with the traditional redcoats of the British infantry. They 
were unpleasantly warm, and the tight fit that was so important for appearances, 
restricted movement and made the coat uncomfortable to wear.19 Taken together, 
Maule’s comments expose the possibility that without the constraints of British 
clothing customs, soldiers could be stronger, and “the summit of human beauty”.20  
 
The importance of dress in Maule’s description indicates that the traditional 
conceptions of difference, such as clothing, religion, civility and class, remained an 
important factor in Britons’ assessment of themselves and other people. As noted in 
the previous chapters, according to Colin Kidd, Roxann Wheeler and Dror Wahrman, 
these traditional conceptions of difference, which had been dominant throughout 
much of the eighteenth century, had gradually begun to be replaced by racial 
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understandings of human difference.21 However, the realignment towards racial 
conceptions only became fully visible a few decades into the nineteenth century, with 
the emergence of scientific racism.  Therefore, by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, there was a confusing mix of interpretations of human variation. The 
significance of clothing in Maule’s account implies that the traditional criteria for 
evaluating different peoples still held some sway at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. 
 
The Anglo-Ottoman alliance  
Although the British widely believed that the martial qualities of the Ottomans 
endowed them with great military capabilities, this potential was unfulfilled. Ottoman 
martial vigour was thought to be poorly managed, thus they constituted an ineffective 
military force. This posed a problem for the British, who were aware they had to fight 
a highly trained and experienced French army, which was both larger and better 
supplied. They relied on the Ottomans to counter these disadvantages. In this way, the 
Anglo-Ottoman coalition was very similar to a range of alliances the British had 
participated in throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century. With a significantly 
smaller population than many of the continental powers, Britain had limited 
disposable land forces, and consistently adopted the practice of subsidizing allies to 
take the leading role in campaigns. These allies would suffer the brunt of the inevitable 
human cost, in exchange for gold. In some cases, this had worked well: in Canada and 
India, the British were assisted by substantial sections of the native population, many 
of whom, in the case of India, fought directly under the British. Such cooperation 
would also prove instrumental in the Peninsular War in Portugal and Spain.22 The 
original plan for the Egyptian campaign followed this pattern. The British intended 
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for the Ottomans to lead the offensive, with their own forces playing a supporting 
role.  
 
Therefore, the British servicemen’s negative perception of the Ottomans could at least 
partly be attributed to the friction that often arose between allied forces in combined 
military operations. This had certainly been a problem in recent British alliances. On 
several occasions throughout the late eighteenth century, the British had become 
dissatisfied with various allied groups, having overestimated their capabilities, 
resources or commitment to the operation in question. During the War for American 
Independence, the British developed unrealistic expectations of American loyalists. 
Although there were areas in the colonies where loyalism was strong and 
revolutionary activity relatively weak, loyalists were a minority of the population, and 
lacked the capacity to fulfil British requirements.23 Similar problems beset the Anglo-
Russian expedition sent to Holland in August 1799. The British believed that once 
they landed in Holland, the Dutch would rise in support of their liberators, and 
welcome the return of the exiled Prince of Orange, William V. Although many Dutch 
hated the French, they had no desire to see the return of the Prince. Instead of 
provoking an uprising, the campaign had the opposite effect, and united the divided 
Dutch Republic against the British. Dutch soldiers made up over half of the defending 
troops, and the predicted insurrection utterly failed to materialize.24 Moreover, 
considerable difficulties were encountered cooperating with the Russians. At 
Castricum, near Alkmaar on 6 October, the Russians attacked the French positions 
too soon, and then retreated unnecessarily, throwing the British into disarray. Twelve 
days later, an armistice was agreed, and by November the Anglo-Russian forces had 
evacuated Holland.25  
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Following this trend, Britain possessed overly optimistic expectations for the Anglo-
Ottoman alliance. Although widely accepted as declining, the British seemed to 
believe that the Ottoman Empire remained an imperial power with substantial 
resources at its disposal. They wildly overestimated Ottoman attachment to Egypt and 
assumed the Ottomans were fully committed to the removal of the French.26 Prior to 
the French invasion, the Ottomans were masters of Egypt only in name; they had no 
control over the country and obtained little from it. At this time, the reach of the 
Ottoman government in Istanbul rarely extended beyond the central provinces of 
Turkey, and then only weakly.27 The Ottomans had, with British assistance, 
successfully repulsed Napoleon at the siege of Acre in March 1799, but since then 
two offensive campaigns against the French had both ended in disaster at Aboukir in 
July 1799, and Heliopolis in March 1800.28 They were understandably reluctant to 
launch a third offensive. Unlike the conservative monarchies in Europe, the Porte was 
not ideologically opposed to the French, and with reports of Russian troops massing 
on Turkey’s borders, they saw little reason to send more troops to Egypt. Recent 
British conduct had done little to inspire confidence in an Anglo-Ottoman alliance. 
During the peace negotiations at the Convention of El-Arish in January 1800, the 
British cabinet refused the terms of the French surrender, which led directly to the 
resumption of hostilities and the Ottoman defeat at Heliopolis.29 
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The British expeditionary force that sailed to the Levant in December 1800 was totally 
unaware that the Ottomans were unprepared to supply their needs. Sir Ralph 
Abercromby, the commander of the British expedition, had sent his quartermaster-
general, Colonel Robert Anstruther, five weeks ahead of the army to arrange the 
purchase of supplies.30 Abercromby intended to land at Marmaris Bay on the southern 
coast of Turkey, spend a few days loading up everything needed for the coming 
invasion – horses, horse transports, landing craft and provisions – and sail for Egypt 
immediately. Five weeks later, as the army’s flotilla sailed into Marmaris on New 
Year’s Eve 1800, John Moore wrote optimistically: “The Turkish Government is 
friendly, and promises every assistance”.31 He was to be greatly disappointed. It was 
soon discovered that Anstruther had been unable to acquire anything from the 
Ottomans. Instead of a few days, the army spent seven weeks at Marmaris, acquiring 
the needed supplies. The passing weeks were not spent idly, the men were put to work 
training for the planned amphibious landing in Egypt, but they were nevertheless 
tortuously frustrating for Abercromby. Time was of the essence, he had hoped to land 
in Egypt and surprise the French before they could entrench themselves. The longer 
the British stayed on the Turkish coast, the greater the chance that the French would 
learn of their presence and prepare their defences.32 
 
All Abercromby could do was make the best of the situation. Commissaries were sent 
to forage and purchase locally, and provisions of food soon built up, but the landing 
craft and horses were still missing. The cavalry required 1,200 horses, and had none. 
Purchasing parties were sent inland, and enough horses were eventually bought to 
mount 450 dragoons, but even these were small in size and were not suitable for a 
cavalry charge.33 Many of these shortages were never resolved. Although the horse 
transports were eventually received, the draught animals promised never arrived. 
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After intelligence had confirmed that two French frigates had slipped the British 
blockade and docked in Alexandria, Abercromby could wait no longer; the risk of 
more reinforcements reaching the French was simply too great, and the army set sail 
for Egypt on 22 February.34 The lack of draught animals forced the men to improvise; 
hand carts and rope slings were constructed which allowed them to carry ammunition 
boxes or musket cartridges in pairs.35 With few horses, the movement of the guns was 
especially difficult. The most common cannon used by the British at this time were 
light and medium 6-pounders, and 5 ½ inch howitzers. A single light 6-pounder 
artillery piece weighed approximately 230kg, and, combined with its limbers and 
ammunition carriage, weighed over a tonne. The British also had some 12 and 24 
pounders to be used as siege artillery. A single 12-pounder with its limbers and 
ammunition carriage weighed more than two tonnes. In ideal circumstances, six to 
eight horses would be used to move each artillery piece, but in Egypt, much of this 
work had to be done by the men. There were simply not enough men in the artillery 
to move the guns, and two detachments of foot companies were sent from the line to 
assist them.36  
 
Outnumbered, ill-equipped and doubtful that any support would be received, British 
officers became pessimistic about the outcome of the campaign. Abercromby 
expressed his concerns in a series of letters written on 16 February. To David Dundas, 
half-cousin of Viscount Melville and author of the 1792 army regulations, 
Abercromby wrote “The enterprise… is arduous, and perhaps doubtful…. I do not 
wish you to consider this a desponding letter. I certainly however am not confident of 
success.”37 Abercromby’s subordinates shared his concerns. His second in command, 
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John Hely-Hutchinson, confessed that he was strongly opposed to the operation and 
saw no reasonable grounds to expect success.38 John Moore was furious. In his view: 
 
We have lost two months and the advantage of a 
surprise… Had we sailed straight from Malta to 
Alexandria, or after staying here a few days to water, 
we should certainly have taken the French unawares. 
They have now had time to prepare and to digest their 
mode of defence.39 
 
He concluded, “I cannot but think the enterprise in which we are about to engage 
extremely hazardous and doubtful in its event.” He did not believe that the French 
would offer a pitched battle, and instead feared they would use their superiority in 
cavalry to constantly harass the British communications during the assault on 
Alexandria.40  
 
Although some of these problems that arose in the Anglo-Ottoman alliance were 
typical of combined operations in this period, many were not. The lack of ‘western’ 
features in the Ottoman army – such as full-time regularly drilled infantry – was the 
most important factor in shaping Britain’s appraisal. This can be discerned before the 
Egyptian campaign. In 1791, William Pitt attempted to curb Russian expansion into 
Ottoman lands. Pitt declared that unless the fortress of Ochakov, seized by the 
Russians in 1788, was restored to the Ottomans, Britain would attack with the aid of 
80,000 Prussians, Ottomans and Poles. The threat provoked a huge outcry around 
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Britain. Most of the public had never heard of Ochakov, and supported Christian 
Russia over the Muslim Ottoman Empire.41  
 
British attitudes during other alliances in the 1790s provides an important point of 
comparison. During the disastrous Dutch campaign in 1799, there was a certain degree 
of affinity in customs, culture and religion between British and Russian officers, many 
of whom conversed with one another in French. Perhaps for this reason, the British 
regarded the Russian troops in far more positive terms during this failed campaign, 
than the Ottomans during the successful operation in Egypt two years later. Some 
British officers were disappointed by the Russians. John Moore, who commanded a 
brigade in the Low Countries, wrote that the Russian troops “from the very beginning 
preserved no order… Their retreat was precipitous and as undersoldierlike as their 
advance.”42 Generally however, the British had a more mixed opinion of the Russians. 
Henry Bunbury, a lieutenant who served on the Duke of York’s personal staff, recalled 
that the Russians proved themselves brave, if somewhat reckless:  
 
…the Russians pushed forwards in one solid mass, 
overturning everything that stood in their way, … the 
fearless mass burst into the midst of the French,… If 
there had been a reserve, fresh and in good order, the 
battle was won. But there was nothing but the one mass 
of confused men. Such people were not to expect 
victory over the active and intelligent Frenchmen on 
their own ground.43 
 
Others were more positive in their appraisal. As a column of recently disembarked 
Russian infantry passed him in early September, Francis Maule noted they: 
 
                                                        
41 Robert Harvey, The War of Wars the epic struggle between Britain and France 1789-1815 
(London: Constable, 2007), 111-112.  
42 Moore, Diary, vol.1, 350, 352-353.  
43 Sir Henry Bunbury, Narrative of the Campaign in North Holland 1799 (London: 1849), 12-13, 19. 
 222 
…were well appointed, and made a fine and imposing 
appearance. I was delighted by their firm and noble 
gait, their healthy and bronzed countenance, and that 
general appearance of hardihood, the result of exercise 
and temperate habits, which fully denoted them fit for 
the field, and the privations incident to warfare. The 
appearance of such an ally naturally gave rise to high 
expectations. The great character which the Russians 
have always maintained in war, which every year 
manifests itself still more conspicuously, and the 
known bravery of their nation in general, filled 
everyone with confidence.44 
 
Maule’s high opinion of the Russian troops continued after the campaign turned 
against them. Watching the Russian retreat after the battle of Castricum on 6 October 
1799, Maule saw many of the wounded on the carts “rolled up in blankets drenched 
with rain, and disfigured with the marks of their blood. Still these noble and hardy 
soldiers appeared unmindful of their lot, and bore not in their stern and manly 
countenance the marks either of grief or of dismay.”45 
 
This preference for European allies, such as the Russians, among the British military, 
was also noticeable during a small operation conducted at Aboukir Bay shortly after 
the Battle of the Nile in 1798. Following the destruction of the French navy, a portion 
of Nelson’s fleet remained off the coast of Alexandria to maintain a blockade. On 21 
October, the British were joined by a squadron of Russian and Ottoman frigates and 
gunboats. The arrival of this small squadron provided an opportunity for offensive 
operations. The following day, Commodore Hood ordered Benjamin Hallowell, 
captain of HMS Swiftsure, to proceed to Aboukir with the Ottoman gunboats and a 
Russian frigate. The intention was to attack the Castle of Aboukir, a French held fort 
that jutted into Aboukir Bay.46  
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Within a few days, Hallowell had everything prepared, and chose the Ottoman gun 
boats as the main instrument of attack. John Lee, a young midshipman, and Cooper 
Williams, the reverend on board the Swiftsure, described the assault. Hallowell 
“resolved to put the courage of the Turks to the test”47, but “having no very high 
opinion of their zeal he took the precaution to put five British seamen into each boat: 
yet, notwithstanding their example and exertions, it was impossible to make the Turks 
do their duty.” Hallowell had himself  
 
rowed from gun-boat to gun-boat, in vain endeavouring 
to instil some ardour into their minds, and, at length, by 
occasional coaxings and threatenings, he drew them 
near enough to batter the castle; and it would have been 
with more effect, but the motion of the vessels 
prevented certain aim.48  
 
Describing this episode, Williams was less than complimentary towards the 
Ottomans. He claimed their cannon were inadequate: there was no way to lock the 
guns for better aim, nor did they have breechings, a thick rope used to secure the 
carriages of the cannon to absorb the force of the recoil. When fired, the cannon 
“frequently recoiled with great force from the stem to the main-mast.” 49 Interestingly, 
Lee and Williams repeatedly highlighted the cowardliness of the Ottoman seamen, 
and especially their commanders. On the first day of bombardment, Williams writes 
“Whenever the Turks heard the whistling of a shot, down they fell, or sneaked below 
into the hold.” A few days later, a second bombardment was attempted. To “prevent 
a repetition of past evils”, Hallowell put fifteen British sailors and five Russians on 
board each Ottoman gun-boat to work the guns, while the Ottomans kept at the oars. 
These oarsmen, Lee wrote,  
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were so slack in rowing into action, that the boats were 
eventually obliged to tow them in. It was truly 
laughable to observe the captain of one of the Turkish 
frigates, assisting in towing the gun boats into action 
cast off his tow line, on the first shot being fired from 
the fort, [and] row rapidly out of gun shot [range].50 
 
A third attempt on the castle ended farcically. This time, the Ottoman gun boats came 
so close to the castle that the men on board were able to use their muskets. “The 
business was beginning to grow very serious”, when the Ottomans in one of the boats, 
“made desperate by their fears, rose upon our unarmed people, and with sabres began 
to cut them down.” British and Russian boats nearby rushed to help the British sailors, 
and Captain Hallowell boarded the rebellious gunboat to “put an end to the fray”. 
However, “the dastardly conduct” of the Ottomans had thrown “the rest into 
confusion”, and “the action was obliged to be discontinued.” British officers struggled 
to discourage their sailors from seeking revenge for the death of their compatriots. 
“An Englishman seeing one of his comrades cut down by a Turk, instantly attacked 
the Mussulman with wooden handspike and beat out his brains”.51 
 
The conduct of the Russian sailors, by contrast, was described as superior to that of 
the Ottomans. Williams wrote they were “neat in their persons and remarkably patient 
of fatigue and hardship. They were entirely obedient to command and fearless of 
danger.”52 It is evident from these appraisals that the British favoured what they 
deemed westernized, disciplined Russian sailors, over their Ottoman counterparts, yet 
this peculiar operation raises many questions. If the Ottoman gunboats were so 
ineffectual in the initial assault, why were they repeatedly used in subsequent attacks? 
Commodore Hood, who ordered the assault, had other resources at his disposal; 
namely two Russian and two Ottoman frigates, as well as the larger ships of the line 
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in the British blockading force.53 These larger ships could conceivably close in to fire 
on the fort; gunboats were not necessarily required. Aboukir castle was surrounded 
by shoals, into which HMS Culloden had run aground in the initial phases of the Battle 
of the Nile. As a result of this, the British had developed some idea of the water depth 
around the fortifications. Moreover, Nelson’s squadron had come under fire from 
Aboukir castle during the battle; it was certainly in range of the larger cannon the 
British had available. One suspects that the British persisted with the Ottoman gun 
boats because they were known to be of poor quality and an expendable force; the 
British were less willing to risk the lives of their own or the Russian sailors in a 
hazardous and impulsive amphibious assault.  
 
The criticism of the lack of ‘western’ features in the Ottoman military continued in 
the Egyptian campaign. Discipline and organization were the crucial dividing factors; 
the unorganized masses of the Ottoman military were considered inferior to the 
disciplined ranks of the British army. This view arose from a misconception. The 
British totally misunderstood the fundamental differences in organization between the 
Ottoman army and their own. The Ottoman government had to control a larger area 
and a greater variety of ethnic and religious groups than either the Habsburg or French 
Empires at their respective heights. Hence it was incapable of enforcing the same level 
of control over the individuals who fought for it. From 1650, the Porte increasingly 
resorted to recruiting militias and hiring private armies for temporary use, instead of 
attempting to maintain a professional standing army.54 In this way, Karen Barkey 
argues, the Ottoman government established an informal agreement with the rural 
peasants. The peasantry provided “disposable, bargain recruitment”, and in return, the 
government allowed raiding and plunder as a reward.55 This preference for temporary 
recruitment of militias allowed the Ottomans to recruit great numbers of men cheaply 
and rapidly, giving the military a greater flexibility to respond to different problems. 
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Such flexibility came at the expense of the discipline and organization familiar to 
European armies. The troops required constant bribes during campaigns, and Ottoman 
commanders doled out money in return for dangerous service, for trophies such as 
heads, ears or noses of slain enemies, and as compensation for wounds graded 
according to severity. Such practices were designed to strengthen what was never 
more than temporary allegiance to Ottoman commanders, and could not be easily 
transformed into European-style discipline. The hierarchy of military rank and the 
obligation to obey orders and perform them as instructed, was alien to the traditional 
military bodies in the Ottoman Empire. Among these groups, particularly the 
Janissaries, individual martial prowess was an asset to be prized and bought. Loyalty 
rarely went beyond fellow soldiers in a battalion, and command depended on 
negotiation, not automatic compliance. While the Ottoman government did its best to 
attract as many men as it could, there was little to prevent these soldiers from returning 
to their homes should the campaign turn against them.56 The difficulty in establishing 
a semblance of order was exacerbated by the diversity of the men who constituted the 
Ottoman military. It was a melting pot of various nationalities and races, many of 
whom possessed different languages. William Wittman was struck by the ethnic 
variety of the Ottoman army: “complexions of every hue, black, copper-colour, olive, 
tawny, yellow, and white, are to be found…. Which result from so motley a compound 
of so many different nations indiscriminately brought together.”57 With no measures 
in place to prevent these temporary troops from deserting, the army was in constant 
flux: irregular levies deserted in large bands, but new recruits also poured in.58  
 
The Ottoman forces provided a stark contrast to the mechanical-like discipline 
espoused by the British army. Heavily influenced by the European school of military 
tactics, British soldiers frequently referred to the army as a machine, and mechanical-
like movements were exhibited in soldiers’ posture and motion. When at drill, on 
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parade, or on the march, the movements of a soldiers’ body were precisely regulated; 
they were not allowed to step out of line to avoid mud or water that might soil their 
dress.59 Strict discipline and mechanical-like manoeuvres were considered essential 
in an army that relied upon the vollied firing of smooth-bore muskets, to obtain the 
greatest effect from their limited range and complicated loading procedure. It moulded 
soldiers so that they would respond automatically by instinct, which allowed 
commanders to move large numbers of men in an orderly manner, and could make 
the difference between life and death. Moreover, it helped officers maintain total 
control over their men, many of whom were ill-treated, underfed and did not want to 
be there.60 
 
The criticism of Ottoman indiscipline and disorder was also motivated by the British 
army’s sense of professionalism. By 1801, the reputation of the British army had 
plummeted after a series of failed campaigns and aborted expeditions in the 1790s, 
leading it to become, in the mind of Lord Cornwallis, “the scorn and laughing stock 
of friends and foes.”61 Many of the men in Abercromby’s expeditionary force were 
amateurs. Of the twenty-six battalions under his command, only ten had combat 
experience.62 Despite this, Abercromby had been given several months to train his 
army into a respectable force, as they prepared for the campaign. The aging general 
was mild mannered and affable, but he was a strong disciplinarian and considered an 
exceptional trainer of men. His subordinate, John Moore, was a huge asset in this 
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regard, and has been described as one of the best instructors in the history of the 
British army.63 The rigorous training and preparation of the men instilled a confidence 
in their own abilities. Abercromby reflected on the marked improvement of his army 
as their flotilla came in sight of Egypt on 1 March 1801. “Most of the regiments”, he 
wrote, “are amongst the best in the service; the general officers men of high honour, 
with the advantage of vigorous health joined to experience.”64  
 
One can argue that the British expeditionary force was not, in the strictest sense, a 
professional military body, but under Abercromby’s tutelage, his men acquired a 
confidence in their own abilities and professionalism. Used to their own system, and 
unaware that the Ottoman military was organized around the temporary recruitment 
of irregulars, British soldiers were appalled at the unruly disorder of the Ottoman 
troops.65 The contrast between British and Ottoman styles of warfare became obvious 
to the British soldiers as an Ottoman infantry detachment joined their army, under the 
command of the Capitan Pasha, the High Admiral of the Ottoman navy. They 
marched, camped and fought alongside the British throughout the campaign. The first 
of the Pasha’s men landed at Aboukir on 19 March - a small detachment of 500 
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irregulars - and was followed by a larger force of approximately 3,600 a week later.66 
Aeneas Anderson, a lieutenant in the 40th Regiment, assessed the men of the first 
detachment as they disembarked: “they had little better than the appearance of a 
rabble, with somewhat of a gaudy flutter about them, from a great number of their 
colours.” Abercromby was unwilling to test the Ottomans’ abilities, and ordered them 
to “encamp three miles in the rear of the army, to be out of the way, as it seemed, in 
case of attack.”67 General Hutchinson, who succeeded to command after 
Abercromby’s death, shared the concerns of his predecessor.  Only a few days after 
taking command he wrote to Henry Dundas complaining about the Ottomans attached 
to the British army: “The Turks are in a deplorable state… you cannot place the 
smallest reliance on them.”68  
 
Unaware of the differences in organization, British observers often drew unfavourable 
comparisons between the ordinary Ottoman and British soldiers. The contrast in their 
discipline was most apparent during the marches. Captain Wyvill of the 79th 
Regiment, bluntly described the Ottoman march as “a most laughable procession”, 
that trailed behind the ordered British infantry columns.69 Another officer wrote to a 
friend: “I must tell you that they will, even if marching to an enemy, halt of their own 
accord, not wishing to lose time by waiting for leave from their commander, seat 
themselves, light their fires and pipes, make and drink their coffee”. The British 
supposed that the disobedient nature of these Ottoman soldiers was a consequence of 
the lack of control and discipline in the Ottoman military. The troops were seen as 
lazy, ignorant, and entirely self-interested: “This creature thinks of nought – but - 
coffee – pipe – pipe and coffee.”70 More seriously from a British strategic perspective, 
the Ottoman troops were thought to lack esprit de corps and were reluctant to follow, 
or even disobeyed orders. They were, in William Wittman’s judgement, “unruly and 
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intemperate in their passions, which they cannot govern,… they frequently commit 
assassinations among one another.”71  
 
Interestingly, both the British and Ottoman ranks were depicted as criminals or 
lowlifes, devoid of the finer qualities of mind. Through a combination of meagre 
wages, poor food, harsh, squalid living conditions, the length of the term of service 
and the likelihood of invalidity or death, there was a widespread belief in Britain that 
self-respecting men never signed up. Only the most despicable individuals were 
thought to join the military, whose crimes and failings of character meant the army 
was the only occupation left open to them.72 The British appear to have applied this 
thinking to the ranks of other armies, but there was however, a crucial difference 
between the perception of Ottoman and British rank-and-file. Both were depicted as 
mindless killers, but in the British army, soldiers were rigidly controlled by a single 
commander for a practical purpose, through the enforcement of discipline. To the 
British soldiers, used to their own strict military system, the problems Ottoman 
commanders experienced with their troops resulted from their inability to properly 
control them.   
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The conduct of the Ottomans soldiers, as they marched alongside the British was 
considered “proof of their subordination”, and was accompanied by concern. The acts 
of indiscipline the British witnessed had occurred “in their best disciplined army, the 
Pacha’s. If such irregularity and confusion exists among them at a moment of 
comparative peace and quiet, what must be their state in battle?”73 The answer to this 
question presented itself during the attack at Rahmanieh on 9 May, as the British and 
Ottomans engaged the French alongside one another. Seeing the Ottomans waver on 
coming under fire, the French pressed their attack, and the Ottoman retreat required 
the rapid deployment of a British brigade on the left to stabilise the advance.74 In short, 
the underwhelming performance reinforced British conviction in Ottoman military 
defectiveness. Sergeant Robertson, of the 92nd Gordon Highlanders, who was part of 
the division that engaged the French alongside the Ottomans, wrote “The Turkish 
mode of warfare was rather out of our way of doing business.”75 Wilson was more 
candid: “The Turks were five thousand… yet from the want of discipline, their 
strength cannot be rated as equal to more than fifteen hundred Europeans.”76 Such 
crude attempts to estimate how many European troops would be able to match the 
Ottoman army was a recurring theme among the British. After reviewing the Grand 
Vizir’s army in October 1800, Brigadier-General George Koehler, who commanded 
the military mission attached to the Ottoman forces, declared: “I am certain that 2,000 
European troops are more than enough to put to rout, in an instant, all the grand 
army…. of 15,000.”77 Such valuations show how poorly the British rated their 
Ottoman allies, but more importantly, they demonstrate the British conviction in the 
strategic importance of European style discipline and organization.  Lieutenant 
Thomas Evans provided one of the most interesting appraisals on this subject, for he 
considered the fanatical bravery of the Ottomans a contributing factor towards their 
indiscipline and military ineffectiveness.  
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I am persuaded that, in considerable bodies, an English 
force would have a striking advantage over six times 
their number... not that I am accusing the Turks of a 
want of courage, far otherwise, for it is the possession 
of this very courage, spur’d on by religion, teaching the 
doctrine of predestination, that makes them so 
vulnerable to the attacks of veteran soldiers, brought up 
and perfected in the European system of tactics; as it 
requires no great depth of thought or foresight to 
discover that the greater the bravery possessed by 
Troops fighting (without order or system), and utter 
strangers to the art of War, against so steady and wily a 
foe, which no danger, much less noise or appearances, 
can intimidate, the greater, in proportion to that 
bravery, must be their loss.78 
 
Another officer gave a similar evaluation of the impact of religious fanaticism on 
military effectiveness: 
 
Amongst them is certainly to be found that description 
of person who, firmly believing in the picture of 
paradise… drawn in wondrous glowing colours by his 
prophet, and consequently expecting his every wish, 
while living, will be gratified when he quits this world, 
rushes headlong into eternity with a frantic zeal 
unknown to Christians… an army this composed and 
thus organized should be beaten by an European force 
of not more than one-third its number.79 
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The British aversion to ‘non-western’ methods of warfare is perhaps most obvious in 
the contrasting opinions of the two Ottoman commanders: the Grand Vizir, the 
commander of the Ottoman army, and the Capitan Pasha, the High Admiral of the 
Ottoman navy. The Grand Vizir was not only the commander in chief of the army; as 
the Sultan’s prime minister he wielded a great deal of political power and influence. 
In 1801, this post was held by Kör Yusuf Ziyaüddin Pasha. At sixty-six years old, 
with white hair and one eye, the aging commander had a striking appearance. He was 
a competent general and known for his piety and fatalism.80 In British accounts 
however, the Vizir was often regarded as a buffoon, for he was totally ignorant of 
European politics and western knowledge. He had “an inclination to attribute every 
circumstance to the course of fate, which, whether it conduct to good or evil, he thinks 
is irresistible”.81 In one meeting with George Koehler, the Ottoman commander-in-
chief asked for a map of the world to be sketched out for him. The request was 
complied with, and the Vizir was astonished to hear that the earth was round. “If” he 
observed, “the earth is round, how can the people, and other detached objects on the 
half beneath, be prevented from falling off?”82 His ignorance Koehler found shocking; 
he was “so weak, so frivolous and childish that an infant three years old would have 
more foresight.”83 His most serious fault, however, was his limited knowledge of his 
own army. After multiple conferences with the Ottoman commander, a frustrated 
Koehler wrote of the Vizir’s casual dismissal of military matters:  
 
He is always very polite and, provided you will talk 
about his fine horses, the great superiority of the Turks 
on horseback, about his little fountain of water with a 
child’s boat in it, nothing can be more satisfactory than 
our conferences, but directly I touch upon anything 
which relates to military operations… he waives the 
conversation.84   
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John Moore formed a similar opinion during his discussions with the Vizir in January 
1801. The Vizir told him that he had sufficient supplies to reach the Nile, he only 
needed barley for the horses and cart animals. Moore’s own investigation however, 
found that the Ottomans did not have sufficient food to reach Egypt, and his figures 
for various resources were inaccurate. He concluded that the Vizir “was a weak-
minded old man, without talent, or any military knowledge.”85 Unknown to Koehler 
and Moore, it was impossible for the Vizir to attain accurate information on his 
resources due to constant fluctuations in the availability of supplies and in the number 
of the irregular militia attached to his army.  
 
An undoubtedly important contributing factor towards these critical appraisals of the 
Grand Vizir, was the poor state of his forces. The Vizir had set out from Jaffa for 
Egypt at the conclusion of Ramadan on 25 February. He crossed the desert and 
advanced on Cairo, hoping to cooperate with the British as he approached the 
Egyptian capital. British servicemen in contact with this force ridiculed its confused 
and irregular nature. John Phillip Morier thought it “resembled a large fair” rather 
than an army.86 Their method of communication and movement he considered “truly 
ridiculous when compared with our ideas of a military system”.87 George Koehler 
described it as “an irregular mob… without order or discipline… who will not even 
defend their own lives and property without presents.”88 He added, “if any should say, 
that these people have made any progress in the art of war, or have any notion of order 
in battle, they are egregiously misinformed, for their exercises constitute nothing but 
a scene of confusion of one line upon another…”89 One of the most popular anecdotes 
conveyed in descriptions of the Vizir’s forces, was the violent opposition of Ottoman 
regiments to his orders. They supposedly fired into the Vizir’s tent if they were 
unwilling to fulfil his commands, “a thing which frequently occurs if they have any 
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grievance”. This became a popular form of opposition to orders for the mustering of 
regiments or breaking camp.90 Again, such views arise from the British failure to 
appreciate the fundamental difference in the command structure of the Ottoman army. 
The hierarchy of military rank and the obligation to obey orders was alien to the 
irregular bodies of troops that served the Ottomans on a temporary basis. Command 
of troops was not based on automatic compliance, and relied on the ability of the 
commander to negotiate and compromise. The violent reaction of the troops to the 
Vizir was often the consequence of his attempts to coerce them into action.91 Unaware 
of these differences, John Moore provided the most damning conclusion on the Vizir’s 
army. Moore’s opinion was highly respected, and it was for this reason that he was 
sent to inspect the Ottoman camp at Jaffa during the preparations for the campaign in 
winter 1800-1. He concluded they were “a wild ungovernable mob, incapable of being 
directed to any useful purpose; and, as they were destitute of everything that is 
required in an army.”92  
 
Moore’s appraisal of the Ottomans had a significant impact on the course of the 
campaign. Abercromby had originally intended to land his army at Damietta, to allow 
for better cooperation with the Vizir, although the British would be operating on a 
wide front, exposed to French cavalry. This plan was scrapped when Moore returned 
from the Vizir’s camp in early February. It was obvious that cooperation with the 
Vizir did not outweigh the strategic disadvantages of landing at Damietta: “it was” 
Moore wrote, “vain to expect any co-operation from them.”93 Instead, Abercromby 
resolved to land at Aboukir Bay. It put greater distance between the British and 
Ottoman armies, but the topography of the bay would allow the British to defend their 
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beachhead more easily.94 Little was heard of the Vizir’s army after it advanced from 
Jaffa on 25 February, and once the British landed at Aboukir on 8 March, many were 
sceptical whether it would participate at all in the campaign. Abercromby’s adjutant-
general, John Hope, wrote “A Turkish army exactly resembles one of our old feudal 
armies – a machine of so little consistency that it cannot keep the field long for any 
useful purpose, and probably never will be brought across the desert.”95  
 
One can detect a sense of frustration in Hope’s comments and he was not alone. Many 
found the indiscipline of the Ottomans irritating, in part because their martial potential 
was going to waste. Wittman claimed that the Ottoman Empire:  
 
…has produced men not deficient in judgement and 
acute penetration, who, with minds better cultivated, 
would be the boast and ornament of any nation 
whatever… it is therefore to be lamented, that this 
quality should be rendered useless, or even pernicious, 
by… the radical vices of their government.96  
 
John Phillip Morier thought: 
 
…if they are considered in regard to their personal 
courage, their bodily strength, or their military habits, 
they will be found to equal, if not to surpass, any other 
body of men…. Discipline would certainly make men 
who are possessed of such natural advantages very 
formidable; whereas, from a want of it, they are 
despicable enemies.97 
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General Hutchinson’s judgment was just as striking. In late May, he visited the 
Ottoman camp to discuss with the Vizir plans for the siege of Cairo, and was appalled 
by what he saw. In a despondent letter to Lord Hobart, the new Secretary for War and 
the Colonies, he wrote, “It was the worst army that ever existed.”98  
 
Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, the Capitan Pasha, was seen by the British in a very different 
light from the Grand Vizir. The High Admiral of the Ottoman navy was singled out 
as energetic, competent, generous and indefatigable, “with a taste for everything 
European and a desire to better the condition of those around him”. He had taken 
command of the navy in the wake of defeat against Russia in 1792, and his tireless 
efforts to introduce “every innovation which could lead to improvement” were 
applauded.99 As a consequence, “there is not one Turkish commander, except himself, 
who has disciplined his troops with any degree of regularity.”100 The Pasha’s 
determination to introduce European inventions, policies and tactics was the 
fundamental reason why he attracted British admirers. Although respected, the Pasha 
remained in British eyes the product of a corrupt and inferior regime. Captain Thomas 
Walsh argued that thanks to “his education in the seraglio”, the Pasha possessed an 
“opposite and dark side of his character, profound dissimulation, and a deep spirit of 
intrigue.” Moreover, his talents may have “obtained him high renown in this country, 
but… dwindle away when put in competition with the talents of an European 
commander.”101 Although he possessed some ‘oriental vices’, Robert Wilson thought 
that: 
 
The character of the Captain Pacha sanctions the hope 
that those prejudices and abuses which have occasioned 
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an unnatural weakness, may very soon be extirpated. 
He seems to be born in this age of splendid talents, to 
retrieve the fortunes of the Ottoman empire, and refix 
the crescent in the sphere from which it has 
wandered.102  
 
Wilson’s praise of the Ottoman commanders is noteworthy, for he offered a different 
view to the majority, who emphasized their inherent lack of ability. Most 
significantly, Wilson highlighted their supposedly harmonious nature. Describing the 
Pasha, he wrote, “his manners were remarkably elegant and at the same time 
dignified.” He portrayed the Grand Vizir in a similar manner, claiming the 
commander possessed “a very expressive and engaging countenance” and “a 
remarkable cleanliness in person”, which “gave him a majestic and pleasing 
appearance whilst the affability and particular elegance of his manners operated 
irresistibly in his favour; nor was this impression ever diminished by a more intimate 
knowledge of his character; brave, loyal, and humane”.103 Wilson’s description of 
Ottoman commanders contrasts with the unfavourable portrayals by other British 
soldiers. Indeed, admiration for the Pasha among the British had very little impact on 
the prevailing negative appraisal of the Ottomans. He remained “an honourable 
exception” to the inferior Ottoman people. 104  
 
It is possible that Wilson’s comments were intended to highlight the lack of admirable 
traits among British officers. Throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the 
purchasing of commissions allowed a number of unsuitable and incompetent men to 
rise rapidly, which had lamentable repercussions. Regimental officers enjoyed a great 
deal of authority over their men, and punishments were meted out at their discretion. 
According to Scott Hughes Myerly, these conditions rendered military life attractive 
to sadistic officers who enjoyed inflicting pain.105 That said, far from all the officers 
who dealt out harsh punishments to their men were sadistic; such penalties were 
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undoubtedly influenced by the popular image of the ranks as unruly vagabonds who 
needed the lash to keep them in line. The use of flogging to punish trivial offences 
reached its peak in the first decade of the nineteenth century, as a number of tyrannical 
colonels used it to excess. In 1813 Colonel Archdall of the 40th Foot was dismissed 
from the service after having men flogged without establishing a proper regimental 
court, and for “piling up” sentences on soldiers for minor offences, in order to inflict 
several separate punishments at the same time.106 Another officer who possessed a 
seemingly perverse nature was General Sir Eyre Coote, who commanded the force 
that besieged Alexandria in 1801. He acquired a reputation throughout his career for 
erratic and eccentric behavior, and was charged in November 1815 with indecent 
conduct, having allegedly paid boys from Christ’s Hospital to allow him to flog them. 
Although Coote escaped court proceedings by being declared insane, a separate 
military inquiry concluded his behavior was not caused by mental illness, and he was 
dismissed from the army in April 1816.107 
 
Wilson’s reformist background suggests that he was capable of looking with a less 
prejudiced eye at the structure and character of non-British armies. One of his primary 
areas of concern was the plight of the common soldier. His work The History of the 
British Expedition to Egypt went through several editions and achieved exceptional 
popularity because of its accusations against Napoleon for cruelty to prisoners at Jaffa, 
and his own men in Egypt.108  Later, in 1804, he published an Inquiry into the present 
state of the military force of the British empire with a view to its reorganization, in 
which he made his first public protest against corporal punishment in the army. 
Throughout his active career, Wilson proved himself an efficient and fearless 
commander, but one who was unconcerned with carrying out orders. His tendency to 
criticize his own superiors provoked disapproval among his readers. An article in the 
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Critical Review, discussing the merits of Wilson’s work, claimed: “We have had 
occasion… to reprehend our writer, who, we find is a young man, for assuming too 
often the character of a judge on the conduct of the ablest generals.”109 As a result of 
this, the government treated Wilson as an unpredictable entity, a view summarized by 
Wellington, who described him as “a very slippery fellow”. Wilson served with 
Russian, Prussian and Austrian forces, in addition to those of his own country during 
his career. He received numerous distinctions from foreign sovereigns, and it is telling 
he received none from his own.110 
 
The failure to understand how the Ottoman forces were organized seems to have 
blinded the British soldiers to the considerable efforts that had been made to 
restructure the Ottoman military along European lines, and the moderate success 
achieved in this area. In an ambitious programme of reform, Ottoman Sultan Selim 
III undertook a series of reorganization programmes, the most significant of these was 
the formation of a new army, the Nizâm-ı Cedid, or New Order, in March 1793. This 
army was organized along European lines, dressed in European uniforms and 
followed European drill.111 Although the Nizâm-ı Cedid grew far more slowly than 
the government’s projected target, by 1806, 22,685 men and 1,590 officers had been 
recruited. 700 Nizâm-ı Cedid troops helped defend Acre against the French in March 
1799, and a further 1,000, trained by “German renegadoes”, constituted part of the 
Capitan Pasha’s infantry detachment during the Egyptian campaign. These men could 
“move and form relatively well”, and “use the bayonet which no other Turkish 
soldiers do.” They were considered by the British to be the best Ottoman troops.112  
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Mixed among the new recruits of the Nizâm-ı Cedid army were a significant number 
of foreign, mostly French, advisors. Many were veterans of wars in Europe and 
overseas, and Selim relied heavily on them for the technical expertise required to 
modernize the Ottoman military. Standford Shaw estimates that about 600 foreign 
technicians were in the pay of the Porte at any one time.113 To further this process, 
Selim established permanent Ottoman embassies in European capitals from 1793: 
London, Vienna, Berlin and later Paris. These ambassadors were not merely 
instruments of negotiation; they sent reports to Selim describing the military, 
bureaucratic and political affairs of their host nation.114 In spite of his efforts, most of 
Selim’s reforms were only partially successful. They were hindered by a lack of 
finances and the constant threat of war with various European nations. Reforming the 
old military institutions could have been disastrous if undertaken at a time when 
foreign enemies were waiting to take advantage of every weakness.115 Most 
significantly, the reforms encountered severe and violent opposition from multiple 
groups, particularly the Janissaries. This opposition proved fatal to Selim personally 
in 1808, yet the attempts at reform demonstrate that the Ottomans were aware of the 
limitations of their military system, and the need for change. Many of Selim’s 
initiatives were carried through by his successor, Mahmud II, with greater success.116 
 
The conviction in the total inferiority of Ottoman troops led to a complete reversal of 
Britain’s traditional policy of encouraging their allies to commit their men and suffer 
losses against the French. Hutchinson, upon taking command on Abercromby’s death 
on 28 March, was determined to keep Ottoman forces out of harm’s way. He was 
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certain that should the Ottomans engage a sizeable French force, they would be 
annihilated. As Thomas Walsh recognized, there was nothing to stop the Vizir’s levies 
deserting him should defeat be expected: “In times of prosperity and success the army 
increases in proportion with the hope of plunder but should it experience a defeat the 
general is entirely deserted and left to seek safety in flight.”117 Hence the mere 
presence of the Ottomans was thought to be of greater strategic value than any 
contribution they might have made to a military engagement. Hutchinson judged - 
correctly - that the presence of the Vizir’s army would discourage the French from 
concentrating superior numbers against him. Jacques-François Menou, the 
commander of the French garrison, refrained from launching a determined attack on 
the British bridgehead at Aboukir when it was most vulnerable, precisely because he 
was unsure of the Vizir’s location, and vastly overestimated the extent of Anglo-
Ottoman cooperation.118 
 
This policy of protection brought considerable aggravation to the British. The 
intentions of the Vizir were often contrary to Hutchinson’s, forcing the latter to revise 
his plans against his better judgement. After the Battle of Alexandria on 21 March, 
the British intended to lay siege to the encircled French garrison within the city, but 
the Vizir announced he was unable to cooperate in any operation except one against 
Cairo. He explained that his troops expected to plunder the capital, and feared they 
would desert should he countermand their wishes. Hutchinson was forced to either 
abandon the Vizir, or advance with him. He chose to advance, but leaving Alexandria 
in the hands of the French posed enormous risks. Hutchison had to divide his army, 
leaving 6,000 men under Sir Eyre Coote to maintain the siege at Alexandria. Dividing 
the already outnumbered British army made the number of troops available to 
Hutchinson perilously small. Moreover, Hutchinson’s advance on Cairo provided the 
French in Alexandria with an opportunity to break out and cut his tenuous supply 
lines.119  
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 243 
The decision to advance was met with severe, almost mutinous opposition from 
Hutchinson’s subordinates, who wanted the British to act independently of the Vizir. 
For some, cooperating with the Vizir was too dangerous, his army might be defeated 
regardless of British assistance, and the surrender of Cairo might not be the decisive 
blow hoped for. It was safer to remain at Alexandria and ensure the surrender of the 
French garrison. A group of officers “had written to both Coote and Moore inviting 
their concurrence in a plan which tended virtually, if not absolutely, to deprive 
Hutchinson of the command of the army”. The plan fell apart after “the stern and 
uncompromising answer which they received from Moore.”120 The British reluctantly 
agreed to assist the Vizir, but their anxiety over the capability of the Ottoman forces 
remained, along with a great sense of frustration. Many of the strategic problems 
would not have been encountered had the Ottoman military possessed European 
discipline. On the advance towards Cairo from April to June, many of Hutchinson’s 
5,000 men fell sick with fever and ophthalmia, and the British became increasingly 
reliant on the Capitan Pasha’s infantry detachment to maintain the offensive.121 
Hutchinson bitterly detested his dependence on the Ottomans, writing to Henry 
Dundas: 
 
…they are not even the shadow of an army, no 
dependence can be placed upon them; they are of that 
description that it is a most frightful experiment to act 
at all with them, and it is not by any means impossible 
that even in action, they might be more mischievous to 
their friend than to their enemy; they are therefore a 
most miserable instrument, but bad as they are, they 
must be used, we have no other resource…. they 
certainly have some degree of individual courage, but 
there is no doubt that their prejudices against 
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innovation and the name of a Christian are still as strong 
as ever.122 
 
A consequence of this policy of protection was that Ottoman forces played little part 
in the fighting that took place during the Egyptian campaign. The British ridiculed the 
Ottomans’ meagre contribution, and expressed considerable animosity at the prospect 
of sharing with them the spoils of the campaign. One officer wrote: “Although the 
Turks certainly compose a part of the army,… they certainly have nothing to do with 
the fighting”.123 Viscount Keith, an admiral known for his hot temper, mocked the 
Ottomans’ involvement upon learning that the Vizir had been labelled by his troops 
“the Conqueror of Egypt”: “in what Covert of Eastern double dealing will the Turks 
find a Cloak to conceal their inefficiency, not to say Nullity!”124 This acrimony at 
sharing the victory is best illustrated by one officer, in a letter to Lord Minto:  
 
….what creates general surprize, is that we come as 
Auxiliaries to the Turks tho’ the Capn. Pashaw [Capitan 
Pasha] and Vizier never ventured to approach untill 
they had certain information of our Victories – and after 
we have Conquered a part of the Country we are told 
we have nothing at all to do with the internal Govt. tho’ 
our very existence might depend upon a Judicious 
interference. Our Commr. in Chief says the Turks are 
to govern the Country, and we as long as we remain in 
it are to obey – Turkish Govert.: and British Subjects 
do not seem well calculated for harmonious Unison. I 
therefore should imagine, there must be some 
mistake…125  
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Symptoms of moral and social decay in the Ottoman military  
The overwhelmingly negative appraisals of the Ottoman forces by British soldiers, 
share strong similarities with the writings of civilian travellers, historians and 
philosophers, who published work on the Near East in Britain in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century. Writers such as the Comte de Volney, François Baron 
de Tott, Claude-Étienne Savary, William Robertson, William Hunter and William 
Eton, who all adhered to the core arguments of Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws, 
portrayed the Ottoman Empire as a despotic regime, gradually decaying under the 
cruelty, sensuality, corruption and arbitrary nature of its government and people.126 
Due to the popularity of travel literature in Britain at this time, and the interest of 
military men in such literature, one can safely assume that many British servicemen 
were pre-programmed by, or were at least receptive to, this prevailing negative image. 
The martial talents the Ottoman troops were thought to possess were being wasted by 
the corrupt and depraved regime under which they served, and the ineffectiveness of 
Ottoman military forces was a symptom of moral decay in Ottoman society. This line 
of thought is exemplified in William Wittman’s writing. In May 1799, Wittman 
watched a majestic ceremony in which the Grand Vizir formally took command of his 
army. He argued that the grand affair encapsulated the problems within the Ottoman 
Empire: 
 
It is impossible to contemplate these pompous 
ceremonies, and not to contrast them with the secrecy 
and silence with which the first movements of 
European armies are undertaken. It must be a trifling 
nation which can delay an expedition of importance, 
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even for a single day, lest some little rite or ceremony 
should be omitted. 127 
 
Wittman argued the Ottoman desire for vain, narcissistic displays damaged their 
chances of military success, as “it is truly impolitic thus to advertise an enemy, for 
even months beforehand, of the advance of an army.”128 
 
For some British observers, the decay and corruption of Ottoman society was most 
apparent in its officer corps. This was a common topic of discussion among British 
officers, perhaps because, as Patrick Porter points out, the upper echelons of western 
society had a tendency to believe they had more in common with Near Eastern nobles 
than their own social inferiors.129 Despite this, the Ottoman officer was seen as a “man 
preferring to remain at home in quiet and indolence, enjoying his women, pipe, and 
coffee. In such an officer the Turkish soldier naturally puts no kind of confidence, but 
looks upon him as an animal, which in truth he is”.130 One anecdote frequently 
narrated was the process by which Ottoman officers embezzled military funds. Each 
corps commander allegedly “obtains pay for double or triple the number of men he 
has to maintain; and this abuse having grown into a kind of established rule among 
them”.131 The criticism of corruption in the Ottoman army was a popular one, perhaps 
because it was known for British officers to engage in similar practices. Colonels 
controlled the wages and the supply of clothing to their regiment, and there were 
instances of certain officers abusing these responsibilities for financial gain. The 
average manpower deficiency for each battalion from 1801-1811 was 202 men, yet 
some colonels still received and pocketed the clothing allocated for these non-existent 
troops. Moreover, items of clothing could be purchased in bulk and then sold to their 
men for a profit.132  
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To the British soldiers, the most obvious sign of social and moral decay in the 
Ottoman Empire was the extreme violence of Ottoman soldiers towards Egyptian non-
combatants and French prisoners. This level of violence and oppression seemed 
abhorrent to British soldiers, but as Mike Dash points out, ruthless violence was 
common practice within the Ottoman Empire, and from the Ottoman perspective, 
there was reason for it. Much of the success that the Ottoman dynasty had enjoyed 
throughout its history, certainly during the “golden age” in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, was thanks in part to the staggering violence it employed against even the 
most powerful members of society. The Ottomans were famous for the “law of 
fratricide”, drawn up by Mehmed II in the middle of the fifteenth century. Under the 
terms of this legislation, members of the ruling dynasty who succeeded in seizing the 
throne on the death of the old sultan were not only permitted, but commanded to 
murder all other potential claimants to the throne, in order to reduce the risk of 
subsequent rebellion and civil war.133 Although the law of fratricide was abandoned 
early in the seventeenth century, this culture of violence remained. For many years 
Topkapi palace, the main residency of Ottoman Sultans in Constantinople, provided 
a mute testament to Ottoman ruthlessness. In order to enter the palace, visitors passed 
through the Imperial Gate, on either side of which were two alcoves where the heads 
of recently executed criminals were put on display. Inside the gate stood the First 
Court, through which all visitors to the inner parts of the palace had to pass. The focal 
point of this area was a pair of “example stones”, directly outside the central gate. 
These “stones” were marble pillars on which were placed the severed heads of 
notables who had offended the Sultan. Additional warnings and reminders of the 
sporadic mass executions ordered by the Sultan were occasionally piled up by the 
central gate: severed noses, ears and tongues.134  
 
The British failed to understand that the Ottomans approached the Egyptian campaign 
as a colonial and financial enterprise, using violence, plunder and extortion against 
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the Egyptians as a method of re-establishing control over the country, and acquiring 
the funds to pay their troops. The Porte had struggled to assert its authority over Egypt 
for much of the eighteenth century, and the alliance with the British provided an 
opportunity for Ottoman power to be reaffirmed.135 Incidents of Ottoman soldiers 
murdering or plundering the Egyptians shocked British soldiers. “The Turks… 
conceive they cannot plunder and oppress too much the inhabitants of a country 
towards which they feel no natural tie… and to whose complaints they uniformly turn 
a deaf ear!!!” The Ottoman cavalry sent by the Vizir to join the British army were 
described as “miscreants” and “inhuman barbarians”, who “scarcely passed through 
a village upon the Delta without plundering, murdering, in short committing all the 
most atrocious and horrible crimes that one could only think the greatest savages 
capable of”. One officer described the Ottomans’ method of extorting the inhabitants: 
“You cannot conceive how the private soldiers as well as others, knock about the poor 
Arabs, force them to sell their goods… at the price they think fit, as bastinado the 
unfortunate fellows if they look discontent.”136 The rough treatment the Egyptians 
endured at the hands of the Ottomans was nonsensical to the British army. The 
inhabitants had sternly resisted the French occupation, and did not oppose the 
Ottoman advance. Robert Wilson argued that Ottoman officers, if not in collusion 
with these acts of oppression, were powerless to prevent such excesses. One officer’s 
attempts to discipline his men resulted in him being “hooted at, and obliged to 
desist”.137 Such an anecdote demonstrates that the British mistakenly thought the 
Ottoman hierarchy of command had broken down.  
 
After witnessing acts of Ottoman violence, British servicemen frequently expressed 
concern about leaving Ottomans in control of Egypt upon the conclusion of the 
campaign.  
 
…if the Ancient Govt. is to be destroyed by our means, 
it is hardly justice in us to place the Inhabitants under a 
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worse form of Govt. – it should be well weighed, now 
we have a footing in the Country, how it should be 
disposed of – and if it should be the Intention to leave 
the Turks in possession: the Inhabitants should not have 
it to say that we were the occasion of their miseries & 
the plunder of their homes  - the french brought us here, 
and we should not in honor abandon this Country to be 
ravaged by an unfeeling Turk.138 
 
This British resentment of Ottoman conduct in Egypt was not only motivated by moral 
outrage. The oppression of the Egyptian inhabitants posed practical problems to the 
British, as Hutchinson recognized: 
 
I perceive that their troops… will commit all kinds of 
horrors, and I am sure I do not know how to prevent 
them. There is a choice of difficulties – we must have 
either the Turks or the Inhabitants for our enemies, if 
we interfere with the Turks it will certainly indispose 
them against us, if we do not, the natives will soon be 
as little inclined to us as they already are to the 
French…. If [the Ottomans] do not establish some 
regular system of policy which can hardly be hoped for, 
after having done infinite mischief to the country they 
will be expelled again.139 
 
It was in Britain’s interest to maintain amicable relations with the Egyptians, which it 
was hoped would provide a base for a strong administration once the British left 
Egypt.140 Ottoman conduct towards the Egyptians obstructed this goal and had the 
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potential to incite the inhabitants against them. Should the Ottomans be left in power 
as planned, most soldiers reasoned that their administration would be weak and 
unsustainable, due to the animosity they provoked amongst the inhabitants. They 
would not be able to resist another attempt by the French to occupy the country.141  
 
Throughout the campaign, particular disgust in the British army was reserved for the 
Ottoman practice of collecting the severed heads of French soldiers as trophies. The 
heads were often “carried with a triumphant insolence to the Turkish camp, where 
they were laid before the tent of the Capitan Pacha; here they were insulted by every 
Turk that passed, who kicked them, spit upon them, or made a stroke of a sabre at 
them...”142 Benjamin Miller, an artillery gunner, witnessed one such scene: “It was 
horrid to see the savage Turks come into the camp with the poor Frenchmen’s heads 
tied together by the hair and thrown across the saddle, and one or two in each hand 
streaming with blood.”143 Seeing the collected heads was disturbing enough, but, as 
Sergeant Robertson wrote, witnessing the act of decapitation was “most horrifying”: 
 
Two French soldiers, who had fallen in the rear, either 
by fatigue or sickness, were overtaken by some Turks, 
who had been hovering about the retreating army like 
so many vultures. That they might get their penchant 
for cruelty fully indulged, and to protract the agonies of 
their victims, they had been cutting off their heads by 
the back of the neck with their sabres and long knives, 
….When we came up and perceived the barbarous work 
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in which they had been engaged, we soon put an end to 
it; but it was too late to save the lives of the poor 
Frenchmen….144 
 
Robertson’s use of language to describe the Ottomans as “vultures” with a “penchant 
for cruelty” highlights the perceived inhumanity of their actions, and there is a little 
indication they were an allied party. It is important to note the timing of these anti-
Ottoman publications is significant. Most were published in the two years following 
the Egyptian campaign, when British-Ottoman relations were poor. Following the 
conclusion of the campaign in Egypt, Ottoman foreign policy undertook an about-
face as they re-established close relations with France. Britain did not cooperate with 
the Ottomans in any further operations throughout the Napoleonic Wars. Anglo-
Ottoman relations continued to decline until hostilities broke out from 1807-9. These 
events provided little reason for British soldiers to write favourably of their former 
allies in the years following the Napoleonic Wars.145  
 
Another reason for opposition to the massacres of Frenchmen was the several British 
deaths that resulted from it, supposedly the victims of mistaken identity. Once the 
British captured Rahmanieh in May, a store of French clothing was discovered. Such 
a find was gratefully received, for the soldiers’ uniforms had become dreadfully worn 
after months of fighting. The new clothing resulted in a drastic change in appearance 
among some of the men, attired in French blue rather than British scarlet. Tragically, 
this “cost several men their lives…. for the Turks saw some of them straggling and 
took them for French soldiers…”146 Further altercations between British and Ottoman 
soldiers occurred as the allies converged on Cairo. Such episodes might have been the 
result of the reward offered for severed heads. There was little physical difference 
between British and French soldiers, and isolated, unsuspecting redcoats could have 
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seemed a more convenient target.147 Whatever the cause, Hutchinson’s response 
conveyed his displeasure. Benjamin Miller wrote: 
 
Our General made complaint to the Basham [Capitan 
Pasha] and told him if he did not cause the Turks to 
desist from their barbarous treatment to the British 
soldiers, that all the influence he had with them would 
not prevent the whole British army from turning against 
the Turks and destroy[ing] them all.148 
 
At the time this threat was made, the British were heavily reliant on the Ottomans to 
make up the numbers for the anticipated assault on Cairo. Although Hutchinson had 
a reputation as an unlikeable, cantankerous character, his forceful complaint to the 
Pasha demonstrates the extent to which the British resented the Ottomans’ seeming 
penchant for violence. Had relations between the Ottoman and British commanders 
been damaged by this protestation, it could have jeopardized the campaign.149  
 
One may argue there is an element of hypocrisy in British criticism of Ottoman 
conduct in Egypt; British troops were also guilty of roughly treating Egyptians, 
particularly when short of provisions.150 The soldiers took or destroyed much of the 
local produce as they marched through and camped in fields of corn, tobacco, melons, 
and poppies. There were also “many instances of petty depredations and pilfering”. 
The Arabs who sold their produce at the Arabian market in the British camp had “their 
articles taken from them by ‘fellows of the baser sort,’ without any payment, and 
sometimes with abuse into the bargain.”151 In addition, the prodigious resentment of 
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Ottoman head collecting is puzzling when one considers that these atrocities were not 
that different from the conventional legal punishments imposed on felons in Britain. 
David Tyrie, the last treason convict to be hung, drawn and quartered in 1782, was 
still in recent memory.152 Head collecting is slightly different from execution by 
beheading, but the two practices illustrate a comparable tolerance for spectacular 
physical violence. Between 1752 and 1832, judges could order that a murderer not 
only be hanged, but that the body be given afterwards to surgeons for dissection. One 
of the ways in which hospitals and medical schools could supplement their incomes 
was by selling souvenirs from the dissected remains. The tanned skin of executed 
murderers was used to bind commemorative pocket books or court proceedings, and 
there was a disturbingly high demand for such mementoes.153  Moreover, in Britain 
there was occasionally a distinct lack of regard for the bodies of the deceased, 
particularly those of the lower classes, and lower ranked soldiers. Officers killed in 
action were buried with honours according to their rank, but the bodies of common 
rankers were buried with little or no ceremony in mass graves, or even left where they 
lay. The bones of the men and horses left on the battlefield at Waterloo were treated 
like some sort of industrial by-product: they were collected by English contractors, 
who had them ground down into fertilizer and sold to farmers in the north of 
England.154  
 
Although the sanctity of the human body was not rigorously enforced in Britain, 
British soldiers of the French Revolutionary Wars regarded the defilement of enemy 
corpses as a practice that belonged to an uncivilized, non-European society.155 The 
soldiers were able to adopt this stance because Europeans had developed a view of 
themselves as conducting civilized and humane wars, by virtue of their character as a 
civilized people. However, the obedience of European armies to civilized conventions 
of war was conditional. States reserved the right to carry out reprisals if their 
opponents did not abide by these conventions. If one side mistreated prisoners of war, 
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the other could legitimately retaliate with transgressions of its own. This unspoken 
code of conduct provided European nations with the pretext to adopt more severe 
methods when fighting non-European enemies, who, it was assumed, did not adhere 
to European laws and customs of war. According to Simon Harrison, such crimes 
carried out by European military personal were almost exclusively against enemies 
who were perceived to belong to a different race. Although it was permissible and 
often deemed necessary to kill enemies who were of the same race, it was not 
acceptable to mutilate the bodies of these people. Heads or other body parts could 
only legitimately be taken from enemies who were socially and geographically 
remote, and classified as sub-human or semi-human. During the Seven Years War and 
the American War of Independence, British soldiers fought Native American Indians, 
who employed irregular tactics that were alien to European soldiers. As a 
consequence, it became permissible or even necessary, when fighting “savage” 
enemies, to adopt their methods, imitating the savagery imputed to them and 
reciprocating it. Civilized behaviour towards opponents was only deemed feasible 
when fighting armies of the same type as one’s own.156 If one accepts this argument, 
the British could have interpreted the decapitation of Frenchmen as a demonstration 
of Ottoman feelings of superiority over Europeans. Given Britain’s own sense of pre-
eminence, this would have been a cause of irritation. Moreover, such an argument 
provided an excuse for French atrocities during their occupation of Egypt. One could 
argue that the French were merely adopting the uncivilized tactics of those they fought 
when Napoleon ordered the massacre of Ottoman prisoners at Jaffa.  
 
One incident which seemingly confirmed British beliefs in the uncivilized nature of 
the Ottomans occurred on 22 October 1801. The Mamluk Beys, the de facto rulers of 
Egypt prior to the French invasion, were invited on board the Capitan Pasha’s 
flagship, anchored in Aboukir Bay, to negotiate a settlement on the government of 
Egypt. The Mamluks suspected a trap; they knew that the Ottomans longed to be rid 
of them as political rivals to the control of Egypt. They appealed to the British, who 
provided escorts to ensure their safety. However, when the Mamluks met the Ottoman 
ferrymen who would take them to the Pasha, it was explained that the British could 
not accompany them. At length, the Mamluks complied, convinced by the Pasha’s 
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pledge of safety and security. Their trust was misplaced. While being ferried to 
Pasha’s ship, the Mamluks were fired on by Ottoman gunboats. Nearly all in the 
Mamluk party were killed, and those wounded were taken prisoner. Within a few 
days, the Grand Vizir had arrested a large proportion of the remaining Mamluks at 
Cairo.157 It is uncertain whether the Ottomans had intended to murder the Mamluks. 
In Robert Wilson’s opinion, “if the massacre of them had been predetermined on, the 
Pacha and the Grand Vizir would assuredly have at once executed all within their 
power.”158 It was beyond doubt however, that some form of coercive measure had 
been planned. 
 
According to Edward Ingram, in his series of articles on the geopolitics of the 
Egyptian campaign, this sequence of events illustrates the misunderstandings that 
arise between allied states with conflicting interests. General Hutchinson thought that 
the Ottomans had given him assurances about the safety of the Mamluks.159 
Meanwhile, the Ottomans affirmed that the British had promised to assist them in 
recovering the government of Egypt, an agreement which they assumed gave them 
the freedom to deal with the Mamluks. Seemingly unknown to the Ottomans, 
Hutchinson had promised the Mamluks British protection. This left Hutchinson in a 
difficult position:  
 
Never was a General in a more embarrassing situation 
than that of the Commander in Chief… General 
Hutchinson had frequently witnessed the cruelty and 
cowardice of the Turkish Army, and he had received 
essential services from the Beys & Mamelouks. He had 
moreover solemnly pledged himself to protect them. If 
he abandoned these chiefs to the mercy of their… 
enemies he forfeited his word;…. and yet if he 
                                                        
157 Diary of Captain C. Fitzmaurice Hill, The British Library (BL) MSS Eur D108, pp.134-136, 139; 
James J. Auchimuty, ‘Lachlan Macquarrie and the Anglo-Indian Expedition to Egypt’, Egyptian Society 
of Historical Studies 2, (1952), 109-110, 130. See also: Wilson, History, 244-245. 
158 Wilson, History, 244.  
159 Ingram, ‘Geopolitics - occupation’, 330; Hutchinson to Hobart, 21 September 1801, War Office 
(WO), 1/345, pp.470-473.  
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prevented the Turks from prosecuting their odious plan, 
he would probably involve his Country in a War with 
the Ottoman Porte.160  
 
Although there was certainly an element of misunderstanding between allied parties 
here, there was also a sense of discomfort among many British observers, at what they 
deemed to be Ottoman deception. Lachlan Macquarie, the deputy adjutant-general to 
the Anglo-Indian army, wrote that the “massacre” of the Mamluks was “A most 
shocking and disgraceful Scene”, a “vile and infamous assassination… in the most 
treacherous, cruel and cowardly manner”.161 Likewise, Charles Hill was unequivocal 
in his condemnation: “the diabolical act… appears to have been planned and ordered 
to be put into execution by that disgrace to all courts, the Divan of Constantinople”. 
Hill was concerned that it would bring shame on the British, for “they will be sure to 
be implicated in the eyes of Europe, either as accessorys [sic] to this villainous 
murder, or as having designs of keeping the country themselves, in case they quarrel 
with the Turks for having commuted it.”162 The Capitan Pasha, previously described 
by Hutchinson as the “honourable exception” to Ottoman depravity, was labelled the 
primary culprit: 
 
Turkish Faith was pledged for their [the Mamluks’] 
safety and security. But the vile and cruel Capitan 
Pasha paid no regard to that faith, and took advantage 
of the credulity of these noble generous gallant men… 
It was certainly ordered by the cruel Captain Pasha… 
What a wretched cruel policy! – but it is all of a piece 
with the system of the weak and tyrannical Turkish 
Government for many years back – but more 
particularly in governing Egypt.163 
                                                        
160 Anon., Narrative of the Proceedings of the Forces that left Bengal in December 1800 to Egypt, 
National Army Museum, 68-07-223-1.  
161 Auchimuty, ‘Lachlan Macquarie’, 109-110. 
162 Hill Diary, 136-7.  
163 Auchimuty, ‘Lachlan Macquarie’, 109-110. 
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Hutchinson, having given the Mamluks his protection, was livid. He promptly 
marched a brigade over to Aboukir, surrounded the Pasha’s forces, and ordered 
Admiral Bickerton to anchor his fleet beside the Ottomans. According to Charles Hill, 
a stormy meeting between Hutchinson and the Ottoman admiral then took place.  
 
Nothing could surpass the rage of the British Genl…. 
He called him a villain, an assassin, a murderer, and by 
every infamous epithet that naturally swelled in his 
heart on this occasion,… he told the Pacha, that he was 
so infamous a scoundrel, that he would have nothing 
more to say to him than this ‘that if he did not 
immediately deliver over the persons of the Beys dead 
or alive, he would hang him at the head of his army, and 
put to death every man of them if anyone dare interfere 
with the execution’.164  
 
An anonymous narrative describes a similar series of events, claiming that “The 
General [Hutchinson] then acquainted the Captain Pacha that if the whole of the Beys 
were not given up in Ten Minutes, the British troops would attack his Camp & recover 
them by force.”165 Hutchinson dealt with the Grand Vizir in a similar manner. A few 
days after the massacre, he wrote to the Vizir “I have just heard with the greatest 
astonishment that notwithstanding your most sacred promises… [you are] obstinately 
persevering in a system of conduct which has already covered you with shame and 
opprobrium.”166 When the Vizir refused to release his captives, and had “the insolence 
to demand” that the British should hand over the beys living under their protection, 
Hutchinson insisted “that he should deliver up the Beys, or send him a declaration of 
war.”167  
                                                        
164 Hill Diary, 140-141; Bengal Narrative. See also: Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 81-92; 
Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, 232. 
165 Bengal Narrative.  
166 Quoted in ‘Geopolitics - occupation’, 330.  
167 Hill Diary, 144. 
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These were not mere threats; Hutchinson prepared his forces for hostilities with the 
Ottomans. Lachlan Macquarie recorded that  
 
Lieut. Colonel Lloyd, with the Detachment of the 86th 
Regt., embarked this day [27 October] for Giza to 
reinforce that garrison; and thereby enable Colonel 
Ramsey to enforce the demand lately made by Lt. Genl 
Sir Jho. Hutchinson to the Grand Vizier at Cairo to give 
up all the Beys & Mamalukes recently arrested and 
imprisoned by him at that place.168  
 
One officer presumed “that should the Grand Vizir refuse to give up the Chiefs he had 
confined at Cairo, the British Army would immediately march to the Capital.”169 The 
Anglo-Indian army received orders to be ready to move at the shortest notice. One 
officer wrote: “The troops who detested the Turks, were daily expecting orders to 
commence hostilities.”170 General Baird, with part of his force at Rosetta, fortified the 
ports in the town. Having seen the work, Charles Hill reported: “upon the least 
disturbance, I am convinced General Baird will spare none of them. It is needless to 
say with what detestation and contempt we all look upon a Turk.”171 At the same time, 
Lt-Col. Harness was ordered to take possession of Fort Julien, a few miles north-east 
of Rosetta, in the “view of the probable rupture with the Turkish Government on 
account of the assassination of the Beys – an action of so much wanton barbarity and 
atrocity loudly calls for reparation and vengeance!”172 
  
The Vizir eventually released the Mamluks, and Anglo-Ottoman tensions died down; 
by December, Charles Hill wrote: that “every thing in regard to them has blown 
over”.173 Yet this series of events epitomized the problems experienced with the 
                                                        
168 Auchimuty, ‘Lachlan Macquarie’, 110.  
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Ottomans throughout the campaign. British soldiers were tired of the Ottomans, and 
looked forward to leaving Egypt. Hill wrote  
 
God send us out of this disgraceful country! For I really 
believe there is not a man, not a man upon the face of 
the Earth, however abominable, bloody, and 
treacherous but a Turk is capable of and does commit 
whatever he has it in his power so to do – The Devil 
take them all.174 
 
In a private letter to his sister in law dated 28 February 1802, Lachlan Macquarie 
expressed himself forcibly on the desire of the army to evacuate Egypt, especially 
owing to the methods of government and of warfare adopted by their Turkish allies. 
“We now daily hope to receive the happy tidings (of a definite Peace Treaty) and at 
the same time for us to evacuate this evil country – of which we are all most heartily 
tired.”175  
 
British and French cultural identification 
Perhaps because of their opposition to Ottoman methods of war and conduct of rule 
in Egypt, British military personnel developed a closer cultural affinity with French 
soldiers during their time in Egypt. Despite having waged war on one another for a 
total of fifty-five years in the eighteenth century, British and French soldiers shared 
common cultural assumptions, which probably played a part in the British criticism 
of the executions of Frenchmen. Both were organized and clothed in similar ways, 
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lived under similar conditions, and shared similar conventions of warfare.176 
Consequently, both armies recognized the legitimacy of their opponents, and treated 
prisoners fairly. As Catriona Kennedy has argued, this indicates that although the 
shared code of civilized conduct came under severe pressure during the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic wars, it remained largely in place.177 This shared code of conduct 
complicates David Bell’s arguments in The First Total War. He asserts that the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars witnessed a transformation of the nature of war, 
from a limited mode of warfare of the eighteenth century, into a state of ‘total war’, 
whereby all of society’s resources – its economy, culture and people – were mobilized. 
Bell claims these wars saw the breakdown of traditional transnational codes of honour 
that had characterized the wars of the ancien regime.178 Although the enmity between 
Britain and France could be easily sustained on opposite sides of the channel, the 
narratives of the soldiers in Egypt demonstrate this was more difficult to maintain 
when fighting in an unfamiliar land inhabited by non-European people. The 
associations British and French soldiers formed with one another also suggests that 
Britons were not always culturally opposed to the French Catholic ‘other’ during the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, as Linda Colley has argued.179 
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The sense of a shared identity and code of civilized conduct between the British and 
French is apparent in a series of remarkable events during the siege of Acre in 1799. 
Before the hostilities got under way, Napoleon sent a request for an exchange of 
prisoners to Sidney Smith, commander of the British detachment of marines assisting 
the Ottoman defenders. Smith agreed, and in a chivalric act characteristic of his 
persona, he informed Napoleon that he had retained one French officer, Delasalle, 
who Smith had found in the dungeons of Acre, badly beaten. Smith told Napoleon he 
had removed Delasalle from Acre to his ship, adding,  
 
It would be much better not to complain to Djezzar [the 
Pasha of Acre] about his mistreatment, for this would 
merely remind him of the matter, and make him wish 
to lay hands on him once more, given the present 
antagonism which Djezzar and the Turkish have 
towards the French.180  
 
Smith undoubtedly saved Delasalle’s life. The governor of Acre, Ahmed Pasha, better 
known as “Al-Jezzar” (The Butcher), would have certainly ordered the Frenchman’s 
death. Jezzar had acquired a well-deserved reputation for cruelty, ruthlessness and 
violent Francophobia.181 After the initial French assault, he ordered all French 
prisoners in his dungeons strangled. The French were grateful for Smith’s compassion 
amidst increasingly savage siege warfare, and reciprocated. During a sortie against 
the French lines, some 60 British marines were killed or wounded. As Napoleon 
recalled in his memoirs, “The wounded Englishmen were looked after as if they were 
French, and these prisoners camped in the midst of our army as if they were from 
Normandy or Picardy; the rivalry of the two nations had disappeared at this great 
distance from their homeland amidst such barbaric people.” For Paul Strathern, in his 
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narrative history of Napoleon’s Egyptian campaigns, these chivalric exchanges 
suggest that the war in the Levant, for the French at least, was interpreted as a war 
waged between Europeans and people of the Levant.182 
 
These sentiments of cultural affinity with the French were shared by members of the 
naval blockade squadron at Alexandria. On 2 September 1798, HMS Emerald, a 36-
gun frigate, with the larger Swiftsure in close support, gave chase to a small French 
cutter, L’Anemone of 6 guns and 70 men. Cooper Williams and John Lee watched the 
events unfold on board the Swiftsure. To prevent capture, L’Anemone grounded on 
the shore a few miles west of Alexandria. This proved a fatal mistake, as “an armed 
body of Arabs” appeared on the coast, and approached the wreckage of the French 
cutter. From the wild gestures and signs made by the French sailors towards the 
British, the crew of the Swiftsure concluded that the Frenchmen would meet a grisly 
end if left ashore. Boats were swiftly dispatched to retrieve the hapless Frenchmen, 
and the atmosphere on board the Swiftsure grew tense, as Lee described.  
 
It was announced to our young Mid. that the only fresh 
meat dinner that could for a long time be expected was 
ready; but although some went below, our young 
sailor’s anxiety, to see the fate of these poor 
Frenchmen, far exceeded the desire to partake of the 
last fresh meat meal that was for some months to be 
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enjoyed; and he therefore remained on deck, to witness 
the result of this distressing occurrence.183  
 
What is remarkable about this episode was the substantial efforts made by the British 
to save as many Frenchmen as possible from the Arabs. Both Williams and Lee 
recalled the extraordinary actions of a midshipman from the Emerald, who, having 
tied a rope around his waist, threw himself overboard and swam ashore. He instructed 
as many Frenchmen as he could to grab the rope and make for the frigate, and by this 
method saved the captain of the cutter and four of his crew. Others were hauled off 
through the surf by boats, yet only a minority were saved; the Arabs had captured the 
majority before the British arrived ashore. Williams recalled what happened next: 
“We perceived that the officers and men suffered themselves to be stripped without 
resistance. Many were murdered in cold blood, and apparently without any 
cause…”184 
 
Three years later, the chivalrous treatment of French soldiers continued in the 
Egyptian campaign. General Hutchinson angrily protested the execution of 
Frenchmen to the Capitan Pasha, who ordered his soldiers to take prisoners alive and 
“they should have 6 dollars instead of 5.”  This had seemingly little impact on the 
number of decapitations, as it was traditional (and perhaps more practical) for the 
Ottomans to collect heads of their enemies for payment.185 On occasion, British 
officers took matters into their own hands. According to Benjamin Miller, “our 
general” upon seeing “a Turk going to kill some poor wounded Frenchmen… ordered 
one of our Dragoons to go and cut him down”.186  
 
Amiable though such sentiments may have been, Paul Strathern suggests that this 
chivalrous treatment of enemy European soldiers exposes the unthinking racism of 
the period. Europeans saw themselves as superior; they were worthy of such 
treatment, and were capable of appreciating such marks of civilization amidst the 
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carnage of war. No such sentiments were extended towards the Ottoman army. It was 
assumed that the Ottomans did not share or respect the unspoken codes of honour that 
existed between British and French soldiers.187 Moreover, the associations British and 
French soldiers formed with one another demonstrates that their perceptions of Near-
Eastern peoples can be treated collectively, as part of a wider European view. This 
sense of a European awareness was far from the modern form, and was generally 
limited to the more powerful western European nations. As Victor Kiernan argues, 
Europeans of ‘superior’ countries thought of ‘inferior’ Europeans and non-Europeans 
in very similar terms. The Czechs, the Spanish and the Italians, were all at one time 
or another regarded as backward, inferior and little different from non-Europeans.188  
 
Conclusion 
When the British soldiers and sailors left Egypt, their verdict on the Ottomans was 
very similar to prominent civilian travel authors who had written on this subject. Both 
civilian and military authors regarded Ottoman society as inferior and corrupt, yet the 
way in which military personnel reached this conclusion differed considerably from 
their civilian counterparts. Martial characteristics and performance in combat were 
vital elements in British servicemen’s appraisals of the Ottomans. The alleged warlike 
nature and appearance of the Ottomans was one of the only elements praised by 
British soldiers, and it provided a basis from which observers could critique various 
elements of British society. However, there was considerable disappointment at the 
thought that this martial potential was going to waste in the Ottomans’ degraded 
society. Some of the problems the British encountered with the Ottomans were typical 
of military alliances throughout this period, but many were not. Within British 
servicemen’s writings, there is a strong sense of a divide between British and Ottoman 
methods of warfare. The lack of distinctive ‘western’ features in the Ottoman army 
meant that the Ottomans were seen in a poor light despite the success of the campaign. 
This divide focused on discipline and organization: the chaotic masses of the Ottoman 
military were thought to be totally inferior to the disciplined, mechanical ranks of the 
British army. Ottoman individuals known to have tried to westernize their forces, such 
as the Capitan Pasha, were seen in more positive terms, but the British were blind to 
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many of the improvements the Ottomans had made, such as the introduction of the 
Nizâm-ı Cedid. Most significantly, the British failed to appreciate the differences in 
the Ottoman system of military command. There was no permanent Ottoman standing 
army; the government’s preference for the temporary recruitment of militias gave it a 
greater flexibility to respond against threats, but at the expense of the discipline and 
organization familiar to the British. Unaware of this fundamental difference, British 
soldiers evaluated the Ottomans based on the principles of their own military system.  
 
A second dividing factor was the level of violence in Ottoman society. Through the 
plundering of the Egyptians, the execution of Frenchmen, and the attempt to trap and 
destroy the Mamluk Beys, Ottoman conduct in war came to be seen by the British as 
uncivilized and savage. By contrast, British, or European, methods of war were more 
refined, restrained and bound by unofficial conventions. Again, such a view derived 
from the British soldiers’ failure to understand how the Ottoman army was organized. 
Plunder and the collection of heads and other body parts were the primary ways by 
which Ottoman soldiers were paid. These men were not motivated primarily by 
bloodlust as the British thought, but by a need for money. In opposing the excesses of 
Ottoman violence, the British developed a stronger cultural affinity with the French. 
Although at war with one another, the British and French prided themselves on 
exchanging acts of charity and civility. They did not consider themselves deserving 
of the savage treatment which the French prisoners had endured at the hands of the 
Ottomans and Egyptians during their occupation of Egypt. This suggests that the 
British military were not always culturally opposed to the French Catholic ‘other’, as 
Linda Colley has asserted. One could even argue for the existence of a wider European 
identity, which saw itself as superior to other non-European peoples.
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5.  
A “generous” but “cruel” race: British 
military perceptions of the Mamluks in 
Egypt 
 
 
The Mamalukes are a brave and generous race, but are 
cruel and revengeful.1 
 
This comment, written by Captain Thomas Walsh in his Journal of the Late Campaign 
in Egypt presents an apparent contradiction. It makes little sense to refer to the 
Mamluks, the former rulers of Egypt, as both generous and cruel within the same 
sentence, but Walsh’s view was not an anomaly. He encapsulates the opinion of 
British servicemen towards the Mamluks during their time in Egypt. This seemingly 
paradoxical view is only present in the writings of military personnel, and this chapter 
will explain how and why these soldiers and sailors arrived at this judgement. It 
derived largely from the two dominant influences on their writing; the first of which 
was the negative stereotypes associating the Mamluks with despotism and 
effeminacy, which was prominent in civilian accounts of Egypt published before the 
1801 campaign. The second was the Mamluks’ warrior image. Their appearance, and 
the skill with which the Mamluks controlled their horses and wielded their weapons, 
gave them a formidable reputation as a body of cavalry, at a time when the British 
were in desperately short supply of this resource. Much like its predecessor, this 
chapter will shed some light on the unique and distinctive ways in which military 
servicemen imagined and judged other peoples and cultures. It will provide an 
                                                        
1 Thomas Walsh, Journal of the Late Campaign in Egypt: Including Descriptions of that Country, and of 
Gibraltar, Minorca, Malta, Marmorice and Macri (London: 1803), 172. There are several alternative 
spellings of ‘Mamluk’. I have employed the most commonly accepted variation: ‘Mamluk’. The different 
spellings within contemporary quotations have not been altered.  
 267 
examination of western perceptions of Mamluk warfare at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, a period often overlooked by scholars of military orientalism.  
 
First however, it is necessary to explain who exactly the Mamluks were. Egypt had 
been effectively under their control prior to the French invasion in 1798. The word 
Mamluk signifies “slave” or “bought man” in Arabic; in this case the latter is closer 
to reality as the Mamluks were not slaves in the ordinary meaning of the term. The 
Mamluks first appeared in Egypt in about 1230, when the Ayyubite Sultan Al-Malik 
purchased 12,000 youths from the Caucasus to form the elite corps of his army. Within 
twenty years, the Mamluks had moulded themselves into a formidable fighting force 
and, after murdering Al-Malik’s successor, established their own dynasty in Egypt.2 
The Mamluks organized themselves as a military caste of warriors, who replenished 
their numbers, which fluctuated between 10,000 and 12,000, by purchasing boys from 
the Caucasus, usually of Georgian, Circassian or Armenian origin, from remote 
mountain villages who had little contact with civilization. These boys were commonly 
eight to ten years old, and were immediately subjected to a fierce disciplinary regime 
aimed at instilling warrior virtues. Once a young Mamluk received a military 
command, he became a free man. It was these men who formed the Mamluk 
aristocracy, and they looked down contemptuously on those they ruled. There was 
very little miscegenation; the Mamluks only took wives of Caucasus origin, 
specifically imported for the purpose. These marriages seldom produced children, 
owing to high infant mortality and the almost universal practice of Mamluk wives 
aborting their pregnancies in order to preserve, so they believed, their youth and 
beauty. Hence the Mamluks remained totally reliant on the importation of youths.3 
 
In their official capacity, the Mamluks were vassals of the Ottoman Empire after the 
conquest of Egypt in 1517. However, in the following centuries, the Mamluks had 
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informally re-established their rule over the country at the expense of the Ottoman 
pasha, but had refrained from declaring independence. Preoccupied with defending 
its borders against the Austrians and the Russians, the Ottoman government had no 
cause for interference as long as there was a semblance of peace and the tribute was 
regularly paid. By the end of the eighteenth century this had degenerated into a farcical 
situation whereby the pasha had no real authority and remained under virtual house 
arrest. Should the pasha attempt to interfere with this arrangement, the Mamluks 
would request the Porte to send a replacement, and one would duly be sent.4 
 
The Mamluks’ constant and relentless combat training from childhood produced 
warriors who were wonderfully gifted in hand-to-hand fighting and horsemanship, yet 
these men had little knowledge of, or interest in, the means by which Egypt was 
governed. They enjoyed luxurious splendour, living off the extortionate taxes they 
levied on the fellahin, the local peasantry, which often amounted to three fifths of the 
produce. The regime they maintained kept the population downtrodden and allowed 
little economic or cultural development. Under Mamluk rule there was no provision 
for saving water or maintaining the irrigation canals upon which the agriculture 
depended. After a series of low yearly floodwaters in the Nile delta, hunger and 
epidemic became frequent occurrences. Decreases in the population left swathes of 
land in the countryside unworked, which would produce no crops for the following 
seasons.5 The Mamluks kept themselves occupied with constant infighting, as they 
overthrew one another in a succession of revolutions. With the focus largely on 
political scheming, the territory outside a bey’s immediate domain was of little 
interest to him, which meant that the fierce roaming Bedouin tribesmen had free rein 
over the extensive wilderness and desert regions of the country, hindering the 
development of trade.6 Defeat by the French at the Battle of the Pyramids on 21 July 
1798 effectively ended Mamluk control of Egypt. The Mamluks were reduced to 
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groups of nomadic cavalry, which continued to harass French troops until they allied 
with the British expeditionary force in 1801.    
 
Images of Mamluk despotism  
The Mamluks’ mode of rule prior to the French invasion led authors of contemporary 
civilian travel literature to associate them with oriental stereotypes, many of which 
had been inspired by Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws. John Antes, John Remmey and 
the French writers the Comte de Volney and Claude-Étienne Savary all denounced 
Mamluk rule, emphasizing its cruelty, depravity, effeminacy and despotism.7 Volney, 
perhaps the most popular travel writer to Egypt in the eighteenth century, was 
particularly severe in his criticism:  
 
Ignorant and superstitious from education, they become 
ferocious from the murders they commit, perfidious 
from frequent cabals, seditious from tumults, and base, 
deceitful, and corrupted by every species of 
debauchery…. Their only employment is to procure 
money; and the method considered as the most simple, 
is to seize it wherever it is to be found, to wrest it by 
violence from its possessor, and to impose arbitrary 
contributions every moment on the villages...8 
 
Due to the popularity of Levant-based travel books, and the keen interest military men 
displayed in this literature, it is unsurprising that British servicemen could be heavily 
critical of the Mamluks. According to Captain Thomas Walsh, the taxes levied by the 
Mamluks “often oblige the Fellahs [peasantry] to abandon their houses, and take 
refuge among the inhabitants of the Desert. Numerous villages, totally deserted, are 
                                                        
7 See: John Antes, Observations on the Manners and Customs of the Egyptians (London: 1800); 
W.G. Browne, Travels in Africa, Egypt, and Syria, from the year 1792 to 1798, sec edn (London: 
1806); John Remmey, An Account of the Present State of Egypt (New York: 1799); Constantin-
François Volney, Travels through Syria and Egypt, in the years 1783, 1784, and 1785 (London: 
1787), 2 vols; Claude Étienne Savary, Letters on Egypt (London: 1787), 2 vols. 
8 Volney, Travels, vol. 1, 185-187.  
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seen all over Egypt; sad examples of these vexations.”9 Major Francis Maule wrote, 
“Their despotism and tyranny were so dreaded by the Egyptians, that, in the first 
instance, they hailed the advance of the French army, and were happy at the defeat of 
the Mamelouks.”10  
 
Perhaps the most vehement critic of the Mamluks among the British forces in 1801 
was George Baldwin, who had served as the British consul in Egypt, from 1786-98. 
Although not a military man, Baldwin’s experience of Egypt and his fluency in Arabic 
made him an invaluable asset to the expedition. He advised Ralph Abercromby on 
topographical matters, and, shortly after the landing, was made responsible for the 
requisitioning of provisions from the local population, and the management of the 
Arabian market that was established at the British camp.11 Baldwin wrote extensively 
about the Mamluks in Egypt, strongly associating their rule with cruelty and 
despotism. A selection of letters and essays written about Egypt can be found in his 
Political Recollections Relative to Egypt, published on his return to Britain in late 
1801. His work is easily one of the most detailed sources available in English on the 
Mamluk government prior to the French occupation. In it, Baldwin described the 
Mamluks as: 
 
a set of swineherds, vagabonds, any thing; kidnapped 
in the mountains of Mingrelia, Circassia, Georgia, and 
brought young into Egypt; sold, circumcised, and 
trained to the career of glory; their road to honour, 
apostacy; their title to power, assassination and a 
contempt of death: no stability, no order, no character 
                                                        
9 Walsh, Journal, 273. See also: Lieut. Aeneas Anderson, A Journal of the Forces Which sailed from the 
Downs, in April 1800… (London: 1802), 454.  
10 Major Francis Maule, Memoirs of the Principal Events in the Campaigns of North Holland and Egypt; 
Together with a Brief Description of the Islands of Crete, Rhodes, Syracuse, Minorca, and the Voyage in 
the Mediterranean (London: 1816), 121-122.   
11 James Mew, ‘Baldwin, George (1744–1826)’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Accessed 25 May 2015, 
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among them, but a constant thirst and jealousy of 
command.12 
 
One of the most interesting documents within Baldwin’s Recollections is 
‘Speculations on the resources of Egypt’, a memorandum written between 1773 and 
1785 on the request of the India Board. In it, Baldwin wrote of the constant infighting 
among rival Mamluks, which, encouraged by the Ottoman Pasha resident in Egypt, 
had brought about political and economic decay.  
 
Hence the perpetual commotions in the government of 
Egypt…. hence the continual fluctuation in the tide of 
power; hence the security and affection of the state…. 
Ever since the establishment of this incongruous 
government, these have been the invariable effects of 
it. The Pasha inciting disorders and conspiracies among 
the Beys; the Beys expelling the Pasha in return, and 
the government subsisting inviolate in the midst of it.13 
 
One of the major allegations made against the Mamluks was their ignorance of the 
ways of governing. Such a fault, it was supposed, derived from their upbringing which 
focused on military training to the exclusion of all else.14 Unable to read, “they are 
consequently obliged to leave their interest in the hands of the people.” Each Mamluk 
employed administrators to tender to their regions but there was no communication 
or cooperation between these groups. Without this the Egyptian economy could not 
properly develop.15 Hence, the limited education of the Mamluks seemed to hinder 
the progress of Egyptian society, a state of affairs which exasperated Baldwin. During 
the 1790s, many foreign consuls left the country, weary of the continued economic 
                                                        
12 George Baldwin, Political Recollections Relative to Egypt, with a Narrative of the Ever-Memorable 
British Campaign in the spring of 1801 (London: 1802), 188-189. 
13 Ibid., 189-90.  
14 Ghorbal, Egyptian Question, 2; Herold, Bonaparte in Egypt, 8. 
15 Anderson, Journal, 455. 
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and social decay. Baldwin left in March 1798, and reflecting on Egypt after his 
departure, he wrote:  
 
I do not conceive that Egypt can be much longer tenable 
by the Franks [Europeans] owing to the excessive 
tyranny of [the Mamluk ruler] Murad Bey who latterly 
had given them to understand… that Capitulations 
mean nothing to him, and that he shall extract and 
extract, as in fact he has done, without respect to 
anyone. The same spirit invades the whole body of the 
Mamluks.16  
 
Criticism of ignorance, or lack of education, was a popular topic of discussion 
throughout the eighteenth century, but it is significant that these ideas were expressed 
in the British army, where signature literacy in some regiments was as low as forty 
per cent.17 Baldwin’s view arises from a fundamental misunderstanding of Mamluk 
society. A ‘western’ style of rule was of far less use to the Mamluks in a country 
where displays of force were the traditional pathway to, and maintenance of, power. 
The political situation in Egypt made the constant use of force seem a legitimate mode 
of rule. The Ottoman pasha of Egypt remained technically at the head of the 
administration of the country, but his power had long since eroded. Real authority was 
divided between the Mamluk Shaykh-al-Balad (Governor of Cairo) and the Mamluk 
Amir-al-Hajj (leader of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, but effectively the 
commander of the army). In the 1790s, Ibrahim and Murad Bey occupied these two 
positions, and both constantly vied for ascendency over each other. The infighting 
between these men and their followers dominated Mamluk rule and prevented either 
                                                        
16 George Baldwin to Spencer Smith, 19 April 1798, F.O. Turkey 31, quoted in Marlowe, Anglo-
Egyptian Relations, 12; Ghorbal, Egyptian Question, 2; Mew, ‘Baldwin, George’. 
17 Gavin Daly, The British Soldier in the Peninsular War: Encounters with Spain and Portugal, 1808-
1814 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 31.  See also: John E. Cookson, ‘Regimental Worlds: Interpreting the 
Experience of British Soldiers during the Napoleonic Wars,’ in Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: 
Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790-1820, ed.  Alan Forrest, 
Karen Hagemann and Jane Rendall (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), 23-42.  
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side from consolidating their power.18 Any sign of weakness, such as a relaxation of 
coercive measures, or a more liberal policy, could be capitalized upon by political 
rivals, or lead to attempts by the Ottomans to re-establish their authority.   
 
Apart from their cruelty and illiteracy, British servicemen commonly accused the 
Mamluks of effeminacy and depravity. This image was conveyed effectively by one 
staff officer, who wrote: 
 
You will be surprised when I tell you that several 
French soldiers have deserted to the Mamelukes!!! 
How they can be so base, and so lost to manly feeling, 
I cannot conceive; for they subject themselves not only 
to everything that is humiliating, but disgraceful to 
human nature.19  
 
The use of the phrase “disgraceful to human nature” might refer to a suspicion of 
collusion between the French and the Mamluks over the future of Egypt. The French 
had a history of fraternizing with various factions that were in a position to potentially 
damage the British Empire. Two years previously, Britain had been alarmed by talk 
of an alliance between France and Tipu Sultan of Mysore. Fearing an attack on British 
India, forces of the East India Company declared war on Tipu, storming his fortress 
at Seringapatam and killing him. The officer was certainly concerned with what the 
French might have planned should they remain in Egypt, especially since the 
Mamluks had no hereditary succession:  
 
I should hope and believe that we will not suffer these 
[French] soldiers to remain in the country, for their stay 
would be replete with mischief, and indeed of the most 
serious kind: in truth there is no knowing what the 
extent of the evil would be; for, as any individual is 
                                                        
18 Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 7-12. 
19 Anon., A Non-Military Journal, or Observations made in Egypt by an Officer upon the Staff of the 
British Army (London: 1803), 82.  
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liable to become chief of the [Mamluk] Beys, why 
should not one of these intriguing Frenchmen, who 
possibly may be sent on purpose, gain such 
ascendency…. and not only incline them towards the 
French, but ensure their alliance and active assistance 
at any future period.20  
 
However, the language used by the officer in the letter – “humiliating”, “disgraceful” 
and the reference to “manly feeling” – is most probably an allusion to the popular 
suspicion that the Mamluks practiced homosexual acts, seen at the time as abhorrent 
to gentlemanly sensibilities. In this context, the officer’s shock that Frenchmen chose 
to join the Mamluks is more easily understood. References to homosexual acts among 
the Mamluks can be found in other memoirs: Thomas Walsh wrote that they were 
“addicted to the most detestable and unnatural crimes, which is extremely prevalent 
in parts of the Turkish empire.”21 Reflecting on the fall of the Mamluk government at 
the hands of the French, Robert Wilson wrote: “Nor should Europe lament their fall. 
The government of the Mamelukes was unnatural and oppressive” and “their habits 
and customs degrading to manhood.”22 Such accusations were not completely 
unfounded; there had been a prevalence of same-gender sex without moral censure in 
the Mamluk military system in medieval Egypt.23 However, the popular oriental 
stereotype employed by travel writers throughout the eighteenth century, that 
emphasized effeminacy and debauchery, was certainly exaggerated. It was a portrayal 
expressed both in writing and painting, and was not limited to British observers.24 
Volney, in his Travels, wrote that the Mamluks were: 
                                                        
20 Ibid.  
21 Walsh, Journal, 172.  
22 Robert Thomas Wilson, History of the British Expedition to Egypt; to which is subjoined a sketch of the 
present state of that country and its means of defence… (London: 1803), 246-247.  
23 Patricia Owens, ‘Torture, Sex and Military Orientalism’, Third World Quarterly 31, no.7 (2010): 
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24 One example of this representation in painting is Anne-Louis Girodet’s painting The revolt of 
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… above all, addicted to that abominable wickedness 
which was at all times the vice of the Greeks and of the 
Tartars, and is the first lesson they receive from their 
masters. It is difficult to account of this taste, when we 
consider that they all have women, unless we suppose 
they seek in one sex, that poignancy of refusal which 
they do not permit the other.25  
 
These comments on the inherent wickedness and debauchery of the Mamluks implied 
that colonial intervention in Egypt would be easily possible and beneficial for 
mankind. George Baldwin provides one of the best examples. In spite of the damage 
wrought by the Mamluks on the country, he asserted that Egypt’s pivotal position 
gave it enormous trading potential. In letters to senior officials in London, he made 
numerous sweeping statements that described the country as “a resort of all traders of 
the world”, and “a common centre of universal commerce.”26 A similar message was 
contained within a series of letters Baldwin wrote in autumn 1801 to Henry Dundas, 
and published in his Recollections.  
 
If Egypt could be improved in any proportion to the 
susceptibility of improvement, I would not hesitate to 
say that we might reckon upon a circulation of two 
thousand ships of commerce in one year from Egypt to 
the ports of England. Do we forget what Egypt was?... 
If it can be held to England, she may talk of jewels in 
her crown, but a brighter than this she will not 
possess.27  
 
                                                        
See: Todd Porterfield, The Allure of Empire, Art in the Service of French Imperialism 1798-1836 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 69.  
25 Volney, Travels, vol. 1, 185. 
26 Baldwin, Recollections, 8-9, 184; Mew, ‘Baldwin, George’. 
27 Baldwin, Recollections, 174-176. 
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One could argue that Baldwin’s grim appraisal of the Mamluks and his fanciful 
speculations on Egyptian trade were the rantings of a frustrated man. By 1801, when 
Baldwin’s Recollections were published, the former consul had much to be bitter 
about. Baldwin had first visited Egypt almost thirty years previously, to explore 
possible connections between India and Egypt via the Red Sea. He saw the country as 
an untapped centre of trade, ripe for exploitation. According to his own account, his 
initial investigation into a trade route promised great success.28 In 1774, under the 
auspices of the East India Company, Baldwin sought to establish trade with India and 
Britain, organizing schedules and quick turnarounds.  Between 1776 and 1778 the 
trade route blossomed, but prosperity was short lived. The success of Baldwin’s 
business competed with that of the Ottoman Empire, and the Sultan issued a firman 
forbidding the traffic of European ships via Suez. In May 1779 a caravan from Suez 
was attacked, some merchants died and others were imprisoned. European trade via 
Suez came to an abrupt halt. With his commercial venture in tatters, Baldwin set out 
for India, hoping to restore his fortunes, but was robbed and wounded by bandits on 
his journey and returned to England in 1780. Six years later he embarked for Egypt 
again, this time as Consul, but was unable to further any commercial ventures in the 
face of Mamluk opposition.29 Although much of Baldwin’s writing on Egypt may 
well have been an attempt to recoup his lost investments, the language he used, and 
the stubbornness with which he continued to assert his opinion, suggests he genuinely 
believed what he wrote. Irrespective of his motivations for writing, Baldwin’s 
portrayal of the Mamluks, and his conviction in the commercial potential of Egypt, 
provided an overt rationale for British colonial intervention. Other military personnel, 
such as Robert Wilson, who lacked Baldwin’s financial attachment to the country, 
also commented on the commercial promise of a pro-British government in Egypt. 
“Egypt would soon again recover by commerce considerable splendour, if a good 
government did but direct the resources… to what vast extent would it expand, when 
cherished and protected by the regulations of an adequate government.”30 
 
 
                                                        
28 Ibid., 3–4; Mew, ‘Baldwin, George’. 
29 Mew, ‘Baldwin, George’. 
30 Wilson, History, 234-235.  
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Martial images of the Mamluks 
Although the Mamluks were considered cruel, depraved and despotic by British 
military observers, an argument can be made that these negative stereotypes were 
highly conditional. They altered according to circumstances and military imperatives. 
Irrespective of their alleged personal character, there was a widespread British 
appreciation of the Mamluks’ contribution to the success of the Egyptian campaign. 
Their praise outweighed their negative assessment of the Mamluks, and this sets 
military writing apart from civilian travel authors. The differing perceptions of the 
Mamluks in military and civilian writing, reflect the unique conditions to which 
soldiers were subject on campaign. Before the Mamluks joined the British in June, 
the latter had been in desperate need of cavalry. They had hoped to obtain 1,200 
mounts before the campaign, but had only managed to acquire 450, all of which were 
small in size and not suitable for a cavalry charge.31 Even before losses during the 
campaign are considered, the British cavalry was severely limited.  
 
Aside from this, British cavalry at this point in the wars was largely inferior to that of 
the French. Standards of training and organization for both men and horses were poor;  
a regular system of manoeuvre was introduced in 1795, and standard sword exercises 
and trumpet calls the following year, but these were not directed to the requirements 
of active service. Even simple manoeuvres were made complex; for example, when a 
regiment in line changed its facing by pivoting on the central squadron, 35 verbal 
commands were required. Part of the reason for the lack of control in cavalry troops 
was the sacrifice of order for speed in training. As a consequence of this, British 
cavalrymen were generally less stable on their mounts than their continental rivals; 
many injuries and deaths were caused by falls and accidents in unexpected 
circumstances, even on ceremonial occasions. Moreover, unlike most continental 
armies, the British cavalry received no training in scouting and skirmishing before 
1805, and these vital skills had to be learned entirely on campaign. On the continent, 
cavalry were given specialized roles; heavy cavalry was deployed almost entirely in 
shock tactics, whereas outpost duties and scouting were reserved for light cavalry. 
Many British cavalry regiments failed to appreciate the significance of these 
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specialized roles: apart from their titles, there was no difference at all between the 
seven regiments of Dragoon Guards, and the six regiments of Dragoons. Generally, 
in the British army, both light and heavy cavalry were expected to undertake all 
cavalry roles. This lack of specialization harmed their efficiency and effectiveness.32 
 
The inexperience of cavalry troops added to these problems. The training for new 
cavalrymen was relatively short, and they required a period of active service before 
they could be considered proficient. Insufficient training was not the only failing; 
there were a high number of inadequate officers. Purchased commissions into cavalry 
regiments was popular, thus, before the system was reformed in 1802, twenty per cent 
of cavalry officers were under fifteen years of age. Some were simply unsuited to 
leadership. One of the most infamous examples was George ‘Beau’ Brummell, a 
crony of the Prince of Wales. He served in the Prince’s regiment, the 10th Light 
Dragoons, from 1795-8, and was so neglectful of his duty that he allegedly was unable 
to recognize his own troops.33  
 
Although the army reforms from 1795-1809 substantially improved the effectiveness 
of the cavalry, they continued to suffer from a lack of control and discipline.34 It was 
almost impossible for them to reform themselves to execute fresh orders after an 
attack had been made, and Wellington was acutely aware that his cavalry was a 
weapon that could only be used once in battle. At Waterloo, the Royal Scots Greys, 
after reinforcing the crumbling infantry line, famously charged the French artillery 
battery without orders and were bloodily repulsed. Wellington complained during the 
battle: “Our officers of cavalry have acquired a trick of galloping at everything. They 
never consider the situation, never think of manoeuvring before an enemy, and never 
keep back or provide a reserve.”35 Years later, in a letter to John Russell, Wellington 
maintained this view when reflecting on the performance of the British cavalry during 
the wars: 
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I considered our cavalry so inferior to the French for 
want of order, that although one of our squadrons was 
a match for two French, yet I did not care to see four 
British opposed to four French… as the numbers 
increase, order becomes more necessary. They could 
gallop but could not preserve order.36 
 
The quality of the horses themselves was another problem. Instruction on the care and 
feeding of horses were published in 1795, and veterinary surgeons became regularly 
commissioned a year later. Despite this, a significant proportion of horses were 
neglected by cavalrymen. They often considered stable duties beneath them, and left 
the care of their horses to NCOs. Throughout the wars, the army found it necessary to 
closely supervise the feeding of horses to ensure that no unscrupulous troopers sold 
their horses’ rations to buy alcohol. When on campaign, any shortage in supplies 
could severely affect the performance of the cavalry. The condition of horses was so 
poor that the instructions on the care of horses were repeated in an article in the British 
Military Journal in 1801. Furthermore, heavy cavalry outside Europe was severely 
limited, owing to the difficulty of finding horses large enough. Although useful work 
was performed by the light cavalry as flank guards during the advance on Cairo, their 
standards of efficiency were well short of the British infantry during the Egyptian 
campaign. In the only sizeable clash between British and French cavalry in Egypt, the 
former were severely bested by the latter.37 
 
It is unsurprising then that the arrival of the 1,200 Mamluk cavalry, under the 
command of Osman Bey, resulted in a marked increase in optimism among the 
British. Aeneas Anderson considered the Mamluks’ arrival in the British camp as “a 
circumstance of great importance, from the superior discipline of that cavalry, their 
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intimate acquaintance with the country, and their powerful influence among the 
inhabitants.”38 Francis Maule provided a similar judgement:  
 
This force was of the highest importance at such a 
crisis, our own cavalry being but weak in number. The 
Mamelouks [sic] made a fine appearance. We admired 
the appearance of their noble horses, their rich and 
sumptuous appointments and the wonderful rapidity of 
their movements.39  
 
Even the usually pessimistic General Hutchinson wrote an upbeat letter to Lord 
Hobart, the new secretary of state for war and the colonies, announcing the arrival of 
the Mamluk cavalry: “I am sanguine enough to hope, that the most serious good 
effects will arise from this junction, as they have a most intimate knowledge of the 
country, and the greatest influence amongst the inhabitants.”40 
 
It was obvious to the British that the Mamluk cavalry was vastly superior to their own. 
The sense of a cultural divide between Britons and Mamluks faded as the potential 
importance of the Mamluks to the campaign was realized. A significant factor in the 
formation of British perceptions was that little had been expected from the Mamluks 
in the initial stages of the campaign. By 1801, the Mamluks had little control over the 
country, their powerbase had been irrecoverably destroyed by Napoleon after the 
Battle of the Pyramids in 1798. In subsequent clashes Mamluk numbers were greatly 
reduced, and they had been unable to replenish their losses, after the lines of 
communication to the Caucuses were cut. Therefore, British servicemen did not 
witness the Mamluks’ oppression of Egypt first-hand. What they did see however, 
were the wonderful displays of swordsmanship and equestrianism by Mamluk 
warriors. These physical encounters did not correspond with what British personnel 
had read or heard about the Mamluks from earlier civilian portrayals. The more 
positive appraisal of the Mamluks in servicemen’s writing demonstrates that physical 
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encounters could be more influential on individual opinions than second-hand oral 
accounts or written records. Such a conclusion suggests that recent literature on 
European encounters in the Near East during this period, such as the work by Aslı 
Çırakman and Michael Curtis, may have overemphasized the dominance of pre-
existing stereotypes in shaping attitudes towards this region.41 
 
British praise of the Mamluks’ martial qualities also has significant ramifications for 
Heather Streets’ thesis on martial race. After the Indian Mutiny in 1857, Streets argues 
that concepts of martial race became an influential factor on the British Empire’s 
recruitment policy towards Indian Sepoys, Punjabi Sikhs and Nepalese Ghurkhas. 
Enlistment of these groups was favoured as they were considered culturally and 
biologically predisposed to war.42 Although martial race theory had no direct 
influence on British imperial thinking in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, 
the observations made by British servicemen on the appearance of the Mamluks 
during the campaign, provide a comprehensive example of martial race discourse pre-
1850.  
 
The appearance of the Mamluks struck the British and it is easy to see why. They were 
undoubtedly an impressive sight; picked as boys by experts and trained from 
childhood, they were invariably large, lean and muscular. Each cavalryman was a 
veritable arsenal on horseback, armed with carbines, several pairs of pistols, djerids 
(a short javelin made of palm branches) and scimitars. The supreme confidence in 
their own abilities meant that they carried with them a fortune in jewels, clothes and 
coins. Over a muslin shirt, they wore layers of bright and brilliant silken vests and 
caftans, the whole encased in gigantic silken trousers. Their swords, saddles, and 
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pistols were all inlaid with silver and jewels, each alone worth a fortune. The result 
was that a fully armed Mamluk cavalryman literally glittered in the desert sun.43 
 
One of the first occasions in which British forces physically encountered the Mamluks 
came on 1 May 1801. During the advance towards Cairo, British and Ottoman forces 
were joined by “Mulley Mahammed, the Prince of Fez”. Although a mere messenger 
for his master, Osman Bey, Muhammed made a strong impression. Robert Wilson 
provided an account of this Mamluk’s imposing appearance:  
 
…his dark eye was remarkably keen, his face florid, 
and extremely handsome: his turban and robe were 
white, edged with gold; a red and gold embroidered 
pouch was suspended from his shoulders, by a broad 
gold lace belt: his arms were superiorly fine, his 
horsemanship and dexterity admirable; indeed every 
motion was graceful: his modest yet noble mien, a 
certain expression of sanctity in all his actions, enforced 
an immediate idea of his pretentions and character.44  
 
Such was the sensation caused by a simple messenger. When the full force of the 
Mamluks, under the command of Osman Bey, joined Hutchinson’s army on 1 June, 
the British were awed by their collective appearance. Osman, “a handsome lusty man, 
of fifty years of age” commanded 1,200 cavalry, a “united efficient force”. Each 
Mamluk was “richly dressed, well mounted, appointed, and armed”. “Their 
appearance”, one officer wrote, was “truly magnificent; nothing can be more splendid 
or rich than their dress and appointments… Their swords are of a peculiar good quality 
and highly valued: some of them at so extravagant a price as 1,000 dollars.”45 Thomas 
Walsh was just as amazed: “every individual superbly mounted, richly dressed, and 
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attended by a servant on foot…. the magnificence of the beys or chiefs was beyond 
any thing that can be conceived”.46  
 
The French soldiers shared this view of the Mamluks’ appearance. Once the Mamluks 
realized the danger of the French invasion to their rule, they united their forces, and 
faced the French for the first time at Shubra Khit on 13 July 1798. The French cavalry 
officer Nicholas-Philibert Desvernois witnessed this first clash. Presumably with the 
aid of a telescope, he wrote: 
 
It was a magnificent sight. In the distance, the desert 
beneath the blue sky, before us these beautiful Arab 
steeds, sumptuously harnessed, snorting, neighing, 
prancing lightly and gracefully beneath their martial 
riders, who were covered with dazzling arms inlaid 
with gold and jewels. They were clad in varied 
brilliantly-coloured costumes, some wearing turbans 
bedecked with egret feathers, others wearing golden 
helmets, armed with sabres, lances, maces, spears, 
rifles, axes and daggers, each with three double-
barrelled pistols.47 
 
According to Desvernois: “the novelty and richness of this spectacle dazzled our 
soldiers”, but not in the sense that they were intimidated, for “from then on they began 
to dream of pillage.”48 Years later, Napoleon would remember how “the sun touched 
their helmets and coats of mail, making their fine line glimmer in all its brilliance.”49  
 
Given the riches they carried, it is unsurprising that the French soldiers poured over 
the bodies of the Mamluk fallen even before the fighting was over, looting them of 
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gold coins secreted amongst their charred satin jerkins, sewn into their silk cloaks and 
hidden in money belts. After delivering the killing blow to a majestic, white bearded 
Mamluk during the Battle of the Pyramids, Desvernois found rich booty on his corpse: 
a “canary-yellow turban made of cashmere… more than five hundred gold pieces 
sewn into his skull cap… a magnificent sabre, its sheath and pommel inlaid with gold; 
its handle was a rhinoceros horn, and the blade was black Damascus steel.”50 The 
looting continued into the evening. Many soldiers left the camp that night under the 
pretext of seeking out any remaining French wounded, but in reality they roamed 
across the battlefield, lantern in hand, eagerly helping themselves to the valuables on 
the Mamluk corpses. Napoleon himself wrote in his memoirs that the men  
 
…had a field day. They found the luggage left behind 
by the beys and their warriors, containers of jam and 
sweets, carpets, porcelain, silverware in great 
abundance… During the days following the battle, the 
soldiers busied themselves fishing in the Nile for 
bodies, many of which had two or three hundred gold 
pieces on them.51 
 
Auguste de Marmont, one of Napoleon’s division commanders, who also recorded his 
men fishing Mamluk bodies out of the Nile, wrote “Some soldiers deposited as much 
as thirty thousand francs with their regimental cashier.”52 When the French army 
embarked for home after their surrender, they took many of the trophies taken from 
the Mamluks with them. A selection of these items can be seen in the Musée de 
l’Armée in Paris. 53 
 
The Mamluks’ horses boasted an equally impressive appearance, and provided much 
joy to British personnel with equestrian interests. “Their horses are beautiful…. In the 
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highest order possible, and managed with such grace and dexterity, that their exercise 
is a spectacle really well worth seeing.”54 Thomas Walsh was amazed not only by 
appearance of the horses, but also by the equipment that adorned them, which was 
just as extravagant as the clothing of their riders:   
 
Nothing can equal the grand and splendid appearance 
of this cavalry. Their horses are well made, strong, 
sleek, and plump, very surefooted, stately in their 
attitudes, and have altogether the most beautiful 
appearance. The magnificence of the trappings, with 
which they are covered, is amazing, and the saddles and 
housings glitter with gold and silver, almost dazzling 
the eyes of the astonished spectator.55 
 
French soldiers too were impressed by the Mamluk horses: One soldier wrote: 
  
There is no spectacle more graceful in its strength than 
an Arabian horse ridden in the Arabian style... To the 
weary French army, after trudging for days in utter 
exhaustion through the desert and through the parched, 
cracked land along the Nile, the sight of such dancing 
vigour, such weightless power, such beauty in strength, 
must have seemed something unbelievable.56  
  
The Mamluks’ military spectacle appealed to the British army, which, according to 
Scott Myerly, was itself very much a “theatrical institution”. Great emphasis and 
importance was put upon colourful, brilliant clothing, extravagant headgear, and 
elaborate equipment. Generally, the more splendid the uniform, the greater the 
implied honour attached to it. Flamboyant uniforms were strongly associated with a 
soldier’s pride, self-esteem and sexual appeal. Presenting the correct and proper 
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appearance was frequently a source of personal gratification in the British army, some 
became so fixated with the image of themselves and their regiment that they neglected 
other important considerations, even if these were vital to the army’s success.57 It is 
unsurprising then, that the Mamluks, who poured most of their considerable wealth 
into their appearance and equipment, found many admirers amongst British 
servicemen.  
 
Much of the equipment that the Mamluks carried with them was not just for show. 
Although their mode of warfare was outdated by the nineteenth century, they were 
extremely adept at their craft. Their skills elicited universal admiration and respect 
from European observers. This was certainly the case for Cooper Williams and John 
Theophilus Lee, respectively a reverend and a midshipman serving on board the HMS 
Swiftsure. From the aftermath of the Battle of the Nile in August 1798, until February 
1799, the Swiftsure took part in the blockade of the Egyptian coast, intercepting any 
ships and harassing French strongpoints. Their operations kept them in frequent 
communication with the French, as they negotiated for the exchange of various 
supplies. On one such occasion, Frenchmen came aboard the Swiftsure, and told the 
crew of the battles they had fought with the Mamluks. After listening intently, 
Williams recorded what he had heard about the Mamluk cavalry charge: “The mode 
of attack of these brave, but ill-disciplined troops, was extremely irregular”. Small 
bodies of Mamluk cavalry simply charged at the French infantry that were arranged 
massed square formations.  
 
In this desultory mode of attack they were open to every 
disadvantage: in the first place, they had no covering 
artillery, but were themselves exposed to that of the 
French… and on their near approach they were 
received by a steady fire of musketry.58  
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According to Lee, the Mamluks were aware of their vulnerability, and adorned 
themselves with “a quilted jacket lined with steel net, that will resist the sharpest 
sword, and often turn bullet.”59 Many Mamluks were killed, “but” Williams wrote, 
“if, escaping these dangers, they came to close quarters, the bayonets of the French 
could not protect them from the force and skill of the Mamaluk sabre, which bearing 
before it every resistance, hewed down all that came within reach.” 60  
 
A charging Mamluk was unquestionably an imposing sight. At full gallop he would 
first discharge his carbine with some accuracy, and then fire several pairs of pistols at 
closer range. Next he would fling his djerid, and finally he would charge his foe with 
scimitar in hand. The Mamluks wielded their scimitars with deadly accuracy and 
power, capable of decapitating their enemy with a single blow. Some could even wield 
scimitars in both hands, whilst holding the horse’s reigns between their teeth.61 
Although these abilities were rendered obsolete by the French soldiers’ use of cannon 
and muskets, there remained considerable respect for the Mamluks’ martial 
capabilities amongst both the British and French military. Williams wrote:  
 
The French officers who came to us, reported that the 
stories we had heard of the skill and power of the 
Mamaluks with the sabre were literally true, and that if 
they were disciplined according to European tactics, 
they would be the finest cavalry in the world.62 
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The image of the Mamluks charging headlong towards an organized enemy, and who, 
once engaged with their foes, “hewed down all that came within reach”, emphasized 
their bravery, ferocity and physical strength. The dedication and training required to 
wield their sabres with such skill was often written about. Williams noted:  
 
The mode in which they are exercised to the use of the 
sabre is curious; bags stuffed hard with cotton, are 
placed upright the height of a man, and till a soldier can 
cut through one of these with a single stroke, he is not 
accounted a skilful Mamaluk.63  
 
Nearly three years later, one officer in the British army wrote in a similar manner 
about the Mamluks’ swordsmanship:  
 
so expert are they in the use of the sword, that one of 
their common practices is cutting in two a thread 
suspended without any weight at the end to keep it 
stretched, and thus afford resistance; infinite skill is 
required to do this.64  
 
These comments support Patrick Porter’s assertion in Military Orientalism that once 
in battle, cultural differences between people became less important, and men were 
judged primarily on their military skill. Combat was seen as a redemptive, cleansing 
and manly experience. The impressive performance of the Mamluks in battle 
exonerated them from accusations of cruelty, corruption and effeminacy. It was 
perhaps for this reason that the martial talents of the Mamluks held greater sway over 
the opinion of military personnel, than over those of civilians.65  
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Furthermore, slicing through bags of cotton with a single blow, or cutting individual 
threads of linen from horseback, endowed the Mamluks with a certain romantic and 
exotic appeal. The image of the Mamluks’ charge in particular can be connected to 
the romantic sublime. In the 1790s, with the advent of a new scale and ferocity of 
warfare on the continent, Europeans began to see war as an appalling abomination, 
but one that held a terrible fascination, even sublimity. War became seen as the 
ultimate test of a society and of an individual self. In this way, war was becoming a 
matter of romantic self-expression.66 Although the romantic sublime was primarily 
associated with natural phenomena, such as panoramas from mountaintops, it was also 
closely connected to war, especially pitched battles. Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant 
and Friedrich Schiller grounded the sublime in the sense of self-preservation, arguing 
that terror and fear of death are at the bottom of the sublime experience.67 Obviously, 
a battle has the potential to be more terrifying than any naturally occurring spectacle. 
For Kant, in his Critique of Judgement, the figure of the brave soldier, defying the 
fear of death on the battlefield, is “the object of the greatest admiration.”68 It was this 
heroism that was so admired by British and French troops. When the order to attack 
was given, the Mamluks simply galloped forward as fast as they could, each man just 
as keen to be the first into the fray and intent on individual glory. It became more of 
a race than a charge, the lines of cavalry becoming ragged as they approached the 
French. The Mamluks had little conception of an ordered concerted charge that might 
have broken through the French infantry squares, and were dumbfounded by the 
seemingly impenetrable lines of bristling bayonets. The swirling masses of Mamluk 
cavalry were met with barrages of artillery, grapeshot and small arms fire. Wave after 
wave of Mamluks were cut down in a series of engagements, with little or no 
impression made on the French squares. The Mamluks’ formidable skills and quixotic 
heroism could not gain them victory against well-drilled European infantry, a fact 
which contributed towards their appeal.69 The moment in which the Mamluks charged 
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towards the waiting French guns, their armour glittering in the desert sun, and death 
almost a certainty, was identified as sublime, romantic and tragic. 
 
Such emotions are present in the writing of Captain François, a French officer present 
in Brigade General Marmont’s infantry square during the Battle of the Pyramids. 
According to his account, the Mamluks 
 
threw themselves forward in a mad charge. Our order 
was not to move! We hardly breathed; brigade 
commander Marmont had ordered us not to fire until he 
gave the command. The Mamelukes were almost upon 
us. The order was finally given, and it was real carnage. 
The sabres of the enemy cavalry met the bayonets of 
our first rank. It was unbelievable chaos: horses and 
cavalrymen falling on us, some of us falling back. 
Several Mamelukes had their [silk] clothes on fire, set 
alight by the blazing wads from our muskets…. I saw 
right beside me Mamelukes, wounded, in a heap, 
burning trying with their sabres to slash the legs of our 
soldiers in the front rank… I have never seen men more 
brave and more determined.70 
 
Unlike the French, the British soldiers had little chance to observe their effectiveness 
in combat. Aside from a series of sporadic skirmishes with the French, there was little 
fighting involved in the latter stages of the campaign. Robert Wilson recorded one of 
the few skirmishes that took place at Giza. He wrote that the Mamluks charged a body 
of French cavalry 
 
in a very handsome manner,… and although the French 
fired sharply with their cannon at them, killing and 
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wounding several horses, they retired again in perfect 
good order. This affair, if not brilliant, from the loss of 
the enemy… still was honourable to the Mamelukes, 
and assured the English that their reputation was justly 
earned.71 
 
Such a short action provided little evidence with which to draw conclusions, but the 
Mamluks’ constant training provided the British with opportunities to observe their 
skills. Soldiers gathered at the market in the British camp, where “there was some 
good horsemanship to be seen by the Mamelukes.” Two horsemen would face each 
other roughly 300 yards apart, with their fine Arabian horses and javelins, when they 
would ride at each other at full speed, throwing both javelins in the air at once. They 
would then throw themselves out of the saddle and hang by the side of the horse to 
avoid the incoming missile. Their incredible abilities to manoeuvre their horses 
suddenly, without even stirrups, amazed European observers.72 During Hutchinson’s 
visit to the Grand Vizir’s camp in mid-May, the Mamluks performed in front of a far 
larger audience, when a djerids tournament was held. An equestrian team sport, the 
objective of djerids is to score points by throwing blunt javelins at opposing teams’ 
horsemen. Solyman Aga, “the pride of the Mamelukes”, stole the show. Robert 
Wilson, watching in the crowd, wrote “the beauty of his countenance,… his 
excellence in all the martial exercises…excelled beyond competition, and extorted 
universal admiration.”73 One could argue that the British fascination with the 
Mamluks’ martial skills, in training and tournaments, comprised a form of nostalgia.  
As outlined in the previous chapter, classical republican thinkers, writers and 
philosophes, such as Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith, saw military service and 
martial virtue as an important unifying force for society. Commercial and industrial 
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expansion, although undoubtedly having some benefits, was thought to encourage a 
decline in martial virtue. Hence the Mamluks, a band of brave, ferocious warriors 
seemingly devoted to war, came to symbolize the martial traits which Britain had 
lost.74 
 
The British conviction in the martial qualities of the Mamluks was shared by the 
French, and is evident in their attempts to recruit them.  As early as 7 September 1798, 
Napoleon ordered all Mamluk slaves between the ages of eight and fourteen to be 
drafted with a view toward the eventual formation of a Mamluk corps. General Desaix 
advocated a similar project: to integrate approximately two thousand young Mamluk 
slaves with French apprentice seamen, “imported Negroes” and other young Arabs, 
all of whom would be given military training and French schooling. The project was 
proposed largely for its practicality; if realized, it would have precluded the need for 
any reinforcements from France. This was, however, a long-term project, requiring 
five years to come to fruition and was never undertaken.75 Other attempts to employ 
the Mamluks’ martial skills were more successful. On 14 September 1799, Jean 
Baptiste Kléber established a mounted company of Mamluk auxiliaries and Syrian 
Janissaries. The unit was later reorganized and renamed “Mamluks de la République” 
(Mamluks of the Republic). In 1801, the Mamluk regiment returned to France with 
the rest of the French army, and by decree of 25 December 1803, they were organized 
into a company attached to the Chasseurs-à-Cheval of the Imperial Guard. They 
served in numerous Napoleonic campaigns. Impressed by their loyalty and bravery, 
several French commanders hired Mamluks as bodyguards. Napoleon himself 
employed Roustam Raza, who served for almost sixteen years from 1799 to 1814, and 
was privy to the most private aspects of Napoleon’s life. Following the emperor’s 
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example, Napoleon’s stepson, Eugène Beaharnais, and the Imperial Old Guard 
Marshal, Jean-Baptiste Bessières, also appointed Mamluk bodyguards.76  
 
Interestingly, the British made very little effort to recruit the Mamluks for military 
purposes, despite appreciating their military skills. Only one letter in the war office 
alludes to an attempt at recruitment. It is addressed to Henry Dundas, and written by 
Lt-Col. John Douglas, who worked closely with Sir Sidney Smith during the Ottoman 
operations against the French prior to the Egyptian campaign. Douglas wrote vaguely 
about his attempt to raise a corps in Egypt, but he abandoned the project due to 
unsurmountable obstacles.77 This lack of effort is unusual, Britain certainly had a 
history of enlisting ethnic groups considered to have great martial prowess. The East 
India Company recruited Indian sepoys in large numbers from 1750, and twelve West 
India regiments had been formed in the 1790s to serve in the Caribbean. As Heather 
Streets highlights, after the 1857 mutiny, the ethnic recruitment of “martial races” 
became the standard practice in India. However, in Egypt, recruitment of indigenous 
peoples was never considered by the British because officially, they had no intention 
of remaining in the country. The objectives for the campaign, set by the cabinet in late 
1800, were to remove the French from Egypt and hand the governorship of the country 
over to the allied Ottoman forces. By October 1801, these objectives were achieved, 
and the majority of the British forces were withdrawn. The seven-month campaign 
was too short for any policy of selection to be considered for the formation of a 
Mamluks corps. Moreover, by the time the British arrived, the Mamluks were a 
shadow of their former strength, many having been killed or driven away after defeat 
by the French. When the French landed in Egypt in July 1798, there were an estimated 
10-12,000 Mamluks in the country; yet only 1,200 Mamluks joined the British as they 
advanced on Cairo in June 1801.  
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Although the British commanders never sought to recruit the Mamluks, they did 
declare a preference for Mamluk rather than Ottoman rule in Egypt. This contradicted 
the official policy agreed by the British cabinet in October 1800, which had declared 
that Egypt should be returned to Ottoman rule. John Hely-Hutchinson, the commander 
of the British forces in Egypt, saw the value of the Mamluks as a cavalry force and 
gave Osman Bey “the protection and guarantee” of the British government.78 A 
constant theme of Hutchinson’s despatches to Henry Dundas, the Secretary of War, 
and Lord Elgin, the ambassador at Constantinople, was the inability of the Ottomans 
to govern the country, and the proposal for a British sponsored Mamluk regime in 
Egypt.79  
 
By October 1801, Hutchinson was expecting to establish the Mamluks in power. He 
had put the British in an embarrassing position, having promised Egypt to the 
Mamluks while the cabinet had given similar assurances to the Ottomans. This led to 
disaster, as British attempts to mediate a compromise between the two parties were 
unsuccessful. On 22 October the Capitan Pasha, the Ottoman admiral, set an ambush 
for the Mamluk commanders, under the pretext of negotiations on board his flagship. 
All of the leading beys were either killed or captured, and although Hutchinson 
secured the release of the Mamluk prisoners, a settlement became impossible.80 As 
the British army withdrew from Egypt, the situation was far from resolved; neither 
Ottomans nor Mamluks were able to gain ascendency. This chaotic state of affairs 
was only resolved when the Albanian contingent of the Ottoman army, commanded 
by Muhammad Ali, mutinied over lack of pay. Being the only fully trained unit in 
Egypt, they prevailed, and Ali became Pasha of Egypt in May 1805.81 
 
                                                        
78 Hutchinson to Dundas, 3 April 1801 and Hutchinson to Hobart, 2 June and 21 September 1801, 
quoted in Edward Ingram, ‘The Geopolitics of the First British Expedition to Egypt – IV: Occupation 
and Withdrawal, 1801-3’, Middle Eastern Studies 31, no.2 (1995), 327-329.  
79 Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 24. This brought about a rupture between the British military 
command in Egypt and the British embassy at Constantinople. Preoccupied with limiting French 
influence in the Porte, Lord Elgin chose the Ottomans in preference to the beys.  
80 Stuart to Hutchinson 23 October 1801, War Office (WO) 1/345, pp.507-508.  
81 Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 31-32.  
 295 
The response of British personnel to the murder of the beys demonstrates their strong 
attachment to the Mamluks, as well as their nostalgia for Mamluk military virtues. 
Charles Hill, an officer in the Anglo-Indian army, was saddened by the loss of these 
exotic and formidable warriors. They were, he wrote, “fine Mamalukes, who behaved 
so well in their different actions with the French, and who were the greatest friends to 
our army”. Hill felt guilty that Hutchinson had “pledged for their protection”82, but 
had failed to keep them safe:  
 
…the brave Mamalukes heartily acquit us of even being 
the means of their Beys unhappy fate, and nobly say 
that ‘The English not being so well acquainted with the 
treachery of the Turks, were more liable to be deceived 
but that their Beys should never have trusted them 
because they knew them better’ nevertheless poor 
princes! It was the sacred word of Britain, that drew you 
into destruction – and that word has never been pledged 
in vain before.83 
 
When the bodies of the dead were secured from the Ottomans, Hutchinson ensured 
they were “interred with minute guns & military honours”. On their release, only one 
of the Mamluks attacked in the boats, Osman Bey Bardisi, was still alive, but seriously 
wounded. He “has eight wounds on him,” Hill wrote, “General Baird paid a visit to 
the wounded Bey, who burst into tears directly he saw him.”84 
 
For the romantically inclined among the British army, this was a tragic end to a 
formidable warrior people. Others were more ambivalent. Robert Wilson still 
remembered their tyrannical mode of government prior to 1798. Reflecting on his 
belief that “the Mamluks will surely become extinct” he wrote, “Nor should Europe 
lament their fall. The government of the Mamelukes was unnatural and oppressive, 
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their habits and customs degrading to manhood”.85 Wilson’s view was rare. Lachlan 
Macquarie was happy to see the Mamluks released and living under British protection, 
but he was concerned for their future: “I fear we shall not succeed, and that the poor 
Mamluks will, in the end, be left to shift for themselves.”86 Despite their dwindling 
numbers, Hill admired their resolute defiance.  
 
Even the small remains of them only wish for leave to 
show at, how soon they could clear Egypt of near 
30,000 Turks – there is something uncommonly 
interesting in the fate of these brave fellows, and God 
forbid, the English should allow them to be swept off 
by the arm of the Turkish assassin! Even before this 
bloody business, a Mamaluke was loved and respected 
by every British soldier, whereas a Turk has been justly 
detested by every Christian who have [sic] been serving 
near them.87 
 
Hutchinson continued to advocate a British-sponsored Mamluk regime in Egypt after 
returning to Britain in 1801. He endeavoured to move the government and public 
opinion over to support the Mamluks, and enjoyed some success. The public was 
shocked by the Ottomans’ attempted massacre of the beys and were impressed by the 
warrior traits of the Mamluks.88 Hutchinson’s opposition to official policy, and his 
stubborn backing of the Mamluks after the campaign, testifies to how attached some 
British personnel had become to these seemingly exotic warriors. This affection might 
be attributed to the appeal that the Mamluks seemed to offer to British officers. 
Although a large proportion of written material available to historians was authored 
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by officers, the lack of almost any notable comment by the lower ranks on the 
Mamluks, suggests that officers associated with them more closely. It is possible that 
British officers saw the Mamluks as the Muslim equivalent of the upper-class 
gentleman officer. Comparisons such as this go back centuries; Saladin was often 
recognized to have had ideal European qualities, and some western European 
contemporaries even branded him an honorary Christian.89 Bernard Lewis claims that 
from the fifteenth century onward, Ottoman Muslims were likened to gentlemen of 
the established Church, and Ottoman Christians were equated to factious 
nonconformists.90 Moreover, European intellectuals had a habit of comparing their 
own social and political life with that of Muslims, particularly the Ottomans, during 
their expansion into eastern Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. British 
officers who were raised in this intellectual environment would be more disposed to 
compare and contrast themselves with the Mamluks.91  
 
The impact of the Mamluks on the British military’s self-image and on images 
of other ‘martial’ peoples 
A striking aspect to the admiration of the Mamluks, was the conviction among some 
British observers that the Mamluk cavalry was superior to any European equivalent. 
One of the strongest compliments was written by an officer in the Anglo-Indian army. 
 
These brave handful of gallant cavalry… have ever 
withstood all attempts of the Turks to extirpate them by 
fair force of arms, and, must to the British, the French 
themselves acknowledge, they gave them most 
desperate battles, they fairly beat their cavalry 
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whenever they met them, but the French infantry & 
artillery were too hard for them.92  
 
General Hutchinson described them as “inferior certainly to none in the world”,93 and 
another officer wrote, “The French confess that their cavalry, which is… decidedly 
the finest European I ever saw, did not dare meet the Mamelukes with equal 
numbers.”94  
 
Such comments contrast with the common tendency of Britons who visited the Near 
East or India to express a deeply engrained conviction in superiority over the people 
they encountered.95 The statements of regret among the British army after learning in 
October 1801 that their withdrawal from Egypt was imminent, demonstrates British 
confidence in their capacity to rule over eastern peoples, not only Indians. George 
Baldwin thought that “the peasant could enjoy the fruit of his labour” with Egypt 
under British rule,96 and Robert Wilson considered how much “happier” and “more 
advantageous” it would have been for the Egyptians “if Egypt had been constituted 
an Indian colony.”97 Even John Moore, contemplating a redevelopment of Alexandria, 
thought “it was in the power of the English to do more in Egypt than it will ever been 
in that of any other nation.”98 
 
The statements alleging the superiority of the Mamluks may have served a practical 
purpose. It provided an image with which Britons could critique their own forces, and 
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improve elements in their society.99 This propensity for Britons to look towards exotic 
oriental powers in order to critique themselves was not a new development. Europeans 
had often compared themselves unfavorably with the Ottoman Empire, as it expanded 
into eastern Europe from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries.100 Patrick Porter 
argues that Europe had a long-standing sense of vulnerability to the ‘orient’, despite 
the conviction in technological and moral superiority over it. This was expressed in 
the folklore of famous battles between East and West, such as Thermopylae (480 BC), 
Roncevaux Pass (778), Constantinople (1453) and Lepanto (1571).101 One may argue 
the favourable portrayals of the Mamluks merely continued this trend. Indeed, it is 
possible that representations of the Mamluks served as an implicit criticism of 
Britain’s own cavalry. This would certainly be justified; as we have seen, the 
performance of British cavalry throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars 
was at times far from exemplary. One could argue that problems existed in the army 
as a whole. Since the Seven Years War, the British army had known nothing but 
failure. Expelled from the American colonies after the War of Independence, driven 
out of the Low Countries by the Revolutionary armies in 1793-4, the British army had 
been obliterated by yellow fever and malaria during an inconclusive campaign in the 
West Indies. The 24 months prior to the Egyptian expedition added to these 
disappointments. In autumn 1799, a second campaign in Holland ended in failure. In 
1800, three separate amphibious assaults were aborted last minute, on Belle Ile in 
June, the Spanish naval base at Ferrol in August, and at Cadiz in October. By 1801, 
the reputation of the British army had plummeted to arguably its lowest ever depth. It 
had become, said Lord Cornwallis, “the scorn and laughing stock of friends and 
foes.”102  
 
Not all agreed that the Mamluks comprised a superior military force; their quality was 
a debated topic. The martial ability of the Mamluks was employed to both disparage 
and champion the British army. For several observers, such as Thomas Walsh, the 
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Mamluks were certainly competent, but inferior to elite European cavalry regiments, 
particularly those of the British army. “The Mamalukes, taken as light troops, or as 
individual horsemen, are equal, and perhaps superior, to any in the world; but without 
tactics, and never acting in a body, they cannot be expected to succeed against 
European troops.”103 Robert Wilson agreed with this estimation: “Individually, 
without doubt, they are superior to any cavalry in the world; but collectively, British 
dragoons must, from their physical superiority of strength, weight, and velocity, 
overpower in a charge more than an equal number of them.”104 These comments are 
particularly interesting, for they highlight a conviction in the superiority of ‘western’ 
over ‘eastern’ modes of warfare. This belief continues in modern literature to this 
day.105 For the British soldiers in Egypt, organization and discipline were the crucial 
differences between the two modes of war; it was commonly highlighted as the 
fundamental reason behind Europe’s self-perceived military superiority over oriental 
powers. Such a view was prevalent among French as well as British observers. Vivant 
Denon is a significant example. He accompanied General Desaix’s division as they 
chased Murad Bey and his followers into Upper Egypt. The two forces clashed on 22 
January 1799. Denon, in the middle of one of the infantry squares attacked by Mamluk 
cavalry, evoked the scene, drawing a strong contrast between the two sides.  
 
The Mamelukes wheeled around us, their resplendent 
arms shining as they manoeuvred their horses. They 
deployed all the splendour of the Orient, but our 
northern severity presented a harsh aspect which was 
no less imposing. The contrast was striking: it was iron 
defying gold – the plain glittered, the spectacle was 
superb.106 
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These representations of the Mamluks draw strong parallels with, and were likely 
influenced by, images of other, supposedly primitive ‘oriental’ warrior peoples. 
Indeed, the British view of the Mamluk often seems to comprise of a combination of 
‘eastern’ images: of the effeminate ‘oriental’ despot, and of the primitive, simple-
minded, noble and exotic warrior. Such a blend of paradoxical images was not unique, 
as strong comparisons can be made between more general British views towards 
Indian and Mamluk peoples. Much like opinion of the Mamluks, the British formed 
two discrepant views towards native peoples living in British India. The first was that 
Indian societies were backward, despotic and corrupt, and should be overthrown in 
favour of the more sophisticated European model of civilization. The second was that 
native people enjoyed a primitive but natural, traditional and harmonious form of 
civilization. This style of society had been destroyed in Britain by the development of 
commercial society and should therefore be preserved and cherished where it still 
existed. These two opposing viewpoints often came into conflict with one another, 
most infamously during the trial of Warren Hastings, the former Governor-general of 
India, who had been accused of misconduct and corruption.107  
 
Furthermore, the martial characteristics attributed to the Mamluks were recognized to 
exist among Indian Sepoys. Much of the success the East India Company enjoyed in 
the wars against indigenous Indian powers during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
period can be attributed to the performance of the native sepoys, who bore much of 
the fighting. At the battle of Assaye in 1803, during the Marathas Wars, Wellington 
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wrote “Our troops behaved admirably; the sepoys astonished me.”108 The impressive 
conduct of the sepoys led many British personnel to think of them as bred for war, in 
a similar way to the Mamluks. In some respects, this image was accurate. In India, 
jati, literally meaning birth, defined an individual’s occupation and status - it was one 
of the most important determinants of an Indian’s life. The profession of the sepoy 
effectively became another jati, and fitted well into Indian culture that was largely 
defined by function and community. Sepoys easily adopted the military mentality that 
one individual was a representative of a wider community, which required 
unconditional loyalty.109 
 
Similar to the encounters with the Mamluks, the experience of Indian powers 
occasionally engendered criticism of British forces. Indian rulers had observed the 
success of the East India Company in the 1760s and 70s and copied their military 
tactics. By the end of the century, the native powers had become proficient in 
European-style warfare. It was not difficult to import European weaponry and tactics, 
but Indian arsenals were also perfectly capable of churning out their own weapons, 
which were no different to the British in quality.110 The Nizam of Hyderabad, Tipu 
Sultan of Mysore and the Marathas all possessed armies that were armed and trained 
in the European fashion. They were far from being a tribal rabble, and were able to 
wage conventional modern warfare.111 Wellington, who suffered army losses between 
thirty and fifty per cent at Assaye, later considered it to be his hardest battle. 112 
 
Conclusion 
As this chapter demonstrates, British soldiers were able to maintain seemingly 
contradictory views towards the Mamluks, which derived from the two dominant 
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influences on their writing. It seems that the soldiers arrived in Egypt carrying 
negative stereotypes about the Mamluks and other ‘eastern’ people, having most 
likely been pre-programmed by portrayals of the east in civilian travel literature. 
These images, focusing on the despotic rule of the Mamluks were never disproved, 
for when the British army landed in Egypt, the Mamluks were a shadow of their 
former strength, and no longer in power. When the Mamluks joined the British forces, 
and the strategic value of their superior cavalry to the campaign was recognized, the 
British were more accepting of Mamluk culture, and forgiving of any perceived flaws 
in character. The negative stereotypes that soldiers had brought to Egypt were to some 
extent supplanted by military imperatives. This argument calls into question the 
assumption, made by recent scholars, that pre-existing stereotypes were always pre-
eminent in shaping attitudes of Europeans towards non-European peoples.113 Instead, 
it seems clear that the physical encounters between Britons and Mamluks were far 
more influential on personal opinions than second hand verbal accounts and written 
records. Such a conclusion supports Patrick Porter’s view that British servicemen saw 
war as a crucial medium through which the calibre of civilizations were judged, and 
that once in battle, cultural differences tended to fade. 
 
Significantly, the warrior-like image of the Mamluks draws marked similarities with 
popular representations of East India Company sepoys. This suggests that both 
Mamluks and Sepoys were part of a more general, homogeneous British image of the 
‘oriental warrior’. It also demonstrates that the concept of ‘martial race’, examined by 
Heather Streets, was fairly well formed at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
This was long before the 1857 Indian Mutiny – the point from which Streets argues 
that martial race began to influence British imperial culture.114 The formidable 
appearance of the Mamluks, and the skill with which they used outdated weapons and 
tactics, inspired a romantic attachment, and a nostalgia for the chivalric, martial values 
thought to have been lost during Britain’s commercial development. These martial 
representations of Mamluk warriors served an important purpose; they provided an 
image with which Britons could evaluate their own military. In this way, 
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commentators could both criticize and glorify various elements within the British 
military. 
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Conclusion 
On the morning of 7 October 1801, just over a month after the surrender of the French 
garrison at Alexandria, George Billanie, a private in the 92nd Gordon Highlanders, 
sailed with his regiment from Aboukir Bay for Britain. By noon, he had “lost sight of 
the celebrated land of Egypt”. He wrote: “None regretted this. We indeed regretted 
our countrymen and comrades, who had found a grave there; but the country itself had 
no charms to make us regret leaving it.”1 Billanie’s desire to leave the country was 
probably greater than most: having been wounded in battle on 21 March, he had spent 
the remainder of the campaign at the hospital camp at Aboukir. His wound suffered 
from multiple recurring infections and he would never fully recover. Upon his return 
to Britain, he was discharged from the army and lived the remainder of his life as an 
out-pensioner at the Chelsea Hospital.2 Nevertheless, Billanie’s comment 
encapsulates the general attitude of the army. The soldiers had no wish to linger in the 
country that had been the cause of so much hardship over the past six months. The 
appearance of the men told of the adversity they had endured. The majority were clad 
in rags, having worn the same clothes day and night for six months. Many were 
suffering from ophthalmia and had bandages over their eyes. Added to this were the 
numerous blotches and swellings from the bites of mosquitoes and spiders, and the 
sting of scorpions.  
 
The British government had long anticipated the victory in Egypt and had planned the 
redeployment of the army. 7,000 were to return to England to help quell bread riots. 
Another 7,000 were relocated to Malta and Minorca to maintain a strong 
Mediterranean base. 4,000 were headed for the West Indies to attack Spain’s 
American colonies.3 The dispersal began immediately after the French capitulation. 
Lord Keith departed with the majority of the battle fleet on 9 September. Over the 
next two months, British regiments slowly embarked at Alexandria or Aboukir Bay 
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and set sail. A small garrison remained at Alexandria until the last of the British forces 
evacuated in 1803. General Baird’s Indian army stayed with the garrison until June 
1802, when they departed for India via Suez. Those who remained looked on 
enviously at the embarkation of their comrades. Major Francis Maule learnt that his 
regiment was to remain in the garrison: 
 
The prospect was indeed discouraging – to bear up 
another year against the maladies with which this 
climate is pregnant; to live amongst Mahometans, who 
detested the very sight of Christians, and who had 
already began to shew symptoms of hostile conduct 
towards us, will sufficiently explain the cause of our 
chagrin.4  
 
Fortunately for Maule, he did not remain much longer at Alexandria. His regiment, 
the Queens’, unexpectedly received orders for their departure, and had left by 
December. His relief at his evacuation is palpable. “The fatigue, the cares and the 
recollections of Egypt were quickly dissipated… We forget the past, enjoy the present 
and anticipate the future.”5  
 
Those who survived the campaign were proud to have helped to restore the fighting 
reputation of the British army and of having played a small part in the army’s victory. 
Yet in their comments, this pride is secondary to a sense of relief at leaving the 
uncomfortable Egyptian climate and its strange inhabitants. This sense of alleviation 
is underlined by the loathsome conditions on board the troopships. Embarkation 
meant at least a month of poor food, inadequate drinking water, and unsanitary 
accommodation. At the beginning of the campaign in March, the soldiers had been 
anxious to leave the troopships, some even volunteered for the amphibious landing at 
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Aboukir to accelerate their disembarkation.  After six months of campaigning, many 
wished to be shipboard as soon as possible. For those heading home, the chance to 
see their families and loved ones again was certainly an important factor in their 
impatience. Few, if any at all, however, expressed a desire to remain in Egypt.  
 
The joy the soldiers expressed at sailing from Egypt highlights one of the central 
distinguishing features between the accounts of British military personnel and civilian 
travellers. Soldiers were not ordinary travellers; the war distinguished them from 
civilians, and their paths were determined by the exigencies of war. The variety of 
ways in which the soldiers saw and described the Egyptian environment has been 
detailed in chapter 1. Exclusive to the writing of soldiers was their strategic appraisals 
of the landscape. They discussed how cities might be attacked or defended, and 
speculated – with the benefit of hindsight – how the campaign might have progressed 
differently had they been fully aware of the topography at the time. These strategic 
surveys were not as common as one might assume. It was a taboo subject in military 
circles during off-duty hours and was not a popular or fashionable topic to discuss in 
memoirs. It was more common for soldiers to outline the suffering they endured as a 
result of the climate and landscape. The accounts of heat, dehydration, unbearable 
conditions in sandstorms, irritating pests and the prevalence of infection and disease, 
provided a medium through which soldiers could transmit the extreme psychological 
experience of war to their readers. This enabled them to establish themselves among 
reading audiences as sentimental heroes. Many of these responses drew a strong 
resemblance with the writing of civilian travellers, particularly those labelled by Carl 
Thompson as “suffering travellers”, who sought out discomfort and adversity to evoke 
a sympathetic response from their readers.6 It is important to remember that military 
memoirs competed with popular travelogues, and for this reason, contained a similar 
structure and narrative arc. It was common for military memoirs to contain a symbolic 
turning point, usually the moment that the soldiers reached the Nile, when the misery 
of combat, heat and dehydration was replaced by the joy of the picturesque and fertile 
landscape of the Nile delta. From this point on, the worst privations were in the past, 
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and British victory was more assured, which set up the remainder of the narrative for 
a positive conclusion.  
 
Although the soldiers were at pains to emphasize their suffering, many favoured some 
form of further imperial intervention in Egypt. The picturesque, used by several 
officers to describe the landscape, played an important role in this regard. The literary 
and visual representations of the picturesque, helped writers and artists to domesticate 
exotic landscapes, and by doing so, render them desirable. This desirability was 
reinforced by the productivity of the Nile delta, which, given the lack of proper 
cultivation, could be improved upon and exploited under British instruction. This 
desire to acquire or exploit Egypt’s productive landscape was juxtaposed with 
concerns over the moral and physical diseases within the country. Although the 
number of casualties from disease during the Egyptian campaign was relatively low, 
Egypt came to be regarded in a similar manner to the deadly tropical climates in India 
and the West Indies. This assumption was largely unfounded and derived from several 
factors: the geographical proximity of Egypt to India, which led to the belief that 
Egypt possessed similar dangerous diseases to India’s tropical climate, the biblical 
account of the ten plagues of Egypt, and the warm climate, which was thought to have 
an enervating effect on the human body. Moreover, the superior health of the Indian 
sepoys during the campaign furthered the conviction that Egypt was unsuitable for 
European habitation. Nevertheless, the fear of disease in Egypt also provided a 
rationale for an increased involvement in the country. Disease provided British 
physicians, who possessed an enthusiastic curiosity and a confidence in the superiority 
of British medical sciences, with a powerful moral right to intervene. 
 
Although soldiers and sailors were not ordinary travellers, they were capable of acting 
as such when not marching or fighting. One of the most popular pastimes for the 
soldiers in Egypt was the exploration of the monuments and ruins of antiquity, 
examined in chapter 2. Antiquarian pursuits were not at odds with military priorities. 
The techniques of draughtsmanship, surveying and cartography that were important 
to military proficiency in this period also enjoyed a great deal of overlap with the 
techniques associated with antiquarian study. One might even argue that 
antiquarianism in Egypt held a strategic importance, as it enabled Britain to maintain 
a low-level presence in the Near-East after the campaign, and provided detailed 
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information on ancient structures that might be used for military purposes. Many 
soldiers adhered to the established civilian conventions for collecting antiquities, a 
practice which was justified in part by the allegedly uncivilized, undeveloped state of 
contemporary Egypt. However, the soldiers also developed a distinctive militaristic 
understanding of collecting. They referred to objects they acquired not only as 
“souvenirs” and “mementoes”, but as “trophies”, and “spoils”. These terms imply that 
collection served as a form of reward for achieving victory over the French, and 
enduring the hazards of the campaign.  
 
The response towards antiquities was varied, and this was most discernible between 
the officers and the lower ranks. Without the classical education that many officers 
possessed, the ordinary soldiers’ experience of antiquities was surprising and 
revelatory. They relished exploring and learning about ruins, of which they had little 
or no knowledge, and looked to the Bible and the ten plagues of Egypt to explain the 
decayed state of Egyptian civilization. Officers, by contrast, were well read about 
classical antiquities, some had embarked on Grand Tours to Greco-Roman sites in 
their youth. The exploration of Egyptian ruins allowed these men to continue their 
cultural refinement. They explained the degenerated condition of Ancient Egypt with 
reference to secular interpretations of history, such as the concept of the cyclical rise 
and decay of civilizations.  
 
When the British soldiers and sailors left Egypt, their verdict on the people they had 
encountered was often comparable to prominent civilian travel authors, Their 
portrayals of Egyptian customs and culture, examined in chapter 3, demonstrate the 
fluidity of conceptions of identity and difference at this time. As highlighted by Colin 
Kidd, Roxann Wheeler and Dror Wahrman, conceptions of religion, civility, clothing 
and class were traditionally more important to Briton’s assessment of themselves and 
other people than physical attributes, such as skin colour, but in the final decades of 
the eighteenth century this began to gradually change. Britons began to realign their 
conceptions of human variation towards more racial understandings of difference. 
This shift only became fully visible a few decades into the nineteenth century.7 In 
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1801 therefore, a confused mix of both traditional and new conceptions of identity 
and difference existed. From the confused mix of images in the writing of servicemen, 
one consistent theme which emerges is that the people encountered in Egypt were 
seen as polar opposites to Britons. The exposure to Egyptian customs and practices 
proved a jarring experience for most British soldiers, and the local culture was seen 
negatively, as a mirror reflection of British society. In this regard, British servicemen 
probably based much of their arguments on earlier travel works, which, under the 
influence of Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws, saw the Near East through a negative lens 
which Malcolm Yapp has labelled the “Turkish Mirror”. The critical arguments made 
by these travellers were often ambiguous, homogenised and drew heavily from 
existing stereotypes.8 The campaign in Egypt took place at the height of the 
evangelical missionary impulse in Britain, hence it is unsurprising that the soldiers’ 
negative reaction to Muslim customs and practices led to support for the foundation 
of a British imperial mission.  
 
Although the verdict of the British military on the people they had encountered was 
often comparable to prominent civilian travel authors, the way in which they formed 
these views differed considerably from their civilian contemporaries. Unlike civilian 
literature, martial characteristics and performance in combat were vital elements in 
British servicemen’s appraisals. The alleged warlike nature and appearance of the 
Ottomans, discussed in chapter 4, was one of the only elements praised by British 
soldiers, and it provided a base with which observers could critique various elements 
of British society. However, there was considerable disappointment at the thought that 
this martial potential was going to waste in the corrupt, despotic Ottoman regime. 
Military performance was also vital in appraisals of the Mamluks. As outlined in 
chapter 5, negative stereotypes associating Mamluk society with despotism and 
effeminacy seemed to be supplanted by military imperatives. Once the strategic value 
of Mamluk cavalry to the campaign was recognized, the British were more accepting 
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of Mamluk culture, and forgiving of any perceived flaws in character. The argument 
in these chapters calls into question the assumption, made by recent scholars, that pre-
existing stereotypes were always pre-eminent in the shaping attitudes of Europeans 
towards non-European peoples.9 Physical encounters could be as influential on 
personal opinions as second hand verbal accounts and written records.  
 
The different modes of warfare that these ‘eastern’ bodies practised was one of the 
primary ways in which British soldiers and sailors distinguished themselves from 
these people. The lack of western features in the Mamluks’ mode of warfare added to 
their exotic appeal in the eyes of British soldiers. The formidable appearance of the 
Mamluks, and the skill with which they used outdated weapons and tactics, inspired 
British soldiers, who developed a romantic attachment and a nostalgia for the 
chivalric, martial values thought to have been lost during Britain’s commercial 
development. It can be argued that this image was part of a more general, homogenous 
image of martial groups in the ‘east’, which included Indian sepoys. Conversely, the 
absence of western features in the Ottoman army meant they were seen in a poor light 
despite the success of the Anglo-Ottoman alliance in the Egyptian campaign. Unaware 
of the fundamental differences in the Ottoman system of military command, British 
soldiers evaluated the Ottoman soldiers based on the principles of their own military 
system. They castigated the chaotic masses of the Ottoman military, which were 
thought to be greatly inferior to the disciplined, mechanical-like ranks of the British 
army. The poor condition of the Ottoman armed forces was seen by some as a 
symptom of Oriental despotism. Most significantly, through the plundering of the 
Egyptians, the execution of Frenchmen, and the attempt to trap and destroy the 
Mamluk Beys, Ottoman warfare came to be seen by the British as uncivilized and 
savage. By contrast, British or European methods of war were more refined, restrained 
and bound by unofficial conventions.  
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As they became estranged from their Ottoman allies, and unsettled by local Muslim 
culture, the British found in their French enemy a cultural ally of sorts. Despite the 
demise of the French Catholic church during the Revolution, British soldiers 
continued to refer to the French as Christian, or the French nation as a “Christian 
power”.10 The British and French also prided themselves on exchanging acts of 
charity and civility. They did not consider themselves deserving of the savage 
treatment which the French prisoners had endured at the hands of the Ottomans and 
Egyptians during their occupation of Egypt. This suggests that the British military 
were not always culturally opposed to the French Catholic ‘other’, as Linda Colley 
has argued. The Protestant-Catholic divide outlined by Colley was less clear to British 
and French servicemen when they encountered one another in a non-Christian 
environment. This British and French identification with one another was not unique 
to the Egyptian campaign and draws a comparison with recent research on British 
soldiers in the Peninsular wars, particularly that by Gavin Daly.11 In both Egypt and 
the Peninsular, British opposition to the local religion and culture led to a level of 
sympathy for the French occupation, who were seen, to some extent, as progressive 
liberators. There was however, a contradiction in attitudes in Egypt that was not 
present in the Peninsula. On the one hand, a similar culture reinforced a sense of 
‘Christian’ affinity with France, but on the other hand, Egyptian Christians, such as 
the Copts, were seen as lying outside this shared identity because of their adoption of 
Muslim customs and culture. Evidently, those living outside Europe without European 
manners could not be considered Christian. 
 
Over the course of their time in Egypt, British soldiers and sailors had seen most of 
the locations that would have been on a civilian tourist’s itinerary. They marched 
through deserts and along the lush banks of the Nile, they saw Egypt’s famous cities 
– Alexandria, Cairo and Rosetta - and visited the great structures of Egyptian antiquity 
– the Pyramid complex at Giza, Pompey’s Pillar, Cleopatra’s Needles, and the temple 
at Dendera. Many of the ancient objects discovered were acquired as personal trophies 
                                                        
10 See, for example, Anon., A Non-Military Journal, or Observations made in Egypt by an Officer upon 
the Staff of the British Army (London: 1803), 31, 33, 42. 
11 See: Gavin Daly, The British Soldier in the Peninsular War: Encounters with Spain and Portugal, 
1808-1814 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013).  
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or mementoes; some of the larger pieces were removed to the British Museum, where 
they catalysed the study of orientalism as an academic discipline. Finally, the soldiers 
mingled with Ottoman troops and the formidable Mamluk cavalrymen. This varied 
range of experiences highlights that there was much more to soldiering than the 
experience of battle, even during a campaign that lasted a mere six months. Writing 
about their experiences in Egypt, British soldiers and sailors discussed a range of 
topics beyond military imperatives. Their accounts constitute a distinctive form of 
military orientalism. Much like contemporary civilian orientalists, military authors 
were influenced by the ideas of Montesquieu, and often saw the people they 
encountered in Egypt as opposites to themselves. Yet, as I hope to have shown here, 
these soldiers and sailors retained a distinctive military outlook on their experiences. 
Their writing is a unique historical source; a fascinating blend of military narrative, 
travelogue and oriental scholarship, which deserves further study. They can be 
described as ‘orientalists in uniform’.  
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Appendices 
 
Figure 1. ‘Plan of the Action on the 13th March’, from Thomas Walsh, Journal of 
the Late Campaign in Egypt (London: 1803), 86-87. 
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Figure 2. ‘The Battle of Alexandria 21st March’, from Thomas Walsh, Journal of 
the Late Campaign in Egypt (London: 1803), 96-97. 
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Figure 3. ‘The Bay of Acre, from the Top of Carmel’, from Cooper Williams, A 
voyage up the Mediterranean in His Majesty’s Ship the Swiftsure, one of the 
squadron under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson (London: 1803), 
152-153.  
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Figure 4. ‘Caiffe and Mount Carmel’, from Cooper Williams, A voyage up the 
Mediterranean in His Majesty’s Ship the Swiftsure, one of the squadron under the 
command of Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson (London: 1803), 152-153.  
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Figure 5. ‘Antiquities from Aboukir Island’, from Cooper Williams, A voyage up the 
Mediterranean in His Majesty’s Ship the Swiftsure, one of the squadron under the 
command of Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson (London: 1803), 134-135.  
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Figure 6. An inscribed stone uncovered by Thomas Walsh’s men, from Thomas 
Walsh, Journal of the Late Campaign in Egypt (London: 1803), 132.  
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Figure 7: A Mamluk saddle, captured by the French at the Battle of the Pyramids 21 
July 1798, on display at Musée de l’Armée, Paris. 
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Figure 8. A set of Mamluk sabres, captured by the French after the Battle of the 
Pyramids, 21 July 1798, on display at Musée de l’Armée, Paris. 
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Figure 9. ‘Combat between a hussar and a Mamluk’, an engraving by Carle Vernet, 
circa 1800.  
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